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In the field of comparative literary studies, a number of scholars have previously pointed out 
the lack of substantial side-by-side analyses of Herman Melville and Feodor Dostoyevsky’s 
major novels. This is a significant gap for those studying nineteenth century literature from a 
comparative viewpoint – especially as these two writers have been noted to hold a number of 
similarities in the themes they address and the manner in which they present those themes. 
 
 
This academic thesis seeks to address the previously little-explored connection between 
Melville and Dostoyevsky’s works, following an interdisciplinary approach where I focus on 
contextualizing a selected number of landmark texts in relation to the broader philosophical 
and political debates going on at the same time that these texts were published. My argument 
deals with the notion that by the middle of the nineteenth century, as the Romanticist moods 
gradually ceded to make way for the new Realist perspectives, the figure of the writer could 
not remain detached from the major social and political debates and reforms. The writer was 
expected to act as an involved societal observer, recording and presenting potentially 
problematic themes for a broader audience, so that their response would eventually effect 
genuine societal change.  
 
As the first half of the nineteenth century was a time permeated with societal upheaval and 
revolutionary thought, in this thesis I am looking at Dostoyevsky and Melville through this 
prism, dealing with the question of how each addresses the balance between individual liberty 
and the obligations that an individual holds towards society founded upon quasi-nationalistic, 
“exceptionalist” ideals. I connect my analysis with figures such as Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Carlyle and Johann-Gottfried Herder, seeking to comprehend the 
existing intellectual background at the time that Melville and Dostoyevsky wrote, reconciling 
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Liberty And Equality: Individual versus Society in the Works of Herman Melville and 
Feodor Dostoyevsky.  
 
   
          The Declaration of Independence (1776), conventionally seen as the document creating 
and embodying the concept of American statehood, famously contains the following words:  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.1 
           By the beginning of the nineteenth century, America presented a singular phenomenon 
on the world stage as a nation-state founded upon the democratic ideals of liberty and 
equality. It appeared radically different from the largely absolutist governments of the Old 
World, such as Russia, described by Alexis De Tocqueville as “holding all the authority of 
society in a single arm,” as the decision-making powers were concentrated in the despotic 
figure of the monarch.2 Yet, as one reads deeper into the Declaration, the gleaming promise 
appears too complex to be achieved in reality. The statement that apriori “all men are created 
equal,” seems straightforward enough, providing a welcome change from the meticulously 
hierarchical societal systems functioning throughout most European states at the time, like 
                                                 
1 See Declaration of Independence of the United States: a Transcription. In Congress, 4 July 1776.  
2 See Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty, for the general analysis of this era. Unlike the earlier attempts at 
attaining democratic government (for instance as with Haitian Rebellion, or the English Civil War) America 
represented a singular example of successful introduction of the democracy-based governance. Also De 
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 656. 
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the Russian Table of Ranks.3 The same statement further on also implies that presumably all 
members of this perfectly equal society possess unquestionable rights to “liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness.”  
        Looking at this argument through a purely individualistic lens, all seems well – 
however, if we consider the previous point that “all men are created equal,” the concepts of 
“liberty” and “happiness” sit uncomfortably alongside it. To what extent may one enjoy one’s 
liberty and actively pursue “happiness” so that it does not encroach upon the liberty or 
happiness of one’s equal fellow-subject? Achieving a viable balance between liberty and 
equality (that is, between the rights of an individual and the demands of society), creates 
conflict, due to the oxymoronic nature of the task.  
            Let us look closer at the historic context. By the middle of the nineteenth century, as 
the dust has settled after the tumultuous events of the American Revolution, and the French 
Revolution in Europe, a new age gradually emerged upon the shards of the past.4 In the 
aftermath of the turbulent revolutionary years of the last half of the eighteenth century (echoed 
later by the unexpected revolutionary resurgence of 1848 throughout Europe by the newly-
formed bourgeois circles, demanding recognition for the ordinary citizen and opposing the 
monarchical state-systems), the need for individual liberty was recognised by figures like John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873), yet had to be balanced against the necessity to preserve societal 
peace.5 Joanna Innes and Mark Philp illustrate this state of affairs in Reimagining Democracy 
in the Age of Revolutions (2013), highlighting the fact that applying theoretical principles of 
liberty and equality in practice frequently proved to be a complicated matter in the period 
known as “The Age of Revolutions” spanning roughly 1750-1850 (1-2), which was marked by 
                                                 
3 This system organised individuals within the Russian society according to the position they occupied in the 
governmental apparatus (which in reality frequently was affected by the individual’s familial background). See 
David Herman’s comprehensive outline of the system, “Peter the Great’s Table of Ranks” at 
http://www.faculty.virginia.edu/herman/tolstoy/tableofranks.htm. 
4 See Gordon S. Wood’s discussion of the revolutions of 1848 in Empire of Liberty.  
5 See Mill, On Liberty. 
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a number of historically significant uprisings throughout, such as the French Revolution, the 
American War of Independence, or the Revolutions of 1848.6 
           Philosophical and literary works emergent at the time frequently asserted the question 
of recognizing the importance of individual liberty, such as Max Stirner’s treatise, The Ego 
and His Own (1844), where the value of the individual personality was discussed and 
emphasised. Stirner’s oeuvre later on influenced the argument in Feodor Dostoyevsky’s 
landmark novel, Crime and Punishment (1865-6) which addressed the dangerous attractions 
of excessive individualism. In France, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) contemplated a 
society founded upon willing mutual cooperation of all its members rather than 
depersonalized legalistic codes. In America, Henry David Thoreau preached individual 
resistance against stringent governmental control in Civil Disobedience (1849).   
           In short, the time of individual “enlightened despots” described by Derek Beales, ruling 
over the voiceless masses with an iron fist, appeared indeed to be over. Yet what came in its 
stead?7 I argue that it concerned a renewed sense of interest and pride in one’s belonging as a 
subject within a specific nation-state. In the United States, an interest in expansionalist and 
nationalist rhetorics could be observed, seen most typically in the politics of Thomas Jefferson 
(1743-1826) and Andrew Jackson (1767-1845).8 Meanwhile in Europe, the first half of the 
nineteenth century was also associated with the growth of consciously nationalistic tendencies. 
For instance, Andrei Zorin asserts about Russia in By Fables Alone (2012), that the time period 
starting roughly around 1830 coincided with “a new phase of ideological production” (325), 
characterised in a broader cultural sense by a transition from vague romantic moods to a 
consciously nationalistic, communitarian outlook. In short, the middle of the nineteenth century 
                                                 
6  Joanna Innes and Mark Philp, Reimagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions (2013). Innes and Philp 
discuss revolutionary uprisings flaring up time and again in Europe, as “many different contenders – from Marx 
to monarchs – quarrelled over whose cause was the most “democratic” (2). 
7 See Derek Beales, Hamish Scott, “Philosophical Kingship and Enlightened Despotism” in Enlightenment and 
reform in eighteenth century Europe. 
8  Reginald Horsman, “The Northwest Ordinance and the Shaping of an Expanding Republic.” 
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was marked by the increased awareness and participation of the individual in the national 
destiny.9 “Everyman” was expected to become part of a glorious community, as a thinking and 
active participant working towards its improvement.  
          Nevertheless, such ideals of commonality were frequently resented. The extent of 
liberty offered by the Declaration of Independence logically had to be curtailed to preserve 
societal equality: “…[A]s the notion of liberty began to challenge all hierarchies of property 
and power, nativism was redeployed to establish the proper limit of the liberty’s reach and 
property’s distribution” (Laura Doyle 29).10 This came into conflict with the general moods 
pervading society at the time, described by Gordon S. Wood (331).11  Societal change 
dawned; yet in reality, some desperately clung onto the old hierarchical foundations offering 
greater scope of personal power: a sentiment reflected by contemporaneous political figures 
such as Napoleon III (1808-1873) whose published treatise on Julius Caesar (1866) 
emphasised the superiority of certain individuals as a “natural” phenomenon, or John 
Randolph of Roanoke (1773-1833), who famously professed to “hate equality”.12 In the realm 
of letters, Ralph Waldo Emerson, in Representative Men (1850) expressed disgust at cohesive 
communal existence devoid of individuality: “[B]ut enormous populations, if they be 
beggars, are disgusting, like moving cheese, like hills of ants, or of fleas—the more, the 
worse” (Representative Men). 13  
          Literature also mirrored the existing conflict, with novels like Crime and Punishment 
(1865-6) addressing the theme of conflict between an individual and wider society. In Moby-
                                                 
9 The personality and historical influence of Napoleon I (1769-1821), whose origins were bourgeois rather than 
aristocratic, are also culturally significant for that particular era.  
10 Laura Doyle, Toward a Philosophy of Transnationalism. 
11  Gordon S. Wood, Empire for Liberty. 
12 See David Johnson, John Randolph of Roanoke, for the overview of Randolph’s life and politics, and Russell 
Kirk’s The Conservative Mind. Furthermore, Napoleon III’s History of Julius Caesar (1866) caused much 
debating at the time it was published, being essentially an apologetic of a “superior” individual unconstrained in 
his actions. 




Dick (1851), the protagonist describes this resentment, metaphorising collaborative existence 
as humble sailor’s work: “And at first, this sort of thing is unpleasant enough. It touches one’s 
sense of honor, particularly if you come of an old established family in the land, like Van 
Rensselaers, or Randolphs, or the Hardicanutes” (MD 3).  From a literary perspective, looking 
at the image of a ship is a classic metaphor for the nation in itself, the sailors being comparable 
to the population working harmoniously towards the single common goal to keep “the ship of 
state” afloat – and one resentful aristocrat reluctant to participate.14  Cooperation, as well as 
the associated uniformity, was deemed by such figures to be menial, opposed to the essential 
concept of Jeffersonian liberty.  
  
BACKGROUND OVERVIEW: WRITER AS OBSERVER. 
          Therefore, the literary world of the middle of the nineteenth century echoed what was 
happening on a broader societal level.15 The literary heroes appearing at this same time 
confronted the conflict between the personal aspirations and social expectations. Two such 
examples could be the idealistic crisis experienced by Pierre Glendinning in Herman Melville’s 
Pierre (1852), or, more sinisterly, the obsessive Napoleonic tendencies of Rodion Raskolnikov, 
illustrative of the notion that social harmony cannot be attained by individualistic impulses 
alone without cooperating with others. Rather than remaining completely detached, the literary 
hero (as well as his real-life emulators), was expected to function amicably within a group. The 
“pursuit of happiness” could no longer be the sole personal preoccupation. Consequently, I 
                                                 
14 See broadly C.L.R. James, Mariners, Renegades and Castaways, as well as Yuri Kovalev, Herman Melville 
and the American Romanticism. The “ship of state” is a metaphor first coined by Plato in Republic (360BC), 
which has become a staple in political parlance ever since. In specifically American, antebellum context, 
Longfellow’s poem, The Building of the Ship (1849?) extolling “Union, strong and great,” is noteworthy.  
15 On a generally “European” note, this is echoed by Martin Hewitt, who claims that the time period beginning 
circa 1830 was marked by culturally significant transformations from the individual concerns to societal 
improvement (see Hewitt 433-4). In regards to America during the same chronological period, the figure of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson is discussed by Aidan Day in Romanticism (2011) as the quintessentially American 
literary figure who exudes individualism (190-191). Moreover, Day states that “Romanticism gave a special 
importance to individual experience” (3). 
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argue that the markedly individualistic romanticist spirit in literature was gradually being 
overshadowed by texts emphasising concerns for societal justice - contradicting Edward 
Sapir’s claim that ever since the dawning of Romanticism, it was individualism, rather than 
communitarianism, that has shaped society.16 
           Analysing that trajectory closely, the figure of a refined nobleman dabbling in writing 
for his own pleasure was being replaced in favour of a more socially ambiguous authorial 
presence frequently raising uncomfortable questions about how society functioned, and acting 
as an involved commentator. This phenomenon was initially probed in Commissioned Spirits 
by Jonathan Arac in 1973, whose argument proposed that mid-nineteenth century writers 
sought to put forth a unified vision of society and its problems.17  An interesting example of 
the authorial figure acting in this capacity is offered by Aidan Day, who discusses the 
“beginning of the waning of Romantic interiority” by referring to Herman Melville (1819-
1891), who, he claims, illustrated “the failure of Romantic idealism,” drawing attention to the 
oft-imperfect actuality (203-204). Considering Melvillean texts such as “The Paradise of 
Bachelors and Tartarus of Maids” (1855), or White-Jacket, or the World in a Man O’War 
(1850), this tendency can be noted, the narrator using personal experience so as to describe 
actual existing problems (inhumane treatment of factory workers in the former, and corporal 
punishment in the navy in the latter). To reinforce that point, Andrew Delbanco mentions 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Jerome McGann, “Hero with a Thousand Faces: the rhetoric of Byronism,” Byron and 
Romanticism, 2009. Excessive romanticist individualism had been represented by the likes of George Gordon 
Byron (1788-1824), described by McGann as the “most personal of poets” (141).  
     Edward Sapir in “Culture: genuine and spurious” (1924), expresses unease at the overt individualistic 
tendencies in American society, and generally draws a suggestion that these tendencies first took root in the 
Romantic, Emersonian era. Richard Handler, in his essay “Anti-Romantic Romanticism” claims that “[Sapir] 
equated romanticism with the worst excesses of American individualism, which led people to undisciplined 
quests for self-development and ego gratification” (1). 
     Concerning the interest in social justice, see an entry on the “social novel” (albeit largely dealing with British 
literature) by Bethan Carney, “Social-Problem Novel,” in Victorian Literature, January 2015. The social novel 
as a concept was meant to attract the public’s attention to existing problematic issues in society at the time. 
     The chief difference from the same concerns exhibited during the years preceding the reign of romanticism 
was the interest in the concrete problems experienced by actual society, rather than utopian visions of some 
idealised non-existent order. See Charles M. Andrews’s introduction in Ideal Empires and Republics. 




Melville using his art to “illustrate this or that social pathology” (224) and “writing 
commentaries in the form of fiction” (225).    
         The example of Melville illustrates the core argument that I am putting forward in this 
thesis, that by mid-nineteenth century, rather than documenting their own “pursuit of 
happiness,” more and more writers frequently fulfilled the role of a watchful critic commenting 
on how well the equilibrium of social equality and personal liberty is preserved. Sometimes it 
was intentional; upon other ocassions it happened quite independently of the writer’s original 
aims, as, for instance, occurred with Melville’s White-Jacket, where the depictions of life 
aboard an American warship contributed to the debate on abolition of corporal punishment in 
the United States navy.18 As stylistically Realism began to gradually replace the Romantic 
excesses, so had the actual subject-matter of the novels slowly become more socially relevant.19 
         Looking at this hypothesis from a transnational platform, one should note that such a 
tendency was not limited to America alone, but manifested throughout what we understand as 
“Western” literature. Whether one opens a novel by Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804-1864), 
Nikolai Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), Harriet Beecher Stowe (1811-1896) or Gustave 
Flaubert (1821-1880), underneath the different plot twists and turns, the same tendency 
appears. The author does not explicitly place themselves as identifying and belonging with 
either higher (land-owning nobility) or lower (petty bourgeois, or solidly working class) 
social strata, but stands as a separate, neutral figure providing a broad commentary on the 
events they depict. As George Sand put it in the preface to her novel Horace (1841): “God 
save me from mocking any real-life person. But my aim this time is to depict satirically a vice 
                                                 
18 See George Hodak for the detailed discussion of this case. Brook Thomas in “American Literature and Law” 
also mentions this, although he suggests that Melville’s own influence was “minimal” (Levander and Levine, 
416). 
19 See also Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, for the discussion of the stylistic interest in more realistic subject-
matter at the time, particularly in relation to Gustave Flaubert’s works. 
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prevalent in today’s world; and if have not succeeded to do this better than ever, I’ll say that 
this is not the author’s fault, but the actual reality’s” (Horace).20 
           Describing “truth” first and foremost was seen as the writer’s prime moral duty – for 
instance, Charlotte Bronte states in the preface to Jane Eyre (1847): “The world may not like 
… to let white-washed walls vouch for clean shrines.  It may hate him who dares to scrutinise 
and expose … to penetrate the sepulchre, and reveal charnel relics: but hate as it will, it is 
indebted to him.”21 The writer is primarily preoccupied not with extreme sentimental 
experiences or word-play for its own sake, but with drawing attention to the composites of the 
societal fabric and its flaws.22 Certainly, sentimentalism still remained a major literary trend, 
particularly in the realm of popular novels (and both Melville and Dostoevsky do depict plenty 
of emotionally-fraught scenes in their texts).23 However. I argue that frequently it was 
employed by writers like Harriet Beecher-Stowe in Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852), for example, 
to draw attention to important societal issues such as abolitionism, through the means of an 
emotionally involving story.24  
       It is true that at that exact time, the main changes occurred regarding the social class 
system, economical status and the writer’s position in society – it was yet a long way to go for 
the gender dialogue to commence: for example, female writers either had to assume male 
                                                 
20 See George Sand, Horace. 
21 See Charlotte Bronte, Jane Eyre. 
22 In Melville and Aesthetics, Samuel Otter discusses the general aesthetic patterns dispersed throughout the 
Melvillean works, calling Melville “richly suggestive” (5). However, what I want to stress particularly is that 
Melville (quite like most authors of his day) is not exclusively preoccupied with creating “art for art’s sake” as a 
wordsmith, or recording personal sentimental responses.  
See also Raymond Henry Williams, Marxism and Literature, for a distinct interpretation of this problem. 
Williams speaks of “emergent discourse” (123), which concerns the gradual recognition and growing influence 
of the culture produced by a minority group within a given society. 
23 For a good example of the discussion of sentimentalism used as an instrument to draw attention to pressing 
debates such as abolitionism, is the analysis of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s world in Engendering Romance (1994) 
by Emily M. Budick. 
24 Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852), was also well-known in Russia at the time, as a 
popular text highlighting humanitarian, ethical concerns, which many compared to the situation regarding 
serfdom on home soil. For instance, the educated characters in What is to be Done? (1863) by Chernyshevsky 
are seen referring to Stowe’s work in one of the scenes.  
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pseudonyms (like George Sand or Charlotte Bronte) or deal with presumably “sentimental” 
themes.25 Yet, compared to the situation in the past, this was a significant breakthrough 
nonetheless, paving the way for the future. In this respect, Russia (exhibiting the culturally 
significant phenomenon of raznochintsy – i.e. intellectuals stemming from diverse 
backgrounds, not necessarily materially wealthy yet educated and “self-made” to an extent, 
who, unlike the European bourgeois, primarily stressed intellectualism and pursuit of academic 
knowledge rather than economic success as centremost virtues) and America (with its focus on 
the democratic concept of equality), present an especially interesting comparative case - the 
described phenomenae juxtaposed to the quasi-feudal vision of society cemented upon rigid 
hierarchy.26  
           The fluid origins of the commentator implied the reduction in class-based bias of 
opinion, as the figure of the writer traversed the conventional societal boundaries.  Melville in 
his correspondence does mention “aristocracy of the brain” – hinting at the intellectual 
capacities rather than birth or wealth being the new prerequisite for those seeking to shape or 
influence society.27  These boundaries were not solely limited to the world of class alone. The 
Seneca Falls Convention (1848) stressed the growing role of women’s voice in influencing 
societal change as education for women became a prominent issue, and presumed an 
expectation of an active stance on diverse social issues: “[T]he women of this country ought 
to be enlightened in regard to the laws under which they live, that they may no longer publish 
their degradation, by declaring themselves satisfied with their present position, not their 
                                                 
25 In the article discussing Mary Wollstonecraft’s legacy, R.M. Janes explicitly complains of the extremely slow 
progress of female emancipation in the political and cultural field post-1790.  
26 Raznochintsy as a social group gave rise to nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia, as we know it 
nowadays. See D.S. Mirsky (445-450) for the outline of the phenomenon, and Robert J. Brym’s article. 
27 Herman Melville, letter to Nathaniel Hawthorne, 1? June? 1851, in OUP’s edition of Moby-Dick. 
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ignorance, by asserting that they have all the rights they want.”28  Frederick Douglass (1817-
1895) and Sojourner Truth (1797-1883), both born into slavery, rose to passionately condemn 
the harrowing injustices of the slave-holding society, Douglass reiterating yet again the 
importance of the writer’s observational capability for attaining social justice: “A man must 
be disposed to judge of emancipation by other tests than whether it has increased the produce 
of sugar,—and to hate slavery for other reasons than because it starves men and whips 
women,—before he is ready to lay the first stone of his anti-slavery life” (Narrative of the 
Life of Frederick Douglass).29 Now the ability to affect societal change required primarily the 
ability to be an astute observer, who, as Margaret Fuller (1810-1850) noted, can “…see often 
the real relation which men bear to their race and age, and observe the facts by which to 
determine whether such men are great only because of circumstances, or by the irresistible 
power of their own minds.”30 
           Literature echoed societal ambiguousness, as education and social consciousness grew 
in importance over noble origins, expanding from the original notion of “bourgeois” or 
“middle-class” tied in mainly with economic status.31 As Doyle asserts in Freedom’s Empire: 
Race and Rise of the Novel in Transatlantic Modernity, 1640-1940 (2008), the wide availability 
of printed matter rendered the ability to form a concise opinion on the existent issues 
democratic and accessible (44). The true “aristocrats” in the new society now were those who 
were observant, attentive, and could express their views well.  
         Such positioning can be seen particularly well in Melville’s personality. As Andrew 
Delbanco states, “He (Melville) was born on August 1 1819, into good circumstances. But his 
                                                 
28 Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 was a pivotal event dedicated to the discussion of women’s rights in 
America. See “Report of Woman’s Rights Convention” (1848), on the NPS website, 
https://www.nps.gov/wori/learn/historyculture/report-of-the-womans-rights-convention.htm  
29 See Frederick Douglass. 
30 See Margaret Fuller, At Home and Abroad. 
31 The interest in concepts of social inequality, and the rise of the middle class in Melville’s day is alluded to by 
Gavin Jones in “Social Inequality in American Literature” (Levander and Levine, 95). 
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parents lacked the money to stay there” (17). Equally reluctant to pigeonhole himself as an 
aristocrat, a practical bourgeois or a working-class presence, Melville, whose youth consisted 
of a series of oscillations between different lowly occupations and attempts to pursue a suitably 
genteel education (Delbanco 33) was exactly such a writer – well-fitted to be an observer as a 
representative of the new, more democratic order, who is able to relate to different segments 
of society and produce an impact on it through the means of his writing.32 
          The image of the writer remaining interconnected with the discussions on the major 
societal issues is prominently presented in the work and personality of Feodor Mikhailovitch 
Dostoyevsky (1821-1881), quite akin to Melville in terms of fluid family origins and capacities 
for social observation.33 Anna Schur stresses the influence of contemporary legal processes and 
societal reforms on Dostoyevsky’s works, stating that for the writer, “…[T]he boundaries 
between his fiction and journalism are more porous than we have thought” (6).34  
Dostoyevsky’s involvement in most pressing social causes of the day, such as the land reforms 
and the plight of the peasant population, is factually attested, and has been recorded by 
biographers (Frank, Leatherbarrow), correlating with my own argument that the writer was not 
expected to be entirely detached from the world anymore.  
       
MELVILLE AND DOSTOYEVSKY: IMAGINARY REALMS. 
        I maintain that Melville and Dostoyevsky played a similar role as observers and 
commentators on the world around them, and thus present a perfect case for comparative 
analysis. Yet what other uniting traits between the two do we need to bear in mind – apart from 
                                                 
32 Myra Jehlen in “Melville and Class” also stresses the fact that although Melville was conscious of economic, 
class-based boundaries, he positioned himself as standing outside those. 
33 See Leatherbarrow, and also Frank.  
34Anna Schur, The Wages of Evil. Michael Rogin in Subversive Genealogy also discusses at length the relevance 
of Melville’s preoccupation with various social issues, which renders him akin to Dostoevsky in this respect.  
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the fact, that, as Charles Olson states, both were “great writers” (150)? I propose that there are 
three significant factors to consider. 
           The first factor is that Melville and Dostoyevsky can be held as products of the literary 
(and socio-historic) period which entailed a transitional moment between the stages of 
Romantic idealism with its particular focus on the power of individual personality, and 
Realism, where the interest in the nature and improvement of various mechanisms holding a 
given society together, took over. Typically, Dostoyevsky is seen as a canonical “Realist” 
writer, notwithstanding some occasional forays into Romanticism.35 Melville has alternatively 
been described as a Romantic or a Realist by different scholars (although overlooked by his 
contemporaries and only fully reintegrated into the classical American literary canon after the 
“Melville Revival” of 1919).36 Considering these two possibilities, I prefer the latter, siding 
with Aidan Day’s suggestion that Melville is a “foil” to Romantic individualism in that he 
showcases its failings in works such as Moby-Dick (a statement also echoed by Yuri Kovalev), 
as well as with Michael Rogin’s arguments concerning Melville’s lively engagement with 
social issues of his day.  
            The second significant factor addresses the fact that both writers were interested in 
societal order and reform, and in the course of their career often used their works to comment 
on relevant issues. Previously, there have been produced scholarly analyses that sought to 
connect Melville specifically with social issues such as class or political reform: by Dennis 
Berthold (2015), Myra Jehlen (2005) and Nancy Fredericks (1995).37 Dostoyevsky, as per most 
                                                 
35 See Fanger, Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism – A Study of Dostoevsky in relation to Balzac, Dickens and 
Gogol. Also see Bakhtin and Berdyaev in general. 
36 For Melville as a Romanticist, see Morse, American Romanticism – From Melville to James – the enduring 
excessive. 
    For Melville as a Realist, see Rogin, Subversive Genealogy – The Politics and Art of Herman Melville. Rogin 
goes as far as to label Melville a Realist (thus putting him on a par with Dostoyevsky), because his novels “do 
not escape society” but penetrate and reflect it.  
    See Marovitz’s essay, “The Melville Revival” for outline of the resurgent interest in Melville in 1919. 
37 Also see Joel Pfister, “The Critical Work of American Literature” (Levander and Levine, 30) mentioning 
Melville’s significance for the democratic discourse. 
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scholars, from Mikhail Bakhtin (1972) to Schur, is described as being a vigorous campaigner 
for various cases such as the improvement of the peasants’ plight, dubbing it “a most important 
question” in  An Announcement Concerning the Subscription to Vremya Magazine for 1861 
(1861).38  Taking to view his own words, it is obvious that Dostoyevsky definitely was not 
solely preoccupied with far-fetched theories. Just like Melville, he fulfils the part of the 
involved observer, conscious of the actual happenings in his immediate surroundings.  
          The third factor is the fact that in their landmark texts (such as Crime and Punishment 
(1861) or Moby-Dick (1850)), both writers explore at length the opposition between a strong-
willed individual (such as Captain Ahab or Rodion Raskolnikov) and the wider hierarchical 
society or its representatives. This theme permeates both writers’ works throughout. In Crime 
and Punishment, the protagonist wonders, “Am I a trembling creature, or do I have a right?” 
(398), whilst Melville, in personal correspondence, describes an individual “who, like Russia 
or the British empire, declares himself a sovereign nature”.39 Their works thus offer a means 
to reflect on the conflict between the individual, placed high by virtue of birth and invested by 
personal power, and the wider society united by common goals and the sense of national 
identity.  
          Did Melville and Dostoyevsky ever cross each other’s paths in reality? I maintain – no 
(as no factual proofs to this have been discovered to this day), and this is what makes this 
project even more interesting in terms of comparativeness. One may recall the term “cross-
pollination” coined by George Panichas to indicate an influence that one writer’s work may 
wield over that produced by another.40 This term implies the mutual exchange of ideas 
between two individual writers, rather than permitting to consider how each writer’s course 
of thought developed individually. Comparing the two writers who have not come across 
                                                 
38 Dostoyevsky, An Announcement Concerning the Subscription to “Vremya” Magazine for 1861.  
39 Herman Melville to Nathaniel Hawthorne, 16 (?) April (?) 1851. 
40 See George Panichas. 
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each other, however, may reveal the key developmental moments that each went through 
independently.  
         In John Fiske’s article on the reception of American literature in the Soviet world, one 
encounters a direct statement that there is an almost complete certainty that Melville and 
Dostoyevsky existed on wholly separate planes. 41 According to Fiske, only Typee (1846) 
might have been available in the Russian language before 1953. None of Dostoyevsky’s 
personal correspondence or diaries suggest at any point that the author could have read it. Nor 
were Dostoyevsky’s novels widely available in the English language and on American soil 
(the only existing translation in Melville’s lifetime would have been Crime and Punishment 
translated by Frederick Whishaw in 1885, and again, none of the writer’s personal 
correspondence suggests that Melville had ever come across it).  
        Considering the existing scholarly evidence, one may say that so far, an explicit point of 
dialogue between the two writers has not been established. The hypothesis that Melville and 
Dostoevsky’s works resemble each other was first probed by Franklin D. Reeve in The White 
Monk: An Essay on Dostyevsky and Melville (1989), yet, as his monograph was ill-received at 
the time, it has been largely overlooked until recent years. Andrew Delbanco considers Melville 
“an American Dostoevsky” (12) in that Melville asserts crucial universalist issues in a quasi-
prophetic manner. However, Delbanco does not offer any solid comparative evidence to 
elaborate on his claim.42  The actual academic inquiry carried out to date is far from extensive 
(the few existent examples include Nancy Ruttenburg’s recent analysis, Dostoyevsky’s 
Democracy;43 or Reeve’s aforementioned monograph).44 Charles Olson discusses both 
                                                 
41 See John Fiske, “Herman Melville and Soviet Criticism.” Fiske also points out that until 1953, Melville was 
virtually unheard of in Russian scholarship on American literature.  
42 Andrew Delbanco, Melville, his world and work. 
43 See Nancy Ruttenburg, Dostoyevsky’s Democracy. Ruttenburg briefly discusses Melville’s short story, 
Bartleby the Scrivener, as opposed to the vision of Dostoevsky, regarding the role of the “little man” oppressed 
by the existing social order. 
44 See F.D. Reeve, The White Monk: an essay on Dostoevsky and Melville.  The attempt by Reeve to contrast the 
general themes running through both authors’ works was poorly received, with reviewers such as Andrew 
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Melville and Dostoyevsky in a chapter of Collective Prose (1997) titled “On Melville, 
Dostoyevsky, Lawrence and Pound.”45  However, it is notable that he attempts virtually no in-
depth comparative analysis of Melville and Dostoyevsky specifically, preferring instead to 
discuss each as a separate instance. One can thus note that the existing research has been at 
best sporadic. 
        Nevertheless, despite those meagre gleanings, there have frequently emerged suggestions 
that Melville and Dostoyevsky are quite alike. Andrew Delbanco’s opinion has already been 
mentioned. Ellen Chances, reviewing Anne Lounsbury’s monograph Thin Culture, High Art, 
openly suggests the comparison of the two writers as a potential field for closer analysis.46 
Lounsbury, for her part, in a comparative case study of Gogol and Hawthorne as two writers 
who had been unaware of each other’s work or ideas, implies that the cultural climate pervading 
Russian and American literature at the time, peculiar in its similarity and distinguished by a 
lack of solid cultural heritage as well as a desire to express the authorial perception of universal 
issues, is an area that needs to be studied more.  
        Considering a specific point of convergence for the two that I chose for the purposes of 
this particular project, I am looking at the ways in which both address the problem of 
maintaining balance between liberty and equality in their respective national communities. 
Considering Melville’s initial place in the pro-democratisation, reform-supporting Young 
America movement (documented by most scholars, such as Michael Rogin, Andrew Delbanco 
or Yuri Kovalev), as well as Dostoyevsky’s biographically attested pro-nationalistic position 
as “the most important of all the conservative heirs of the Slavophiles” (Abbot Gleason 8), it 
comes across that both were evidently involved, or at least interested in the philosophical and 
                                                 
Wachtel stating that it contained a number of ungrounded, highly personal viewpoints. Reeve also maintains that 
Dostoyevsky and Melville did not have any connection or awareness of each other during their lifetime.  
45 Charles Olson, Collected Prose. 
46 See Anne Lounsbury’s analysis in Thin Culture, High Art – Gogol, Hawthorne and authorship in nineteenth 
century Russia and America, as well as Ellen Chances’s review of the said monograph. 
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political debates regarding their respective national communities, which duly was reflected in 
their works.47  
          Can visions of Russia and America, compared against each other, be taken as a starting-
point of dialogue between the two writers? Generally, the scholarly consensus regarding 
Dostoyevsky and America perhaps is best summarised by Abbot Gleason. Although it is 
biographically ascertained that the writer never physically went to the United States, America 
reappears throughout his writing as a mythologised, imaginary construct that Dostoyevsky 
imbues with specific meaning: a soulless, individualistic “otherworld” acting as the opposite 
of the Russia he deeply cared for.  To give but some examples: “[J]ust tell them he went to 
America” (C&P, 486) says the dissipate Svidrigailov in Crime and Punishment (1861)  – 
America being a not too subtle metaphor for a hellish otherworld; and in Devils (1871), the 
idealistic nationalist Shatov speaks of the hard time he had as a worker in the United States, 
bemoaning the pragmatic American spirit that appears particularly unpleasant contrasted with 
Russian innocence: “We Russians, when compared to Americans, are little children” (Devils, 
146).  The author himself may not have been familiar with real America, but created an 
imaginary realm reflecting his own views. This phenomenon is described as “fictional forms 
of nationalism” by Paul Giles in Virtual Americas (2002) (1).  For the writer-observer, it is 
easier to notice flaws in a realm different to their own (frequently depicting it as an imaginary 
construct rather than relying on fact), since the writer is essentially a product of their national 
background and is likely to be at least somewhat biased in that respect, even if 
subconsciously.48 
                                                 
47 See, for example, Nina Baym’s article, “Melville’s Quarrel with Fiction”. It is true that Melville’s association 
with Young America may be seen chiefly as an income-generating venture, however, the fact remains that the 
writer at a particular chronological period formed part of this movement and his contribution should not be 
overlooked. Dostoyevsky’s involvement with Slavophile thinkers is well documented biographically (Frank, 
Gleason). 
48 In “Globalization” essay, Paul Giles hints that although “national narratives have often attempted to present 




       To illustrate this point, Gleason notes the general juxtaposition between the individual 
liberty and societal equality in Dostoyevsky’s eyes: “Russia, according to nativist canon, was 
fundamentally Christian and communal; American society was unchristian and took to 
extremes the general European tendency towards individualism” (4). To a non-American 
writer, the principles of liberty and equality would unsurprisingly be more unbalanced in the 
United States.  
          Meanwhile, Melville mentions Russia only occasionally: “[W]hat are the sinews and 
souls of Russian serfs and Republican slaves but Fast-Fish, whereof possession is the whole of 
the law? … What was Poland to the Czar?” (MD, 356). The sentiment is quite clear – the writer 
attributes to Russia of his imagination the similar rapaciousness that Dostoyevsky endows 
America with. Whilst both writers lacked real-life points of contact, both still envision the 
other’s country as the perverted opposite of their own; a field for projecting authorial anxieties 
upon. In this way, there rises a hypothetical juxtaposition between Melville and Dostoyevsky 
in that each saw his own nation as an ideal society contrasted with an imaginary faraway realm 
pervaded by injustice and evil.  
 
AMERICA AND RUSSIA: ACTUAL SIMILARITIES.  
        We cannot commence discussing Dostoyevsky and Melville’s opposition over 
imaginary constructs of Russia and America without considering the actual similarities 
existing between those two nations at the time, in a more general sense. The points of 
resemblance between the two were frequently mentioned specifically during the early 
Republic and antebellum eras in diplomatic rhetorics – the overall tendency leaning towards 




          One such an example is the speech by Dr Thomas Bond, the president of American 
Philosophical Society (1782), as recalled by the historian Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, claiming 
that there rests something in common between Russia and America in what concerns created 
improvements and unexpected greatness.49 Another example mentioned by Bolkhovitinov is 
the conversation between John Randolph serving as the Ambassador to Russia in 1830, and 
Prince Lieven:   
The new American ambassador recalled that since “the times of renowned Catherine,” 
Russia and the United States were one in what concerned sea-laws and principles. 
Their interests are “similar, if not the same.” There is no rivalry between the two, but 
a friendly competition, which of the two would faster populate and transform its 
immense expanses of land. (Russian-American Relations 1815-1832) 50 
            Obsequity of diplomats aside, scholarly evidence to date suggests that specifically in 
mid-nineteenth century, Russia and America enjoyed a generally benevolent, or at least 
neutral relationship as “equals,” the actual political situation hardly reflecting the conflict 
hinted upon in Dostoyevsky or Melville’s writing.51 The general diplomatic landscape 
suggested mutual acceptance, born out of the necessity to carry out trade between the two 
nations.52 As Bolkhovitinov argued in Russian-American Relations 1815-1832 (1975),“The 
bourgeois-republican American government indeed was a distinct opposite of tsarist Russia, 
yet it did not preclude the two states from maintaining a wholly neutral and even benevolent 
relationship” (15).  
                                                 
49 See Bolhkovitinov N.N. Rossiya Otkryvaet Ameriku: 1732-1799. Also see Russian-American Dialogue on 
Cultural Relations, 1776-1914, pp 4-5. 
50 See Bolkhovitinov, Russian-American Relations 1815-1832. Also see John Randolph, letter to H.  А. Lieven, 
29 July (10  August) 1830. 
51 See, for example, Norman Saul, Distant Friends (1991). 
52 During John Quincey Adams’ service as the ambassador to Russia (1809-1814), he also frequently referred to 
the necessity to foster successful trade links between America and Russia. See David W.McFadden’s article, 
“John Quincey Adams, American Commercial Diplomacy, and Russia.” 
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          A crucial contemporaneous source depicting the resemblances between the two states at 
the time comes from Alexis De Tocqueville discussing the similarities of Russia and America 
in Democracy in America (1835).53 He concludes that “[E]ach one of them seems called by a 
secret design of Providence to hold in its hands one day the destinies of half the world” (656). 
As tempting as it is to dub De Tocqueville a visionary, he manages to pinpoint the similarity 
between the two seemingly distant and unrelated nation states undergoing somewhat similar 
developmental patterns, from being relatively young nations who “grew up in obscurity” with 
no fixed sense of cultural identity to powerful nation-states where this identity was beginning 
to form “with an easy and rapid stride”, especially if compared to the slowing development in 
Europe (655).  
            The most fascinating matter, however, is that De Tocqueville notes the vast potential 
for influence and “holding the… destinies of half the world” in both nations. This powerful 
force is concealed within the combined human potential of individual subjects making up the 
national body, when unified by a common objective or goal and moving towards it. 
Considering the impact that this power could exert on the world, the idea is frightening, evoking 
echoes of expansion progressing with “rapid stride.” Yet De Tocqueville’s specific language 
is more respectfully admiring in tone, and does not manage to convey the frightening 
totalitarian connotations that emerge at the thought of combining the enormous potential for 
power with the narrow nationalistic vision.  
            Concentrated human potential, where the entire nation acts as one individual, is a 
significant topic linking Russia and America. It is discussed by Wai-Chee Dimock in Empire 
for Liberty (1991), where the analysis of Moby-Dick and Ahab’s fixation on the pursuit of the 
White Whale are tied in with the concepts of Manifest Destiny and the Jeffersonian apologetics 
for territorial expansion (3) – the rampant “pursuit of happiness” taking on dark tones, and 
                                                 
53 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol.2. 
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recalling Melville’s  reflections about the avaricious world of whaling being comparable to the 
land-grabbing attitude of whole nations (MD 356). As per Dimock’s argument, even though 
she tends to see America as standing in the avant-garde of the world (14), and in comparison 
to this image Russia may be likened to a fly in amber or past solidified, unwilling to rapidly 
progress towards “modernity” - the concept of vast dormant potential rings true for both.54  
           I maintain that the notion of dormant human potential should be connected with the fact 
that acting as a national subject is essentially a concept which presumes belonging to a national 
community made up of many individuals. In this way, realising the inert national potential is 
only possible when the individual subjects act in unison. Jefferson’s metaphoric “pursuit of 
happiness” actually presumes Americans as a group, seizing upon the potential as yet untapped, 
forming a glorious national image in the process. Russia was also frequently described in terms 
of vast expanses of land available for urbanisation and development, supposedly “unoccupied” 
and holding immense prospective significance for the nation as a whole rather than for just a 
few select individuals.55  Symbolically, unoccupied land explicitly stands for human potential 
yet to be revealed, that can be theoretically directed towards any, as yet unspecified, purpose.  
Peter Kolchin (17-19), writing on slavery and the expansionist politics in Unfree Labour 
(1987), implies that human masses, just like empty land, were seen at the time as a fount of 
group-based potential to be seized, used and directed by a particularly tenacious, “exceptional” 
individual. Such an image is more reminiscent of Melville’s despair at the rapacious avarice 
on the high seas, than Dostoyevsky’s stately Christian ideals. Human potential gathered 
                                                 
54 In “The American Scholar” speech, Ralph Waldo Emerson also explicitly refers to the “postponed expectation 
of the world” as American nation-state has yet to reveal its true power. This shows the fact that some prominent 
thinkers at the time addressed the same idea.  
55 Commentaries on this aspect of Russia as a nation, associable first and foremost with empty land-space as yet 
unused, had become a stereotypical presence in Russian literature by the middle of nineteenth century. Nikolai 
Gogol is one of the writers who frequently refers to this in his works, creating the image of Russia as a troika (a 
carriage drawn by three horses) hurtling through huge expanses of land. See Strobe Talbott’s address referring 
to the image. 
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together equated to great power – yet, if this power is being controlled by a figure whose 
intentions are less than transparent, it also equates to great danger to the entire world.  
              A relevant, if rather more modern comparative vision of this danger is offered by 
Russell Kirk in The Conservative Mind (1953). Speaking from a Cold War vantage-point, Kirk 
contrasts America and Russia, evoking vast human masses acting as one and realising the 
potential contained within them, yet, ominously, being directed by a shadowy manipulator in 
complete perversion of the theoretical liberty-equality balance: 
…[T]he “freedom of uniformity,” Russian style or American style, in which man feels 
himself content because personal opinion is eradicated and he knows no other 
condition. Whether educated to “be like Stalin” or to “adjust to the group” after the 
notion of John Dewey, the tendency of these gigantic states is towards a sheep-
population, though achieved in Russia by harsh compulsion, in America by contagion 
and attraction. (450) 56 
                  Kirk comments on the unrealised potential that both nations hold as communities, 
connecting it precisely with the united existence of the national subjects, who appear to be 
divested of individual motives exactly so that their communal potential may be realised. There 
seems to be no wide variety of individual motives – instead, Kirk recalls the Pied Piper-like 
individual who directs or manipulates the rest of society described disturbingly as “sheep-
population”. This dark image obviously has been affected, in Kirk’s case, by echoes of the 
Second World War and the uneasy Cold War years that came after; and yet, remembering 
Melville’s Captain Ahab or Raskolnikov’s visions of Napoleon, it is clear that such an image 
goes back in time much further. I maintain that this is a crucial point at which the previously 
successful nation-state descends into a totalitarian nightmare where neither liberty or true 
                                                 
56 The anti-democracy moods prevalent in America at the time, and the Communist rule in Russia both served as 
real-life examples of what happened in exactly such a case as described by Kirk.  
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equality is respected. The image of society acting as a single harmonious unit attains a sinister 
tinge if one considers it alongside the concept of the unrealised potential (symbolised by 
expanses of the land) and the shadow figure of the individual manipulator.   
         The lack of freedom is an essential concept at the heart of the controversial picture I have 
just described. As an illustration of such collective state of being, where both liberty and 
equality are practically nullified, there come to mind the debates surrounding slavery as an 
actual historical common factor linking Russia and America in the middle of nineteenth 
century, and concerning attempts to reconcile “the pursuit of happiness” economically afforded 
by slave labour with universal equality. 
         Peter Kolchin provides historic analysis which shows that the initial circumstances 
leading to the existence of slavery in Russia and America in the nineteenth century were quite 
distinct from each other. For starters, with Russia, Kolchin attributes the phenomenon to the 
gradual erosion of individual rights (1-4) - whilst in America, the slaves were essentially 
individuals trafficked originally from abroad, who had been denied the rights enjoyed by the 
free population from the start.57 Nevertheless, the final picture was somewhat similar for both; 
a significant part of the population being enslaved by a far less numerous elite.58 As Kolchin 
states, “… [B]y the middle of the eighteenth century they [slavery and serfdom] appeared part 
of the natural order, as God-given as government or the agriculture itself” (31).  
            Melville may have been aghast at the injustices in Russia of his imagination, yet the 
reality was rather similar in America. The chief distinguishing factor between the two was of 
course the notion of race: if African-American slaves were at the mercy of their masters 
because of their racial origins, in Russia it was chiefly an economically-founded process and 
                                                 
57  Kolchin, Unfree Labor. 
     In Fragments and Various Thoughts, 1828-1850, the prominent liberal pro-European thinker, Peter 
Chaadaev, commented on discrepancies between slavery in Russia and America, claiming that in Russia, the 
division between the slaves and the free was not as markedly pronounced, and so was a more insidious presence 
(118-119). 
58 See Kirk, The Conservative Mind. Also David Johnson, 6. 
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in the majority of cases it were ethnic Russians oppressing one another. However, the 
distribution of control and power in both societies looked quite similar – a grotesque mockery 
of the theoretical “liberty and equality” image. 
           Yet the essential disbalance at the core of both nation-states ran even deeper than this 
obvious injustice. Both Melville and Dostoyevsky, disturbingly, seemed to metaphorise the 
enslavement of the individual as the very principle of any given state’s existence. Being a 
national subject, even in a supposedly democratic state, presumed constrainments on one’s 
freedom, produced by the individual’s obligations towards that nation.  “Who ain’t a slave? 
Tell me that” (MD 4) states the narrator of Moby-Dick, suggesting that the lack of freedom 
permeating the contemporaneous American society runs throughout its very fabric, ironically 
founded upon inequality of its members, where slavery is just one hideous aspect of a general 
problem.59 In Devils (1871) Dostoyevsky echoes this in a parody of the supposedly equal 
socialist society: “Everyone belongs to all the others, and the others belong to each one. They’re 
all slaves and equal in their slavery” (442). From this viewpoint, Russia, just as well as 
America, was marred by basic inequality as well as lack of individual freedom – yet, 
paradoxically, this was the mechanism holding the societal fabric together. “Behold a free man 
in Russia! There is no visible difference between him and a serf … In Russia, everything is 
marked by slavery: customs, aspirations, education, and even freedom itself, if only it can exist 
in such an environment” (118-119), despaired the thinker Petr Chaadaev (1794-1856), stressing 
that the ugly influence of serfdom had saturated the entire rigid societal system.60 
          Actual, not metaphoric, slavery was a subject for multitudinous heated abolitionist 
debates in both nation-states. Yet the final abolition of slavery on Russian soil came as a single 
decree signed by Tsar Alexander II in 1861, presenting a generally centralised, largely 
                                                 
59 See also Jeannine-Marie Delombard, “White Jacket: Telling who is – and ain’t –a Slave” for discussion of 
Melville’s novel in the light of general slavery debates at the time. 
60 See Chaadaev, Fragments and Various Thoughts. A liberal, pro-European thinker, Chaadaev was one of the 
most significant intellectual figures in Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
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bureaucratic process, which, although flawed in many respects, was not recordedly marked by 
excessive violence at the exact time of the signing.61 This was quite illustrative of De 
Tocqueville’s idea that in Russia, the potential for decision-making is concentrated in just one 
individual – the monarch. In America, meanwhile, the same desired outcome (despite the fact 
that the Emancipation Proclamation had been signed in 1863) was preceded by five years of 
Civil War horrors. As an illustration, this historical comparison shows decision-making in 
Russia as coming from a “collective body” acting as one single individual, represented by the 
tsar; in America, we meanwhile see a conflict of many individuals whose interests clashed.62 
How society functioned, different for the two states in reality – just as De Tocqueville states: 
“Their starting-point is different, and their courses are not the same” (656). This may well be 
the difference that Dostoyevsky and Melville were subconsciously aware of, each believing 
that it was their own nation which was correct in its approach.  
        Presumably, such an assumption would also suggest that in different nations, the general 
stance concerning how exactly the principles of individual liberty and communal equal 
existence should be balanced out, would also differ markedly. To uphold this assumption, 
Kolchin (17), as well as Stephen Sabol in The Touch of Civilization: comparing American and 
Russian internal colonization (2017), link the issue of slavery with another notion that also 
connects Russia and America, and which forms the backbone of my comparison of the two 
authors. I am speaking of the exceptionalist rhetoric: that is, a development on De 
Tocqueville’s argument that each nation is unique in its predestined path.  
                                                 
61 Admittedly, the emancipation process was flawed in many respects – with many former serfs finding 
themselves in an economically difficult situation which the government failed to address effectively. However, 
there were virtually no acts of recorded violence surrounding the passing of the Emancipation Declaration (the 
violence surfaced during the later events, such as the 1917 Revolution, which were attributable, among other 
things, to a large segment of the population being left economically destitute, and lacking genuine rights, despite 
the freedom granted on paper).  
62 See also an interesting development on this topic by Louis Menand in Metaphysical Club. In a statement 
echoing my prior claim concerning the writer’s role as the recorder of society’s various concrete needs, Menand 
proposes that differing theoretical ideas reflect primarily the genuine needs or problems people encounter, that 
are rather unique to each nation or society concerned (xii). 
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         In terms of how the notion of the idealised functioning as a national community 
developed in America and Russia, by mid-nineteenth century America already followed a 
formed vision dubbed “The Manifest Destiny.”63 This was associated with the role of the nation 
as an example to all others because of its radically unique democratic composite not found 
anywhere else, and which, at the time that Melville was writing, was extolled as a virtue 
founded upon natural law itself: “[P]olitical institutions, which in other lands seem above all 
things intensely artificial, with America seem to possess the divine virtue of a natural law…” 
(Pierre, 13). 
         Russia meanwhile was still searching for its own vision, exemplified primarily by the 
opposition of the West-supporting liberals (Zapadniki) and the Slavophiles (Slavyanofily) - an 
elite small group of thinkers active during 1830-1861 (Gleason 8). It is a proven fact that 
Dostoyevsky was involved in these discussions, siding with the Slavophiles and advocating for 
a specifically “Russian” vision of improving society, as Anna Schur implies, which had been 
rooted in the specific Russian kind of traditional group-based decision making called 
sobornost’, described by Hans Kohn in “Dostoyevsky’s Nationalism”.64  
          Sobornost’ is a curious notion, which focuses on traditionalistic collective coexistence, 
particularly when decision making is concerned. It is a distinctly Russian term, and presumes 
society acting harmoniously together as a group, united by the quasi-Orthodox ideals of 
commonality – an ideal that pervades the judicial, the governmental and the interpersonal levels 
of human interaction. Of course, sobornost’ is also reminiscent of the communal realization of 
human potential that I discussed before. 
                                                 
63 There are some debates surrounding the exact origins of the term, but it is chiefly associated with the 
controversial figure of John L. Sullivan, journalist, public speaker, and, more ominously, supporter of slavery as 
an institution, coining the term in 1845 for a journalistic article. See Sampson, 194.  
64 See Anna Schur, Wages of Evil. “Introduced in the course of Great Reforms, trial by jury represented for 
Dostoyevsky the evils of Western civilization founded on the notion of social contract and the idea of self-
interest as the mainspring of all human activity. … [T]his view of Western civilization represented to 
Dostoyevsky an antithesis to his own ideal of Orthodox community based on Christian love” (8). For 
sobornost’, see Hans Kohn, in his article “Dostoyevsky’s Nationalism”.  
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            From this, one may assume that whilst the American culture was more preoccupied 
with individualistic concerns (that is, the “liberty” part of the liberty-equality balance), Russia 
was more about societal cohesion – at least, theoretically. The real-life public sphere in Russia, 
as opposed to the imagined ideals,  functioned primarily as a nation-state held together by a 
rigid governmental system where the essentially voiceless individual was allocated a specific 
place and frequently reacted against this in a bout of impulsive action (the Nihilist movement 
metaphorised by Dostoyevsky in Crime and Punishment and Devils being an obvious 
example).65  Meanwhile in America, the importance of the individual as a player, preserver and 
contributor within the “exceptional” state was recognised – if vaguely defined (Donald 
Critchlow, 14).  
             This crucial difference is noted in De Tocqueville’s critique, emphasising the 
pragmatic American recognition of the individual political subject and the Russian focus on 
cohesiveness, the power being contained “in one man”: 
 The American struggles against obstacles that nature opposes to him; the Russian is 
grappling with men …To reach his goal the first relies on personal interest, and, without 
directing them, allows the strength and reason of individuals to operate. The second in 
a way concentrates all the power of society in one man. The one has as principal means 
of action liberty; the other, servitude. (655-665) 
             So far, America, relying on “the strengh and reason of individuals” banded together 
and honouring “personal interest” appears more favourable towards individualistic liberty than 
Russia. Evidence provided by present-day scholars attests to this celebration of individual 
enterprise: for instance, Dimock (11) proposes that some aspects of the economic situation in 
the United States during the antebellum era (urbanisation, territorial expansion and the 
                                                 
65 The literary world reflected what was happening on a broader political stage – however, censorship in 
Dostoyevsky’s Russia was extremely restrictive. See, for example, Irene Zohrab’s chapter on censorship in 
Dostoyevsky in Context (295-302). 
Akroyd 31 
 
breakdown of the typical rural family-clan unit) gave rise to the cultural development of a more 
individualistic stance subsequently reflected in literature. The intellectual reflections on what 
it actually meant to be an individual emerged with figures such as Emerson (1803-1882), 
Thoreau (1817-1862), Emily Dickinson (1830-1886), and so on, focusing on exploring 
concepts such as developing personal independence (as in case of Emerson) or even withdrawal 
from society to lead a life of contemplation (as Thoreau proposed in Walden, or Life in the 
Woods (1854), or Emily Dickinson wondered in her poems). 
          Nevertheless, in both nation-states the individual could pursue either of the two different 
paths: becoming “a sovereign nature in himself” as per Melville, opposing the societal rules 
and laws established to maintain balance, or an integrated human “unit” forsaking individual 
desires and following the sway of abstract national destiny. At this point, yet another important 
difference between Russia and America at the time comes forth. Attaining pragmatic 
Jeffersonian“happiness” does not form part of the Russian vision, unlike the promise held 
within the Declaration of Independence. Instead, the Russian vision (manifested in literary texts 
such as What is to be Done or Crime and Punishment) stresses primarily the effective  
coexistence as a group. My rationale, then, is since the American national vision, presented by 
an American writer, affords a greater amount of personal freedom to the individual, “liberty” 
or individual enterprise associable with the “pursuit of happiness” would be recognised as a 
cornerstone value in American literary texts (revealed, for example, in the individualistic 
personality of Ishmael in Moby-Dick). With the Russian vision, the balance tips to the opposite 
side of “equality,” extolling the extreme depersonalizing societal cohesion attained at the 
expense of individual desires. Hypothetically speaking, the respective texts by Melville and 




AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, RUSSIAN EXCEPTIONALISM – ONE FOR ALL 
AND ALL FOR ONE. 
          The willingness of a national subject to forgo individual needs for the sake of the 
community, characterised by Melville and Dostoyevsky as essential “enslavement,” upon 
which society is founded, is intrinsically connected with the concept of exceptionalism.  
          How does one define “exceptionalism”? It is the belief in a particular nation’s unique 
and important role in world history (according to Merriam-Webster dictionary, it signifies 
“the condition of being different from the norm” as well as “a theory expounding the 
exceptionalism especially of a nation or region”).66  This correlates well with the 
aforementioned overall direction prevalent throughout the mid-nineteenth century intellectual 
thought, where the search for a specific vision of national destiny, attained by the joint efforts 
of all national subjects working together, gained significance.  
           To this definition, I would also add the fact that exceptionalism is primarily a 
communitarian notion, presuming a particular group’s awareness of its own unique position. 
In an “exceptionalist” community, therefore, the concept of equality would always 
presumably override liberty, and the welfare of the community as a whole would be of 
greater importance than that of the individual. This reconciles my argument with the historic 
context I previously outlined, where societal preoccupation with individualism was being 
replaced by the growing significance of the national community.  
          The importance of the exceptionalist discourse for this specific thesis is that I maintain 
that the exceptionalist discourse (essentially a concept associated with imaginary constructs 
of one’s perfect “nation-state,” as per Donald Pease and Paul Giles) binds the individual 
national subjects together towards a single purpose (such as animosity towards a perceived 
antagonist of the said nation-state), so as to attain the societal equilibrium necessary for the 
                                                 
66 See definition of “exceptionalism” by Merriam-Webster. 
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idealised vision of a nation’s future in the world.67 “Exceptionalism” is predominantly an 
imaginary projection that can be interpreted or understood in many different ways.  The 
projective visions of Melville or Dostoyevsky that I previously described, quintessentially 
fantastical as they are, can be compared to imaginary “state fantasies” central to the 
exceptionalist discourse, as depicted by Donald Pease. Pease’s definition of “exceptionalism” 
alludes to a somewhat poeticised image, which he nevertheless wishes to present in an 
ambiguous manner, as a phenomenon necessary for the formation of the strong state-nation 
and yet strongly mythologised so as to potentially evoke mistrust.  
        Pease describes “the dominant structure of desire out of which US citizens imagined 
their national identity” (1), highlighting the wishful, romantic element constituting a 
significant part of the entire concept which could consequently grow into a far more ominous 
notion of rampant nationalism and related concepts, if the fantasy is manipulated by an 
unscrupulous leader-figure.68  “State fantasy” is a term that is more mythic than solidly 
defined, rife for manipulations, and which strongly evokes the fantastical visions of Russia 
and America that Melville and Dostoyevsky presented. Entering a dialogue with Pease, Anna 
Brickhouse in her article “Cabeza de Vaca and American Exceptionalism” evokes the notion 
of exceptionalism specifically as a discourse that also makes a national subject aware of their 
own individuality’s significance within the national discourse (Levander and Levine, 225). 
Looking at the juxtaposition of the two writers from this angle, we may also find that the 
exceptionalist discourse provides the figure of the antagonised doppelganger precisely so as 
to ensure greater societal cohesion against the supposed common enemy within any given 
nation.69  
                                                 
67 See Pease, The New American Exceptionalism. 
68 Pease, The New American Exceptionalism. 
69 See also David Foglesong, Evil Empire. 
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            Both Melville and Dostoyevsky, I argue, exhibited a marked awareness of the 
exceptionalist discourse in their respective homelands. The existing critical legacy supports 
this. In his analysis of Emerson - Melville’s contemporary and likely influence, Aidan Day 
discusses American exceptionalism as a predominant factor pervading American society 
(187-191). Earlier on, Hans Kohn addressed Dostoyevsky’s intent to reject the Western ideals 
in order to pursue a uniquely Russian path (387).70 Turning to Dostoyevsky’s own, non-
fiction writing, one encounters statements revealing intent engagement with the 
exceptionalist discourse which places one’s nation-community as “most unique”: 
 We’ve become convinced at last that we are also a distinct nationality, most unique, 
and that our task is to create for ourselves a new form, our own, special to us, taken 
from our soil, our spirit and roots. (An Announcement of Subscription to “Vremya” 
Magazine) 
         One may compare this statement to the passage in White-Jacket, which provides a 
comparative angle on American exceptionalist views: 
 [T]he laws of the Russian navy … conform in spirit to the territorial laws of Russia, 
which is ruled by an autocrat, and whose courts inflict the knout upon the subjects of 
the land. But with us it is different. Our institutions claim to be based upon broad 
principles of political liberty and equality. (WJ ) 
           Whilst being essentially ironic in the context of the entire novel, Melville is well aware 
of the supposedly democratic framework holding American society together. Just as one may 
expect from his role as a writer-observer, he is also able to efficiently note the divergence 
between the exceptionalist ideal and reality. What becomes clear from analysing Melville and 
Dostoyevsky’s statements side by side is that the exceptionalist discourse imposes certain 
                                                 
70 See Frank (730) who describes Dostoyevsky as being fiercely nationalistic, and also broadly Leatherbarrow 
and Schur. Dostoyevsky’s nationalistic outlook is generally noted by those biographers. 
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expectations upon an individual as a member of society; to act or express oneself in a certain 
definite manner congruent with the direction of a specific nation’s exceptionalist rhetoric. 
These expectations can be effectively described as “enslavement” to the exceptionalist 
discourse.  
         They also bring up another, highly problematic concept: nationalistic chauvinism. 
Considering Melville’s vision, one recalls the controversial image of  “American 
exceptionalism” familiar from present-day media, which focuses on the imposition of the 
American model of governance in the worldwide setting, frequently associated with an 
aggressive political stance. Since the times of the Cold War, given the frequently dramatic 
happenings on the political arena, the term “American exceptionalism” has all but become a 
term synonymous with America assuming an active role in its foreign policy and imposing 
certain values upon the rest of the world. 71  
       Interestingly, the word “exceptionalism” was a term first coined in Russia by a figure as 
controversial as Joseph Stalin, to describe America in a negative sense, as being supposedly 
preoccupied with the maintenance of a highly signficant and specific role in the world arena 
and creating a wholly new version of “American” national narrative.72 Yet the roots of this 
phenomenon run much deeper. An obvious example stemming from Melville’s day would be 
the apologetics for the rampant expansionist politics under the aegis of “Manifest Destiny,” 
described by Dimock, Saul or Pease. One trait remained the same, however: the opposition of 
one’s own nation (or essentially, its imaginary vision), seen as exemplary and incorrigible, to 
all others.  
                                                 
71 For examples of journalistic writing asserting the notion, see Beinart or Zeitz’s articles concerning the current 
reassessments of exceptionalism as a topic. 
    Also see Pease, The New American Exceptionalism, Dimock, Empire for Liberty, and Saul, Distant Friends: 
The United States and Russia, 1763-1867. 
72 For the account of the exact events surrounding the origins of the term during the expulsion of a group of 
American communists under the leadership of Jay Lovestone in 1920-30s, who entered into conflict with Joseph 
Stalin over the claim that in America, the variety of capitalism was highly specific and divergent from the main 




         Russia also exhibited “exceptionalist” tendencies, especially concerning Dostoyevsky 
and Slavophiles in general, who, according to Gleason, “…sought to define their country by 
opposing it ideologically to others” (3). The name for the Russian “answer” to Manifest Destiny 
was Osobyj Put’ (A Special Path), founded on the concept that Russia differs radically from 
any other nation and should follow a wholly unique historical path.73  Andrei Zorin, Timur 
Atnashev and Michael Velizhev compare this “Special Path” to the somewhat later German 
concept, Sonderweg, prevalent in the ninteenth century and associated with Johann-Gottfried 
Herder (1744-1803), sometimes seen as a founding figure for the theories of nationalism and 
exceptionalism.74  
         However, unlike the American exceptionalist discourse, the Russian version of 
exceptionalism - at least according to Dostoyevsky, is not as corrective as it is absorptive. The 
author suggests this vision: 
 We know, that at this point we won’t shield ourselves with Great Walls of China from 
the rest of humanity. We foresee in awe that the character of our future actions should 
be most universal, that perhaps the Russian idea would be a fusion of all the ideas that 
Europe so deliberately and staunchly is developing in some of its peoples; that perhaps 
everything controversial contained in those ideas will be reconciled and further 
developed in the Russian national idea…. (An Announcement regarding the “Vremya” 
Subscription) 
         As Russia was still finding its identity at the time Dostoyevsky was writing, one cannot 
fail but wonder if Russian exceptionalism is not just a vague “fusion of all the ideas” produced 
elsewhere, unlike the defined American vision, founded chiefly upon the Protestant religious 
                                                 
73 See Atnashev, Zorin, Velizhev, Osobyj Put’ – ot ideologii k metodu. 
74 See Arnd Bohm, Herder and Politics. Bohm stresses that Herder himself was not an active advocate for 
nationalism, but many saw him as such a presence (A Companion to the works of Johann-Gottfried Herder, 
278). Earlier scholarship, such as Barnard’s Herder’s Social and Political Thought, speaks of Herder’s thought 




ideals and expansionist rhetorics. Dostoyevsky’s claim that “we won’t shield ourselves with 
Great Walls of China” seems an opposite to the self-contained American exceptionalism; 
however, there is a certain subversiveness in the claim, suggesting gentle gradual conquering 
by the Russian national idea using mimicry and adaptation, rather than head-on conflict.  
          A nation-community may thus assume either a corrective or an absorptive stance in 
imposing its core exceptionalist ideals upon its members. What stays constant irrespective of 
these differences, however, is a narrow, nation-specific understanding of what is “correct” – 
and a belief that a particular nation and its representatives hold an inherent right to influence 
or assert various universal matters according to this understanding of societal equilibrium, 
administering rather harsh measures, if necessary. Exceptionalism is essentially an example 
of group functioning in which one has no choice but to agree to being a “slave” to the 
established narrative, whether one considers Melville’s metaphor of a ship’s crew, or echoes 
of sobornost’ in Dostoyevsky’s writings. The national community united by the 
exceptionalist discourse may be seen as moving in unison towards a purpose common to all 
its members, and this state of being would then be seen as a “norm” to be preserved, by harsh 
measures if necessary. The rules holding it together presume equal responsibility for all its 
subjects, but little scope for individual expression. Such a state of affairs is transnational: as 
Melville succinctly metaphorises, “Indeed, both the written and unwritten laws of the 
American Navy are as destitute of individual guarantees to the mass of seamen as the Statute 
Book of the despotic Empire of Russia” (WJ). 
         From a broader theoretical perspective, Johann-Gottfried Herder, who strongly believed 
in the development of the national idea as a consequence of the national subjects uniting 
together to act for the preservation of peace within the national community, described this 
situation as “unity out of multiplicity”,  where individuality was being passed over in favour 
of the “superior maximum of cooperating powers”: 
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  As an individual man can subsist of himself but very imperfectly, a superior maximum 
of cooperating powers is formed with every society. …  In all, however, we see the 
operation of one principle, namely human reason, which endeavors to produce unity 
out of multiplicity, order out of disorder... (Excerpts from Reflections)75 
            Herder’s early reflections, as a founding figure of nationalistic discourse, are linked 
with the generalised concept of exceptionalism as it was seen by the middle of nineteenth 
century, not the least in that he proposes that each nation in the course of its development 
follows a unique trajectory (just as De Tocqueville suggested), and, more importantly, 
because he envisages the ideal existence as society united and based on the cooperation of its 
members; “equilibrium and harmony” opposed to “wild confusion” of individualistic 
existence. His visions of “order out of disorder” correspond with the Melvillean metaphor of 
the sailing ship, where individual transgression or initiative may prove fatal. 
        Notably, certain critics drew a parallel between Herder’s theory and the utopian vision 
created by Dostoyevsky (although there is no direct parallel between Melville and Herder, 
scholarly figures such as C.L.R. James or Yuri Kovalev, speaking from a primarily Socialist 
perspective, alluded to the image of work and cooperation reemerging in Melville’s works 
time and again). The following citation from a post-Soviet Dostoyevskian scholar, V. 
Kamnev, which hinges on the metaphor of “an ant colony” as an example of perfect unison, 
is illustrative: 
 Both Dostoyevsky and Herder allude to the image of an ant colony, stressing the 
natural and seemingly necessary essence of connections uniting the humankind. 
However, if Herder stresses the opposition between the haphazard movements of ants 
and the historic plan coming from Providence, things are not so obvious with 
Dostoyevsky. In an atmosphere pervaded by work, activity and constant frenzied 
                                                 
75 Herder, Excerpts from Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind (1784-91) 
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movement for the sake of some remote abstract goal, the human being forgets its 
individual superfluity, its own mortality and insignificance. (Kamnev, Russkij 
Razgovor)76  
          This unexpected angle on Dostoyevsky’s views offers a whole new vision of the 
“pursuit of happiness” Russian-style. In the writer’s world, far from being a happy 
replaceable unit engaged in “frenzied movement” without a genuine purpose, the individual 
seems to serve a high purpose by consciously choosing to forsake individual impulses 
described as “superfluity” for the sake of becoming a part of a united community, an “ant 
colony” where strength lies in numbers, yet keenly aware of individual “insignificance.”  
         Consciously preserving the sense of one’s individuality whilst submitting to the 
exceptionalist discourse is an essential factor preventing the descent into a completely 
depersonalized totalitarian dystopia. The danger otherwise lies with the fact that essentially, 
exceptionalism is fantastical and projective. If to take the definition of the term 
“exceptionalism” proposed by Donald Pease, the exceptionalist discourse is a uniting bond, 
bringing individuals together through awareness of national belonging. Yet the problem with 
such “state-fantasies” in that they can rapidly turn into totalitarian nightmares, if individuality 
is completely and wilfully overlooked.  
        Furthermore, exceptionalism as a notion is closely connected with Romanticism and 
gradually forming self-awareness leading towards the Realist tendencies for social observation 
and commenting.77 Indeed, an analysis of Melville’s views expressed in White-Jacket suggests 
that the role of the writer as an observer presumed not only observing individual transgressions, 
but also revealing the dangers of an over-equalizing, totalitarian approach. Dostoyevsky, 
                                                 
76 See V.M. Kamnev, Russkij Razgovor.  
77 Zorin (336-337),  discusses the reintegration of the Romanticist ideals into the Russian governmental 
structures by S.S. Uvarov in 1832, where the Romantic ideal of one’s belonging to a nation was reconciled with 
a highly specific brand of patriotism at the service of Russia, characterised most typically by the motto, 
“Orthodoxy, Sovereignity, Nation” (Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost’). One cannot help but recollect 
Dostoyevsky’s idealised vision, as described by Schur and Kohn. 
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meanwhile, recognises the significance of preserving individuality even whilst honouring the 
communal existence.   
         In short, complete depersonalized totalitarianism associated with the darker side of 
exceptionalist societies (such as Soviet Russia) is quite as dangerous as the anarchic situation 
where  egotistical individualities run riot. The difficulty of achieving workable balance between 
the rule of a few individuals with potentially highly personal agenda over a depersonalized 
human mass, and the anarchic populist rule is commented on by Herder: “…[T]he tyranny of 
aristocracy is a severe tyranny, and popular sway is a very leviathan” (251) – an image not 
unlike Melville’s juxtaposition of the leviathanous White Whale and tyrannical Captain 
Ahab.78 The following chapters, particularly the second and the third one, would address this 
problem in more detail. For now, however, it would suffice to say that logically, in order not 
to descend into either abyss, a framework or juristic code according to which a given society 
could exist, had to be devised, or at least, considered.  
          The reworked vision of the exceptionalist discourse where the role of individuality is 
recognised, offering each member of a given society an opportunity to see themselves as its 
valid and integrated member taking pride in their own identity and content with working 
towards the greater good, could be a valid solution to achieve the equilibrium between 
individual and societal needs. Yet guidelines were needed to be set to make this vision 
achievable in reality. Individualistic statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson favoured the notion 
of commonality of interests and instinctively harmonious existence founded upon a so-called 
“natural right” which could be equated to a law of nature (Wood, 10-11). However, the 
Jeffersonian instinctive rhetoric is flawed, as the rampant “pursuit of happiness” may endanger 
the concept of equality, and there rests the necessity to instil a strong legal code in order for 
the vision of the perfect balance of liberty and equality to work. 
                                                 
78 Herder, Outlines on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind. 
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            For Russia and America in particular, the quest for their own national identity was being 
sidelined by more realistic needs and concerns such as the need to format the legal and societal 
framework in order to efficiently hold together the national community, “newly-fashioned” in 
the true sense of the word. Vague and alluring “state fantasies” described by Pease were simply 
not practical enough to be implemented in reality. There prevailed a necessity to address several 
major issues which, from a historical perspective, appear uncannily similar for both states. Just 
like America, Russia boasted enormous territorial expanses that at the time were being actively 
settled and urbanised. Just like in Russia, large parts of America (mainly in the South) were 
agrarian lands owned by generations of wealthy families. Both countries, as it has already been 
said, were affected by slavery, which formed a subject of fervent abolitionist rhetorics. It was 
therefore not enough to rest just with purely philosophical ruminations on the topic of national 
community-building anymore; rather, the newly-apparent practical concerns for both of those 
national upstarts on the world arena called for developing a realistic and solid system of societal 
coexistence. America had the Constitution (and indeed, the Constitution could be regarded as 
the founding stone for the nation); Russia in the meantime had a defined hierarchical system 
symbolised by phenomena such as the Table of Ranks.79 Nevertheless, essentially these were 
theoretical constructs first of all. 
           One of the most interesting stances regarding the implementation of such codes in 
practice comes from Melville’s Moby-Dick. The writer parabolises the stance assumed by an 
exceptionalist nation (America) as an image from whaling industry: 
 Perhaps the only formal whaling code authorized by legislative enactment, was that of 
Holland. It was decreed by the States-General in A. D. 1695 . But though no other nation 
has ever had any written whaling law, yet the American fishermen have been their own 
legislators and lawyers in this matter. (MD 354)  
                                                 
79 For the exact overview of this system of distributing societal honours, see Hassell. 
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            In this way, Melville outlines a key problem with the “American exceptionalism” of 
the America he knew. The actual rules or laws governing how a nation should position itself in 
the world are unclear at best, but Melville’s America is rapacious in assuming such a stance as 
would reflect its own best interests, and then put it forward as the existing actual word of law. 
“Exceptionalism,” in Melville’s eyes, boils down not to an arcane romanticized notion, but to 
a shrewd ability of certain individuals to articulately protect their own interests by taking 
advantage of the vagueness of the situation and twisting the “vast volume” of interpretations: 
“[B]ut what plays the mischief with this masterly code is admirable brevity of it, which 
necessitates a vast volume of commentaries to expound it” (MD 354). 
             According to Melville, there supposedly exists a very brief, general set of maxims 
governing how one should act on the high seas (as a metaphor for the world arena). The 
trouble is, this “universal law” is subject to misinterpretation. An individual may twist it to 
their own distinct advantage in their personal “pursuit of happiness.” Therefore, it remains 
the solid duty of each and every member of the national community to actively strive for the 
creation and preservation of defined rules and laws common to all – a picture quite 
harmonious with Dostoyevsky’s stance regarding the conscious forsaking of individualism 
for the communal welfare.   
          My own hypothesis regarding the difference of attaining the balance of the individual 
and the communitarian impulses in the United States and Russia is connected with the necessity 
of installing valid juristic frameworks. In the American exceptionalist vision, personal freedom 
is recognised, but is expected to be contained within safe limits by legal obligations applicable 
to everyone within the national community, devised much like Melville’s naval codes to ensure 
smooth societal functioning. Transgressing these would result in punishment, as a potential 
threat to national, communal stability. In Russia, however, despite the distinctly hierarchical 
nature of the social order, the duty of preserving the balance of the individual and the communal 
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forms, as per Dostoyevsky, remains a personal obligation, which comes as a result of individual 
reflection and experience rather than following a concrete set of rules. In America, the 
exceptionalist discourse recognises the importance of individual liberties, yet to protect the 
societal equilibrium, a solid set of legal rules equalling all out is envisaged. In Russia, 
meanwhile, the curtailing of personal liberties is expected to be the individual’s personal 
concern and conscious moral duty. The American version of attaining the equilibrium is public 
and generally comprehensible; the Russian version is private and personal. And the texts which 
I analyse in this particular project will reflect exactly this. 
             To summarise the direction of this thesis’ argument, my theoretical assumption is 
that, as per Hamilton’s argument as well as the De Tocquevillean notion of the “tyranny of 
the majority,” the “exceptional” nation-state in both America and Russia of “The Age of 
Revolutions” existed as a complex construct which may be overturned or threatened by a 
particularly powerful individual intent on the imaginary Jeffersonian “pursuit of happiness,” 
giving rise to a totalitarian or tyrannical order. Henceforth, a system of “checks and balances” 
must exist so as to prevent or at least contain the emergence of such individuals and the due 
descent into tyranny. This was the overall ideological mood prevailing at the time, which 
coincidentally, in terms of specifically literary history, presented a “gap” between the 
gradually retreating individualistic Romanticism and socially-conscious Realist movements. 
In that respect, analysing the texts by Melville and Dostoyevsky, who have already been 
described by scholars as fitting just in-between those two movements, provides a valuable 
insight for the understanding of that historical epoch in general as well as for strictly literary 
scholarship, filling in a significant, admittedly blank area in the study of nineteenth-century 






         The study of literature is crucial for the understanding of deeper general socio- historic 
context. As Brook Thomas (1987) points out, literature can reflect moral norms governing a 
society at a given historical time, and I argue that a landmark novel stemming from a 
particular historic era can be employed quite as effectively for the analysis of the background 
context as a solid non-fictional monograph. Novels are interconnected with the broader 
intellectual discussions occuring at the time of their publication, and therefore can be 
regarded as bona fide ruminations on societal change – albeit presented as narratives of 
fiction. As Thomas argues in “American Literature and Law” essay, this approach has been 
rather overlooked during the twentieth century, yet is highly useful (Levander and Levine, 
406-407, 409, 417).80 
          My specific method rests upon analysing the selected texts within the historical context 
against which they had been produced. To do so, I am leaning on the hypothesis put forth by 
Mikhail Bakhtin in The Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics (1972). Bakhtin suggests that 
“…Dostoevsky never created his idea-images out of nothing, he never "made them up" … he 
was able to hear or divine them in the reality at hand” (77-80). The writer does not “invent” 
what he depicts, but records hypothetical reality. In this manner, the novel can be regarded as 
a reflection on the actual intellectual and societal preoccupations at the time, and thus serve 
as a quasi-historical source. And this is the initial vantage-point I assume with this project. 
         My analysis of the texts against the backdrop of the exceptionalist discourse 
respectively in America and Russia would rely on three factors: that exceptionalism is 
essentially an imaginary construct that can be interpreted in diverse ways by different 
cultures and epochs; that it presumes group coexistence at the core, and thus would put 
equality over liberty; and that living as a member of an exceptionalist national community 
                                                 
80 Also see Joel Pfister (Levander and Levine, 29, 31). 
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would entail a degree of curtailing individual freedom and submission to its rules, whichever 
they may be. Having selected three core texts each to be used as case studies which most 
fully appear to assert the problem of the opposition between an individual and the 
exceptionalist society, I separated the main body of the thesis into three chapters, each 
focusing on the comparative analysis of one Melvillean and one Dostoyevskian text. 
            The first chapter, focusing on Pierre and Crime and Punishment, addresses the 
emergence of the individualistic personality in the “exceptionalist” societies of Russia and 
America of the mid-nineteenth century. The second chapter subsequently discusses the 
conflict that arises as the monadic individual assumes the position of the leader within their 
specific microcosm, and interacts with the rest of the microcosm’s population. The novels I 
will be looking at are Moby-Dick and Devils (concentrating on the depersonalizing 
relationship between the charismatic leader and the led - discussing specifically the characters 
of Ahab and Stavrogin). The third and final chapter assesses how the conflict of individual 
and society is responded to within the novels by the exceptionalist society. The themes of 
societal control and particularly the law as instrument for subjugating the individual who has 
transgressed the set boundaries are of special interest here. White-Jacket and Brothers 
Karamazov have been chosen for depicting a variety of ways (presenting the application of 
law on board of a warship and in a courtroom trial respectively) in which those are applied. 
         Overall, this choice of texts and the order in which I decided to analyse them, 
corresponds with the Hamiltonian notion of “checks and balances” or the argued necessity to 
curtail and regulate individual freedom in a given nation-state. I seek to show that the need 
for legislative “checks and balances” necessary for social order is a transnational, universalist 
notion not limited to just America or Russia – and that both writers, as social observers and 
commentators, amply reflect this concept in their works. 
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          In what concerns the theoretical background to my argument, I am predominantly 
interested in looking at the problem from a contextualised historical viewpoint grounded 
primarily in the intellectual discourses that had developed by mid-nineteenth century with its 
specific socio-historical climate (as per Innes and Philp (2), and roughly around the same 
time that both Melville and Dostoyevsky commenced their creative journeys. Therefore I 
compare and contrast my chosen case-study texts alongside the philosophical ideas in 
existence at the time that those very texts were produced. My rationale for this approach is 
that it is useful in allowing one to understand where both writers stand in relation to the 
general intellectual climate established by the time of their own era (and especially the ideas 
regarding national belonging and exceptionalist discourse), and whether their views diverge 
significantly. Therefore, alongside the selected novels, I am addressing thinkers such as 
Franklin Pierce, Alexander Hamilton or Thomas Carlyle, who discuss at length the concept of 
individual freedom in society and the role of national identity in regards to this in 
philosophical treatises that had already emerged by mid-nineteenth century, focusing on what 
constitutes the concept of individual liberty within the state, and which factors could be 
viewed as a threat to it.  
           To reconstruct the intellectual context that formed the backdrop to both writers’ work, 
I incorporate the analysis of treatises relatively contemporary to or preceding (but not 
following) the “Age of Revolutions” (1750-1850) who focused on the role of the individual 
subject in a nation-state, such as Alexander Hamilton and specifically, his theory of “balances 
and checks” or Thomas Hobbes’ theory of proportionality.81 Historically speaking, this epoch 
was one of significant changes affecting all aspects of existence, from politics to art – and 
novels produced at the time or in the immediate aftermath reflect the societal preoccupation 
                                                 
81 The “Age of Revolutions” was an epoch characterised by a worldwide series of drastic changes affecting 
various aspects of existence, from politics to art. See Historical Association’s website for the detailed 
explanation of the term. For a broad comparative analysis of various nation-specific case studies at the time, see 
Joanna Innes and Mark Philp, Reimagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions.  
Akroyd 47 
 
with these transitions. In order to understand the literature of the era, I maintain that it is vital 
to look at the philosophical and intellectual undercurrents dominating the background.  
          In what concerns the more modern intellectual developments, I refer occasionally to 
works by present-day thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben (whose arguments regarding the 
treatment of an “outlaw” figure in Homo Sacer may be linked with the citation from 
Hamilton regarding the insurrection as the disorder of the state-body) or Priscilla Wald 
(whose analogy of an intellectual idea to a biological virus is noteworthy, specifically for the 
purposes of the first chapter), to illustrate specific points mainly to do with totalitarianism 
and anarchy as two aspects of disbalance within an exceptionalist society. Overall however, 
the analysis of the selected literary texts relies on the broader intellectual background formed 
by the mid-nineteenth century, in order to help comprehend the context within which 

















CHAPTER ONE: THE INDIVIDUAL AND EXCEPTIONALIST DISCOURSE: PIERRE 
AND CRIME AND PUNISHMENT. 
 
           One of the most important aspects in the juxtaposition of the individual and the so-
called exceptionalist society united by the quasi-democratic vision of equality, is the 
psychological and spiritual state of the individual in question. What exactly is contained 
within the individualistic personality, that presents an essential threat to the idealised unified 
community? 
           Throughout Melville and Dostoyevsky’s works, one particular tendency is prevalent. 
Society in general (which the individualistic protagonist, like captain Ahab or Rodion 
Raskolnikov, confronts) displays extreme cohesion of its members, just as Herder described; 
up to the point that it can be seen as a single “body” or organism functioning in a precise, 
regulated manner. The individual daring to oppose it can therefore be likened to a virus or 
physical ailment threatening its wholeness.  
        Contextually speaking, this psychologically effective image frequently occurred in the 
political discourse of the early Republic era in the United States – for example, in Alexander 
Hamilton’s rhetoric regarding the wholeness of the state-body which is threatened by 
insurrection in the same manner that a physical organism is threatened by a disease, or in the 
“Join, or Die” image of a serpent cut into pieces, that since the times of the Revolution has 
become part of the American political mythology.82 Russell Kirk reiterates this notion later 
on in his treatise, 10 Conservative Principles, arguing that uncontrolled individualism results 
in lawless chaos: “[P]ower is the ability to do as one likes, regardless of the wills of one’s 
                                                 
82 A political cartoon titled “Join, or Die,” dated 9 May 1754 and attributed to Benjamin Franklin, represented a 
snake cut into several pieces. The purpose of the cartoon at the time was to rally the American colonies to unite 
together against the British rule, yet this image generally was seen as a part of broader vision of union opposed 
to disunion. See also Berndt Herzogenrath. 
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fellows. … When every person claims to be a power unto himself, then society falls into 
anarchy.”83 
           In this chapter, I am focusing on the comparative analysis of the protagonists in 
Herman Melville’s Pierre (1852),84 as compared to Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment 
(1866).85 Both texts centre around the notion of the threat contained within an individual 
personality, to the bodily wholeness of a given community (upholding Reeve’s suggestion 
about the “determining patterns” in both authors’ works being similar).86 This chosen angle 
rests upon previously described theoretical aspects, reflecting both the ecclesiastical rhetoric 
of the community being “as one body” and the “seditions and insurrections” alluded to by 
Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804), who describes rebellion upsetting the societal order 
functioning like a physical disorder needing to be healed.“ …[S]editions and insurrections 
are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politics, as tumours and eruptions from 
the natural body” (Hamilton, Federalist Paper No.28). 
              The image of the organism being assaulted by a virus combines the religious and the 
scientific, thus being quite reflective of the general spirit of the time, and recalling the 
Herderian image of cohesive unity. In both novels I am looking at, the individual attempts to 
overturn this unity. Melville’s Pierre Glendinning defies his aristocratic familial background, 
fleeing for the Bohemian underbelly of New York with his newly-found “sister,” and 
eventually becomes a murderer, whilst Dostoyevsky’s Raskolnikov toys with the visions of 
individual superiority posed against the dull “ordinary” world before proceeding to commit 
an actual crime. 
 
                                                 
83 Kirk, Ten Conservative Principles. Also consider the definition by Michel Foucault, who proposes that power 
as a concept is intrinsically connected with the individual’s ability or failure to attain a certain set “standard” of 
acting or being.  
84 In Melville, Pierre, or the Ambiguities.  
85 In Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment, translated by Pevear and Volkhonsky. 
86 See Reeve, The White Monk: essays on Dostoyevsky and Melville. pp 13, 14-16, 87. 
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THE RELEVANCE OF PIERRE. 
        My analysis of Melville’s novel takes root in a broader investigation currently going on 
in the world of Melvillean criticism. The role of Pierre as a key text within the canonical 
scope of American literature has at last been fully affirmed in the field of Melvillean studies, 
even though at the time of publishing, the novel was mostly ignored or poorly received by the 
critics.87 However, as time progressed, the importance of this text as being highly relevant for 
the understanding of nineteenth-century socio-historic tendencies became gradually 
recognised.  
         To illustrate precisely how the scholarly interpretations of Pierre changed over years, in 
a brief article listing the main existent critical works, Ahmed Banisalamah draws the outline 
of major milestones in criticism of the novel, from the initial (scarce and somewhat 
simplified) views that it reflected Melville’s own tumultuous biographical events, through 
analyses by symbolist or psychoanalytic schools and racial, gender or postmodern theorists, 
to its present-day recognition “as an important historical and cultural document about 
nineteenth-century America” (Banisalamah 46).88 This relevance of Pierre for the study of 
nineteenth-century context makes the novel a perfect case study to start with.  
        Yet, as Pierre has finally attained recognition as a core text within the Melvillean canon, 
present-day critics have to answer the question that was overlooked by the previous 
generations of scholars: why was it so rarely discussed until the recent past, if the text is so 
laden with significance and subtleties as to out-Kraken Moby-Dick?89  A straightforward 
answer could be that outwardly, Pierre appears as a sensationalist romance set in a mundane 
                                                 
87 An example of one such scathing review (an 1852 review by the New York Day Book publication dubbing 
Melville “crazy”) is proffered by Herschel Parker, in his extensive analysis of Pierre (131-132).  
88 See Banisalamah. 
89 Factual evidence gleaned from Melville’s personal correspondence points towards a possibility that the author 
himself considered Pierre to hold even greater meaning than Moby-Dick. “So now, let us add Moby-Dick to our 
blessing, and step from that. Leviathan is not the biggest fish: I have heard of Krakens” (Correspondence, 
212/13), in Higgins and Parker, “Reading Pierre,” 25. See also Higgins and Parker 44, and 143. 
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milieu, and does not explicitly assert more complex concepts such as the national discourse. 
This renders it akin to Crime and Punishment, which at a first glance appears chronicling a 
particular episode from the realm of criminal law. The seeming ordinariness of Pierre’s 
setting, the plot, and the majority of the characters (save perhaps Isabel) belies a much deeper 
meaning which might be missed upon initial reading. My own argument is that Pierre should 
be seen as a metaphoric narrative, dealing at its core with the exact problem of the Herderian 
“anthill” or the exceptionalist community being opposed by one of its members who dares to 
contradict the laws holding it together – and in that respect, it is comparable to Dostoyevsky’s 
classic narrative of killing not just a human being, but “a principle” (C&P 260). 
 
EVERYDAY HEROES: ROMANTIC OR PRAGMATIC? 
        The situation in the academic field, particularly during the Cold War era when 
exceptionalism as a concept was reasserted, attests to the possibility that Pierre for a long 
time seemed a text too complicated to be analysed at length, and especially in relation to the 
exceptionalist discourse. To illustrate this, Christopher Castiglia recalls the state of affairs 
during the postwar era, stating that Pierre can be seen as a chronicle of quintessential 
youthful rebellion doomed to failure (comparable to Dostoyevsky’s dark story of the youth 
who “wanted to become a Napoleon” (C&P 394)), and it did not relate to the post-war 
atmosphere with its brash optimism.90 As he argues: 
 Although the postwar United States was said to be “coming of age” as a world power, 
national maturity ended up as perpetual adolescence, plagued by narcissistic self-
satisfaction and hackneyed ideals. In such a state, American critics naturally ignored 
“Pierre,” “pointing out to us, as it does, the enormous difficulties to be encountered in 
coming of age… (Castiglia, 227) 
                                                 
90 See Castiglia, 227. Also Chase, 140. 
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           The exceptionalist context of the time demanded a cheerful sense of self-importance 
which Castiglia dubs “narcissistic,” and the seeming ability to set things right – an image 
completely at odds with the main plot of Melville’s novel, the plot and even the language of 
which satirise the “hackneyed ideals” that the critic mentions (recalling, for instance, Pierre’s 
elaboratedly sentimental courtship of Lucy Tartan in the first few chapters, that sets the 
emotionally exaggerated tone for much of the rest of the novel). Castiglia’s argument presses 
on the fact that the novel’s subject matter stood at odds just as much with the brashly positive 
exceptionalist doctrine associated with the postwar era, as with the idealisation of 
individualistic self-reliance in Melville’s day (evidenced chiefly in popularisation of figures 
like Benjamin Franklin).91 A sharp critique summarising the ideals permeating the ideological 
space in antebellum America at the time that Melville’s novel was being written, is offered by 
Yuri Kovalev, who offers a holistic view transcending the limitations of Socialist criticism. It 
is interesting to note that Kovalev indirectly evokes both the Romantic desire to be seen as a 
hero and the Herderian duty to be useful to one’s native community as things that were 
expected from the ideal American citizen at the time – or the two conflicting ideas expected 
to be fulfilled simultaneously: 
 During the first decades of the nineteenth century, Americans still worshipped 
knowledge, and have not yet been disappointed by the capacities of human thought. 
However, these things were intended to serve solely practical purposes. Ideally, every 
American, like the hero of [Franklin’s] “Autobiography,” should have strived to “reach 
the heights of fame and wealth,” bringing maximum benefit to their home country in 
the realms of trade, industry, seafaring, politics, etc. Any acquired knowledge was 
intended precisely for this purpose, and all intellectual efforts had to be directed towards 
                                                 
91 See Kovalev, Herman Melville and the American Romanticism.   
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this specific aim. This also summarised the moral traditions of the American 
educational system. (27) 
              Kovalev’s argument is significant for this thesis in that it reveals that the ideal 
citizen was expected to exhibit both the heroic and the mundanely practical traits – which of 
course would inevitably produce intrinsic conflict, and culminate in actual confrontation. In 
an exceptionalist society founded upon the principles of national pride and belonging, the 
individual had to be an ambitious hero – yet only in such a manner that would render one 
useful to the wider community. However, as Thomas Carlyle, writing amid the revolutionary 
atmosphere in 1848, would assume, being a hero frequently presumes acting “out of bounds” 
or transgressing certain norms in order to achieve a suitably heroic result.92 At the very least, 
the hero is expected to surpass all others in appearance or behaviour – for how else would he 
be recognised as such? Such an expectation contradicts Herder’s image of societal cohesion 
producing an universally harmonious outcome. To attempt combining the two would be an 
oxymoron. 
               Therefore, what initially comes across as two tales of youthful rebellion eventually 
suppressed by society, can be interpreted as the two protagonists’ reaction to the impossible 
societal norms imposed upon them. Dostoyevsky’s protagonist is expected to rescue a 
number of souls (his mother and sister, the Marmeladov family, a random young rape victim 
he comes across) as his moral duty, but he cannot obtain the means to do so without breaking 
the law. Pierre is an aristocrat and a gentleman by virtue of birth, and yet he is supposed to 
exhibit nobleness of character by rescuing his sister, in an act which would not be approved 
by the milieu he belongs to. Looking at both texts’ plots in their entirety, it appears that both 
characters are presented with a moral task that they are expected to take up, and yet, once 
                                                 
92 See Carlyle, On Heroes. 
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they set out to fulfil it, both would be condemned by the very same society that presented 
them with such an obligation.  
           In Pierre, the conflict between the individualistic and the cohesive philosophies is 
illustrated in the ruminations of Mary Glendinning, who expects her son to “prove a haughty 
hero to the world” (Pierre 22), yet simultaneously remain a harmonious part of the Saddle 
Meadows microcosm. Pierre’s mother is aware of the impossibility of the dilemma, but she 
nevertheless expects Pierre to fulfil these expectations: “Now I almost wish him otherwise 
than sweet and docile to me, seeing that it must be hard for man to be an uncompromising 
hero and a commander among his race, and yet never ruffle any domestic brow” (Pierre 22). 
However, Mary Glendinning is somewhat hypocritical. Acting from his position as a scion of 
the aristocracy, her son would only be fulfilling an expected role within the hierarchical 
structures of society, thus not really upsetting any order or threatening anyone. The real 
danger would come if the hero undermines the domestic realm, forgoing his aristocratic status 
– which duly occurs in the novel. 
            Pierre cannot at once be the heir to Saddle Meadows standing on “this noble pedestal” 
(Pierre 15) and the rescuer of Isabel. Rodion Raskolnikov’s ideas of benefitting humanity by 
flouting human laws in order to do good come to a crushing failure, essentially proving to be 
a practically unviable “plaything” (C&P 4). The Napoleonic hero cannot act within the limits 
of the Herderian “anthill.” I argue that both Melville and Dostoyevsky, although indirectly, 
have arrived at the same conclusion; an individual cannot ever truly succeed in being an 
exceptional, heroic individual who is at the same time firmly entrenched in the exceptionalist 
society. 
         Thus, as I seek to show, Pierre was intended as a critique of the self-sufficient 
American ideal embodied by Franklin, Jefferson and the like, opening up the way for 
Melville’s other literary representations of the “heroic failure” such as Bartleby the Scrivener 
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with his passionate, if illogical defiance, or the events in “Cock-a-Doodle-Doo!” (1853).93 It 
addresses concepts far beyond a sensationalistic plot serving just to entertain, although at the 
time of publication, it may not have attained quite the same recognition as Crime and 
Punishment. My own explanation of that leans towards the possibility that in Russia at the 
same time, the highly structured society heavily oriented towards the Orthodox religious ideal 
of humility and submission to the sovereign powers, would have reacted to the tale of the 
grandiose hero’s failure much more favourably than in America, where individual enterprise 
was viewed as acceptable and even laudable.  
         I connect this view with a notion of perceiving one’s individual self as exceptional – i.e. 
possessing the requisite potential to play a significant part in world history, which I define as 
“exceptional individuality.” This notion stems from the Franklinian concept of self-reliance 
where an individual is deemed to be possessed of a power requisite to shape one’s own 
destiny.94 Yet it is not to be confused with it, since self-reliance implied personal 
independence within the established social order and acting according to its rules, rather than 
viewing one’s self as possessing the power requisite to bring about global change. Self-
reliance is essentially neutrality combined with the ability to provide for oneself; but the 
exceptional individuality is preoccupied with imagining grand outcomes and demonstrating 
one’s extraordinariness to the world – resemblant of Pierre Glendinning’s visions of himself 
as a great writer, or Raskolnikov’s desire to repeat Napoleon’s destiny.  
             In Dostoyevsky’s novel, the difference between self-reliance and exceptional 
individuality is perhaps spelled out more clearly than in Pierre, as the author introduces 
Razumikhin – the sensible, adaptable friend of the protagonist, who seems to embody the 
former: 
                                                 
93 See Bartleby the Scrivener, The Story of Wall Street (1853), “Cock-a-Doodle-Doo!” (1853), both by Melville. 
94 For detailed exploration of self-reliance as a concept, see Huntting Howell, Against Self-Reliance. 
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 Razumikhin was also remarkable in that no setbacks ever confounded him, and no bad 
circumstances seemed to crush him. He could make his lodgings even on a rooftop, 
suffer hellish hunger and extreme cold. He was very poor, and supported himself 
decidedly on his own, alone, getting money by work of one sort or another. He knew 
an endless number of sources to draw from – by means of working, of course. (C&P, 
49) 
             Bearing in mind the point outlined in the introductory chapter concerning the rise of 
the ordinary, largely self-taught and self-supporting individual as opposed to the aristocratic 
elites, Razumikhin (whose surname in Russian resonates with the word razum - “sense,” as a 
subtle hint from the author) may be a Russian character, yet he brings to mind the 
Emersonian or Franklinian self-reliance. He can exist independently and provide for himself, 
by doing work which presumably is of some benefit to society. Although seemingly far less 
complex than Raskolnikov, Razumikhin presents a figure that serenely exists within the 
cohesive exceptionalist community. Moreover, he is also a heroic presence, although his 
heroism concerns no great feats, but rather the ability to cheerfully thrive in the most squalid 
of circumstances. From the comparative angle, Melville seems to echo this attitude in the 
chapters describing the life of the penniless Bohemians in New York among whom Pierre 
settles, metaphorically bringing up the image of a grand converted church, “The Apostles,” 
harbouring the destitute, and therefore serving a practical, commendable purpose rather than 
a purely symbolic one. The essential spiritual significance of the church is not diminished by 
being put to pragmatic use: “Places once set apart to lofty purposes, still retain the name of 
that loftiness, even when converted to the meanest uses” (Pierre 229). 
             In this manner, both writers seem to give a covert hint about how to survive within an 
exceptionalist society. Usefulness, humility, adaptability is indeed a subtle answer; the 
“loftiness” or dignity of spirit, bestowed by the virtue of nature, cannot be tarnished by 
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humble living or work, remaining an intrinsic part of one’s being. Such mundane heroism is a 
huge contrast to Raskolnikov’s cosmic-scale fantasies: “Hundreds, maybe thousands of lives 
put right; dozens of families saved from destitution, from decay, from ruin, from 
depravity…” (C&P 62). One may conclude that in order to coexist within the Herderian 
vision, the only variety of heroism that is acceptable is the self-reliant attitude comprised of 
asceticism and the ability to put oneself to work that may be of use to others.  
            As Pierre finds himself in the shady world of the Apostles, the image of this everyday 
heroism is brought up in what can be described as biting parody: 
Now and then he fixedly gazes at the curious-looking, rusty old bedstead. It seemed 
powerfully symbolic to him; and most symbolical it was. For it was the ancient 
dismemberable and portable bedstead of his grandfather, the defiant defender of the 
Fort, the valiant captain in many an unsuccumbing campaign. (Pierre 231) 
             This image is indeed “powerfully symbolic” in that it also underlines the transition 
from the lofty heroic ideal to the humble Herderian one. Surrounded by poverty, Pierre fails 
to become the self-reliant, adaptable hero like Razumikhin, all the while being presented with 
the stereotypically “exceptionalist” images of  masculinity and prowess like the “the defiant 
defender of the Fort” that he is expected to live up to, metaphorically filling his grandfather’s 
place. It is true that the bedstead brings forth the memories of the heroic forefathers – 
nevertheless, what Pierre fails to comprehend is that his grandfather’s participation in the 
military campaigns also formed part of the accepted exceptionalist narrative: the “grand 
Pierre” in his military capacity acted as a member of the society bringing about a goal that 
was supposedly desirable. Pierre, meanwhile, is not taking part in an actual military campaign 
approved by the state-community. Therefore, his heroism is supposed to be of a pedestrian, 
self-reliant nature – which is something that he fails to realise.  
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             Thus the importance of Pierre to both Melvillean and exceptionalist discourses, I 
argue, stems from the fact that it is a novel that explores the problem of individual awareness 
of one’s “exceptional” self when it transgresses the limits imposed by society, aiming 
towards frequently incongruous grand goals rather than existence within the preordained 
limits. It also asserts a number of problems that essentially render the notion of the 
exceptional individuality unviable, unlike the more moderate concept of self-reliance (which 
essentially presumes the ability to provide for oneself and others in a practical sense, living in 
harmony with the mundane reality). Although Pierre had not attained at the time of 
publication the same level of recognition as Dostoyevsky’s novel, both essentially assert the 
same core topic of the difficulty of mixing the communitarian and the individualistic aspects 
together.  
 
POINT OF CONVERGENCE: COMPARING THE DREAM SEQUENCES. 
          Yet what can be said of the protagonists’ own inner beliefs and reflections? In both 
novels, one particular point emerges as a perfect opportunity for comparative analysis. It is 
the “dream sequence” that occurs as a trope in Melville and Dostoyevsky’s texts. The usage 
of the succinct yet evocative dreamscape serves to metaphorically explain the individual’s 
position within a world shaped by a particular version of exceptionalist discourse. 
           The dream of Enceladus is a relatively short scene, which sits at odds with the overall 
spirit of Melville’s novel. It appears at first to be too grand for a simple metaphor – an ill-
fitting Romantic image amid what could be described as the author’s attempt at sensationalist 
genre staged in a supposedly realistic urban environment.95 Nevertheless, given my prior 
argument about the incongruity of grandeur in the exceptionalist world, this seeming 
disharmony is easily understood.  
                                                 
95 See Higgins and Parker broadly. 
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          Strangely, the Enceladus sequence is little-discussed by the critics even nowadays. In 
“The Flawed Grandeur of Melville’s Pierre,” Higgins and Parker imply that it was a later 
addition, somewhat different from the novel’s main corpus (192)96 – and the 
contemporaneous reviews, for some reason, had utterly neglected to address it (183). I argue 
that the powerful dream sequence, contrasted with the otherwise true-to-life setting of Pierre, 
may serve to represent a vibrant subconscious awareness connected with the realm of 
theoretical ideas inspiring and directing the characters’ motives. To the antebellum critic, 
however, the world of the subconscious and interpreting symbols from that viewpoint was not 
yet familiar, whilst the elaborate mythological imagery associated with Romanticism was 
slowly becoming outmoded – which could explain why at the time of publishing, little was 
said about this particular scene.97 The vision of Enceladus was simply too unusual, presenting 
complex themes of exceptionalism and society in a less straightforward, cryptic manner 
divergent from the accepted stylistic mode. The reviewers of the time generally dubbed the 
Melvillean imagination in Pierre “diseased” or “crazy” (Delbanco, 179) precisely because 
they had to deal with radically unfamiliar material.  
         Concerning my primary focus on individuality threatening the democratic order based 
on equality, the obvious interpretation of the Enceladus sequence is that it comes as a last 
warning to Pierre before he is irrevocably doomed. The quasi-homiletic message of the dream 
(where a Titan rises against the gods and is subsequently cast down and imprisoned in a rock) 
is that arrogance and positionng oneself at odds with the rest of society is comparable to 
Titanic rebellion which would inevitably be suppressed. Such mentality is comparable to the 
                                                 
96 Higgins and Parker in “Reading Melville’s “Pierre, or the Ambiguities”. 
97 John Engell claims that prominent novelists of the time, like Nathaniel Hawthorne, gradually commenced to 
move away from piling on the excessive grandiose imagery in their works as a general literary trend, “going 




“unknown and unseen pestilence” (C&P 518) presented in Raskolnikov’s final dream, which 
reveals to him the erroneous dangerousness of his previous ideas. 
           Yet, in respect to the cryptic complexities contained within, the argument about the 
dream sequence acting as the last warning can be read more deeply. As Melville hints himself 
in a seemingly Emersonian parody, the text of the novel, like the natural world, is open to 
broad interpretation depending on which angle one chooses to adopt: 
 Say what some poets will, Nature is not so much her own ever-sweet interpreter, as 
the mere supplier of that cunning alphabet, whereby selecting and combining as he 
pleases, each man reads his own peculiar lesson according to his own peculiar mind 
and mood. (Pierre 293) 
 
          What is the exact role of the sequence in regards to the narrative? Among the critics, 
Bernard Higgins and Herschel Parker state that Pierre identifies himself with Enceladus, and 
his personal rebellion is summarised symbolically in the vision.98  Other scholars go further 
to allude distinct Promethean echoes to Pierre’s dream.99 The common conclusion is that 
Pierre, crushed by his artistic and amorous failures, metaphorically envisages himself as a 
Titan who, “in his reckless sky-assaulting mood,” suffers a spectacular defeat upon the 
“invulnerable steep:” 
“Enceladus! it is Enceladus!”—Pierre cried out in his sleep. That moment the phantom 
faced him; and Pierre saw Enceladus no more; but on the Titan's armless trunk, his own 
duplicate face and features magnifiedly gleamed upon him with prophetic discomfiture 
and woe. (Pierre 296) 
                                                 
98 See Higgins and Parker, Reading Melville’s “Pierre, or the Ambiguities,” 170-171. 
99 This parallel is amply explored in Reeve’s The White Monk (49), where he compares Pierre with Captain 
Ahab, who also exhibits Promethean tendencies. Furthermore, see Temira Pachmuss, 28, for direct Promethean 
analogy drawn between Ahab and Raskolnikov. 
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             Although in the course of the narrative the protagonist has failed to become a self-
reliant hero, he overcompensates for this failure with dreams of grandeur, envisioning himself 
as a “duplicate” of the struggling Titan. This sequence, in terms of its grand scale, is similar 
to Raskolnikov’s dream which involves no less than a pestilence that “the whole world was 
doomed to fall victim” to (C&P 518). 
            Yet the ending to Pierre’s dream is terrifyingly abrupt. So far, the argument is simple. 
Transgression and wilful disobedience of the established rules should and will be efficiently 
and instantaneously punished. Remarkably, Pierre’s story ends with the transition from “that 
ideal horror to all his actual grief” (Pierre 296). Upon a superficial glance, there arises a 
straightforward textual interpretation: rebelliousness leads either to inevitable doom, or 
(considering Raskolnikov’s dream) to eventual salvation through humiliation and suffering. 
This is admittedly an idea associated strongly with the Russian Orthodox element seen 
throughout Dostoyevsky’s universe, standing at odds with the Protestant, Franklinian concept 
of being an independent active presence, in Melville’s world.  
         It is notable that in Raskolnikov’s story, the dangerous, rebellious mindset 
metaphorically represented through a dream, occurs at the beginning as well as in the end. 
Comparatively, referring to an earlier dream sequence in Crime and Punishment, one sees an 
abused horse (as a reference to the “trembling creature” Raskolnikov fears to become) rather 
than a Titan, killed not in mythical protest, but by being heavily loaded and unable to move, 
in a curious similarity to images of immobility in Pierre’s dream. Dostoyevsky describes the 
scene: 
         The crowd around them is laughing too, and indeed how could they not laugh: 
such a wretched little mare is going to pull such a heavy load at a gallop! … To shouts 
of “Giddap!” the little mare starts pulling with all her might, but she can scarcely 
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manage a slow walk, much less a gallop; she just shuffles her feet, grunts and cowers 
under the lashes of three whips showering on her like hail. 
Suddenly there is a burst of guffaws that drowns out everything: the mare cannot endure 
the quick lashing, and, in her impotence, has begun to kick. Even the old man cannot 
help grinning. Really, such a wretched mare, and still kicking! (C&P 53-54)  
 
                  Although the two subjects of respective sequences are essentially different, the key 
elements are repeated in Raskolnikov’s dream: the immobility under a “heavy load,” the 
“impotence” or inability to retort, the vain efforts to retaliate or “kick.” My argument is that 
both sequences show the dreamer’s subconscious fears concerning his essential weakness set 
against the world in general; or the fear of the individual self to confront the repressive, 
tyrannical mob. The Titan and the horse (in a bitter parody of a freely-moving troika of the 
expansionist rhetoric) represent the self, or how the individual protagonist imagines himself 
to be – and both images are tinged with echoes of the religious tradition that both protagonists 
are to an extent products of. Being constrained by heavy load (whether stones or a laden cart) 
can also symbolically signify the inability of the individual to simultaneously carry the 
burden of being an individualistic hero driven primarily by their own impulses, and a law-
abiding citizen. Supporting this hypothesis, the lofty extent of Pierre’s aspirations is also 
commented on by Jehlen in American Incarnation: The Individual, the Nation and the 
Continent, that the Enceladus dream “…does represent the limits he [Pierre] has failed to go 
beyond, but inextricably his still global extent” (222). 
          This argument can expand further, in that the images represented by both authors can 
represent a consciousness of one’s self specifically as a social and national subject, as it 
stands in relation to the exceptionalist society.  The extreme difference between the two 
creates a feeling of physicality and hints at how each author perceives this idea, the physical 
attributes of each dream-subject being metaphorically representative of the spiritual 
Akroyd 63 
 
undercurrent (weakness and humility in the Russian context, or the dangerous powerfulness 
in the American one). This enables easier understanding of the dream, as the physical plane is 
more readily comprehensible than the abstract.  
           Physicality as a topic extends beyond comparing the attributes of each dream-subject. 
It is a notion closely interwoven with experiencing one’s self as both an independent entity 
and part of a broader discourse. In this instance, Berndt Herzogenrath’s concept of 
Body/Politics, in which a national or a political unit is likened to a physical organism is 
useful, showing that “… the story of the individual provides the story of the nation – the 
biological “evolution” of the individual body has to be read in conjunction with the 
“democratic evolution” of the Body/Politic” (Herzogenrath 210).  Notably, the American 
vision of Enceladus is permitted to exhibit loftiness that Dostoyevsky’s nag lacks. As Higgins 
and Parker hint in Reading Melville’s “Pierre, or the Ambiguities”: “Melville makes clear 
that he approves the “reckless sky-assaulting mood” of both Enceladus and Pierre” (172).100  
          If the spirit of exceptionalist individual consciousness powered by the discourses such 
as the right to “pursuit of happiness” is evident in the image of the doomed Titan, the nag 
represents a classic example of a “humbled spirit” of Dostoyevsky’s Christian Orthodox 
philosophy.101 This is the first major difference between the two national exceptionalist 
traditions: the spiritual ability or inability to rise against the established order. The Russian 
tradition reflected by Dostoyevsky is centred round humility and submission as a natural 
state. The American tradition that Melville echoes, although constraining the rebellious spirit, 
nevertheless openly recognises its greatness as a physical fact, presenting a giant rather than a 
trembling animal.  
 
                                                 
100 See Higgins and Parker, Reading Melville’s “Pierre, or the Ambiguities”.  
101 Frank, Dostoyevsky: the mantle of the Prophet, 1871-1881. 
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THE VIRUS IN THE FLESH: INDIVIDUALITY AND CONTAGION.  
         The idea of physicality, proposed by Herzogenrath, is central to both dream sequences. 
However, it is a highly specific kind of physicality.  
         Images of physical disability or restriction abound throughout Pierre’s dream, echoing 
the immobile nag of Dostoyevsky. Melville refers to the “armless trunk,” and earlier on, 
poignantly states: “Nature, more truthful, performed an amputation, and left the impotent 
Titan without one serviceable ball-and-socket above the thigh.” There remains a general 
explanation of this imagery in psychoanalytical terms of castration and impotent rage, as 
Delbanco implies.102 Yet, in terms of the exceptionalist discourse the metaphor of disability 
may be more specific, evoking the notions of enslavement discussed in the introduction. 
Initially, it may refer to an individual, exceptional genius being suppressed by its environs 
(although to Dostoyevsky, the horse is rather being forced to move against its will). On a 
deeper note, one might assume that the natural order, centred around cohesive coexistence, 
may not tolerate individual excess expressed through rebellion, and curbs it at the root before 
it is even permitted to take shape, leaving one with the concept of “bare life” as coined by 
Giorgio Agamben.  
             This term, as Agamben implies, means what remains behind in an entity once it had 
been subjected to political, social or natural castigation, and stripped of its previous status.103  
Whilst it is also quite relevant in regards to overall plot of Pierre as the story of an 
aristocratic youth forsaking his entire life and status to find himself outside the bounds of his 
background as a social “non-entity,” Enceladus specifically is representative of “bare life” in 
that his rebellion ends in physical mutilation and defilement by the elements as punishment. 
                                                 
102 On psychoanalytical motives or echoes of Captain Ahab as a reflection of Pierre, see Delbanco 183 (on 
Freudian school), 199, 203. 
103  Agamben, Potentialities: Collected essays in Philosophy. 
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Yet his image still maintains a certain vitality that Pierre observes in the dream, which 
potentially still holds power to influence, regardless of imposed restraints.  
         Generally speaking, the expansive tendencies represented by Enceladus are 
conventionally seen as incongruous, unnatural and unviable particularly when regarded 
within the main canvas of the novel’s text, with the majority of critics upholding this 
argument.104 I argue that Melville placed the dream sequence in the midst of the novel’s 
mundane setting precisely with an aim to highlight its meaning more vividly. To support my 
claim, Higgins and Parker argue in The Faded Grandeur of Melville’s Pierre that “…Pierre’s 
increased stature as “deep-diving author and admirable “sky-assaulting” demigod works 
against the logic of much of the novel’s development” (189-190).  Developing their 
argument, I state that the idea of the exceptional magnitude of an individual personality sits 
ill with the external world in general and especially must be mocked or brought down in 
order to be neutralised and reestablish the order founded on submissiveness and cohesive 
unity. As Dostoyevsky describes such a situation: “Man gets accustomed to everything, the 
scoundrel! (C&P 26). Submission to the seeming injustice, humbling oneself, forgoing 
rebellion may be repulsive to one’s individual self, yet it is the only viable way to survive in 
an exceptionalist society. 
            Terms used by Melville such as “the imprisoning earth” or “the defilements of the 
birds, which for untold ages had cast their foulness on his vanquished crest” are essentially 
humbling in that respect. An attempt to envisage oneself as a demiurge would end with 
castigation and mockery. This would take one back to the moderate “self-reliance” of 
Franklin’s emulators and Dostoyevsky’s Razumikhin, in comparison to whom extreme 
individualism (as opposed to individual tendencies contained within the boundaries of social 
                                                 
104 Brook Thomas reiterates: “Pierre’s quest to create a world commensurate with his dream of what the world 
should be might take him away from his only possibility of realising his dream” (140). 
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rules), is not viewed favourably. Not only is individual exceptionalism essentially unviable, 
but it is also presented by Melville as illogical to the point of ludicrousness – as an image of a 
rebellious mythological being disrespectfully besmirched with bird droppings. The Titan is a 
product of the imagination; the birds and their droppings are quite real. Perhaps in this 
metaphor Melville exhibits personal fear of such an experience, but alternatively one could 
suggest that the crude reality of the natural world quickly brings down the excessive 
heroicism.  
          The ideal, meanwhile, is extreme, even affected simplicity, belying extreme actual 
power. In a rather curious observation elsewhere in the text, incidentally recalling Russia, 
Melville muses: “It was for petty German princes to sound their prolonged titular flourishes. 
The Czar of Russia contented himself with putting the simple word “Nicholas” to his loftiest 
decrees” (215). It is comparable to Raskolnikov’s hat (C&P 5), too pathetic and pretentious 
to sit well with his squalid surroundings. The point made by both writers is evident. An overt 
exhibition of power subliminally betrays actual powerlessness.  
             The two separate ideas of rebellion and individualism are intertwined, since Melville 
depicts an individual exceptionalist spiritual entity, whilst highlighting its opposition to what 
emerges as a more powerful order of being. Pierre’s personal relationship with Enceladus 
seems to uphold both equally. It suggests that awareness of oneself as an individual (and 
perhaps specifically masculine) self, connected subsequently with one’s sense of identity as 
an exceptional national subject belonging to a particular (American) nation serves as a 
propelling catalyst for unearthing of the hidden potential of the “bare life” yet dormant, 
metaphorically presented as Enceladus. Melville allocates to the simple Herderian image of 
taking pride in belonging to a particular national group a far more sinister meaning. 
          Looking at the actual historical context pervading the divisive political atmosphere 
specifically in the United States at the time of Melville’s writing, one reverts to the image of 
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bodily “wholeness” threatened by a disease.105 The State of the Union addresses of Franklin 
Pierce in particular offer a good example in that respect. In a speech dated 5 December 1853, 
Pierce states that “…[D]isease, assuming at one time the characteristics of a widespread and 
devastating pestilence, has left its sad traces upon some portions of our country” (State of the 
Union Speech 1853), presenting political dissent as such.106 In another speech, dated 
December 4 1854, Pierce refers to unspecified “disease” yet again, and this image is notable 
in that it can alternatively be interpreted as either a factual assertion of the dangerousness of 
dissenting thought, or else as a metaphoric turn of phrase gathering together all possible 
notions of a threat to national well-being. It goes without saying that Pierce’s rhetoric is 
echoed by the image of the disease in Raskolnikov’s final dream, which also symbolises 
individual excesses threatening the political and social unity. With such imagery firmly 
entrenched in the political culture, it appears likely that Melville’s Enceladus can be viewed 
as another interpretation of the image of bodily “wholeness” – either a broken-down 
organism suffering the effects of inner instability, or else, being encased by earth and part of 
it, as an entity threatening the very environment that engendered it. Whichever of the two 
interpretations one may prefer, it is nevertheless clear that Pierre’s dream is congruous with 
the general political rhetoric in Melville’s day.  
         The image of “unearthing” the Titan by “a strolling company of young collegian 
pedestrians,” who, “struck with its remarkableness, had brought a score of picks and spades” 
is not accidental (Pierre 295). “Unearthing” is a key term, as it hints at created consciousness, 
when the individual consciousness is separated from its being as part of a broader, wider 
environment (Nature), in realising that it is exceptional. Curiously, it is young male students 
who attempt the “unearthing” – the same social group to which Pierre Glendinning and 
                                                 
105 In Federalist Paper 9, Hamilton discusses political faction as a marked danger to the newly-formed state. 
106 See Franklin Pierce’s collected speeches. 
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Raskolnikov belong – the potential youthful rebels.  Interestingly, they “gave over their 
enterprise in despair,” without finishing the task of releasing the Titan, and only succeed in 
“uncovering his shame,” which echoes the imagery of mockery discussed previously, and 
which can be connected with the eventual failure encountered both by Melville and 
Dostoyevsky’s protagonists, such as the foolishness of Raskolnikov, seeking to attain the 
stature of Napoleon yet only gaining a prison-sentence. The result is pathetic rather than 
terrifying, as the “bare life” is not given a chance to truly develop regardless of its potential 
capabilities. Melville is likely to hint at the fact that young men enamoured of the 
Promethean individualism lack the necessary capacities for this; an image echoed later on by 
Dostoyevsky’s hero: “Am I a trembling creature, or do I have the right?” (C&P 398). 
          It is apparent that the problem with the Titanic rebellion lies not with rebellion per se, 
but with the perpetrator’s lack of requisite capacities to see the act of rebellion to the end.107  
As Emory Elliot claims, “…[R]ebellion can bring disaster, as in the case of Pierre, who lacks 
the power and imagination to escape the bonds of the established ideology” (348).  These 
capacities are vitality and the capability to assemble and work jointly towards a common goal 
as a unified organism, explored as the Herzogenrathian “Body/Politic” concept.108 Indeed, an 
analysis of the cultural background at the time implies that this particular concern occupied 
many minds (the famous example being De Tocqueville’s reflection on the individual spirit 
opposed by “the tyranny of the majority” in American culture or John Randolph’s fear of 
“King Numbers,” or mob rule).109 Melville would have been asserting what was already an 
issue of significance. A good example of his contemporaries exploring the idea can be found 
in Emerson’s speech, “The American Scholar (1837).”110 Emerson offers a precise summary 
                                                 
107 See Emory Elliott. 
108  Herzogenrath, An American Body Politic: A Deleuzian Approach. 
109 See Kirk, A Conservative Mind, citing Randolph’s speech (circa 1829) in Congress: “I would not live under 
King Numbers. I would not be his steward, nor make him my taskmaster” (154).  
110 See Emerson’s speech, ““The American Scholar,” An Oration delivered before the Phi Beta Gamma Society, 
at Cambridge, August 31, 1837.”  
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of the concept whilst calling for united action towards creating a new intellectual “American” 
culture: “…[T]here is One Man, — present to all particular men only partially, or through 
one faculty; and that you must take the whole society to find the whole man” (The American 
Scholar). This image is reflective, of course, of the combined individual potential realised 
through cohesiveness that I discussed in the introduction.  
         The awareness of one’s individuality forming a part of a greater so-called “organism” 
and yet presenting a potential danger for the same “organism” is central to my understanding 
of how Melville and Dostoyevsky assess individuality as a topic. Here I bring together 
several concepts that tie in with Body/Politics theory, which would enable easier 
comprehension of the dream sequence’s significance in the exceptionalist reading of the text. 
One key concept that Herzogenrath analyses (101), is the discussion of virulence as a notion 
that enables the spread or diffusion of ideas – be it exceptionalist discourse, or the toxic 
assumption of oneself as exceptional (as is the case with the aforementioned group of 
students). The concept of a spreading virus would be used further in this thesis to assist one’s 
understanding of how dangerous ideas (such as individual exceptionalism) take hold of an 
individual rather than a group and then subsequently are diffused throughout the rest of 
society, affecting more and more human “units.” To illustrate this, Priscilla Wald discusses 
many issues relevant to the stance I take in this thesis, notably comparing the representation 
of Communist infiltration of the American society to an epidemic (174).111    
           Another concept that would help us fully grasp the analogy of a dangerous idea to a 
biological virus, is “bio-power” explored by Foucault.112 This concept describes the 
spreading of a harmful ideology and the “mechanisms of security” needed to control it. 
Foucault explicitly compares the spreading of an idea to a spreading of a virus, and “bio-
                                                 
111 For this, and a parallel discussion of epidemiological approach in the field of the Americanist discourse, see  
Wald, Contagious: Cultures, Carriers and Outbreak Narrative. 
112 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. 
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power” is “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human 
species became the object of a political strategy, or a general strategy of power” (Foucault 1). 
The strategy in our case is the diffusion, or popularisation, of the idea of quasi-nihilistic 
rebellion. Enceladus therefore can be seen as a metaphor for an unearthed biological hazard 
which causes the virus of rebellion commences to spread – the exact analogue presented in 
Dostoyevsky’s novel being the mysterious illness in the second dream of Raskolnikov. The 
possibility that the writer symbolises intellectual ideas by this unknown disease is just too 
explicit: “Some new trichinae had appeared, microscopic creatures that lodged themselves in 
men’s bodies. But these creatures were spirits, endowed with reason and will” (C&P 518). 
            Dostoyevsky’s imaginary virus primarily threatens the social cohesiveness: “Here and 
there people would band together, agree among themselves to do something, swear never to 
part – but immediately begin something completely different from what they themselves had 
suggested, begin accusing one another, fighting, stabbing” (C&P 519). 
         Extreme free thinking and harmonious coexistence are thus, to Dostoyevsky, hard to 
reconcile. In the historical context of the two novels it is particularly important, since, as we 
have already seen, the beginning of the nineteenth century (pre-1870) was marked by a 
worldwide emergence of several important ideological discourses: such as recognition of the 
need for liberty, and a growing nationalistic consciousness.113 Melville and Dostoyevsky’s 
works were contemporaneous with the emergence of movements such as Young America or 
Postmillenialism (as explored by Daniel Walker-Howe, Meredith McGill, or Yuri Kovalev), 
or with the latter emergence of the Slavophiles or the People’s Will in Russia. Looking at the 
actual background in more detail, what strikes one especially is the curious state of affairs at 
                                                 
113 See Walker-Howe, What Hath God Wrought: the transformation of America, 1815-1848. Walker-Howe 
pinpoints that the term “nationalism” was coined precisely during 1830s. However, he also refers to the fact that 
post-Monroe doctrine, there existed many factions and meanings covered by the term “nationalism” that could 
be perceived as different movements (124). This harmonises with the term “imagined communities” that sought 
to explain the American idea as being united by various ideas (religion (195), self-improvement (243), etc.).  
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the time regarding the student and intellectual circles (particularly relevant, given the role of 
the students and bohemian intellectuals of the “Apostles” respectively in Dostoyevsky’s 
novel and Pierre). These were marked (according to evidence gleaned by cultural historians 
such as Eliza Tamarkin) by two seemingly incongruous factors: an incessant search for 
identity (tied in in many cases to the national discourse), since America was seen by many as 
a clean slate perfectly positioned for experimenting with new forms of social order, and 
extreme political apathy, which was often satirized.114  
          Leaning on this evidence, I suggest that the volatile ideas linking the search for 
national exceptionalist ideal and individual identity remained suspended as topics for 
intellectual discussion, confined to theoretical hypothesising rather than immediately entering 
the active political discourse in the antebellum America (this was also somewhat true of 
Russia at the time). However, even though they were discussed as a merely abstract topic, 
those ideas spread, as if by diffusion, throughout the educated circles in both America, and, 
two decades later, in Russia as well.115  
         Reconciling this with the notion of virulence, the algorithm then becomes clear: a 
potentially disruptive idea hangs suspended amid the intellectual community, subsequently 
being spread or diffused by discussion or analysis. By itself it may not be essentially noxious, 
however, once it takes hold of a personality who exhibits a set of particular characteristics 
which may render it more viable than others (and which would be discussed later in this 
chapter), it takes root and mutates, cancer-like, into a psychological state judged toxic or 
dangerous to society as a whole. As more and more personalities become affected by a 
similar idea, social movements (ranging from demagoguery of Young Americans parodied in 
Pierre, “whose greatest reproach was efflorescent coats and crack-crowned hats all podding 
                                                 
114 Tamarkin, Anglophilia: deference, devotion and antebellum America; Walker-Howe, pp 304-305. 
115 Walker-Howe (463) points to the fact that in antebellum America, a course on moral philosophy was a fixed 
feature of college life. 
Akroyd 72 
 
in the sun” (Pierre 230), to the Nihilistic rebels of the People’s Will in Russia) spring up. 
Those are important, as in those social movements, the individuals affected by the same idea 
start acting as a single organism. In many cases, these were seen as a threat to the established 
order (just as per Franklin Pierce’s speeches) which needed to be suppressed regardless of the 
original idea which prompted them.116  Nevertheless, while Andrew Lawson in Whitman and 
Class Struggle (2006) draws a distinct line between an individual and group rebellion, I 
prefer to uphold the notion that an individual rebellion inevitably mutates into a group one – 
the only decisive factors being the matter of time and finding other individual rebels sharing 
the same idea. 
        Looking back at Pierre, both Higgins and Parker (172), and Herzogenrath’s theory of 
Body/Politic, imply that the dream of Enceladus occurs once Pierre is (at least – 
metaphorically) “dead,” so the noxious idea has taken root and manifests itself in an already 
dead entity, in a zombie-like manner: “…[B]ut again the pupils of his eyes rolled away from 
him in their orbits: and now a general and nameless torpor – some horrible foretaste of death 
itself – seemed stealing upon him.” (Pierre 292) 
          Connecting this to the concept of diffusion, I propose a concept of an “ideological 
virus,” arguing that the noxious ideas concealed in the subconscious like Enceladus in the 
earth, become diffused among those susceptible to them once they are unearthed. Some 
groups, like the “young male collegians” are more susceptible, possibly due to the nature of a 
perverted ideal of one’s exceptionalist self, which means one’s identity, destined to partake in 
the exceptionalist discourse, is corrupted so as to gain a destructive, toxic essence. Then, once 
                                                 
116 See Lawson, Whitman and the Class Struggle, xx. Lawson gives a comprehensive listing of various ways in 
which a social movement could seek to undermine the existing social order (organizing strikes, writing polemic 
articles, etc). 
     See Sexton and Tyrrell, Empire’s Twin: US Imperialism from the Founding Age to the Age of Terrorism, 4. 
Sexton and Tyrrell suggest that the culture of social protest in the United States throughout the ages was 
generally linked with the African-American identity and the struggle for racial equality; however, other forms of 




unearthed, those ideas may spread, overturning and destroying the acceptable democratic or 
national structure, or the “milieu” as Foucault would name it. In Raskolnikov’s final dream of 
a strange illness this idea can be seen plainly; however, it is in Pierre’s vision that Melville 
first toys with the possibility. 
         Interestingly, Raskolnikov’s later dream of the unnamed epidemic occurs at the lowest 
point of his spiritual descent, as a “crisis” preceding eventual spiritual recovery. It acts as a 
symptom coming from the inner world, showing the reconciliation of a personality displaying 
individualistic tendencies with the outside world. In that I seek to balance the two, arguing 
that the outside influence such as a noxious idea must conjoin with a certain innate state of 
spiritual being in order to culminate in Enceladean rebellion.  
        Much of the textual matter in both novels suggests in terms of imagery an underlying 
theme of a diffusion of a virus taking place starting with the affected individual and 
subsequently spreading to colonise more and more. The image of “spreading” is notable – if 
for Dostoyevsky it is a strange disease that spreads, for Melville it is the remarkably-termed 
“aspiring amaranth,” which in the dream sequence is seen completely covering the large 
expanses of the Glendinnings’ land. The choice of the term “aspiring” is significant, in that it 
echoes the earlier-discussed tendencies of rebellion and higher aspirations (tied in with the 
exceptionalist idea). Yet the amaranth, for all its tenacity, is useless, if not downright 
harmful: 
The aspiring amaranth, every year it climbs and adds new terraces to its sway! The 
immortal amaranth, it will not die, but last year's flowers survive to this! The terraced 
pastures grow glittering white, and in warm June still show like banks of snow:—fit 
token of the sterileness the amaranth begets! (Pierre 293) 
            If Melville’s amaranth is a direct metaphor for the fruitless inner state of mind of an 
alienated individual confined within his arrogance and narrow-sightedness, it harmonises 
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with Dostoyevsky’s metaphoric microbial-borne disease, which may spread through diffusion 
once it is uncovered (C&P 519). Both are tenacious to an extreme, yet both essentially are 
useless to humans –  bringing to mind the Herderian notion that only those ideas that may 
benefit humanity should be supported. In this way, such ideas are a huge threat to the ideal 
symbiotic community that Herder envisaged. Although the way that Melville sets out his 
novel’s general plot suggests that Pierre’s death is inescapable at this point, we are presented 
with the “immortal amaranth,” frightening in its tenacity. Man dies, yet the idea which 
possessed him, no matter how noxious, lives on in its “sterileness,” passing on from carrier to 
new carrier, rather like Foucault’s idea of a plague virus. Both writers conclude quite 
univocally, implying that the noxious concept of excessive individuality is sterile at heart.   
         The masses of amaranth as an image also evoke movement en masse and loss of 
individual, distinguishing characteristics in pursuit of a noxious idea, the “tyranny of the 
majority” at its most typical. This would correlate with erasing of conspicuous individual 
characteristics in order to fit in American society’s “melting pot” – in an absolute opposition 
to Dostoyevsky’s “pestilence” where the worst aspect is the fact it renders people unable to 
come to a mutual understanding or agreement (C&P 518).  The rhetoric of the Manifest 
Destiny, described in the introductory chapter, is echoed by the frantic “spreading” of the 
amaranth, and the blank whiteness of the plant echoes the erasure of the individual in order to 
fit in better with this perverted version of Herder’s harmonious social coexistence. 
           To support this claim, Wyn Kelley presents the newest interpretation of the Enceladus 
dream sequence that centres around the subconscious loss of individuality in order for the 
hero to become an exceptionalist trope, a rebellious and subsequently castigated figure in the 
cautionary tale within the exceptionalist mythology.117 As she argues: 
                                                 
117 Wyn Kelley, “Pierre, Life History and the Obscure.” 
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If Pierre’s principled pursuit of truth at all costs makes him seem an exceptional hero, 
the narrator perplexingly suggests at this point that he is nevertheless representative …  
Hence even in his dedication to genius, Pierre might be seen as an American type. His 
character is still in some respects fixed in a national mold.... The demands of biography, 
that a subject represent a national and ethical ideal, seem here to have been upheld, even 
as Pierre descends further and further away from the privileged and sanctioned status 
he held at the beginning of the novel. (Levine 93) 
               Taking Kelley’s argument further, it appears that Melville and Dostoyevsky agree 
upon the fact that attempts to emulate an external exceptionalist ideal, rather than stay within 
the bounds of one’s individuality, come at a price. The said price is, oddly enough, the loss of 
one’s identity, despite the seemingly fiercely personal nature of the individualistic mindset. 
The loss of individuality which occurs in pursuit of the said ideal, and subsequent doom is 
imminent in Melville’s text, or narrowly avoided in Crime and Punishment. Bearing in mind 
the socio-political landscape of the time, with rapidly growing dissatisfaction in antebellum 
ideals of independence and striving towards the common good when contrasted with the 
actual atrocities caused by slavery and expansion, Melville’s stance is quite logical. As a 
major difference harmonious with the Russian Orthodox ideal of humility, Dostoyevsky 
emphasises not the tragic loss of individuality, but rather the overt individualism being the 
danger: 
But never, never had people considered themselves so intelligent and unshakeable in 
the truth as did these infected ones. Never had they thought their judgements, their 
scientific conclusions, their moral convictions and beliefs more unshakeable… Each 
thought the truth was contained in himself alone, and suffered looking at others, beat 
his breast, wept, and wrung his hands… (C&P 518-519) 
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           Furthermore, it is the awareness of one first as a national and only then as an 
individual subject that essentially proves the undoing of the Titan – if we read Kelley’s words 
metaphorically, the “…character… fixed in a national mold” (Levine 93) is disturbingly akin 
to the Titan trapped in immobile stone. This is the critical explanation of the immobility 
metaphor: for Dostoyevsky and the murdered horse, is quite different in meaning; it serves as 
evocation of a docile (krotkiy) spirit before the unjust world.  
           The exceptionalist discourse in itself can therefore be successfully represented by 
either metaphor: the struggling Enceladus of national exceptional pride that is on its way to 
demise, or the omnipresent amaranth representing the spreading of an essentially harmful and 
useless depersonalizing idea. If to follow the example of the critics analysing the novel from 
the platform of racial discourse (Carolyn L. Karcher, Samuel Otter, Robert S. Levine)118 – 
also connecting this to De Tocqueville’s stance on the “tyranny of the majority” mentioned 
earlier, one may assume the whiteness of the amaranth is a metaphorical hint at the spreading 
of “white,” depersonalizing American exceptionalism.119 It is quintessentially fruitless, yet 
overbears any incongruent discourses that oppose it, regurgitating them into an impersonal 
mass.120    
 
THE PROBLEM OF THE PRIVATE/PUBLIC.  
            In short, Melville’s novel is a text laden with socio-political arguments – a point 
which is most fully explored in an analysis by William Spanos. According to it, Pierre 
surpasses the common definition of the novel as Melville’s unsuccessful attempt at 
                                                 
118 A number of critics explore this topic further: Karcher in “Shadow over the promised land: Slavery, Race 
and Violence in Melville’s America”; Otter in “The Eden of Saddle Meadows: Landscape and Ideology in 
Pierre”; or Levine in “Pierre’s Blackened Hand.” 
119 See also Walker-Howe (421), who offers a direct summary of the spreading exceptionalist/imperialist idea 
justifying expansion in both the United States and tsarist Russia. 
120 The concept of the “virgin land” colonised in spite of the dispossession of the native population is somewhat 
relevant here. See Pease, The New American Exceptionalism, pp 154-155. 
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psychological writing. In the critic’s own words, “…[W]hat Moby-Dick is to the American 
global imperial project, Pierre… is to the American domestic project” (108).121 
           Spanos carefully pinpoints the relevance of the exceptionalist motifs in the novel. 
Pierre is the Kraken and equal to Moby-Dick, in that it strives to consider the roots of the 
exceptionalist discourse, before it emerges on the global arena. The novel analyses 
exceptionalism within a small-scale, private environment, which, I argue, is linked with the 
individual’s psyche (it is not by chance that both Dostoyevsky and Melville spend a 
significant amount of time presenting dream-sequences as the reflection of the protagonist’s 
inner world).  Typically, the concept of exceptionalism is associated with publicity and the 
relationship between the nation-state and the external world, but the question of how it is 
manifested in the domestic setting (which may or may not evolve into an anti-exceptionalist, 
subversive critique) remains highly pressing.122  
          Here arises a crucial argument, first emergent in the field of queer theory.123 Does 
Pierre represent domesticity as a concept wholly separate from the public sphere (that 
exceptionalism supposedly permeates), or does it dissolve the boundaries between the two? 
The critics present two divergent points equally: Caleb Smith in The Oracle and the Curse 
echoes Spanos’ argument about the control of the domestic sphere, and describes Pierre as “a 
novel preoccupied with the encroachment of the law into the most intimate quarters of private 
life” (15), and Brook Thomas suggests that Pierre fuses the boundaries between domestic and 
external: “In Pierre there is no purely private realm of the moral domestic family separated 
by the public” (Thomas 148). I disagree with Thomas: the novel seems to point towards the 
development of individual, familial tendencies before they commence to influence larger 
                                                 
121 Spanos, “Pierre’s Extraordinary Emergency.” 
122 See Sexton and Tyrrell, 8. The authors refer to the fact that although exceptionalism is still seen by many as 
an external, “public” issue, there remains a critique of central power being oppressive towards the rights of 
individuals or groups (the situation regarding the First Nations given as an example). 
123 See Warner 26-27 for the discussion of “public” and “private” terms and whether they should be seen as 
separate, and also Warner 39 for the argument for why the distinction between the two should be demolished. 
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segments of society beyond family nucleus.  In this way, Melville can be described as the 
predecessor of the general queer theoretical perception of the public and private, who just 
records how this notion was precisely perceived in his day and age, since the subversiveness 
of the private sphere is well-explored in the novel’s text.124  
           Michael Rogin describes Pierre as “a declaration of war against domesticity” (160), 
which was previously idealised in the antebellum society.125 For my part, I maintain that it is 
not a direct challenge. Pierre, as a true product of its era, is a representation of how the 
individualistic rebellion is manifested in a given family unit forming part of bigger society, 
rather than an attempt to bring the private into the public sphere, destroying the implied 
boundaries. This also recalls my point concerning Mary Glendinning’s ambitions regarding 
Pierre’s heroic future, where it is viewed as being nowhere as threatening as Pierre’s decision 
to exit the structured familial existence in Saddle Meadows. Through a Herderian lens, it 
would imply dropping out altogether from the societal framework in order to become a 
potentially highly dangerous individual free agent. 
           Therefore, my specific line of inquiry, choosing to dissect Pierre before the earlier 
novels, is logical, as my initial intention was to consider the exceptionalist discourse as 
related to an individual before proceeding onto two other stages set out in the introduction. It 
is logical that, given the past tendencies in American literary studies, the critics overlooked 
the importance of the domestic in their overbearing concern with the global issues personified 
in Moby-Dick. However, in reality the exceptionalist discourse permeating the American 
culture, as per Priscilla Wald, extends and affects the domestic or intimate sphere, albeit as 
parody (Wald 107). Wald also highlights the fact that Pierre may not escape the influence of 
                                                 
124 The more recent scholarship amply explores Melville’s significance for the field of queer theory: particularly, 
Branka Arsic, Neill Matheson and James Creech, whose analysis of Pierre as a text discussing repressed 
homosexual desire is noteworthy. Also see Christopher Looby’s essay, “Sexuality and American Studies” – 
which notes Melville’s important role in the queer literary canon (Levander and Levine, 423), and Michael 
Snediker, “Melville and Queerness without Character” (Levine 155). 
125 See also Amy Kaplan, “Manifest Domesticity.” 
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the exceptionalist, nationalistic discourse: “Melville’s Pierre is the archetypal American 
subject … more apparent his dependence on the national narrative for his sense of himself as 
a presentable and representable person. Pierre literally cannot survive challenge to that 
narrative” (107). The existence of a character outside of the inescapable exceptionalist 
national framework is thus unfeasible. The domestic sphere, as Melville’s novel subtly 
implies, is not isolated from effects of the exceptionalist discourse, and although the 
separating boundaries between the public and private are known, they are being continuously 
transgressed – precisely as queer theory maintains. As Amy Kaplan argues in “Manifest 
Domesticity,” discourses of domesticity are “inseparable from narratives of empire and 
nation building,” namely in that they represent the continually expanding boundaries of what 
we see as “domestic” sphere.126  Exceptionalism is forming and motioning the picture of life, 
private as well as public, reaching everywhere. Bearing in mind the earlier analysis of the 
“spreading amaranth” image, the parallel with the omnipresent, all-pervading exceptionalist 
discourse is obvious here – shown in a “domestic” setting. 
         The excessive control extends beyond the public sphere, reaching out to affect all 
spheres of an individual being.  In his analysis of Melville’s novel, Spanos offers a sinister 
vision of a society held together by institutional framework that may not be doubted or 
transgressed.127 If Dostoyevsky’s mysterious disease organically threatens the natural course 
of things, with Pierre’s dream, we encounter a rigid set of rules, traversing which would 
result in punishment. This argument harmonises with the fate of Enceladus as shown in the 
dream, and I maintain that it is one of the central themes in the entire novel.  
           To further uphold this idea, Myra Jehlen comments on repressive, immutable society 
at odds with a self-aware individual seeking to bring about change: “Pierre’s predicament 
                                                 
126 Amy Kaplan, “Manifest Domesticity.” 
127 See also Jehlen, American Incarnation: The Individual, the Nation and the Continent. 
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also has a direct historical reference. His own generation both in fiction and in history, faced 
the impossible adjuncts of keeping the patriarchal order intact, while yet recreating the world 
in their own image” (Jehlen 188). The defeat of Enceladus in the dream is a harbinger of 
Spanos’ “absolute silencing” (Spanos 112) – a concept coined to signify the stifling or 
destruction of any element falling outside of the normatives upholding the established, 
exceptionalist society.128 This silencing will take place upon Pierre’s physical death. In this 
case, the dream sequence is a dry reminder of what happens to anyone who dares to fall 
outside the accepted vision established upon the idea of American exceptionalism. It reverts 
back to Agamben’s “bare life” which should be controlled by being divested of an 
opportunity to become harmful.129 Melville illustrates it perfectly, giving a picture of 
grotesque forms struck with immobility, likely due to their potential for action: 
…[T]his long acclivity was thickly strewn with enormous rocky masses, grotesque in 
shape, and with wonderful features on them, which seemed to express that slumbering 
intelligence visible in some recumbent beasts—beasts whose intelligence seems struck 
dumb in them by some sorrowful and inexplicable spell. (Pierre 294)130 
           There remains a solid bulk of scholarly work supporting the notion that Pierre is a 
core text in the exceptionalist discourse as an exploration of how the concept of 
exceptionalism fares in the “domestic” arena before being given a chance to be manifested in 
a public milieu.  Brian Connolly, who dedicated his book, Domestic Intimacies to the 
exploration of incest (a key part of the plot in the novel) as related to a broader American 
national concept, depicts the individual’s particular position within the democratic discourse, 
                                                 
128 See also Lauren Berlant, “The Anatomy of National Fantasy.” 
129 See Pionowska Ziarek for the expanded discussion of the “bare life” concept. 
130 Agamben’s discussion of another Melvillean text, Bartleby the Scrivener, is notable, in that he again assesses 




which again draws on a boundary between the private (individual or family) and the public 
spheres: 
…[T]he central figure of both liberalism and the nineteenth-century incest prohibition 
was the liberal subject, that autonomous, rational individual who acted on his own 
desires, was endowed with capacity for consent, was not dependent on others, and had 
his choices and desires ratified in contracts. This subject enjoyed a life in public … Yet, 
at the same time, the liberal subject was supposed to find his greatest comforts… in the 
private life of a bourgeois, sentimental family. (2-3) 
            Therefore, in Pierre remains relevant to the topic of the exceptionalist discourse, 
although Melville’s focus shifts from abstract to concrete, illustrating how exceptionalist 
tendencies may arise or influence the workings of everyday societal structure.131 Wai-Chee 
Dimock discusses this aspect, tying it in with the discourse of Manifest Destiny associated 
with the era, speaking of the “internalization of Manifest Destiny” in Pierre” (Dimock 165). 
Elaborating on Dimock’s argument, I view Pierre as a novel which explores an individual 
response to the exceptionalist discourse, in a domestic setting, by an individual seemingly 
lacking a concrete political cause to defend. “Exceptionalism” as a concept presumes at the 
core conflict or opposition. One simply cannot partake of the exceptionalist worldview, and 
yet not fight. Pierre’s place in the exceptionalist interpretation becomes clear; it is the same 
kind of battle wrought in Moby-Dick, but on a lesser, internal level.132 In that respect, 
Melville’s chosen subject is relatable to the thoughts of Raskolnikov, who hopes to 
commence powerful societal improvements by “one tiny little crime,” and taking “the money 
that old woman has doomed to monastery” (C&P 62). The deliberately prosaic milieu 
contrasted with grandiose plans is a factor uniting Melville and Dostoyevsky’s texts. Both 
                                                 
131 See Dimock, Empire for Liberty: Melville and the Poetics of Individualism. 
132 Wald in Constituting Americans describes Pierre as a text where “Melville examines the fate of the national 
subject within, and without, the law” (108).  
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protagonists struggle for recognition of themselves as heroes within a markedly everyday 
setting – be it breakfast-scenes at Glendinnings’ house or the bustling slums of St Petersburg.  
          It was the Soviet critical school that addressed the concept of the individual opposing a 
constrictive domestic setting most succinctly, (even though the Soviet scholars failed to 
produce a solid analysis of Pierre as a novel, mainly because it had not been translated into 
Russian until 2016), whilst at the same time, the American critical school dwelled mainly 
upon the interpretation of Pierre as a mirror reflection of Melville’s own artistic journey.133  I 
argue that the post-war Soviet scholars touched the closest to the theory of “domestic” 
exceptionalism. Pierre fights social injustices, just as Raskolnikov muses on “dozens of 
families saved from destitution, from decay, from ruin, from depravity, from venereal 
hospitals” (C&P 62). V. Dukelskaya (1968) summarises this fact: “In Pierre, man is not 
fighting unconceivable evil or universal fatum anymore, but the troubles spawned by the 
social order itself.”134 
           The analysis of the dream sequences reveals how the exceptionalist theme has been 
interwoven with the notion of rebellion. This is only natural, bearing in mind the argument 
proposed by Jay Sexton and Ian Tyrrell, that rebellion (termed as “anti-imperialism” but 
covering an extremely broad range of concepts) is a “functional and foundational part of 
American exceptionalism.”135 It is therefore closely connected with the concept – yet what 
we have seen presented by both writers though, seems to spell things clearly; individualistic 
rebellion within the domestic, everyday setting, although recognised by the exceptionalist 
society, will simply not work, however well-intended.  
                                                 
133 In “Why Pierre Went Wrong” Parker argues that Melville’s exploration of Pierre’s interior motives had been 
sidelined by the metaphorising his own creative and authorial woes.  
134 See V. Dukelskaya’s thesis. Furthermore, in Fiske’s article offering a surface overview of Soviet reception of 
Melville, certain relevant points are briefly raised; in particular, that the Soviet critics were correct in 
pinpointing Pierre’s fate as an attempt to understand society’s workings, or as individualist tragedy at odds with 
the external world (32, 37). 




SELF-INTEREST OR EGOISM? 
         Before introducing us to Plotinus Plinlimmon’s philosophy, which, I argue, is a pivotal 
passage for understanding of the entire text, Melville presents us with a somewhat sketchy 
summary of what lies at the core of the accepted American exceptionalist ideal based on the 
pragmatic Franklinian themes that Pierre comes into conflict with. The American national 
discourse, the writer seems to imply, is founded upon Jeffersonian ideals of material gain and 
ownership, inseparable from the national idea: 
Sooner or later in this life, the earnest, or enthusiastic youth comes to know, and more 
or less appreciate this startling solecism … [B]y all odds the most Mammonish part of 
this world—Europe and America—are owned by none but professed Christian nations, 
who glory in the owning, and seem to have some reason therefor. (Pierre 178) 
           Melville’s idea of exceptionalism is then echoed by the aforementioned image of the 
“aspiring amaranth,” concerned with owning, or covering as much territory as is fathomable, 
driven by pragmatic self-interest. This vision evokes the Enlightenment ideal of Franklinian 
self-reliance which I asserted earlier, and is akin to De Tocqueville’s understanding of how 
the American society functions on the basis of primary self-interest, where individual 
interests combine in order to work towards a common unified goal.136 Of course, this image 
also resonates with Herder’s ideas. However, rather than the utopian image of working in 
unison that Herder presents, one is struck in this particular passage by yet another 
juxtaposition of the “enthusiastic youth” and the overtly acquisitive mercantile attitude 
regnant in the supposed actual society. The term “owning” especially gives a somewhat dark 
tinge to the passage, recalling the notions of slavery and serfdom, true for both America and 
                                                 
136 See Kahan pp 50-51. Also De Tocqueville.  
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Russia. Yet the passage seems to imply that these images of exploitation and control form 
part of the seemingly “harmonious” society that the rebellious youth confronts.  
        Dostoyevsky’s novel (incidentally, published at a later date) reflects the chronological 
evolution of the aforementioned ideas first sparked off in the Western world as Pierre was 
being written, and which eventually reached Russia and were already firmly implemented in 
the ideological discourse when Crime and Punishment was published. The antipathetic 
character of Luzhin expands this statement as an expression of supposedly progressive 
pragmatic, De Tocquevillean views. Their “Westernness” is not referred to explicitly, but is 
implied: 
But science says: Love yourself before all, since everything in the world is based on 
self-interest … And economic truth adds that the more properly arranged personal 
affairs, and, so to speak, whole caftans there are in society, the firmer its foundations 
are, and the better arranged its common cause. A simple thought, which unfortunately 
has been too long in coming, overshadowed by rapturousness and dreaminess, though 
it seems it would not take too much wit to realize. (C&P 141) 
             Leaning on concepts such as “science” and “self-interest,” Luzhin represents a 
perfect scion of the Franklinian mentality. This worldview, antagonised by Pierre and 
Raskolnikov, presents a triumph of mediocrity and efficiency over far-fetched Titanic 
grandeur. While Dostoyevsky is quite direct in painting Luzhin as a robotic, unsympathetic 
personality, I hold that with Pierre, Herman Melville might have preferred Plotinus 
Plinlimmon’s position to Pierre’s. Decidedly it is less artistically arresting, yet far better 
suited to the confines of the actual world. In the author’s own bitter words concerning Pierre, 
“He shall now learn, and very bitterly learn, that though the world worship Mediocrity and 
Common-Place, yet hath it fire and sword for all cotemporary Grandeur; that though it swears 
that it fiercely assails all Hypocrisy, yet hath it not always an ear for Earnestness” (Pierre 
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226). Melville may not be wholly content with this vision, but he attests to the fact that this is 
the way the actual world is arranged. After all, the metaphors of anthills and the like, evoked 
by Herder, suggest mediocrity rather than striking uniqueness.  
          Both Luzhin’s views and Plinlimmon’s philosophy are upheld by strong critical 
evidence. As examples, Jehlen gives an interpretation of Plinlimmon’s pamphlet: “…[J]ustice 
and truth were never meant to exist on earth, they would be personally impractical and 
socially destructive” (Jehlen 208), whilst Alan S. Kahan underlines the fact that in small 
doses, individualism, if taking on the shape as “enlightened self-interest,”  is not just safe for 
the social structure, but beneficial to it: a “remedy against the threats that democracy poses to 
freedom” (Kahan 50-51) that helps overcome excessive tendencies.137 I then conclude that 
Luzhin reflects Herder and De Tocqueville’s views, where work towards common good 
under the stimulus of individual, small-scale interest is preferable to true greatness of Titanic 
proportion.  
            This exact state of affairs is what eventually destroys Pierre, and nearly does so with 
Raskolnikov. However, the two characters pose as much of a problem to the described order 
as it does to them. As Brian Connolly points out, excessive individualism poses a likely threat 
and is interpreted as “egoism.”  
“Egoism,” Tocqueville wrote, “is a passionate and exaggerated love of self which leads 
a man to think of all things in terms of himself and himself to all.” Individualism was 
something else – although it had the air of egoism, it was more desirable because less 
passionate and more tempered. (Connolly 7-8) 
           On a contradictory aside note, Michael Gilmore in The American Romanticism and the 
Market-Place also quotes De Tocqueville as being against commercialization and values 
represented by the likes of Luzhin, which only too readily morph into “the tyranny of the 
                                                 
137 See Alan S. Kahan’s analysis of De Tocqueville. 
Akroyd 86 
 
majority” (Gilmore 57), and this attitude is sharply contrasted in a negative light with that of 
Pierre’s author. However, Gilmore’s argument seems to again reinforce my earlier statement 
that the “tyranny of the majority” or the prevailing opinion, whether seen positively or not, 
forms the basis of the established social order which proves to be fatal to Enceladus and his 
emulators. 
           Subsequently, a sophism forms. If the accepted, “Mammonish” version of 
exceptionalism is primarily egotistical and concerned with personal profit, why should Pierre 
and Raskolnikov then be punished for exhibiting individualistic tendencies? The answer is 
simple: the exceptionalist discourse allows individual interest from the “economical” angle; 
so far that it does not interfere with the established framework of the man-made laws and 
regulations governing the exceptionalist cosmos where it is the group rather than one single 
individual should attain the exceptional status. Individual interest is permitted as long as it 
does not change the overall picture, and is preoccupied with gaining personal profit rather 
than changing society. The external form rules over content, precisely as Spanos would have 
it.138  
          Otherwise, making a display of one’s individuality is quite commonplace and regarded 
as harmless, if slightly deluded or eccentric. Dostoyevsky ironically states of the Nihilists, 
“…[W]ho in our Russia nowadays does not consider himself a Napoleon?” (C&P 252), 
whilst Melville depicts the eccentric inhabitants of the Apostles (parodying exaggerated 
Romanticism of Young America movement), preoccupied with doing absolutely nothing 
(Pierre 228-230).  However, this flirtation with individualistic philosophy is permitted to 
exist as long as it fits in with the established society; genuine individualism and perception of 
                                                 
138 Higgins and Parker in “Reading Pierre” also comment on the “cloying impression of artifice” and 
“playacting” (36-37) pervading the social strata which Pierre emerges from, where the form is held to be more 
important than the essence of things. 
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oneself as exceptional on a grand scale, followed by independent active deeds are, 
meanwhile, unacceptable.139      
         Pease in The New American Exceptionalism discusses precisely why reconciling an 
individualistic personality with the societal expectations in a milieu like Pierre Glendinning’s 
America, is impossible. The “superego” of the individualist conflates itself with the state, in a 
deluded vision: “[T]he subject’s desire to believe that the authority of the state’s laws is 
identical with his or her will would appear to be impossible because of the obscenely 
duplicitous relationship to the state’s laws enacted by the superego in giving expression to 
them” (15). 
          It is evident that individualistic tendencies on a grand scale, symbolised by Enceladus 
(and Pierre) are seen as a major danger. In Subversive Genealogy  Rogin discusses in detail 
the instruments or means that repressive society dominated by exceptionalist discourse uses 
to subdue individualistic rebellion, considering Melville’s text as part of a much broader 
American picture in general. His analysis of G.W. Peck’s scathing review of Pierre in The 
American Whig Review (Rogin 162), and his reference to the “political edifice” in Abraham 
Lincoln’s speeches, are noteworthy, as well as somewhat later attempts to reinvigorate the 
American national ideals by promoting the rule of law and punishment (like prisons) of those 
who oppose it (Rogin 221-223). Robert S. Levine in Conspiracy and Romance offers a 
further point on Melville’s difficulties with grasping the religious-political, accepted yet 
astoundingly repressive national discourse:  
 In the 1850s, Melville lacked [Lincoln’s] ability to appropriate “divine mystery” and 
would mock those, like Pierre’s Plotinus Plinlimmon, who pretended that they could…. 
                                                 




He continued to lack [Lincoln’s] ability to harness the divine for the political. (Levine 
227) 
               This is all the more relevant, as the political rhetoric of that era was preoccupied 
with a somewhat Herderian image of cohesive communal existence, viewed as the ideal. For 
instance, considering Franklin Pierce’s 1854 State of the Union speech, there arises an image 
suggesting the unified national community functioning as a single organism when responding 
to events elsewhere in the world, focusing on the terms like “our” and “we”: 
 Although our attention has been arrested by painful interest in passing events, yet our 
country feels no more than the slight vibrations of the convulsions which have shaken 
Europe. As individuals we cannot repress sympathy with human suffering nor regret 
for the causes which produce it; as a nation we are reminded that whatever interrupts 
the peace or checks the prosperity of any part of Christendom tends more or less to 
involve our own. The condition of States is not unlike that of individuals; they are 
mutually dependent upon each other. (State of the Union Speech 1854) 
 
             The image presented by Pierce can be described effectively as exceptionalist thinking 
at its finest, preoccupied with uniting the disjointed elements making up society. There are 
definite Herderian overtones in that “the condition of States is not unlike that of individuals.” 
It also echoes, on a broader level, Dostoyevsky’s anxieties about the disunion taking hold of 
society that he presents in Raskolnikov’s dream. 
              However, what is even more relevant for this particular chapter is that Pierce’s 
speech, at a second glance, seems tinged with practical self-interest rather than pure-hearted 
altruism. The suggestion that “as a nation we are reminded that whatever interrupts the peace 
or checks the prosperity of any part of Christendom” may threaten the exceptionalist society 
itself appears to put at the forefront a somewhat more ignoble notion of self-preservation. The 
general political climate thus is essentially cynical, in the sense that practicality trumps heroic 
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outbursts. Moreover, it appears quite repressive. The presumed “hero” capable of such 
outbursts is likely to present a danger and should be contained by the efficient governmental 
system which equalizes all citizens out (“no man is so high and none so humble”), as Pierce 
indirectly implies in another State of the Union speech:  
 Fortunately, under this system no man is so high and none so humble in the scale of 
public station as to escape from the scrutiny or to be exempt from the responsibility 
which all official functions imply. Upon the justice and intelligence of the masses, in a 
government thus organized, is … the only security for honest and earnest devotion to 
its interests against the usurpations and encroachment of power on the one hand and the 
assaults of personal ambition on the other. (State of the Union Speech 1853)         
           In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov also comments on the repressiveness of 
society: “Society is all too well provided with banishments, prisons, court investigators, hard 
labour camps – why worry?” (C&P 251). His vision is much more serious than the superficial 
suggestion of “bourgeois shame”: “Or maybe you’re afraid of the bourgeois shame of it, or 
something?” (C&P 436).  
              If we look back at the factual historical evidence offered by Tamarkin (254-267), an 
interesting point arises that would echo Luzhin’s theory: the rebellious violence, if 
superficially permitted (as long as it remains within a “mischief” category which means it is 
manageable and does not pose a genuine danger), it inevitably grows infrequent, and ceases 
completely (it is notable that the revolutionary upheavals of 1848, as Innes and Philp also 
point out, did not result in lasting change). In this way, a seemingly liberal gesture in 
permitting violence as means of expression rather than violently subduing it, may prove to be 
more effective in terms of controlling. The middle-of-the-road liberalism would be an 
instrument of maintaining social peace.  
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          It is interesting to observe that Plotinus Plinlimmon and Luzhin, antagonising the main 
characters, share the imagery of timekeeping and control. In his very first appearance in the 
novel, Luzhin “…slowly drew his hand up to his waistcoat pocket, took out an enormous, 
gold-lidded watch, opened it, looked, and as slowly and sluggishly put it back into his 
pocket” (C&P 136). The slowness of his movement, the measured control felt from this 
description, and the presumed preciousness of the watch all suggest a figure in control of the 
events, the “master” who gets to decide what happens. The scene with the watch is essentially 
the demonstration of power in the face of Raskolnikov’s wild ambitions. With Plinlimmon, 
one encounters the name “Chronometrics” and images of the “paternal old Saturn” (Pierre 
251) both associated with time-keeping and control of the events.140 The fact that desperate 
Pierre sees Plinlimmon as “the mild-mystic aspect in the tower window” (Pierre 251) right 
before his own dwelling-place is also a subtly veiled metaphor for the demonstration of who 
truly is in control. The images of both young men struggling in vain in the face of ruthlessly 
methodical controlling figures seem to be a uniting moment for both Melville and 
Dostoyevsky’s texts; revealing the futility of the individualistic rebelliousness in the 
exceptionalist society.  
 
THE ROLE OF THE PAMPHLET: PLINLIMMONIAN PHILOSOPHY.  
           Whether to mystify us further or to give an explanation of his own stance, Melville 
includes what could be a detailed organised summary of the ideological beliefs regulating the 
domestic world. It is probably the most cryptic part of the novel – Plinlimmon’s Pamphlet.  
         If Moby-Dick has the unhuman White Whale as one of its central characters on the par 
with the human protagonists, one may assume that the pamphlet, unanimated as it is, is a 
character in its own right. Its first appearance is ludicrous and Satanic at once: 
                                                 
140 In Roman mythology, the god Saturn is associated with time. 
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It was a thin, tattered, dried-fish-like thing; printed with blurred ink upon mean, sleazy 
paper. It seemed the opening pages of some ruinous old pamphlet—a pamphlet 
containing a chapter or so of some very voluminous disquisition. The conclusion was 
gone. It must have been accidentally left there by some previous traveler, who perhaps 
in drawing out his handkerchief, had ignorantly extracted his waste paper. (Pierre 178) 
           The pamphlet’s appearance, incongruous in the world where appearance is highly 
important, is particularly at odds with its name. “Chronometricals and Horologicals” suggests 
Franklinian lucidity, implying that superficially the “ruinous old pamphlet” appears to uphold 
the societal rules of self-reliance and temperance, holding together the institutionalised 
world.141 Its triviality belies its demonic role; a similar part is played, for Dostoyevsky’s hero, 
by a fragment of a random conversation: 
This coincidence always seemed strange to him. This negligible tavern conversation 
had an extreme influence on him in further development of the affair; as though there 
were indeed some predestination, some indication in it…. (C&P 63) 
            The seeming logic governing the universe is then boiled down to pure absolute 
chance. However, what is more relevant than the pamphlet’s bizarre random appearance, is 
the fact that the conclusion is absent. There is also a certain irony implying the demonic 
nature of this event: further on, Melville dubs the pamphlet “…a miserable, sleazy paper-rag, 
which … they would hardly touch with St Dunstan’s long tongs.”142 When Plinlimmon 
appears himself later on, he displays a more sophisticated demonic trait: vagueness and 
                                                 
141 In Herman Melville and the American Calling  Spanos speaks of the dominant culture “precipitated by 
Chronologicals and Horologicals” (30) determining how society should function. Earlier on, Pierre’s childhood 
home of Saddle Meadows is termed as “…a totally monumentalized and charted space – that conceals a primal 
rupture…” (21). 
     Melville’s envisaging of Franklin was at best uneasy, as can be seen from “The Lighting-Rod Man” (1854) 
and Israel Potter (1855) 
142 The legend of St Dunstan seizing the Devil with a pair of tongs is well-known in medieval folklore: see 
definition by St Dunstan’s Episcopal Church. 
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elusiveness.143 This brings to mind the serpent-tempter of Eden rather than the stereotypical 
“devil”: 
 But while the personal look and air of this man were thus winning, there was still 
something latently visible in him which repelled … To crown all, a certain floating 
atmosphere seemed to invest and go along with this man. That atmosphere seems only 
renderable in words by the term Inscrutableness. (Pierre 248) 
           Jehlen claims that Plinlimmon “is unambiguously evil – he has resolved the problem 
of ambiguity, effectively by declaring it not a problem, but an advantage” (Jehlen 209). 
However, in purely spiritual terms (unlike the worldly ones), this philosophy is flawed. 
Plinlimmon’s sophist nature and ambiguous philosophising are suggestive of the way the 
Devil is conventionally viewed – and yet, Melville does not make the plot as straightforward. 
My own perception of Plinlimmon’s role in the novel is that he is essentially a “tempter” 
rather like Satan in the Book of Job. His aim is not as much to overturn the accepted social 
order (where he has found for himself a comfortable position), but rather to tempt and weed 
out those like Pierre Glendinning, who may pose a danger to this order. If the pamphlet is 
described as “fish-like,” one could say that Plinlimmon is indeed fishing for potentially 
dangerous souls. 
           Dostoyevsky’s novel mirrors this plot trope in the figure of Porfiry Petrovich, who 
subjects Raskolnikov’s visions to “forced and deliberate distortion” (C&P 245) calling him 
out to commence the discussion and reveal the truth about what he had done. Instead of a 
lively intellectual debate in the direct sense of the word, discussion and exchange of ideas in 
an exceptionalist society serve to separate the potentially dangerous elements from the rest.  
         If to consider the role played by Plinlimmon’s pamphlet from a religious viewpoint, the 
parallel is obvious: Pierre is granted a set of commandments, along with free will to 




independently make a conclusion and reach his own choice. Melville himself coyly expresses 
his awareness of this notion: 
For to me it seems more the excellently illustrated re-statement of a problem, than the 
solution of the problem itself. But as such mere illustrations are almost universally taken 
for solutions (and perhaps they are the only possible human solutions), therefore it may 
help to the temporary quiet of some inquiring mind; and so not be wholly without use. 
At the worst, each person can now skip, or read and rail for himself. (Pierre 181) 
          Thus the “Non-Benevolence” of Plinlimmon and his philosophy is justified: he is not 
required to exhibit such quality as would inspire an individual (Pierre) towards behaving in a 
particular way. Rather, it is the individual who has to read the philosophical treaty, decide 
what to think of it, and act accordingly or “rail for himself” – the attitude which reflects the 
Franklinian ideal of self-reliance.144  However, there is devilish irony in that the 
commandments are presented in the guise of “waste paper” the appearance speaking first and 
loudest (the role of appearance was already noted to exceed the essence of a phenomenon in 
Pierre’s world).145 Initially we can interpret this moment as a point when the supremely 
important dogmas of the exceptionalist society (of which Pierre is part) are being subjected to 
mockery and irony by the intellectual elite.146 The individual who dares to transgress them 
remains unaware of the severe retribution that would ensue, “freezing dissent in the United 
States into a complete silence” as per Spanos.  
            Was Melville trying to hint at the repressiveness of his own rule-bound world? 
Spanos seems to push us towards that direction, hinting at “policing agencies of the dominant 
culture” (118) pressing down on a rebellious individual. Such agencies are so inseparable 
                                                 
144 The fluidity of Plinlimmon’s philosophy and its difficulty to be pinpointed is alluded to by Hester Blum in 
“Melville and Oceanic Studies” (Levine 35). 
145 See also Rogin 11 on the role of appearance. 
146 Melville’s opposition of “intellectual aristocracy” is discussed more deeply through a Socialist lens by Yuri 
Kovalev in Herman Melville and the American Romanticism (63). 
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from the said culture, that they appear as its part and parcel.147 The need to control society is 
evident, even if that may appear to stifle exceptional individual genius. That, unfortunately, is 
precisely what happens in Pierre, despite the possibility that as a relatively “young” nation 
(as per De Tocqueville), America could have served as a ground for developing a new, more 
liberal and just societal structure unfettered by excessive regulatory rules. 
          Returning to Priscilla Wald’s concept regarding the potentially dangerous idea as a 
virus of sorts, the pamphlet yet again attains an ominous air of being a possible source of 
intellectual “infection.” In a later scene in the novel, Pierre has a conversation with a deaf 
bookseller which is at once comical and suggestive of Wald’s idea: 
       Among other efforts, Pierre in person had accosted a limping half-deaf old 
bookstall man, not very far from the Apostles’. “Have you the Chronometrics, my 
friend?” forgetting the exact title. 
“Very bad, very bad!” said the old man, rubbing his back. – “has had the chronic-
rheumatics ever so long; what’s good for ‘em?” 
Perceiving his mistake, Pierre replied that he did not know what was the infallible 
remedy. 
“Whist! Let me tell ye, then, young ‘un,” said the old cripple, limping close up to him, 
and putting his mouth in Pierre’s ear – “Never catch ‘em! –now’s the time, while you’re 
young: - never catch ‘em!” (Pierre 250) 
           In this scene, the comparison of the dangerous idea and a physical illness which can be 
“caught” is explicit, bringing to mind the previously discussed mystery disease in the dream 
sequence in Dostoyevsky’s novel, or the fact that Raskolnikov’s fevered state of mind after 
his crime is referred to metaphorically as an “illness” (C&P 327). Moreover, in an 
                                                 
147 For broader discussion of the antebellum American extreme interest in ritualized social customs of the 
English culture, see Tamarkin xix-xxv. 
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unexpectedly prophetic moment, Melville’s bookseller does suggest that such ideological 
viruses affect specifically young people, posing a veritable danger and bringing up again the 
concept of youthful rebellion discussed earlier on. However, considering the authorship of 
Plotinus Plinlimmon, it also becomes clear that this is not a spontaneous, randomly occurring 
phenomenon, but a deliberate action caused by a figure who seems to initially represent 
reason and societal control.  
           Therefore, Plinlimmon is the serpent-tempter, deliberately diffusing controversial 
ideas so as to identify the individuals most susceptible to them early on - so that society may 
duly restrain them before they attain the full potential of a Napoleonic hero (just as it happens 
with Raskolnikov’s article (C&P 245-248)). In this manner, Plinlimmon is akin to Porfiry 
Petrovich the investigator, gently goading Raskolnikov to confess (C&P 327) by discussing 
“psychology” of murder, which “can drive a man to jump out of the window or off a bell-
tower, and it’s such a tempting sensation, sir” (C&P 327).148  
          The first two paragraphs of the pamphlet come across to the reader as highly 
hypocritical. An exceptionalist spirit appears incorrigible in its own righteousness, gliding 
along its own established boundaries. However, as Plinlimmon comically implies, in the 
diverse actual world the dogmatic narrowness of exceptionalism loses its meaningfulness to 
the point of high absurdity and essential uselessness. Standards accepted in one society 
(however much it wishes to see itself as exceptional) become meaningless when viewed apart 
from that particular society: 
 [T]here is a certain most rare order of human souls, which … will almost always and 
everywhere give Heaven's own Truth, with some small grains of variance. For 
peculiarly coming from God, the sole source of that heavenly truth, and the great 
Greenwich hill and tower from which the universal meridians are far out into infinity 
                                                 
148 See also Melville’s short story, “The Bell Tower” (1855) for similar imagery. 
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reckoned; such souls seem as London sea-chronometers … True, in nearly all cases of 
long, remote voyages—to China, say—chronometers of the best make … will gradually 
more or less vary from Greenwich time, without the possibility of the error being 
corrected by direct comparison with their great standard … [T]he chronometric soul … 
will always, in its so-called intuitions of right and wrong, be contradicting the mere 
local standards and watch-maker's brains of this earth.” (Pierre 181-182) 
           Bringing up the theme of Franklinian reason, Plinlimmon symbolises exceptionalism 
as a chronometer; a “great standard” to assess the world around one, even to the point of 
absurdity.149 Concerning Melville’s own biography (particularly stressed by Lewis Mumford, 
and more recently, Andrew Delbanco)150 - it may be interpreted as a parody on the forceful 
imposition of white, colonial ideals (held by the American exceptionalist discourse as 
“Greenwich time” and “heavenly truth”) on anything that may oppose these, represented as 
hypothetical “China” or an imaginary realm.151 Such exceptionalism (particularly relevant, 
taking into context the specific ideological atmosphere of post-Revolution, antebellum, 
Protestant American North), is narrowly-focused and “domestic” - a conflict between “the 
discourse and practise of the world” (Pierre 112) and the individual hero.  
            However, the narrowness of the exceptionalist viewpoint offers a comforting 
familiarity to the individual spirit. The “long, remote voyages – to China, say” appear to be 
perilous for the psyche. Spanos discusses at length Pierre’s confrontation with the uncanny, 
presented as a wild, meaningless chaos, and of “Pierre’s later obsessive but futile search for 
                                                 
149 Parker and Higgins in “Reading Pierre” suggest that the pamphlet should be seen as satire: “The satire of the 
pamphlet is directed at nominal Christians who (like the author of the pamphlet) are unable to respond to the 
unworldly wisdom of Jesus except in worldly terms, and so resort, at last, to that virtuous expedience, which, 
according to the pamphlet, is “what the best mortal men do daily practice” (117). “A Janusian difficulty for the 
readers of Pierre is that Pierre and Plinlimmon are judged from the stance of absolute Christianity at the same 
time that elsewhere Christianity is judged in the light of the horrors that follow any attempts to put it into 
practice” (117). 
150 See Delbanco, Melville: His World and his Work.  
151 The domineering thought of exceptionalism being seen as not just American, but a European phenomenon is 
mentioned by Spanos in Herman Melville and the American Calling. 
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the “Talismanic secret” that would recuperate and make his disintegrated universe intelligible 
again” (Spanos 109). It is tempting to connect this idea again to the idea of narrow-minded 
masculinity rooted in perception of one’s self as exceptional and incorrigible, in that Pierre, 
confined within its boundaries, sees anything outside those (personified by the feminine, 
inexplicable mystique of Isabel, who arrives unexpectedly from an unspecified place, wholly 
alien to the microcosm of Saddle Meadows) as unsolvable mystery: “So Pierre renounced all 
thought of ever having Isabel’s dark lantern illuminated to him. Her light was lidded, and the 
lid was locked” (Pierre 123). Pierre Glendinning does not succeed in locating the “talismanic 
secret” – but we as readers are made aware of the exact reason to why the world outside the 
limits of the permitted exceptionalist vision was precisely so attractive, and dangerous. As a 
comparative comment, it strikes one as notable that Raskolnikov is lured out into the 
“dangerous territory” opposing the law specifically by female characters: Sonya, who needs to 
be saved from prostitution; Dunya, who needs to be saved from a loveless marriage; or the 
unnamed seduced girl he encounters in the street: “Poor, meek ones, with meek eyes… Dear 
ones! Why don’t they weep? Why don’t they moan?” (C&P 261). It can be clearly seen, that 
the writer at that time looked predominantly at the male character: women still are seen as 
figures assisting the progression of the plot, rather than genuine change-makers and potential 
“Enceladuses.”152 The feared individualistic radical is primarily imagined as male.  
          The above points can be read as the pressing need of a character (specifically a masculine 
one, driven by perverted visions of the exceptionalist discourse) to logically explain and 
familiarise everything within his grasp, especially as the expansion of his universe progresses, 
thus being tied in with concepts of expansionism and Manifest Destiny. An individual is then 
offered an unfavourable position where he lacks the capability to unearth and explore the full 
                                                 
152 Alexander Herzen, in his story The Thieving Magpie (1848) notes that in Russia, there are not enough 
renowned female singers – as women are yet to gain their own voice. 
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potential of his masculinity, but everything outside this concept remains a baffling mystery 
which he is unable to understand. As we remember, Plinlimmon’s pamphlet lacks conclusion 
and cannot reassure, and this may very well be a deliberate omission on Melville’s part, playing 
up on the concept of free will and individual conscious choice. 
         What appears to be the case regarding the individual exceptionalism, however, is that it 
at first denigrates the accepted framework of exceptionalist, “American,” acceptable 
worldview, but then subsequently pushes the individual to seek elsewhere the satisfying 
psychological feeling that this very exceptionalist discourse gave. The right of an individual to 
disassemble or destroy, in order to seek something that would help to reassemble the world 
into a comprehensible place once again, is a powerful topic in Pierre which renders it similar 
to Crime and Punishment. Furthermore, Plinlimmon’s pamphlet echoes the views expressed 
by Raskolnikov himself in an article he produced (superficially interpreted as a discussion of 
the individual’s own standing as opposed to society). It suggests that a particular, 
“extraordinary” category of people (evocative of Plinlimmon’s argument) have a specific right 
of dissembling that otherwise is not permissible societally (“conservative” others would have 
to be presumably satisfied with De Tocquevillean “enlightened self-interest”): 
 The whole point is that … all people are somehow divided into the “ordinary” and 
“extraordinary” The ordinary must live in obedience and have no right to transgress 
the law, because they are, after all, ordinary. While the extraordinary have the right to 
commit all sorts of crimes and in various ways to transgress the law, because in point 
of fact they are extraordinary … [T]he masses hardly ever acknowledge this right in 
them; they punish them and hang them (more or less), thereby quite rightly fulfilling 
their conservative purpose; yet, for all that, and in subsequent generations these same 
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masses place the punished ones on a pedestal and worship them (more or less). (C&P 
245-247) 
             The presence of the extraordinary in the societal framework is then presented as a 
natural aspect of human existence, in a rather alarming idea. Raskolnikov’s article is directly 
challenging. In comparison to it, Plinlimmon’s arguments are of a far more morally 
relativistic, elusive nature, harping on the fact that perhaps some phenomena that are 
inacceptable in certain societies, are perfectly normal in others. He hints that the existence of 
multitudinous exceptionalist traditions, described as “the mere local standards and watch-
maker brains of this earth,” typical to diverse states or societies, yet essentially different in 
spirit from each other, is not just possible, but natural.153 Rogin also mentions that 
Plinlimmon’s pamphlet is relativistic and morally ambiguous (96). However, essentially 
diverse traditions all boil down to the same essence, once the cultural or geographical 
differences, or “Chinese notions” are stripped: 
 [T]hough man's Chinese notions of things may answer well enough here, they are by 
no means universally applicable … And yet it follows not from this, that God's truth is 
one thing and man's truth another … by their very contradictions they are made to 
correspond … [H]e who finding in himself a chronometrical soul, seeks practically to 
force that heavenly time upon the earth; in such an attempt he can never succeed, with 
an absolute and essential success. And as for himself, if he seek to regulate his own 
daily conduct by it, he will but array all men's earthly time-keepers against him, and 
thereby work himself woe and death. (Pierre 182) 
                                                 
153 Rogin, Subversive Genealogy. 
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           To summarise what may be finally said of Plinlimmon’s philosophy, it appears that 
Melville himself is subtly satirising the narrowness of societal exceptionalism ruled by “earthly 
time-keepers” and their standards, threatening “woe and death” to anyone who does not fit in, 
however, at the same time yielding to the fact that it offers the only possibility to make sense 
of how the world works and grow reconciled with it. Unlike with the hero of Crime and 
Punishment, where the conscious act of Christian repentance is offered to somewhat sweeten 
the necessity to submissively follow the pragmatic Luzhin and his ilk, Pierre shows that trying 
to escape the world is impossible and ludicrous, no matter how heroic it may seem.  
 
PIERRE AND RODION: SAME AND DIFFERENT. 
        The rest of this chapter looks at the specific character traits of the protagonists, and how 
they are affected by the influence of the exceptionalist discourse in the course of the plot. It is 
evident that change is a major theme associated with both Pierre and Rodion. In each novel, 
the protagonist emerges as a completely changed being at the end – Dostoyevsky likens this to 
the “raising of Lazarus” (C&P 522) whilst Melville is being decidedly less optimistic, 
presenting a downward descent to doom (Pierre 307-308).  
             Both protagonists are male, white, and experiencing what comes across as a deep 
directional crisis. In the light of the general stance assumed by the modern scholarship on 
Melville, the said crisis is unsurprising, coming as a straightforward result of the conflict 
between the young individualistic intellectual and the hierarchical constraints permeating the 
mid-nineteenth century ideological climate in which both narratives take place.154 This 
conflict holds at the core the notion that as a white male coming from a non-working class 
                                                 
154 See Rogin, and Dimock. Also broadly Parker and Higgins’ analyses.  
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background (one might note Pierre’s illustrious family background, or how Raskolnikov is 
mocked as a “gentleman” by his fellow inmates (C&P 517)), the protagonist is torn between 
two major possibilities. He can either to strive out individually and achieve exceptional 
greatness, as symbolised by Enceladus for Melville and Napoleon for Dostoyevsky (and 
which the exceptionalist mythology seems to promote, using concepts such as the Manifest 
Destiny), or else to adhere to the worldview promoted by Luzhin and Plinlimmon, achieving 
social respectability and good fortune whilst staying within the frameworks of societal 
functioning. Both texts make it clear that it is the former rather than the latter path is chosen, 
the individuality of both characters driving them to assume a radical stance. Pierre and 
Rodion are shown by authors as radical thinkers of the highest degree, even if society, 
terrified at this, chooses to shun them.155  Delbanco notes in Pierre a “serious anatomy of the 
radical imagination that anticipates Dostoyevsky’s The Possessed” (205), and Brook Thomas 
states, “…[R]adical Pierre becomes one of those excluded from the American covenant” 
(147). Radicalism, both writers imply, is a direct consequence for the ideologically 
contaminated masculine psyche affected by identity crisis described above, as well as a 
bugbear for general public.156  
            The manifested radicalism is emphasised by the fact that the characters in question 
happen to be young men, their youthfulness being a risk factor for ideological radicalisation. 
Indeed, both are frequently referred within the text or by the critics as youthful - Higgins and 
Parker refer to Pierre’s “youthful obliviousness” (35).157 Delbanco goes more explicit as to 
call Pierre a “spoiled man-child” (204).  Throughout the first chapter, Pierre is being 
                                                 
155 Delbanco, Melville, his World and Work.  
156 This way, my subsequent analysis of Devils (The Possessed) alongside Moby-Dick in the next chapter is 
strategically positioned to reflect what occurs when the radical imagination of the individual comes into contact 
with the rest of society.   
157 In Higgins and Parker, “Reading Pierre.” Also see Matthisen, “American Renaissance: Art and 
Expressionism in the Age of Emerson and Whitman” 470, and Chase, “Herman Melville: a Critical Study” 113, 
on the same matter.  
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continuously referred to (both by Melville and other characters) as a “youth” or “boy” – “a 
fine, proud, loving, docile, vigorous boy” (Pierre 22) says Mrs Glendinning, listing all the 
virtues commonly associated with the notion. Meanwhile, Raskolnikov is heard ironising 
about those like himself: “[T]he vain and silly in particular fall for such bait; young men 
particularly” (C&P 250).  
             Considering Pierre’s failure to follow in the footsteps of his revered grandfather, as 
well as Raskolnikov’s inability to remain cheerfully practical in the face of daily tribulations 
like his peers, one may connect this fact with the notion of the Plinlimmonian middle-of-the-
road ideal. The conclusion upon which one may subsequently arrive is that in the 
exceptionalist society, a young man of Pierre or Rodion’s standing is expected to play a very 
concrete, recognisable role that would help support the frameworks of the said society rather 
than topple them. In the meantime, any deviation from these set obligations society would 
punish. Looking at Franklin Pierce’s State of the Union speeches, one comes across a passage 
subtly illustrating exactly this state of affairs: 
 Our forefathers were trained to the wisdom which conceived and the courage which 
achieved independence by the circumstances which surrounded them, and they were 
thus made capable of the creation of the Republic. It devolved on the next generation 
to consolidate the work of the Revolution ... To us of this generation remains the not 
less noble task of maintaining and extending the national power. We have at length 
reached that stage of our country's career in which the dangers to be encountered and 
the exertions to be made are the incidents, not of weakness, but of strength. (State of 
the Union Speech 1856) 
           In this respect, young men of Pierre’s calibre were expected to be the “maintainers” of 
the attained social order – and certainly not acting as radical change-bringers that “Young 
America” or Nihilism idealised. Meanwhile, the title of Dostoyevsky’s novel, Crime and 
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Punishment, also seems to hint at the expectations imposed on the protagonist, as well as 
what may occur in case these are not met.  
            An interesting observation is that the characters’ youth is accompanied by physical 
perfection, which notably wanes as the plot progresses, the physical state reflecting the 
psychological change. It is interesting to reflect on the fact that as their descent advances, 
both Raskolnikov and Pierre Glendinning grow more haggard in appearance.158 The 
progression of the spiritual descent manifested in external appearance is evident both in 
Pierre, described as “bright-cheeked, chestnut-haired,” (Pierre 10-11) and Raskolnikov, who 
is “remarkably good-looking” (C&P 4). As the plot continues, Raskolnikov changes: 
“[E]xternally, he seemed to resemble a wounded man or a man suffering from some acute 
physical pain: his brows were knitted, his lips compressed, his eyes inflamed” (C&P 211) – 
the metaphor for illness is blatant. Pierre’s case is even more poignant: “Ah! Shivering thus 
day after day in his wrappers and cloaks, is this the warm lad that once sung to the world of 
the Tropical Summer?” (Pierre 262). The suggestion of appearance-altering spiritual or 
psychological illness encompassing all levels of being is evident. The nature of this illness is 
connectable with the earlier argument about the ideological virus gradually overcoming the 
individual. Both protagonists are essentially presented as “sick” and therefore need to be 
quarantined from society, metaphorically at least.  
          Another aspect of this argument is the conflict between the material and idealistic 
notions. Mired in entirely spiritual musings, Pierre and Raskolnikov dangerously ignore the 
material, imperfect aspect of earthly existence, which proves to be their downfall as their 
idealism comes into contact with the actual world. This is precisely what both the dream of 
Enceladus and the warnings of Plinlimmon and Luzhin seek to stress.  
                                                 




          In regards to the historical context, Peter Onuf suggests that there exist two different 
visions of exceptionalism, depending on whether one looks from an idealistic or a more 
material viewpoint, the latter essentially being tied with the pragmatic, commercial matters 
rather than highbrow patriotism (and an aspect that both protagonists ignore in favour of 
loftier aspirations).159 This is harmonious with Melville’s concept of Pierre as a character 
who has been pursuing an exceptionalist ideal from an imaginary, non-material angle, 
blithely ignoring the impediments brought about by physicality. In the text of the novel, 
Melville offers a humorous testimony to this early on: “…[W]hen we consider these athletic 
habitudes of Pierre, and the great fullness of brawn and muscle they built round about him; 
all of which manly brawn and muscle, three times a day loudly clamoured for attention…” 
(Pierre 19). 
             Yet again we revert to Plinlimmon’s discourse, in that finding a favourable middle-
ground between the flesh and the spirit is absolutely necessary. Melville seems to be quite 
adamant in suggesting that denying flesh altogether in pursuit of the individualistic or 
exceptionalist dream (which later on would be echoed by Raskolnikov and his kin as a 
foremost virtue) is precisely what undoes this dream.160 Both characters have attempted to be 
fleshless – and they fell. “Pierre” sarcastically underlines this fact early on: “[T]here was one 
little uncelestial trait, which, in the opinion of some, may mar the romantic merits of 
gentlemanly Pierre Glendinning. He always had an excellent appetite, and especially for his 
breakfast” (Pierre 19). 
            The heroic aspirations come into conflict with the actual physicality. Unlike the 
automaton-like figures of Luzhin and Plinlimmon, Pierre and Raskolnikov (who experiences 
                                                 
159 See the analysis by Peter Onuf, “Imperialism and Nationalism in the early American Republic” in Empire’s 
Twin, pp 22-23. 
160 See J. Wilson’s thesis, Radical Chastity: the politics of abstinence in nineteenth-century Russian literature. 
However, Wilson mainly concerns herself with the sexual abstinence rather than general asceticism, which, I 
believe, is more relevant here. 
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“deepest revulsion” at the filthy conditions in St Petersburg slums (C&P 4)) are essentially 
human and react physically to the world around them. However, the conflict between the 
physical and the spiritual is not the only one that relates Pierre to Raskolnikov. The 
pronounced tension between the earthly and the spiritual becomes more apparent as both 
characters attempt to emulate a noble ideal imposed by the society, and reveal deep-seated 
tension between the accepted (and quite artificial) vague ideal and the innate truthful self-
consciousness.161  
          “They’re hard-working, commercial people, concerned with “universal happiness.” … 
I don’t want to sit waiting for universal happiness,” claims Raskolnikov of society in general 
(C&P 260). Nor does Pierre Glendinning wish to take the obvious route by offering 
conventional charity to Isabel. Both protagonists wish to choose their own causes to fight for, 
as well as the manner in which they would proceed to do so. Both fail. The obsessive search 
for a cause to champion and prove oneself is also unnatural and at odds with how the world 
stands: Higgins and Parker explicitly dub it “chivalric artifice” (84). 
          It is not enough for a masculine character to be a hero in an institutionally rigid, 
corrective universe: the hero must be careful in selecting a correct cause to champion rather 
than just following his instinct for justice. The societal boundaries imposed on Pierre as well 
as his attempts to dutifully obey those are made plain in the very first chapters, as his 
mother’s thoughts: “Pray heavens he show his heroicness in some smooth way of favouring 
fortune, not be called out to be a hero of some dark hope forlorn…” (Pierre 22). 
           There exists a widespread allegorical notion, where the individual is seen as the 
“prodigal son” disappointing the exceptionalist society that spawned him. This can be said in 
particular of Melville’s novel. Mary Glendinning, “now not very far from her grand 
                                                 
161 Delbanco states, “Pierre in this sense was Melville’s representative American – a quixotic believer who trusts 
his own righteousness ever as he swings wildly between allegiances” (188). 
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climacteric” (Pierre 19) represents the British imperial ideal, that spawns Pierre, who is 
viewed as its dazzling descendant, destined to continue the grand imperial tradition (this 
would also explain the continuous striving for chivalric deeds). As long as Pierre (a 
representative of young America: not necessarily Duykinck’s, but the entire nation entering 
its place on the world arena) remains “docile” and within the boundaries imposed by the 
mother who birthed him, fame and glory remain his by right: as long as the values he chooses 
to uphold and champion remain harmonious with the mother-figure’s: “[H]is little wife, that 
is to be, will not estrange him from me; for she too is docile … How glad I am that Pierre 
loves her, and not some dark eyed haughtiness, with whom I could never live in peace…” 
(Pierre 22). 
        The juxtaposition of Lucy and Isabel in the exceptionalist interpretation of the novel 
symbolises the choice of different causes which a hero could support (it is notable, that in the 
literary world that was still largely ruled by male writers, the female characters are placed as 
symbolic representations rather than wholly realistic characters). Blue-eyed Lucy represents a 
safe and approved set of political beliefs or causes to champion, that offer no threat to the 
imperial figure of Mrs Glendinning, who explicitly states her desire to “live in peace.” As 
long as Pierre chooses to court her, he remains within the accepted grounds of the 
exceptionalist cosmos. However, the “dark-eyed haughtiness” of Isabel represents, in an 
exceptionalist parable, not so much a straightforward erotic temptation as most critics would 
insist, but rather a cause or political belief that falls outside the range of acceptable causes 
within the exceptionalist discourse. She very well may pose actual danger – or she may not. 
In Dostoyevsky’s world, Raskolnikov’s obsessive need to save souls like Sonia or Dunya 
from the clutches of prostitution, is much more benevolent, and yet possibly plays on the 
same subconscious anxieties. 
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         What matters is that “dark” causes represented by Isabel, if championed by American 
youths such as Pierre, would bring the said youths outside the acceptable discourse. This 
would then result in their inevitable expulsion from the safe boundaries of the exceptionalist 
universe, whilst the glory that was theirs by right, would be inherited, as the previous sub-
chapter suggests, by the more pragmatic (if less spectacular), Luzhin-style type personified 
by “the less earnest and now Europeanized” Glendinning Stanley (Pierre 188). 
         Nevertheless, the problem resides with the fact that there are no clear divisions between 
“right” and “wrong” or explicitly termed guidelines which the characters could rely on (apart 
from random snatches of thought like Plinlimmon’s pamphlet, presented under the guise of 
waste-paper), although it appears that their world expects them to do precisely this. The 
correct way to conduct oneself has to be intuitively deduced. More importantly, both Pierre 
Glendinning and Dostoyevsky’s hero have been exposed to noxious philosophical concepts 
such as Plinlimmon’s philosophy or the Napoleonic visions, freely available in their strata of 
society, which offer a perfect breeding-ground for their dark ideas.162   
         Why are the ideas personified by Plinlimmon’s pamphlet toxic in the first place? 
Previously we have discussed the awareness that Raskolnikov, unlike Pierre, exhibits in 
understanding them (even if choosing to wilfully shut his eyes at their true nature). The key 
problem with any idea is that it is essentially neutral until it arrives in the hands of an 
individual who may adapt it so, that it might have a potential to cause harm. John Milbank 
offers a summary of this view: “This liberty is dubious, since it is impossible to choose at all 
                                                 
162 See Higgins & Parker, Reading Melville’s “Pierre, or the Ambiguities”. 
    Also see M. E. Dichmann, “Absolutism in Melville’s Pierre.” The idea that the world is subtly tainted and 
contains germinating rudiments of dangerous ideologies capable of taking over an individual is touched upon by 
Dichmann, who offers an examination of the “Chronometricals” passage in particular, claiming that as man 
attempts to reach the ideal offered to him by the established norms, it is only natural that evil or morally wrong 
events occur as a result, because of the universe’s tainted nature. 
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unless one is swayed one way or another by an influence: hence a supposedly “pure” free 
choice will only be a cover for the operation of hidden and uniform influences” (224).163 
           Taking into account Milbank’s argument, we are presented with yet another reason for 
the necessity of Plinlimmonian balance between the idealism and reality in pursuit of the 
ideal exceptionalist vision. If one looks from this viewpoint, it becomes quite clear: an 
idealistic rebel, no matter how grand or well-intended his plans are, is influenced by an 
external idea coming from elsewhere – and it is truly a game of Russian roulette whether or 
not this idea would turn dangerous.  
          Another factor which explains the radicalism in both characters and renders them 
similar, is the notion of social class. The plot stresses that both have previously enjoyed what 
can be described as privileged or cultured upbringing – less evident, perhaps, in case of 
Raskolnikov.164 I argue that the characters’ social class is what gives them the opportunity to 
consider, philosophize, and even put aside the material rather than idealistic concerns, instead 
of being concerned largely with survival, where toying with a potentially dangerous 
ideological stance could mean physical death. My reading of this aspect of the texts is that the 
characters’ identity as representatives of the educated classes the writers associate with 
perilous carelessness. To reinforce this point, Higgins and Parker in “Reading Melville’s 
“Pierre, or the Ambiguities,” suggest that Pierre’s familial background makes him lack 
discernment in the face of potentially toxic ideas: “…[S]ince Pierre has grown up in the 
sheltered, rarefied world of Saddle Meadows, however, the ideas in the pamphlet are likely to 
be wholly new to him” (119). Perhaps this situation is not accidental, but deliberate on the 
part of the upholders of the social order such as Mary Glendinning, and pointing towards 
societal control equating to imposition of intellectual ignorance (which of course, bearing in 
                                                 
163 See John Milbank. 
164 The cynical idea that punishment and/or prison is “no place for a gentleman” like Raskolnikov is commented 
on by Ruttenburg in Dostoyevsky’s Democracy, 186.  
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mind the subsequent events, only worsens the outcome contrary to the expectations): “A 
noble boy, and docile… And he does not grow vain-glorious in sophomorean wisdom. I 
thank heaven I sent him not to college” (Pierre 22). 
               It is a surprising notion, as one commonly would associate a character like Pierre 
with being carefully educated and intellectually aware. However, Meredith McGill and 
Michael Collins both present one with an overview of the actual situation within the 
intellectual circles of Melville’s day, which show the extent to which an idea (often ill-
devised or essentially toxic) could be “puffed” up (using McGill’s terminology) in order to 
attain influence over those exposed to it. 165 According to McGill as well as Collins, the 
seeming democratisation of intellectual thought in nineteenth-century American setting posed 
a controversy precisely because of the “puffery” of a toxic idea by the elite intellectual 
thinkers, and its subsequent influence over the wider public, wont to produce new 
“Enceladuses” as a result. This image is metaphorically echoed by Melville in his description 
of Pierre, as a juvenile author revelling in his imaginary talent, sitting “smoking, and 
smoking, mild and self-festooned as a vapory mountain” (Pierre 225). 
         Reverting to the concept of a virus, the metaphor of contagion by air is quite obvious. 
Emory Elliott, in “Art, Religion and the Problem of Authority in Pierre” implies that the lack 
of directional ideals in the established American society can also be to blame: “…Melville 
keeps before the reader the question of Pierre’s calling. In his well-established American 
society of the Eastern seaboard no longer fraught with revolution or Indian wars, an angry 
young man has few creative outlets for his righteous indignation” (343). This notion is 
relatable to the idea of futile masculinity explored earlier in relation to the Enceladus 
sequence.  
                                                 
165 McGill, American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1834-1853; Collins, “The Illimitable Dominion 
of Charles Dickens: Transatlantic Print culture and the Spring of 1842.” 
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            Pierre and Raskolnikov have also been affected by the exceptionalist discourse to the 
extent of attempting and failing rebellion against it in order to do hypothetical “good.”166 
However, what interests us is their particular personal susceptibility to toxic ideology. 
Delbanco provides an idea of the socio-political climate at the time, which can allow us to 
comprehend better the characters’ psychological makeup: “The sort of questions Pierre asks 
were being asked everywhere at a time when, as Emerson wrote to Thomas Carlyle, 
Americans were “all a little wild with numberless projects of social reform.” What was to be 
done for those excluded from the vaunted bounty and freedom of American life?” (Delbanco 
191).167  
         Notably, both heroes exhibit a peculiar, strained state of mind when the destructive idea 
is first presented to them. Raskolnikov’s psychological state is meticulously recorded (C&P 
3-6); as is Pierre’s “dark and wild” mental state immediately before encountering the 
pamphlet: 
His thoughts were very dark and wild; for a space there was rebellion and horrid 
anarchy and infidelity in his soul … Just such now was the mood of Pierre; to him the 
Evil One propounded the possibility of the mere moonshine of all his self-renouncing 
Enthusiasm. (Pierre 176) 
           The psychological make-up of a character would be of a very specific nature for a 
dangerous idea to take hold of it. Referring back to the idea of noxious ideology being 
                                                 
166See also Emerson to Carlyle, October 30, 1840 in Correspondence of Emerson and Carlyle, pp 283-84, and 
Levine, Conspiracy and Romance: studies in Brockden Brown, Cooper, Hawthorne and Melville, pp 170-171. 
Levine is focusing mainly on discussion of slavery and rebellion, but also offers a summary of issues pervading 
the society at the exact time.  
167 See Delbanco: “Pierre is the wrong reader for this type of “middle-of-the-roadism.” After Ahab, he is the 
strongest exemplar of … the idea that once “the absolute is introduced into the political realm,” righteousness 
becomes madness. What begins as a wish to correct some personal or historical wrong becomes fanaticism…” 
(193). Also Arendt, On Revolution, 84. Hannah Arendt suggests that there is a tendency of psychological near-
madness which overturns positive intentions contained within essentially neutral philosophical discourses 
available for analysis (such as Plinlimmon’s pamphlet would be in less radical hands) 
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comparable to a life cycle of a biological virus, and if to regard Pierre and Rodion as initial 
victims through whom the idea of an “evil” ideological virus is first manifested, a particular 
state of psychological vulnerability typical of a character who would be likely to get 
“infected” first, is defined by the critics.  The question of maturation or “germination” of an 
idea within an individual is explored by Wald in Constituting Americans (123). There arises a 
powerful parallel of likening a developing idea taken root in one’s psyche as a noxious viable 
growth or entity.  Further on, Howard Bruce Franklin in The Wake of the Gods suggests that 
an initially benevolent idea may only mature into a noxious one – “…The thing born in Pierre 
as a heaven-begotten Christ matures ineluctably into the monstrous stone Enceladus cast 
down from heaven…” (105).  
          This image of a diseased organism slowly disintegrating and mutating is echoed by the 
imagery within the novels. Pierre and Raskolnikov’s descent is marked by the disintegration 
of the concrete (as personified by their altering physical appearance) and immersion in the 
uncanny. This point is summarised best of all by Svidrigailov, Dostoyevsky’s anti-hero: 
“[T]he healthy man is the most earthly of men, and therefore he ought to live according to life 
here, for the sake of completeness and order. Well, but as soon as a man gets sick, as soon as 
the normal earthly order of his organism is disrupted, the possibility of another world at once 
begins to make itself known, and the sicker one is, the greater the contact with this other 
world, so that when a man dies altogether, he goes to the other world directly” (C&P 275). 
This is remarkable, connected with the near-death, otherworldly psychological state that both 
Pierre and Raskolnikov experience at the point of the dream sequences discussed above.  
            There is another factor increasing the said vulnerability to the harmful ideological 
discourses – both characters’ tendency to view themselves through superhuman lenses and 
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their desire to acquire semi-divine, exalted status.168 It is somewhat ridiculous, albeit 
aspirational.169 In the imagery of both Pierre’s dream of Enceladus with “the turbaned head of 
igneous rock” and Raskolnikov’s envy of the “extraordinary” people, “No: such people seem 
to be made not of flesh, but of bronze!” (C&P 260), the theme of dehumanising one’s nature 
to attain invulnerability in pursuit of an individual heroic ideal can be observed.170 It 
harmonises with the earlier point concerning the characters’ denial of the physical aspects of 
being. Delbanco (194-195) also comments on Pierre wishing to be a “rock,” as does Howard 
Bruce Franklin, claiming that “a rock is ambiguously offered as symbol of the divine 
absolutist” (Howard Bruce Franklin, 125). My interpretation of those observations boils 
down to a subtly veiled Melvillean dig at a unified, depersonalized ideal society governed by 
exceptionalist Plinlimmonian ideology that both Tocqueville and Herder uphold. 
           The conclusion of their tale is also similar for both. Pierre and Raskolnikov mistake the 
nascent and expanded consciousness for real supreme truth and knowledge (with disastrous 
results). Both attempt to evade confronting this painful truth face-to-face for as long as 
possible; and both, as the curtain closes, come to a (belated) discovery that no vicious crime 
can be justified by claiming that the moral boundaries established by the external world are 
“unjust.” The theme of “horologicals” re-emerges as the conclusion: following the Franklinian 
ideal established by society, of imitating Christ, is tempting for an individual ego seeking to 
reaffirm its exceptional nature. Yet it is unviable and problematic when attempted in reality. 
Raskolnikov comes realise that only after reaching the lowest point in his descent, and it is 
notable that we do not hear of whether he actually does proceed to amend his behaviour to 
                                                 
168 See Franklin, The Wake of Gods; Melville’s Mythology. 
169 See Delbanco: “…there is something stirring about Pierre’s outrage, but there is also something utterly 
ludicrous about his sense about having been appointed to set the world right” (199). 
170 Collins, in his essay on Poe and Dickens also suggests the dehumanisation of the creative thought, the 
literary process gradually becoming industrialized and dehumanised in much the same vein.  
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revert to the chronometrical framework.171 Pierre, in the meantime, fails completely, his 
downfall being explained by the fact that he had initially chosen a wholly wrong cause to 
defend.172 
         As a final statement for this chapter (regarding, in particular, all that has been said about 
the conflict of the public and domestic, the role of Mary Glendinning, and the pressing need 
for a cause to defend), I conclude that Pierre is as an exceptionalist fable, summarising (if 
somewhat bitterly) the impossibility of transgressing the established boundaries of 
exceptionalist society on purely spiritual rebellion alone – and the utter folly of doing so. This 
presumes stepping away from Higgins and Parker’s argument that Pierre was an attempt to 
draw psychologically correct characters (Higgins and Parker 57) and argue that each 
character is endowed with hidden metaphoric meaning in order to make the exceptionalist 
parable possible, and rather relates to the traditional undercurrent of the homiletic narrative in 
American literature, which uses meaningful allegorical figures to illustrate a principle. 
Meanwhile, I also believe that Dostoyevsky, with his basis in the Orthodox tradition, 
manages to represent this aspect across more successfully from a purely stylistic viewpoint 
(the name of his novel alone sounding sublimely allegorical). The precariously unbalanced 
individualistic brilliance is substituted by deft balance which proves more efficient at treading 
the line between worlds of ideas and the material, or the intellectual “liberty” and universal 
“equality” or well-being. In short, Pierre is quintessentially like Crime and Punishment in its 
role as a ruthless analysis to why any individualistic attempts to go beyond the framework 
offered by the established “exceptionalist” discourse, are doomed to fail. Spiritual enthusiasm 
                                                 
171 See Ruttenburg, 141. 
172 See Higgins and Parker, “Reading Pierre” 172. Also see Higgins and Parker,“The Flawed Grandeur of 































CHAPTER TWO: THE LEADER AND THE MOB - MOBY DICK AND DEVILS. 
 
           In the previous chapter, I argued that the notion of an “extraordinary” individuality at 
odds with its surroundings (as represented by the images of Enceladus the Titan or 
Raskolnikov’s theoreticising), is essentially unviable in the society that such an individuality 
nominally belongs to. The extreme excesses associated with individualistic rebellion are seen 
to be invariably restrained or punished at some point in the texts. However, the first chapter 
also showed that the ideas that an individualistic personality expounds, present a genuine 
driving force, theoretically capable of threatening the fabric of societal structures. Bearing in 
mind the arguments put forth by both writers, I suggested that the awareness of the power 
contained in one’s individuality spreads, virus-like, from the affected individual to others. 
This chapter will consider at length what occurs when such an individuality manages to avoid 
restraint or punishment, assuming a position of leadership within a community united by the 
exceptionalist vision – and what consequences this may bring. 
          The concept of a leader endowed with strong individuality frequently emerges 
alongside the notion of societal upheaval, and the “exceptional individual” encountered in the 
first chapter seems to fit this role perfectly. Previous critical works (from Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
study of Dostoyevsky’s politics to C.L.R. James’ and Charles Olson’s analyses of Captain 
Ahab’s motives) have explored the representation of the figure of the charismatic leader by 
both writers in some detail – however, a study specifically analysing the commonality of 
traits in Captain Ahab and Nicholas Stavrogin has not yet been produced.  A detailed analysis 
of the two, and specifically of the techniques and traits that they employ to influence others, 
is what I focus on in this chapter. 173   
                                                 
173 See M. Bakhtin, The Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics. Also:  C.L.R. James, Mariners, Renegades and 




     PLAYING A TYPE: SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS. 
               I already outlined how the figure of the “exceptional individual” emerges in reaction 
to constrictive societal codes (that is, a set of expectations determining one’s actions and 
reactions as a subject belonging to a specific group, usually a national or socio-economic 
one). As both Melville and Dostoyevsky have showed, the “exceptional” individuality, in a 
Promethean fashion, subsequently seeks to overturn those: Pierre renounces his family and 
home, and Rodion flouts the law. The “exceptional” protagonists thus oppose the 
“exceptionalist” ideology uniting the group or community, which is usually marked by 
precise, rigid rules explicitly setting apart what is acceptable in a specific given strata of 
society, from what is not.   
          In a mid-nineteenth century context, John Stewart Mill held such a situation similar to 
tyranny exhibited by an absolutist ruler, the general society being effectually oppressive 
towards the individual – “the tyranny of the majority” (7-8).174 De Tocqueville also discussed 
the “tyranny of the majority,” and John Randolph - “King Numbers”.175 Such rule presumes 
the suppression of individuality by the society imposing the prevailing mores or expectations, 
which are supposed to be immediately understood and taken into account.176 
         In the more modern context, one could connect this to Foucault’s concept of epistemes 
– intuitively-understood customs or practices holding society together, which are unwritten, 
but immediately comprehensible on a subconscious level.177 Foucault was interested in 
mechanisms of societal control, and indeed, opposing those practices that he evokes, would 
                                                 
174 Mill, On Liberty. 
175 Kirk, The Portable Conservative Reader, 153. “King Numbers” was the rule of the majority vote, the 
predominant segment of the population imposing its ideas on dissenting individuals. Also see De Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America, and John Stewart Mill, On Liberty. 
176 See Bart Bonikowski et al. in the discussion “Populism and Nationalism in comparative perspective.” 
177 See Foucault, The Order of Things, pp xxiii-xxxiv. On generally comprehensible and subconsciously 
recognisable “memes” also see John Bryant, “Wound, Beast, Revision.” 
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likely result in alienation. Yet there rests a major difference: the episteme is typically seen as 
a neutral notion of a practice or custom characterizing a given historical era and determining 
the way that the majority thinks; meanwhile, I maintain that the rigid framework of specific 
social  rules that Dostoevsky and Melville’s protagonists oppose (whether formally outlined 
or unwritten), serves as a controlling mechanism, since it governs the limitations regarding 
what the member of a given societal segment can or cannot do.178  
         The awareness and subsequent rebellion against those rules is what forms the backbone 
of the conflict between the “exceptional” individual and the “exceptionalist” society. To 
briefly illustrate this point, I refer to Timothy Marr describing the extreme discomfort that 
such essentially unwieldy codes produce in the individual. 179 Marr provides a specific 
example of the “ethnic” code, where people’s actions are determined and limited by their 
ethnic identity – which harmonises with the vision of specifically “American” exceptionalism 
opposing the imaginary realms of other, “flawed” states, that was discussed in the 
introduction. As Marr argues, “…Melville found an epistemological escape from such 
bondage by portraying Americans themselves, including many of his own narrators, as ethnic 
creatures marked by the codes they have invented to malign others” (Gunn 137).  His 
suggestion is mirrored by Mary Poovey’s argument regarding the notion that society is held 
together by established codes or practices that are immediately recognisable, such as 
marriage-codes or relationships with figures of authority (both concepts amply explored in 
Pierre as well as in Crime and Punishment), and therefore, society is so used to them, that 
they are seldom questioned or analysed (Poovey 5).180 
                  Those codes recall the imaginary projections of America and Russia in Melville 
and Dostoyevsky’s novels. The exceptionalist discourse is founded upon such “ethnic” codes 
                                                 
178 As a side note, John Stuart Mill discusses such codes in the ethnic or national context in Considerations on 
Representative Government.  
179 Marr, “Without the Pale: Melville and Ethnic Cosmopolitanism.”  
180 Poovey, Making a Social Body: British Cultural Formation, 1830-1864. 
Akroyd 118 
 
or projections, which form its core concept, imposing certain behavioural expectations on all 
those subject to it. A beneficial aspect of those codes and practices is that since they are so 
instantaneously recognisable, they save the average individual from the necessity to think 
deeply or face a dilemma. Instead, they provide a readymade suggestion concerning what 
exactly to think or how to react to any given phenomenon. Such practices are subconsciously 
immediately comphrenensible and possess a controlling aspect, working as a coagulant 
holding the particular societal segment together. In this way, society can be likened to a 
colony of non-thinking biological units moving together whilst unified by a single instinctive 
purpose – an image bringing to mind Herder’s metaphor of the ant-hill, as well as the 
epigraph to Dostoyevsky’s Devils concerning the Biblical story of the possessed swine 
hurtling off a cliff, or Melville’s animalistic descriptions of “extensive herds” and “martial 
columns” of moving cetaceans (MD, 342-344).181  
           As the first chapter has shown, a strong individuality trying to oppose society normally 
is killed or silenced upon coming into conflict with the aforementioned framework of rules. 
However, there remains a question concerning what would happen, if by chance such an 
individual avoids suppression. The previous set of case studies has uncovered that the 
subconscious desire driving the “exceptional” individual is a confused wish to move beyond 
the place originally allocated to them within the societal structure. In this chapter, I argue that 
the Titanic grandeur combines with certain specific traits to produce the figure of a 
charismatic leader overthrowing the “invented codes” of society that Marr and Foucault 
allude to, so as to create a distinct code of their own.       
        The choice of Moby-Dick and Devils as case studies for this chapter has been determined 
by the way that these texts address the concept of charismatic leadership (that is, leadership 
based not on logical merits and solid propositions, but on instinctive appeal to the 
                                                 
181 For the Biblical story, see Luke 8: 32-5. 
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subconscious).182 Both feature a conflict between societal rules and a group of diverse 
individuals headed by a fascinating figure intent on overturning the old order so as to make 
space for a radically new one. To an observer, this can be likened to a revolutionary 
upheaval; the rebellion of Enceladus wreaked on a far larger scale, and much more difficult 
for the established society to contain. 
         Dostoyevsky describes this situation succinctly. “…[D]estructive instincts which, alas, 
lie buried within each and every soul, even that of the meekest and most domestic civil 
servant…” (Devils, 582), are brought out into the open by a dramatic unfolding of the events, 
such as a fire, or the “unleashing” of a Messiah-like figure, “Ivan the Tsarevich” representing 
the irresistible force affecting the crowds on an instinctive level (Devils, 447), resulting in 
“mob rule” (596) yet hypothetically proclaiming an intention to “re-educate a whole 
generation to make it worthy of freedom”  whilst bringing down “both the government and its 
morality” to introduce a radically new order (681).183 Pierre and Rodion were solitary actors; 
at this point, however, we encounter upheaval occurring on a mass scale.  
          Society may take dire measures in attempting to control such a situation. In Moby-
Dick, “The Town-Ho’s Story” chapter, for its seeming lack of direct concern with Captain 
Ahab as a character, is pivotal for understanding how Melville sees the theme of leadership in 
particular. The specific concept of constraint as a by-product of leadership is seen in the 
interaction between Radney (representative of the codes governing the specific microcosm of 
the ship, which is described as a very hierarchical place, characterised by “inflexibility of sea-
usages and the instinctive love of neatness in seamen” (MD 222)) and Steelkilt (an 
“exceptional” individual and leader-to-be). Melville presents an attempt by Radney to 
dehumanise Steelkilt’s “exceptional” personality before it has a chance to fully develop and 
                                                 
182 See Poovey and Foucault. 
183 Ivan the Tsarevich (Ivan the Prince) – a stock character in Russian fairytales, the handsome prince-
protagonist who typically fulfils the part of a hero, slaying a dragon and rescuing a king’s daughter. 
Akroyd 120 
 
overturn the established order. Radney reminds Steelkilt of his low-ranking position in the 
hierarchy, associable with menial tasks: “Intolerably striding along the deck, the mate 
commanded him to get a broom and sweep down the planks, and also a shovel, and remove 
some offensive matters consequent at allowing a pig to run at large” (MD 222). 
               If the individualistic self does not manage to successfully overcome the negative 
response from society, it consequently perishes. Yet Steelkilt, virtually reduced to the state of 
“bare life,” which, as Agamben suggested, is life stripped of any political or social meaning, 
survives, and manages to spark off a rebellion. This poses a potential conflict with what has 
been unearthed in the previous chapter, where the individual, once reduced to the state of 
“bare life,” is viewed by society as divested of harmful potential. In Homo Sacer, Agamben 
proposes that a being reduced to the state of “bare life” cannot be haphazardly “murdered,” 
but can be lawfully killed, if seen as transgressing political or social norms. This killing, or 
rather immobilising, was illustrated explicitly by the dream sequence in Pierre, as well as by 
the fates suffered by both Raskolnikov and Pierre. However, the story of Steelkilt seems to 
overturn completely Agamben’s argument by his survival and being perceived as a heroic 
character.  
           In this way, it can be argued that if an “exceptional” individual managed to avoid 
imposed constraint and gained the status of a leader able to effect revolutionary change on a 
particular segment of society, they could become a viable and accepted part of the 
“exceptionalist” framework, bending and adapting it to their will. Therefore, revolutionary 
change effected by an “exceptional” individual acting as a leader may be, in certain 
circumstances, perceived as a positive thing by society (provided that the charismatic leader 
succeeds in bringing change about). A contextually relevant example of this might be the 
American Revolution (1765-1783) doing away with the British rule, and the consequent 
installation of the Constitution.  
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         Dostoyevsky’s novel, meanwhile, concerns a violent conspiratorial attempt to overturn 
the existing order completely, doing away with the old world and its representatives. It is no 
surprise that Verkhovensky in Devils harps on about teaching the youth about true “freedom”  
(681) – the Nihilists in the novel may initially come across as dissatisfied with the stifling old 
order, of which it is said, “It’s fine for you to talk since you have everything you want, you 
spoilt creatures!” (Devils, 550).184 And it is easy to see, why for Dostoyevsky’s characters, 
the lure of charismatic leadership is so attractive. It is far more exciting, compared to the 
joyless exceptionalist nation-state realities founded on military drills and bureaucracy (quite 
similar to Melville’s brutal sea-laws): 
Twenty years ago on the eve of war with half of Europe, Russia represented as an ideal 
in the eyes of all state and privy councillors. Literature was controlled by censorship; 
military drill was taught in our universities; the army was turned into a ballet and people 
paid their taxes and kept silent under the yoke of serfdom. Patriotism had come to mean 
extorting bribes from the living and the dead. Those who didn’t take bribes were 
considered rebels since they threatened the harmony of the existing order…. (Devils, 
552) 
                 In the American narrative, the revolutionary spirit is discussed rather differently 
from the Russian one (for instance, Steelkilt’s rebellion is seen as an admirable feat, not a 
thing to be condemned). Moreover, quite unlike in Tsarist Russia, the background of the 
specifically American exceptionalist discourse actively supported and even encouraged 
revolution and the subsequent expansion of a completely different order gradually overtaking 
more and more of society. To illustrate this point, Nancy Fredericks discussed at length a 
radically new national order in Melville’s day, which emphasised the doing away with old 
                                                 
184 For historical prototype of the rebellion showed by Dostoyevsky, Philip Pomper’s article, “Nechaev and 




mores based on foundation stones such as religion, as the “self” became a pivotal concept 
instead (Fredericks 45).185 
            The radically new order which arises as a consequence of revolution, overtakes, virus-
like, more and more of space and society, overcoming any boundaries that the initial 
framework of social rules may have established. It presents a radically new way of thinking 
and perceiving the world which was not previously possible; but what is even more important 
is that the self takes the place of God, and it can be interpreted that more and more 
individuals, in harmony with the notion of buried instincts described by Dostoyevsky, 
become aware of themselves as “exceptional” and potential leaders, which would in turn lead 
to yet another possibility of yet another revolutionary upheaval, in a never-ending process 
comparable in how it spreads to an epidemic that has no beginning or end, but commences 
organically. The original unity afforded by the exceptionalist discourse is broken.  
                Leadership and revolutionary tendencies associated specifically with the Nihilistic 
movement and the Nechaev Circle (which served as a prototype for figures depicted in Devils 
– particularly Nicholas Stavrogin, who was based on Serge Nechaev, the circle’s leader 
(1847-1882)) certainly occupied many minds at the time Dostoyevsky was writing his 
novel.186 Yet evidence exists that Melville seriously considered the notion of revolutionary 
change shaping the future – a concept not unthinkable, bearing in mind the historical context 
of “The Age of Revolutions” described in the introductory chapter. For instance, Robert 
Milder suggests that Melville was keenly aware of the need to find new forms of societal 
functioning and organisation that would be radically, revolutionarily different. His argument, 
moreover, reconciles the role of the writer as observer with the need to welcome the new 
world order: 
                                                 
185 Fredericks, Melville’s Art of Democracy.  
186 See Laqueur’s article, “Interpretations of Terrorism: Fiction, Fact and Political Science” for the specific 
mention of Dostoyevsky’s novel in its broader historical context. 
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[B]y 1850 Melville had come to see America as embodying not simply a new political 
system, but, potentially …  a new consciousness of which the writer was the avatar and 
his work a proffered medium of cultural transformation. The success of this enterprise 
depended on America’s sloughing off an old mentality …. (Gunn 33)187 
            Whilst the previous chapter dealt at large with the psychological processes that both 
protagonists undergo as their awareness of their own self as “exceptional” grows, this chapter 
will focus on “charismatic leadership” that an “exceptional” individual exercises and how it 
affects or shapes the reactions and attitudes of a more numerous group of people within the 
limited confines of a given microcosm. The fact that this particular chapter will look closely 
at a particular microcosm  as opposed to the general world, is central to the nature of my 
argument, as I am focusing on the changing dynamics of a specific group due to the influence 
of a charismatic leader. 188 In this chapter, the microcosms are a whaleboat in Moby-Dick and 
a remote provincial town of Skvoreshniki in Devils, where the action unfolds almost 
exclusively. Both are relevant for this analysis, due to their confined nature, symbolically 
representative of an exceptionalist nation-state existing within its own boundaries. 
             The concept of “charismatic leadership” must also be explained. Individualism, 
which in the first chapter has been connected with an individual’s sense of possessing 
qualities or characteristics sufficient to achieve significant change in the wider world, is 
actually closely related to the idea of a leader being “charismatic” – i.e. coming across as a 
believable presence that is judged by others as holding the requisite strengths for creating 
change.  
                                                 
187 Milder, Herman Melville: a brief biography.  
188 See Reeve, The White Monk: an essay on Dostoyevsky and Melville. Focusing expressly on the enclosed 
literary spaces of the whaleboat (in Moby-Dick) and an Orthodox monastery (in Brothers Karamazov), dubbed 
“microcosms” or small universes, Reeve suggests that within a small enclosed microcosm, it is easier to follow 
various interactions between characters and note any specific tendencies. 
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        “Charisma” is a wide-encompassing concept. Essentially I maintain that there rests a 
clear distinction in that whilst individualistic personality exists primarily as a self-contained 
subject, “charisma” suggests relating with and exercising a certain influence upon others, as 
the individualistic protagonist comes into contact with them. This influence, in turn, effects a 
psychological change upon those others. In support of this argument, Mary Poovey cites Max 
Weber, who explicitly identified charisma “as one force capable of inaugurating change” 
(Poovey 99).189  
          Bearing in mind the specifically nineteenth-century context, Thomas Carlyle in his 
treatise On Heroes (1848) proposes a rather more feasible explanation of the concept of 
charisma as society’s “submissive admiration for the truly great,” or an influence that a 
stronger personality exercises upon others, which is rather reminiscent of the Romanticist 
imagery as well.190  In any case, charisma is associable with the sheer potential power for 
dissembling and change that hypothetically would be spread out evenly across the human 
“units” making up society, and yet, for some unfathomable reason, is concentrated within one 
single individual. It has no true reason or purpose, but is rather comparable to sheer vitality of 
a biological organism. Normally, such a force would be associated with a nation as a whole 
rather than an individual, as Dostoyevsky’s hapless Shatov points out: 
Nations are formed and moved by some other force that commands and dominates 
them, whose origin is unknown and inexplicable. This force is the force of an insatiable 
desire to go on until the end, while at the same time denying that there is an end. It is 
the force of a continuous and indefatigable affirmation of its own being and the denial 
of death. (Devils, 264) 
                                                 
189 Poovey, Making a Social Body. 
190 See Carlyle, On Heroes. 
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                 Nevertheless, the “charismatic” individual exhibits the force of personality on the 
par with an entire nation. The image of human activity powered by an unclear yet powerful 
“force” realising the potential hidden within individual human beings, I have already 
associated with the exceptionalist discourse in general (considering Pease, Kolchin, or 
Dimock). At this point, however, we are dealing with the highly volatile situation when the 
potential for societal change within a nation-state is concentrated in just one its member.  
         My own position regarding the above argument is that whilst charisma may not be the 
sole or primary factor in sparking off social change, it acts as an extremely potent catalyst in 
that respect. “Exceptional,” as we have already seen, implies not being like the rest of the 
humanity (at least not in a given segment of society, or microcosm), but greater, and destined 
for greater achievements. It is a term focusing on the individual in question first and 
foremost, tipping the liberty-equality balance towards unbridled individual liberty. 
Meanwhile, “charisma” implies possession of characteristics which are attractive or 
fascinating to other persons who may come into contact with the exceptional individual; an 
outward aspect that permits the leader to draw his followers in, and unite them as a group. It 
can be interpreted either psychologically (looking at the manipulative techniques or influence 
the leader shows), or mystically, as an abstract tendency to fascinate, which may or may not 
be based purely on visual or emotional influence. “Charisma” in this way becomes an almost 
tangible physical force that cannot be resisted or avoided. It acts beyond the scope of ordinary 
human morality or reason, existing irrespectively of moral concepts (quite like the 
previously-explored image of a biological virus), as an entity that holds no definable meaning 
or purpose, or is deliberately divested of such meaning or purpose (in terms of plot, Ahab’s 
pursuit of the Whale seems rather arbitrary, whilst Stavrogin frequently admits to being 
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indifferent to life), yet simply exists because of its sheer viability and its instinctively-
comprehensible presence.191  
         I propose that there can be a further, illogical quality that attracts attention on a 
subconscious “animalistic” level, relatable to what Carlyle uncovers in On Heroes (1848) and 
Sartor Resartus (1836) where he evokes a driving spiritual (or rather, mental) force 
underneath the social persona an individual exhibits.192 Broadly, Carlyle speaks of 
overpowering the rest of individualities assembled within one same microcosm by the 
concentrated potential energy or  “spirit” that both Melville and Dostoyevsky hint at 
throughout their narratives as well.193 It is also essentially neutral (that is, divested of 
associations with “good” or “evil” produced by moralistic societal codes) and therefore, 
affects all within its reach. People’s own motives are diverse, but all react to this force. As 
Melville’s Captain Ahab, in a rare introspective monologue, states of his crew: “I thought to 
find one stubborn, at the least; but my one cogged circle fits into all their various wheels, and 
they revolve. Or, if you will, like so many ant-hills of powder, they all stand before me, and I 
their match” (MD 149). Perhaps Ahab coyly shifts the blame to the crew for choosing to 
follow him – but it is evident that they cannot resist his greater spiritual and mental influence. 
           Melville also outlines another, highly important aspect to this phenomenon. Namely, it 
is the charismatic individual’s ability to bring out and direct the hidden potential concealed 
within others surrounding him, acting as a veritable agent provocateur, and consequentially 
creating a situation of change – or violent chaos. It is of course, somewhat ironic that Ahab 
should refer to an ant-hill as a metaphor, pervertedly refashioning the image used by Herder. 
                                                 
191 See Agamben, Homo Sacer.  
192 Sam Halliday, in Science and Technology in the Age of Hawthorne, Melville, Twain and James, associates 
the charisma of leaders exemplified by Captain Ahab with the concept of magnetism, suggesting that certain 
personalities are “magnetic” – and due to their particular composites, draw in other individuals, irrespective of 
whether their actual goals are oriented towards good or evil. 
193 That Melville was acquainted with Carlyle’s works is a proven biographical fact. See Robert Milder, “A 
Brief Biography” in A Historical Guide to Herman Melville. 
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In some individuals, this ability can be more pronounced than in others. If we think broadly 
about personalities such as Steelkilt, Ahab, or Nicholas Stavrogin, this powerful life force 
comes across as a recognisable uniting characteristic - “wild ocean-born and wild-ocean 
nurtured” (MD 220), as Melville says.  In a leader figure, such life force, connectable with 
nature as a concept, can be compared to “animal magnetism” – a capacity of a stronger 
psychological specimen to hypnotise the supposedly more pliant one to subject it fully to its 
will.194  It bestows upon the submissive subject new powers that in reality were the projection 
of the hypnotist’s will: the notion which is fully explored by Alison Winter.195 As Winter 
states: 
…[There were]… several features of mesmeric practice. One was the fact that magnetic 
influence usually ran from the charismatic French to the susceptible English, and from 
men to women. The other ingredient was the instability of mesmeric experiments – the 
fact that the apparently passive subject of the experiment sometimes seemed to seize 
control. (23)196 
           By regarding the notion of charisma in relation to mass hypnotism by an individual 
who is stronger psychologically, and possibly also physically, if one looks especially at how 
Steelkilt, “superior in general pride of manhood” (MD 221) is portrayed by Melville, as well 
as Ahab, it can be interwoven with the Carlylean notion of deliberately searching for a hero, 
in which the representatives of the wider society willingly submit to the mesmeric qualities of 
                                                 
194 See  Kucklick, Innovative Amateurs, 1829-1867, in A History of Philosophy in America, 1720-2000. As a 
broader commentary on the contextual background addressed in this thesis, Kucklick addresses the phenomenon 
of charismatic leadership and its effect on the masses in a specifically American antebellum setting by analysing 
the figure of a preacher within the varied religious and philosophical movements that emerged in the United 
States at the time. Kucklick’s analysis of Emerson’s Transcendentalist world view where a human being can 
draw personal strength from the natural world and attain an almost divine status, is also noteworthy.  
195 Winter, Mesmerized: Powers of Mind in Victorian Britain. 
196 Notably, it is yet again shown that the power to hypnotise is given by the writers to the male characters rather 
than any female ones (although Moby-Dick essentially is a “novel without a heroine,” in Dostoevsky’s narrative 
it comes across plainly). This reiterates my point made in the previous chapter that the dangerous individualist is 
held by both writers to be male, and could be a reflection of the general political situation of the time – where 
men rather than women predominantly would be seen as holding any political power. 
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a “charismatic leader” so as to finally vicariously attain through this figure the political or 
social power that they cannot otherwise lay claim to. In a straightforward exceptionalist 
narrative, such submission would mean sacrificing one’s life for the interests of the nation as 
a whole. Yet Dostoyevsky’s antihero, Verkhovensky, reminiscing about the superiority of the 
Western thought to the Russian humility, grotesquely parodies this image, incidentally and 
ironically speaking of America (yet again presented as a caricaturesque imaginary realm): 
I read the biography of a certain American in the newspapers. He left his enormous 
fortune to factories and to exact sciences, his skeleton to students in the local academy, 
and his skin to be made into a drum on which the American national anthem was to be 
pounded out day and night. Alas, we’re mere pygmies compared to these flights of 
imagination in the States of North America…. (Devils, 280) 
           This demented picture is an explicit mockery of  imaginary “Western” practicality on 
Dostoyevsky’s part. Verkhovensky, nevertheless, is quick to note that such “patriotism” 
founded on cynical efficiency, is not feasible on Russian soil: “…[T]hey’d accuse me of 
liberalism, and my skin would be banned…” (280). This moment is crucial for our 
understanding: a charismatic leader plays either with the instincts that are not permissible or 
possible to realise in a regulated, Plinlimmonian society, or with the wish for something 
large-scale and “heroic,” yet of which Melville wryly notes, “all mortal greatness is but 
disease” (MD 66). The secret of the charismatic leader is that with so much potential 
concentrated in their single personality, they seem to promise emotional and spiritual 
fulfilment on a grander scale than the “checks and balances” can assure.  
       As Verkhovensky grovels before Stavrogin, “You’re the leader, the sun, and I’m your 
worm” (Devils, 444) the same picture can be observed again. Although Verkhovensky is a 
somewhat hypocritical character, a Mephistopheles to Stavrogin’s brooding Faustus, the 
Carlylean worship of the concentrated potential power is still present. And, as Dostoyevsky 
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shows further, and as Ahab also recalls the image of the wheels craving a cog to turn them 
and put them in motion, such leadership is desirable to all others precisely because it 
concerns realising their own potential vicariously through the charismatic leader, who makes 
subconscious wishes into reality, creating a radical and new “exceptionalist” vision: “Without 
you, I’m nothing. Without you, I am a fly, an idea in a glass bottle, Columbus without 
America” (Devils, 445). 
         The result of such submission may be revolutionary upheaval. In this capacity, the 
“exceptional” individual acting as a charismatic leader serves as a uniting force that brings 
together the disjointed members of society, just as Ahab imagines a functioning mechanism. 
At a first glance this behaviour appears to be assembling rather than disassembling, and can 
be reconciled with the prior argument that in some respects, revolutionary change effected by 
a charismatic leader can be seen as a positive and truly democratic concept that should be 
encouraged, the people being given an opportunity to vicariously express their democratic 
volition through the agency of the leader. What its actual effects on society may be, however, 
remains to be seen.  
          In short, united thinking of a group under the influence of a newly-emerged leader is an 
important notion that we need to bear in mind for this chapter. As Winter suggests: 
“[M]esmerism and similar cultural phenomena are part of a history of agreement. They 
displayed a cord that bound people together: an influence that coordinated their thoughts or 
actions, or a sympathetic current that united a population” (306). 
            The second crucial factor is the role of others, or “the masses” who respond in a 
particular way to the charismatic leader’s manifestations. Winter describes it as follows: 
 The role of the masses was actually the rule of demagogues. When people were united 
into a single body (often by an “electrical” or “magnetic” process), they lost their power 
of independent judgement. They became insensitive to proper guidance yet vulnerable 
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to illegitimate political leaders. There was also uncertainty about who really was in 
charge. (332-333) 
 
                 The above image evokes images of social unrest commonly associated with 
revolutionary movements (a theme which runs throughout Devils and is amply hinted upon in 
Melville’s novel). As we recall the dream-sequences in the first chapter and Dimock’s 
arguments from the introduction, one can argue that the population as a whole is wielding 
immense, Titanic potential for effecting change (potentially with disastrous consequences).  
         Returning to the original argument regarding the balance between liberty and equality, 
we are left with a horrifying image where there remains no liberty as the population moves in 
one destructive current, nor true equality, for the potential forces of this movement are 
directed by one individual. Hence, the system of stringent controlling “checks and balances” 
proposed by Hamilton would likely prove a life-saver in such a situation.  The marriage of 
mesmeric charisma transmitted by a leader figure to unchained potential contained in society 
in general is a volatile combination, particularly in the antebellum American context if we 
think of Hamilton or De Tocqueville discussing societal unrest, or if one recalls the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 and the violent events surrounding it. Winter comments: “Charisma was 
indeed dangerous where it was unharnessed, as in America, that unhealthy laboratory of 
democracy” (333). 
         Such an argument reconciles this chapter with the previous one by the virtue of the term 
“unharnessed,” sending us back to the Plinlimmonian “horologicals” that disable or destroy 
the exceptional potential personified by the image of a Titan encased in earth. Yet rather than 
containing earth, spreading fire becomes the main image. It is notable that Winter employs 
the term “incendiary” (333), which was also quite a popular image in the political cartoons of 
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the Russian Revolution of 1917.197 Generally, the fascination with fire traverses both texts. 
“We’ll spread fires… We’ll spread legends…” (Devils 446) fantasize Stavrogin’s followers. 
This image is also explicitly echoed in “The Town-Ho’s story, where Steelkilt “perceived the 
stacks of powder-casks heaped up in him and the slow-match silently burning towards him” 
(MD 223). It is notable that with Ahab (whose leadership at the end of the plot results in a 
tragic rather than a positive outcome), the image is not as much “incendiary” as 
“extinguishing.” The “three tall masts … silently burning in that sulphurous air, like three 
gigantic wax tapers before an altar” (MD 447) suggest the fire that starts of natural causes 
rather than through the agency of a human being, and Ahab acts as its controller, not a 
provocateur in the true sense of the word: 
          [S]natching the burning harpoon, Ahab waved it like a torch among them; 
swearing to transfix with it the first sailor that but cast loose a rope’s end. Petrified by 
his aspect, and still more shrinking from the fiery dart that he held, the men fell back in 
dismay, and Ahab again spoke: 
“All your oaths to hunt the White Whale are as binding as mine; and heart, soul, and 
body, lungs and life, old Ahab is bound. And that ye may know to what tune this heart 
beats: look ye here; thus I blow out the last fear!” And with one blast of his breath he 
extinguished the flame. (MD 451) 
           The image of the revolutionary “flame” being controlled by the supposed leader figure 
is central to this chapter’s argument. The subsequent analysis of the two case studies is based 
on the hypothetical proposition that instead of nourishing or protecting a “live” organic 
flame-spark of the democratic all-equalling sentiment, the toxic leadership of the 
                                                 
197 Podzhigatel’, or incendiary, was a common image in propaganda material dating to the Russian 
Revolutionary era. A good example would be a cartoon by an anonymous artist, referred to in Alexander Blok’s 
poem “The Twelve” (1918). It presents a revolutionary standing over a town in flames, which a supposed 
“bourgeois” is trying to put out with water from a watering-can. The caption reads: “We’ll start a worldwide 
fire, to the dismay of all the bourgeois.” 
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“exceptional” individual leads to its extinguishing or destruction, creating an exact opposite 
of the desired effect that such leadership would typically be expected to cause. Instead of 
promised boundless liberty and glory, one is left facing depersonalization, becoming nothing 
more than material for the leader to use. Recalling the argument from the analysis of Pierre 
in particular, the “exceptional” individuality is no longer associable with Enceladus contained 
in earth or Raskolnikov shuttered in his coffin of a room, but rather, the “exceptional” leader 
stifling the revolutionary or democratic potential can be compared to the earth or the room 
because of those constraining qualities. The “charismatic leader” in reality is essentially a 
vampire-like parasite draining off the energy of the others.198  
       
PORTRAIT OF A HERO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP.  
          Considering the plot of Melville’s novel, at first, Ahab’s actions appear to be a prime 
example of uncontrolled toxic leadership blown to caricatured proportions in order to 
emphasise how “wrong” it is. This viewpoint is voiced by Starbuck, whose practicality and 
moral rectitude are the essential “human” traits that Melville places as a foil to Ahab’s epic 
delirium:  
But shall this crazed old man be tamely suffered to drag a whole ship’s company down 
to doom with him? – Yes, it would make him a wilful murderer of thirty men and more, 
if this ship come to any deadly harm; and come to deadly harm, my soul swears this 
ship will, if Ahab has his way. (MD 455) 
 
            In a broader cross-disciplinary context, the portrayal of Captain Ahab in Melville’s 
text over time has been culturally established as the archetype of a monomaniac leader 
drawing his followers towards their doom. To an obsessed leader, human potential 
                                                 
198 An image present in antebellum American literature – see “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar” (1845) by 
Edgar Allan Poe. 
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represented in all others whom he imperils, is just mere material to be sacrificed to a single, 
burning idea. Considering this point from a slightly different angle, Emory Elliott describes 
Ahab as an obsessed religious fanatic: “Ahab is a type of American Christian evangelical 
fervor gone mad and directed toward a single purpose, even if accomplishing that purpose 
will cost his own life and the lives of many others” (Gunn 189). 
         Elliott appears to view Ahab as a zealot for whom the fulfilment of some imaginary 
commandment eclipses everything else. To an extent, I disagree with such an interpretation 
of the character, since over-attributing Ahab with apparently religious motives renders the 
entire reading of the text, as well as the character, rather one-sided. His enmity with the 
White Whale is not quite religious, but transcends religion in what rather is a case of singular 
and extremely personal fixation on “a white-headed whale with a wrinkled brow and a 
crooked jaw” (MD 143), to be unpicked by a psychologist rather than a priest. Melville is 
explicit in naming Ahab’s motives “monomaniac revenge” (MD 167) – a heroic, Carlylean 
quest this is absolutely not.   
         In considering the balance of liberty-equality and how relevant it can be here, one could 
argue that Ahab’s case is a case of individual liberty grossly taken to the extreme, coupled 
with inability to accept the harsh realities of the whaling world, and the unwillingness to see 
one’s individuality or integrity compromised in any manner. If we look closely at the text, the 
image that comes across is more that of a Miltonian Lucifer wrapped in his pride than a 
Grand Inquisitor intending to keep the established order of affairs. “In his fiery eyes of scorn 
and triumph, you then saw Ahab in all his fatal pride” (459) states Melville. Yet what I agree 
with Elliott upon, is the fact that in his fanaticism, Ahab is convinced of being essentially 
right, creating what seems to be a believable, albeit perverted, orthodoxy of sorts – which of 
course can be reconciled with the notion of projecting imaginary negative characteristics at a 
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supposedly neutral object, inseparable from the concept of the exceptionalist discourse.199 
Elliot claims: 
When examined within the context of the development of Melville’s religious thought, 
Moby-Dick does not depict a battle between good and evil with Ahab as the human hero 
trying to destroy the symbol of evil in the whale. Rather, what we have is a madman 
who is convinced that he has the right and power to pursue his personal goal as 
symbolized in Moby-Dick, a mere creature in nature that has little or no interest in 
humans. (Gunn 191) 200 
 
                 So far, the immediate trait that strikes one about Ahab is his obsessive fixation on 
a specific goal combined with disregard for any other factors that might be involved. This is 
an image conventionally associated with stereotypical bad leadership in totalitarian society, 
where individual concerns and even plain logic are sacrificed for the sake of some “great 
idea.” An interesting aspect of this fixation is the fact that the obsession affects or involves 
more and more individuals as it progresses, although it begins with just one single 
“exceptional” personality. When Ahab is not immediately present, his influence is still 
symbolised by the doubloon nailed to the mast, which “all mariners revered… as the white 
whale’s talisman” (MD 384) The individual, personal differences or views all become 
dissolved and merged within the grasp of the leader, who seems to absorb the “souls” or 
personalities of those under his spell. Melville provides an excellent image to summarise the 
notion: 
 As the unsettling polar star, which through the livelong, arctic, six months’ night 
sustains its piercing, steady, central gaze; so Ahab’s purpose now fixedly gleamed down 
                                                 
199 For an overview of Protestant religious fanaticism focused on “self” and contextually relevant to Ahab’s New 
England world, see Philip J. Lee, Against The Protestant Gnostics, 74. 
200 Elliott, “Wandering to and fro: Melville and Religion.” 
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upon the constant midnight of the gloomy crew. It domineered above them so, that all 
their bodings, doubts, misgivings, fears, were fain to hide beneath their souls, and not 
sprout forth a single spear or leaf. (MD 473)  
            The above image I hold as a concise summary of the relationship between the figure 
of the charismatic leader and the rest of those populating the microcosm. Any individuality, 
any individual liberty are dissolved within the grasp of the leader, and promised “equality” 
becomes essentially an indistinct mass devoid of personal “bodings, doubts, misgivings, 
fears”. Many become one, in a harrowing image. One single illuminating purpose, 
personified in the leader’s character and actions, and evocative of totalitarian slogans, 
seemingly “unites” the previously highly diverse body of the “Pequod”’s crew. 
           It also suggests several other points. Recalling the earlier image of a light or flame, it 
can be proposed that the crew, or society in general, exists in a state of disengaged entropic 
darkness until a “charismatic leader” endowed with apparently exceptional traits appears to 
bestow upon them a fixed purpose (just as Carlyle would have had it). Whether this purpose 
is actually reasonable or ethical, is a different question.  
           Another, and no less important point is that the “charismatic leader” acts as a 
constraining force limiting any initiative, self- expression or even individuated feelings from 
the masses he leads. This then implies that once an “exceptional” individual successfully 
escapes the rigid framework of societal constraints to become a “charismatic leader” as its 
subsequent evolutionary stage of being, they commence to exhibit constraining or repressive 
qualities typical of a staunch hierarchical order, and not associable with the “exceptional 
individual” as the first set of case studies set out the concept. Therefore, although in spirit 
Ahab or Stavrogin may be more akin to Lucifer or Prometheus, the consequence of their 
actions rather brings to mind the repressive aspect of totalitarian leadership.  
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          Superficially, this particular characteristic of Ahab’s can be interpreted as a simple and 
vocal example of bad leadership, as the exceptionalist idea spirals out of control in pursuit of 
an unspecified aim, leading to destruction. The sense of self plays an important part in that an 
“exceptional” individual believes to hold a right to pursue the said goal whatever the 
consequences may be. Such leadership disregards any established mores or values that it 
might potentially transgress: “I never yet saw him kneel” (MD 206) says Stubb of the captain. 
Typically associated with the critique of bad statesmanship, the image of Captain Ahab has 
become a byword for blind political fanaticism of a ruling government, as Elliott suggests: 
 [Ahab] …believes that he has the knowledge of good and evil and may act for the rest 
of society, nation, and world. Often, secular governments recognize the political value 
of dressing themselves in religious trappings and language to generate such fervor for 
their own purposes. (Gunn 191) 
                Such an interpretation, much favoured in the post-Cold War scholarship, previously 
had been supported by a range of academics from Donald Pease to C.L.R. James, who 
describes the character as “the most dangerous and destructive social type that has ever 
appeared in Western civilization” (15). They connected Ahab’s obsessive pursuit of the 
White Whale with the topic of exceptionalism, and, more specifically, with the supposedly 
typical exceptionalist preoccupation to correct what the discourse sets as “wrong,” whatever 
the incurred costs may be in the long run. The Soviet critical school offers a concise summary 
of this notion. Yuri Kovalev draws the readers’ attention to the final scene as being expressly 
symbolic of the outcome predestined for the American exceptionalist idea.201 As he puts it: 
It is necessary to stress that Melville’s fondness for abstract symbolism and 
generalisations absolutely does not distract Moby-Dick from the economic, political and 
social reality of modern America. Nearly every single symbol in the novel … has at 
                                                 
201 See Kovalev, Posleslovie k romanu G. Melvilla Mobi-Dik, ili belyj kit. 
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least one [meaning] which directly concerns the life-path and destiny of the United 
States. The most obvious example would be the aforementioned image of the ship 
sailing forth under the Stars and Stripes flag; representatives of all races and 
nationalities assembled on its deck … [T]he most obvious meaning would be the 
motley-peopled America, sailing in strange waters of History towards a harbour 
unknown. Will it make it? Where exactly is it going? Who directs its course? This is 
precisely how the reader interprets this symbol, and therefore, sees a tragic prophecy in 
the scene of the “Pequod”’s demise. (600-606) 
             Kovalev’s observation should not be viewed solely as an ideologically-tinted 
“prophecy” that the American national idea, far removed from the apparent merits of socialist 
ideals, is doomed to fail. Melville’s own words, in the last soliloquy of Ahab’s, also wryly 
echo this notion: “The ship! The hearse – the second hearse!” cried Ahab from the boat; “its 
wood could only be American!” (MD 506). Such details do contribute to the image of Moby-
Dick as a novel about the dangers of bad exceptionalist leadership.  
            From the comparative viewpoint, the attempts to summarise and comprehend the 
direction that the nation is taking are well manifested in nineteenth-century Russian literature 
and in the critical works analysing it.202 That is so, even despite the fact that those attempts 
mainly concerned the fate of Russia; a tendency that much later on Kovalev applied to a 
quintessentially “American” text – echoing the post-war American critical school exemplified 
by figures such as C.L.R. James. What is most curious, however, is the same image, when 
compared to the epigraph to Devils, coming from a poem by Pushkin: 
Strike me dead, but I can’t see the track, 
                                         We’ve lost our way, what are we to do? 
A devil seems to be leading us into the field, 
                                                 
202 An example of such an analysis would be Berdyaev, Istoki I smysl russkogo kommunizma (The origins and 
meaning of Russian communism). 
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                                          And making us go around in circles. 
… 
So many of them, where are they being driven? 
                                   And why are they singing so mournfully? 
                                   Are they burying a house-spirit, 
                                   Or celebrating a witch’s wedding? (Devils, 2)203 
 
            Whether a sinking ship or stranded travellers, an image that emerges upon the initial 
analysis of both texts implies loss of direction, or lack of any clear idea of what the final 
destination, goal or aim of the characters involved may be. We see movement for 
movement’s sake, chaotic and inexplicable from the logical perspective. 
            The “reversal” of the timing of the images, which was already observed in the 
previous chapter, is present once again: Dostoyevsky commences his novel with the epigraph 
suggesting a feeling of directionless wandering, whilst Moby-Dick concludes with an 
uncontrolled ship slowly sinking. Symbolically, this difference is understandable: if 
Dostoyevsky discusses the dangers of such aimless wanderings yet offers the possibility of 
redemption, Melville’s tale is a stark parable of what can happen as a consequence.  
             Arguably, Ishmael at the beginning of Moby-Dick, whom one can describe as an 
“outcast,” nevertheless has a clear purpose in joining a ship’s crew on a voyage, and therefore 
can hardly be described as genuinely and entirely directionless, despite not having a clearly 
defined social position. As Melville puts it, “[N]o, I never go as a passenger; nor, though I am 
something of a salt, do I ever go to sea as a Commodore, or a Captain, or a Cook” (MD 3). 
Remaining somewhat amorphous in regards to his hierarchical position on board, Ishmael 
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curriculum, concerns a group of travellers who become lost on a snowy night in the steppe, and imagine the 
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mythology, a kind of a benevolent imp who is responsible for domestic concerns. My personal reading of this 
image suggests that the death of a kindly house-sprite and him being replaced by more sinister otherworldly 




remains first and foremost an observer, whose role is to comment on what is happening rather 
than to actively participate. As a result, he does not perish together with the rest of the crew at 
the end, since he is not genuinely affected by Ahab’s sway. It is an interesting digression 
from the conventions of such imagery, very much in tune with my core argument regarding 
the writer-observer role, which also renders Ishmael similar to the unnamed, elusive narrator 
of Devils, apparently omnipresent enough to note all the intricacies of the plot, and yet 
unaffected by the unfolding anarchy. 
              Both novels end with directionless chaos – a shipwreck, or a fire. This seems to be a 
parody on the traditional mythological trope of the demiurge, to whom a charismatic leader 
could be likened, creating world order out of primordial entropy. The leaders in both cases 
are either dead (as it is with Ahab), or about to die, like Stavrogin. Yet what interests me 
primarily is the question, who was originally supposed to lead the way in both case studies, 
and what force actually influences the events, if there is no socially approved and clearly 
portrayed leader figure. “Who directs its course?” asks Kovalev of America as represented by 
the microcosm of the “Pequod,” whilst the poetic narrator of Dostoyevsky’s epigraph 
complains that there seems to be some devilish mockery at play, leading him in circles. It 
would be too easy to answer that it is Captain Ahab and Stavrogin respectively who act as 
undisputed leaders ill-fitted for the role.204  
             An obvious subsequent question arises: why do such personalities as these emerge in 
the first place? In On Heroes (1848), that precedes the publication of Moby-Dick by only a 
few years, Thomas Carlyle implies that the innate need and subsequent search for a leader is 
a quintessential aspect hard-wired naturally deep in human existence, which can be logically 
pinpointed as being crucial for the smooth running of society at all levels. Further on, he 
suggests that a figure endowed with heroic characteristics, however vaguely defined, inspires 
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a free and positive wish to submit to its authority. Moreover, the purpose of a hero is 
essentially what I argued earlier: to tell the rest of humanity what is to be done, and to give 
clear directions in order to reassemble and organise the previously entropic state existence, 
investing it with meaning: 
The Commander over Men; he to whose will our wills are to be subordinated, and 
loyally surrender themselves, and find their welfare in doing so, may be reckoned the 
most important of Great Men … [W]hatsoever of earthly or of spiritual dignity we can 
fancy to reside in a man, embodies itself here, to command over us, to furnish us with 
constant practical teaching, to tell us for the day and hour what we are to do. (Carlyle, 
On Heroes) 
                On the surface, as the following citation shows, such a necessity for leadership, 
supposedly born of a free, unforced, positive state of thinking, appears to be an exercise of 
democratic choice, where a society of free humans selects the very best among them to act as 
the heroic authority invested with societally approved vestiges and symbols of power. This 
indeed would be the ideal – and could explain the strange lure of Stavrogin as a promised 
prince-saviour, or why is Starbuck unable to confront the seeming authority of Ahab in “The 
Musket” chapter (MD 455-456); yet what actually happens within the case studies, is quite 
different.  
            Carlyle does make an attempt in his treatise to reconcile the “checks and balances” 
theory of regulating liberty and equality with the admiration for the individual heroic 
gloriousness. In the light of specific mid-nineteenth century context, this is quite reflective of 
reconciling the Romantic notion of heroic individuality and the heated debates concerning 




[B]y much stronger reason, may I say here, that the finding of your Ableman and getting 
him invested with the symbols of ability, with dignity, worship (worth-ship), royalty, 
kinghood, or whatever we call it, so that he may actually have room to guide according 
to his faculty of doing it,—is the business, well or ill accomplished, of all social 
procedure whatsoever in this world! (On Heroes) 205 
            Nominally, both texts explored in this chapter as case studies present one with a 
leader figure: Ahab is a formal leader invested with “the symbols of ability” in his status as 
the ship’s captain, occupying a position of recognised power in an extremely enclosed 
microcosm governed by rigid hierarchy (just as Bruce Kucklick places the figure of an 
enigmatic preacher in relation to the rest of society).206 Stavrogin is rather an “informal” one, 
attaining his noteworthy position through personal qualities that he exhibits (although his 
aristocratic background can play a part as well), in a manner which is at a first glance lies 
more close to the previously discussed idea of exceptional individuality, than is the case with 
Ahab. In both cases, one is not as much concerned with actual abilities for good and efficient 
leadership, as with the display of symbols supposedly associated with leadership.207 Yet the 
question remains: can the two be considered as leaders in the true sense of the word, whose 
actions are determined by their self-will, so the outcome of both texts can be univocally 
attributed to their actions, or are there rather different forces at play, such as the disembodied 
Carlylean “spirit” merely transmitted through the “leader” figure? 
           If one tries to reconcile these two suggestions, the notion of a Priest-Hero put forth by 
Carlyle is relevant, as it combines human volition of a leader with the bodiless spiritual force 
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206 A particularly good study of social hierarchy on board of “The Pequod” is offered by Jehlen in “Melville and 
Class.” 
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expressing itself in the material world through the agency of a “heroic” human being. It is 
then not surprising that both protagonists exhibit somewhat “priestly” characteristics in their 
interaction with the world. One particular interesting observation on both characters that 
seems to support the above argument is the fact that for a considerable period of time, neither 
Ahab nor Stavrogin actually appear on the stage in person, despite all the speculation and 
excitement regarding them. One trait that arises before all the others, is, oddly enough, their 
absence. Captain Ahab is supposedly present on board, yet he does not come into contact 
with any other character inhabiting the ship’s microcosm, nor is it possible to comprehend 
what he is like. As Melville puts it: 
For several days after leaving Nantucket, nothing above hatches was seen of Captain 
Ahab. The mates regularly relieved each other at the watches, and for aught that could 
be seen to the contrary, they seemed to be the only commanders of the ship; only they 
sometimes issued from the cabin with orders so sudden and peremptory, that after all it 
was plain they but commanded vicariously. Yes, their supreme lord and dictator was 
there, hitherto unseen by any eyes not permitted to penetrate into the now sacred retreat 
of the cabin. (MD 107) 
             It is quite likely that Ahab’s absence is well-calculated and intentional to uphold his 
intended position as a leader within the confines of the “Pequod.” There is certainly more 
than a mere touch of precise theatricality concerning his behaviour: a trait which makes him 
akin to Stavrogin, whose character has been deemed by Frank in particular to exhibit 
“theatrical” tendencies.208 However, this careful staging extends beyond mere narcissism in 
case of Melville’s protagonist. If one accepts Kovalev’s suggestion that Moby-Dick is almost 
entirely composed of symbols, what Ahab’s non-appearance on deck signifies is clear 
enough. As he remains sequestered in the “sacred retreat of the cabin,” his will or intentions 
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stay concealed from the crew yet made heard by the intercessions from the privileged group 
of ship-mates, who otherwise appear to be in charge of the ship and exercising their will 
(even if somewhat strangely) at a first glance. It is plainly evident that Ahab wishes to imitate 
God, the ship being his universe and the mates acting as his priests, enshrouded in abstract 
mystery and experiencing “the uneasy, if not painful, consciousness of being under a troubled 
master-eye” (MD 109). As Ahab finally emerges on deck, his pose is exactly imitative of a 
sacerdotal rite, and the language used reflects it: “[M]oody stricken Ahab stood before them 
with a crucifixion in his face; in all the nameless regal overbearing dignity of some mighty 
woe” (MD 109). 
              This corresponds in some aspects with Carlyle’s description of the priestly aspect to 
the figure of a hero, who acts as an intermediary between the world and the divine, “the 
Spiritual Captain of the people” as Carlyle ironically dubs him – however, Ahab is not 
content with maintaining the mere priestly status as the “enlightener of daily life” depicted by 
Carlyle: 
The Priest too … is a kind of Prophet; in him too there is required to be a light of 
inspiration... He presides over the worship of the people; is the Uniter of them with the 
Unseen Holy. He is the spiritual Captain of the people … he guides them heavenward, 
by wise guidance through this Earth and its work. The ideal of him is, that he too be 
what we can call a voice from the unseen Heaven … He is the Prophet shorn of his more 
awful splendor; burning with mild equable radiance, as the enlightener of daily life. (On 
Heroes) 
           Considering the discussion in the preceding chapter regarding how individual 
exceptionalism develops, it strikes one that on the surface of things, Ahab can be described as 
behaving exactly like the ferocious individualist we encountered in the previous chapter. An 
exceptional individual seeks to endow himself with divine status (as was seen in Pierre’s 
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dream of Enceladus), and to experience his own nature as godly (a trait often connected with 
Ahab by critics: for instance, by Howard Bruce Franklin).209 Yet, pivotally, if in the first 
chapter the characters’ desire was mainly manifested by haphazard actions or philosophical 
ruminations, the second case study reveals an active and premeditated way of setting oneself 
up as a divinity of sorts (perhaps using social position or powers afforded by a specific 
status), and, what is even more important to this investigation, to convince all others within 
his reach of the fact. Ahab is obviously an exceptional individuality: and he loses no time in 
convincing others from the very outset.    
             Stavrogin is more impassive in that respect. Nevertheless, the notion of carefully 
calculated concealment of oneself until a perfectly timed moment for appearance is also true 
with him: he is essentially described as “a handsome man, proud as a god, seeking nothing 
for yourself, with an aura of sacrifice, who’s “in hiding”” (Devils 447). Further on, the 
developing plotline with the charismatic leader coming into power suggests that he is 
expected to be viewed as the fulfilment of a Carlylean desire for a hero-divinity: “[W]hat’s 
needed is one magnificent, despotic will, an idol resting on something solid and standing 
apart… Then the groups of five would cringe in obedience and be prepared to serve when the 
occasion arises” (Devils 596). 
             Here the first mystery of an exceptionalist leader is revealed. The initial absence of 
the leader on stage may evoke either mystical fascination or make one wonder whether the 
said leader actually exists, and if there might be rather some other force acting in his stead. 
However, as I already hinted, such reactions are indeed expected and premeditated by an 
exceptionalist leader, who cannily uses them in order to seemingly confirm his godly, 
exceptional nature, completely upsetting the democratic balance between liberty and equality. 
Putting it simply, when the charismatic leader emerges, his figure appeals to the irrational and 
                                                 
209 See Franklin, The Wake of the Gods. 
Akroyd 145 
 
instinctive rather than analytical aspect of the psyche, the Dionysiac rather than Apollonian, 
if to use the terms first coined by Friedrich Nietzsche.210 The search for pragmatic good is 
overturned by thirst for intense emotional experience.  
           Whilst, as the first chapter shows, an exceptional individual may be personally aware 
of his own status as a demi-god (as Carlyle would argue), in relation to the other members of 
society he is first and foremost a sophisticated manipulator who plays rather than acts.211 This 
notion (especially if to connect it with the previous mention of the Dionysian principle in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy) is succinctly summarised by Thoreau in On The Duty of Civil 
Disobedience, focusing with particular poignancy on the effect that such leadership exercises 
on others involved: 
 [Y]ou may see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys, 
and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their wills, 
ay, against their common sense and consciences … Now, what are they? Men at all? or 
small movable forts and magazines, at the service of some unscrupulous man in power? 
… The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their 
bodies ... In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgement or of the 
moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones ... (Civil 
Disobedience) 212  
           To Thoreau, the danger of individual human units making up society becoming 
depersonalized, like “machines” or “stones” in bondage to “some unscrupulous man in 
                                                 
210 As well as using the terminology based on the Classical Greek envisaging of heroes and gods, Nietzsche 
presents the “Dionysian” state (based on emotional subconscious response to the stimulus by the “hero” figure) 
as superior to the “Apollonian” one (based on logic and understanding). For detailed analysis, see Friedrich 
Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy (1886), outlining how the Dionysian principle works and exercises its effect 
on individuals.  
211 An interesting summary is also offered by Eric Mottram in an essay “Grown in America: Moby Dick and 
Melville’s Sense of Control.” “The monomaniac is not an artist. He puts his linguistic skills into the art of 
persuasion and his religiosity into elaborate ritual and the fire-cult of Zoroaster. When man aspires to godhead 
in the West, he is damned whether he has chosen that course or not” (104). 
212 See Thoreau, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience. 
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power” is obvious. The direction is chosen by the charismatic leader; the “mass of men” 
serve as a unified organism to bring it about, bringing together their individual potential to act 
as one. Melville similarly describes the situation on board of the vessel: “…[B]y what evil 
magic their souls were possessed, that at times his hate seemed almost theirs” (MD 167). The 
hate is originally Ahab’s; the depersonalized crew nevertheless quite earnestly experience it 
as their own. Furthermore, Melville’s hypothetical case-study of Steelkilt’s rebellion seems to 
reiterate the notion: 
But as he sat still for a moment, and as he steadfastly looked into the mate’s malignant 
eye and perceived the stacks of powder-casks heaped up in him and the slow-match 
silently burning toards hem; as he instinctively saw all this, this strange forbearance and 
unwillingness to stir up the deeper passionateness in any already ireful being …  this 
nameless phantom feeling, gentlemen, stole over Steelkilt. (MD 223) 
            The charismatic leader is seen as “possessed” by the quasi-divine disembodied idea 
(or Carlylean “spirit”) which is manifested through him in the material world. It is 
comparable to an act of religious ecstasy (echoing Kucklick’s radical preachers). Meanwhile, 
the human masses influenced by the leader are represented as being denigrated to crude and 
essentially replaceable physical objects, which remain mute until reanimated by the 
spiritually-possessed leader (a “hero” endowed by spiritual vigour, described by Carlyle) who 
animates them with his emotions or ideas. Unpleasant as it is, this notion nevertheless throws 
light on how an “exceptional” individual views himself in relation to the rest of the world. In 
both case studies, the quasi-divine natures of Ahab and Stavrogin are frequently made to 
contrast with the rest of society who are seen as mute or inept; an image resembling 
Raskolnikov’s argument about the “exceptional” and “unexceptional” humans.213  
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ADHERING TO THE SCENARIO: TYPOLOGICAL CONCERNS. 
          Can one, however, really be assured that the charismatic leader, unlike his followers, 
does possess true substance? Close observation of the character of Stavrogin (also noted 
generally by Frank), implies that the readers are never actually shown the inner workings of 
his psychology, and his true thoughts are never revealed. This correlates with an argument 
raised by Carlyle in On Heroes, that the heroic individuality one admires is essentially a 
number of layered vestiges housing the disembodied “spirit” underneath. The reader is left 
with fragments of Stavrogin’s correspondence, consequences of his various actions or 
recordings of his interactions with other characters, to compose a final verdict on what sort of 
a being he really is. Comparing this occurrence with what is known of Captain Ahab, I argue 
that such presentation of both characters is not incidental. Both Ahab and Stavrogin depend 
primarily on what the rest of the characters might make of them. It is not toxicity or 
complexity of either personality that the novels are mainly interested in showing, but rather 
the theatrical effects that they exercise on the rest of their microcosm.  
           If to take into consideration what Carlyle argues in On Heroes about the innate human 
need to look for a strong leader figure, the explanation is as simple as it is cynical. Both Ahab 
and Stavrogin understand that their presence is wanted (or even, especially in case of Ahab, 
anticipated) – and so they appear, playing out the exact role expected of them. Sianne Ngai 
proposes an interesting theory for such a case.214 “Fake feelings” signify an emotional 
response that has been created by manipulative behaviour. Therefore, an important goal for a 
charismatic leader would be “creating a fake feeling” in his audience – eliciting an essentially 
falsely motivated, but emotionally effective response by deftly planned actions calculated to 
serve a defined, yet undisclosed purpose (Ngai 38). This suggests a sophisticated ability to 
                                                 
214 Ngai, Ugly Feelings. 
Akroyd 148 
 
manipulate others psychologically; not necessarily a trait of a spiritually “strong” character as 
such, but a remarkable trait nevertheless.  
             An interesting twist on Ahab’s character in particular is provided by Melville 
himself, that Ahab can be read as a sociopath of sorts, who is aware of his impaired psyche, 
yet plays his role to perfection: “Nevertheless, so well did he succeed in that dissembling, 
that when the ivory leg he stepped ashore at last, no Nantucketer thought him otherwise than 
but naturally grieved, and that to the quick, with the terrible casualty which had overtaken 
him” (MD 166). This suggests a good measure of self-control, as well as clear understanding 
of what exactly society wishes to see from Ahab at the immediate moment, and the ability to 
act “naturally” in a desired manner. Alternatively it can be explained by an innate inability to 
feel genuine emotion, just as Stavrogin confesses in his final letter found before his suicide 
(Devils 754-755). In any case, there is none of the spontaneous, desperate rebelliousness that 
stands at odds with society and is duly spotted and suppressed. 
            However, those manipulative personalities may in turn be manipulated. One other 
explanation of their careful theatricality can be the characters’ subconscious adherence to the 
notion of typology (i.e. the characters within a literary microcosm being allocated a specific 
role to play). This implies that there exists a created canon or tradition (based typically on 
religious or cultural specifics), and the characters merely fulfil a particular part in this canon, 
and act accordingly, rather than directed entirely by their own clear motives. There is a strong 
sense of convention being present, of an accepted, if hypocritical manner of relating to 
societally-relevant grand ideas, which in reality boils down to little else other than play-
acting: “Nationalism, if you like, has never existed among us except as a form of amusement 
in a gentlemen’s club…” (Devils 36). In this canon, ideas are consigned to being a harmless 
form of societal interaction for supposedly enlightened and educated people, as Dostoyevsky 
describes Verkhovensky’s father: “[H]e needed someone to drink champagne with and 
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someone with whom, over a glass of wine, he could exchange pleasant ideas of a certain kind 
about Russia and “The Russian Spirit” (Devils 33). In a society founded upon pragmatic 
cynicism discussed in the first chapter, grand ideas are taken with a pinch of salt at best. And 
to succeed, a charismatic leader needs first to adapt to this mundane conventionality.  
             This implies that although there is an external force at play rather than the volition of 
the charismatic leader, this force is much less mystical in nature. Considering the notion of 
typology (that is, that in literature, as well as in life, there are certain scenarios or modes of 
behaviour that one adheres to, whether consciously or subconsciously), there re-emerges the 
concept of Plinlimmonian framework of rules governing the “exceptionalist” society that no 
individual can escape.215 The individual’s actions are influenced by it on a subconscious 
basis. This idea is explored by Nancy Fredericks, who admits that typology is a strong 
influence, although she prefers to argue that Melville was opposed to typology as a concept 
(44-48).  
                 If one chooses to dissect both texts from a typological vantage-point, it appears 
likely that Ahab, as well as Stavrogin, dutifully performs a role that has been assigned to him 
by the conventions of how the genre should develop (in the Christian typological tradition - 
based on the Biblical material). Arrogance, manipulativeness and capacity for affecting 
whole groups of people are revealed to be character tropes, which are manifested precisely as 
the typological narrative should develop (ending with inevitable demise). Ironically, this 
divests the figure of a Machiavellian leader of its independence and power, although the 
characters themselves may not be aware of this. Whilst the authors themselves could have 
very likely viewed typology as constrictive and overwhelming, I argue that as literary 
characters, both Ahab and Stavrogin have it in common that they subconsciously tend to play 
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out a specific role according to pre-set social canons prevalent in their microcosm, which 
influence their particular course of action (rather than being wholly “realistic” presences). To 
suggest that it is the typological canon that determines the characters’ actions as leaders 
rather than self-will, Fredericks offers an amusing dilemma regarding the pre-ordained roles: 
 Ahab is a biblical type of evil. His act of personifying evil in the whale becomes a 
projection, an attempt to exorcise evil in himself. Is Ahab, Ahab, he asks. In being 
named for the evil king of old, is Ahab himself a personification of evil?” (Fredericks 
51) 
            Ahab “plays” the villain according to the pre-set vision; he does not create a new kind 
of evil, but only personifies the existing idea in flesh. Fusing the concept of typology with all 
that was previously stated about the bodiless “contagion” of an idea suddenly taking hold of 
an exceptional individual to make him its mouthpiece and subsequently a charismatic leader, 
there rests the argument about the incorporeal, free-floating idea, as put forth by Walter 
Benjamin: “[F]or phenomena are not incorporated in ideas. They are not contained in them. 
Ideas are, rather, their objective, virtual arrangement, their objective interpretation” (34.) 216 
            Ideas are demonstrated to be systems formed of particular objects arranged 
specifically or at random, with Benjamin stating: “[I]deas are to objects as constellations are 
to stars” (34). As Benjamin’s argument deals mainly with a theatrical subject-matter, the 
analogue for this particular thesis is clear: the charismatic leader seizes upon a free-floating 
idea to manipulate it according to his will, forming a “constellation” supposedly according to 
the rules prescribed in existing typology.217 In this manner, the leader does not leave the 
typological framework, however, he can use personal will to make idea logically presentable 
and digestible for the rest of society. At the same time, as an essential object, the leader 
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becomes just as much part of a “constellation” – and the standards set by typology determine 
what exact specifics he would play out. However, my view of the situation is that rather than 
being a deliberate manipulation by one individual of the emotional sphere or feelings (not yet 
fully developed into definable and recognisable ideas) of the onlookers to produce a desired 
effect;  it is much more of an opportunistic, chance phenomenon, where a self-imposed 
charismatic leader latches on, in a leech-like manner, onto a free-floating idea (which is quite 
developed and recognisable, if unwritten), so as to attain a desired outcome; in a “free ride” 
of sorts.  
          Therefore, I would like to propose that the main goal of a “charismatic leader” who 
arises as a product of individual exceptionalist thinking in reaction with the wider world, is 
not as much a defined personal goal (no matter whether positive or negative), or even the 
potential ability to create lasting change, but rather it is influence and the power that comes 
from it. The leader is attracted to the organic “spreading” of personal influence on more and 
more souls, which takes us back to the imagery of the amaranth explored in the previous 
chapter. The importance of the leader is that he can change or influence any other human 
being that he comes in contact with, and it is the subsequent change that is most important. 
Henceforth, I suggest that neither Ahab nor Stavrogin are actually required to exhibit any 
genuine, proven qualities that would vouch for them being exceptional and worthy of the 
semi-divine status they have conferred on themselves, in the Carlylean view of things. They 
are essentially “parasites” in the sense that they are not heroic, but merely latch onto an 
existing disembodied idea so as to increase their influence in their microcosm. Their 
significance to the narrative boils down to one single ability: to influence, affect and 
manipulate as many individuals as possible. And in the end, this leadership results in “mob 
rule” (Devils 596) embodying a depersonalized chaos. The charismatic leader may fancy 
themselves being the captain or director – in reality, they are an instrument.  
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          Therefore, Pierre’s artistic and romantic failures or Porfiry’s mocking comments 
regarding Raskolnikov’s Napoleonic philosophy, are in reality not as crucial, nor do they 
serve as solid proof of the fact that the reason for their failure was a lack of “extraordinary” 
potential. As my theoretical argument above suggests, for an individual to become a leader 
and gain significance, the main characteristic is the ability to influence others convincingly. 
The success of the individual enterprise, it seems, depends on other people and whether they 
respond to an image that the charismatic leader acts out.218 Looking more broadly at Melville 
and Dostoyevsky’s text, we see protagonists “playing out” a part – of Napoleon, or romantic 
poet in Pierre, or the promised prince and the fanatical preacher in Devils and Moby-Dick 
respectively.  
              The ingredient of mysterious absence combines with wild speculations and rumours 
in order to render the leader figure genuinely enigmatic for the rest of society.219 If one 
compares the events preceding Nicholas Stavrogin’s first appearance, the parallel with 
Ahab’s initial lengthy absence from the stage until “The Quarter-Deck” chapter is noticeable: 
 After his promotion, the young man suddenly resigned his commission; once again he 
did not return to Skvoreshniki, and he stopped writing to his mother altogether. It was 
learned … that he’d returned to Petersburg, but he was no longer encountered in the 
society he’d been frequenting; now he appeared to be hiding somewhere. It was 
discovered that he was keeping somewhat strange company; he was associating with 
the dregs of Petersburg’s population, penniless civil servants, retired army officers who 
begged for charity, and drunkards; he was visiting their sordid families and spending 
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scaremongering as means of controlling society (as an example - persuading people to buy lighting-rods).  
219 Melville and Dostoyevsky also bring up the archetype of the trickster – a literary presence also known for 
being theatrical and devious. However, I do not envisage either Ahab or Stavrogin as such, since neither is 
explicitly endowed with comical or fluid traits associable with the trickster. 
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his days and nights in dismal slums and God knows what kind of low haunts; he’d let 
himself go, went about in tatters, and apparently liked it that way…. (Devils 43) 
                Like Ahab, Stavrogin feigns disappearance, “hiding” in order to attract attention. 
However, if Ahab exhibits semi-divine remoteness of a Carlylean priest-hero, Dostoyevsky’s 
“prince” exhibits what can be described as a histrionic tendency to self-humiliation, 
traversing boundaries permitted by the societal customs. He deliberately mixes with “dregs” 
and “drunkards,” and dresses “in tatters” perhaps initially acting as a Bohemian poseur in 
jest. At a first glance, this does not reconcile Stavrogin’s character with the Carlylean 
individual concerned with his own godly nature. However, looking deeper, two possible 
explanations arise: one is that Stavrogin has been envisaging himself as a super-human of 
sorts, a Romantic-spirited egotistical hero testing the limits of his power and holding only 
disdain for the Plinlimmonian rules governing society. In this case, the character exhibits an 
acute awareness of his individuality, that is supposedly so flawlessly perfect that it may 
dispense with any societal regulation whatsoever (it is not surprising that Stavrogin is 
frequently dubbed “Prince Harry” or “Ivan the Tsarevich” stressing his exalted status). 
Alternatively, one may wish to reconcile the individual search for the validation of the semi-
divine status with the general Christian (not even necessarily Orthodox) tradition. In choosing 
to commune with those deemed to be outcasts or “dregs” whilst being keenly aware of his 
exceptional nature, Stavrogin can be described as imitating Christ – at least, outwardly.220 
Certainly, unlike with the Biblical ideal, his motives stem from exhibitionistic pride and the 
necessity to seem Christ-like to those he comes into contact with in order to exercise the 
Dionysiac-type leadership discussed previously. Yet again, this trait makes Dostoyevsky’s 
protagonist akin to Ahab in that the latter (as discussed by C.L.R. James) can also be viewed 
                                                 




as a personality of a higher order who consciously descends to be among the diverse “pack of 
ragamuffins picked up at random from all parts of the earth” (James 25), like a god choosing 
to engage with mortals. 221  
             Nevertheless, the decisive factor in maintaining the leader’s charisma is still present: 
that is, wild rumours enveloping Stavrogin’s persona. As the text satirically tells: 
Our ladies were all mad about the new arrival. They were sharply divided into two 
groups – in one they adored him, in the other they were out for his blood; but both 
groups were mad about him. Some people were particularly fascinated by the idea that 
his soul might harbour a fatal secret; others positively relished the notion that he was a 
murderer. (Devils 43) 
            This observation neatly summarises the general reaction that a charismatic leader 
typically seeks to evoke: either extreme adoration of the “fatal secret,” or hatred towards a 
“murderer.” He also divides society into distinct groups, each animated with powerful 
emotions. This quasi-Dionysiac quality of invoking madness or irrational reaction to the 
exceptional self that can be explained by its supposedly divine characteristics, is also 
commented upon by Dostoyevsky. Again, the connotations of murders and fatal secrets are 
not incidental. Let us compare the above passage with how Ahab is described: 
Step and growl; growl and go – that’s the word with Captain Ahab. But nothing about 
that thing that happened to him off Cape Horn, long ago, when he lay like dead for three 
days and nights; nothing about that deadly scrimmage with the Spaniard afore the altar 
in Santa? –heard nothing about that, eh? Nothing about the silver calabash he spat into? 
(MD 83) 
             In a rather histrionic manner, a charismatic leader seems to thrive against a 
background of scandal and mythologizing. With Ahab, one sees a direct rumour of 
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blasphemy, preceding his actual appearance; the desecration of the “silver calabash,” which is 
more graphic than the vague ideas of “murder” surrounding Stavrogin. Still, and particularly 
in case of Melville’s novel, even rumours of such behaviour correspond with the general gist 
of what a god-like exceptional individual is: he is supposedly entitled to be permitted 
blasphemous or condemnable actions just because his nature allows that. The scandalous, the 
salacious seems to be an acceptable part of the character’s inbuilt traits. Once again, we 
return to Raskolnikov’s argument regarding “exceptional” and “inexceptional” people.  
           Although the observers cannot dare to consider themselves to be actually on the par 
with the charismatic leader, there rests yet another aspect to the appeal of this character. Ngai 
suggests that the strong emotional response to a fascinating figure may be explained by the 
others’ subconscious wish of identification with the object of desire – namely, the figure who 
fascinates or exudes charisma (Ngai 144-150), which echoes the earlier argument expressed 
by Carlyle that the charismatic leader serves as an assembling rather than disassembling 
force. As Ishmael puts it: “I, Ishmael, was one of that crew; my shouts had gone up with the 
rest; my oath had been welded with theirs … A wild, mystical, sympathetical feeling was in 
me; Ahab’s quenchless feud seemed mine” (MD 159). The human individuals making up 
society, with their different, personal preoccupations (Melville cunningly highlights this 
aspect in the chapter “Midnight, Forecastle” (MD 151), by presenting the voices of many 
sailors of different nationalities just before Ishmael pronounces the above words) are all 
unified under the direction cast by the charismatic leader, under his magnetic draw. In what 
concerns Stavrogin’s allure to society ladies and dandies, it can be explained as fascination 
with a conventionally Byronic character, but as for others’ response to Ahab (and also for 
those society members who feel hatred rather than adoration towards the hero, like Shatov 
does) Ngai offers a psychological explanation: “[E]nvy enables a strategic way of not 
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identifying which, in facilitating and ensuring this very transition, preserves a critical agency 
whose loss is threatened by full-blown idealization of the attribute admired” (161). 
               The plain explanation may be that to a part of society who has not been bewitched 
by the leader’s charismatic persona, the feeling that unites it is a sense of envy experienced 
towards the leader-figure, who is permitted to go where others cannot, and the vicarious 
desire to experience this power – rather than “full-blown idealization.” The psychoanalytical 
reading, which Ngai leans upon, concerns itself primarily with the typically disadvantaged 
members of society: women, or the poor (Ngai 21, 126). However, I would like to move 
away from this perception, focusing on the explanation of both Ahab and Stavrogin’s allure 
to characters who are not exactly presented by authors as “disadvantaged” (be it respected 
mariners like Starbuck or small-town intelligentsia of Skvoreshniki). Returning to the 
previous argument regarding the supposedly “magnetic” personality of the self-imposed 
charismatic leader, such one can be perceived as being envied by other individuals on the par 
with him, who nevertheless are too firmly held in place by the Plinlimmonian codes so as to 
proclaim themselves as leaders.  
           A perfect example of such a conflict occurs in “The Musket” chapter of Moby-Dick, 
where the leader figure of Ahab is juxtaposed by Starbuck, representative of a “socially 
acceptable” personality who does not pose a threat to the microcosm’s wholeness. The 
societal hierarchy prevents Starbuck from killing the established leader to seize power, “Flat 
obedience to thy own flat commands, this is all thou breathest. … But is there no other way? 
No lawful way? – Make him a prisoner to be taken home? What! Hope to wrest this old 
man’s living power from his own living hands? Only a fool would try it” (MD 455). This at 
first appears to be a straightforward response by a law-abiding character faced with blatant 
Akroyd 157 
 
disregard for the law.222 And yet there resounds a somewhat symbolic undertone to the scene, 
which seems to put Starbuck face to face with temptation resulting from envy of Ahab’s 
leadership position: 
The loaded muskets in the rack were shiningly revealed, as they stood upright against 
the forward bulkhead. Starbuck was an upright, honest man; but out of Starbuck’s heart, 
at that instant when he saw the muskets, there strangely evolved an evil thought; but so 
blent with its neutral or good accompaniments that for the instant he hardly knew it for 
itself. (MD 455) 
             What occurs at this moment, seems to point towards an unexceptional individual’s 
envy of, and the desire to appropriate the established “exceptional” leader’s specifically 
masculine characteristics in what Melville explicitly describes as “an evil thought.” The 
phallic imagery of the loaded muskets, especially if coupled with the notion of the “spark” is 
suggestive to say the least. However, as Starbuck says, “all of us are Ahabs,” (MD 455) the 
excerpt is reconciled with the argument that the charismatic leader “unites” all under his 
command. Consciously, Starbuck has no pith to assert his desire to be the leader over Ahab. 
He is outwardly moved by the desire to save others from a madman’s disastrous plan; but 
subconscious envy is the mechanism that vicariously allows him, for all his “unexceptional” 
personality, to experience leadership through accepting that he too, can be an Ahab, without 
resorting to actual physical action to assert his right. The reason to why exactly Starbuck 
cannot bring himself to this action is evocative of Carlyle’s theory, in that the religious, law-
abiding Starbuck, “wrestling with an angel” (MD 456) is fearful of committing an act of 
sacrilege by defiling the pre-set, hierarchical boundaries. He cannot be a leader because he is 
unwilling to envision himself as a part of nature, which exercises its will according to natural 
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law: “Is heaven a murderer when its lightning strikes a would-be murderer in his bed, 
tindering sheets and skin together? And would I be a murderer, then” (MD 456). The 
“charismatic leader,” however, is distinguished by the readiness to assert his right, likening 
himself to nature, which of course cannot be held wrong or culpable. 
          I imply that what both case studies show is the desire of those crossing paths with the 
charismatic leader, to vicariously attain some of his “magneticism” which they dare not 
openly claim for themselves as individuals. The two decisive factors at play here are the 
desire for charismatic leader’s powers, and the simultaneous fear of societal punishment. 
Being disadvantaged, however, is less of a significant factor in those specific case studies, 
than might be originally thought. The charismatic leader attracts by the force of their 
personality, and is seen as an object of desire, rather than an opportunity to fill in some 
spiritual or social void.  
           Thus it is unsurprising that even the most reasonable of characters fall prey to the 
influence of a charismatic leader. Whether favourable or negative, some kind of a response to 
the character nevertheless is elicited – even if so as to criticise him or whisper scandalously 
about his actions. The “exceptional” being exists in its own right; the “mediocre” ones have a 
choice of either being for or against him, but they cannot choose to remain indifferent. 
Speaking of commonality and being unified by the figure of a charismatic leader serving as a 
uniting force, it is evident that the leader can unite others not necessarily “for” but also 
“against,” speaking of disgust or repulsion as another means to subsequently unite those 
opposing the leader, and separate the leader’s supporters and opponents into two distinct 
social camps (just as we have seen with Stavrogin’s arrival to town) in order for the 
exceptionalist drama to play out: “…[T]here is a sense in which it seeks to include or draw 
others into its exclusion of its object, enabling a strange kind of sociability” (Ngai 336).  
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         Verkhovensky’s organisational plan where diverse factions would “cringe in 
obedience” (Devils 596) echoes this almost precisely. Such a view is also relatable to the 
notion of the exceptionalist discourse uniting the national subjects against some imaginary 
construct of the antagonised “enemy” – the main difference being that the charismatic leader, 
doing exactly the same, acts as if emobodying an entire nation-state in their individual figure. 
                 Another crucial quality of a charismatic leader, that comes to light regarding 
Stavrogin’s association with social outcasts, is the exceptional adaptability in diverse settings 
or situations. The immediate explanation would be that an individualistic leader, who 
managed to escape the societal controls laid out for them as described in the previous chapter, 
possesses such personal grandeur, that it transcends the artificial boundaries of societal 
structure, affecting all the segments of the existing world and changing them radically. The 
individual can thus change the existing exceptionalist ideology as it stands, and set new 
criteria regarding what should be viewed as right or wrong. As Thoreau discusses the 
relationship between the societal structure and the truly “strong” individual: 
This American government—what is it but a tradition, though a recent one, endeavoring 
to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant losing some of its integrity? 
It has not the vitality and force of a single living man; for a single man can bend it to 
his will. (Civil Disobedience) 
 
            Thus, an individual can embody the nation-state, and “bend it to his will,” by virtue of 
“vitality and force” associable with living organisms rather than invented social structures. 
The power of the charismatic leader essentially comes from (often mythologised) vantage-
point which encompasses a broader range than the permissible extents of the national 
discourse may allow. As Ahab is described: “Mark ye, be forewarned; Ahab’s above the 
common; Ahab’s been in colleges, as well as ‘mong the cannibals; been used to deeper 
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wonders than the waves; fixed his fiery lance in mightier, stranger foes than whales…” (MD 
71). 
            The perception of experience as opposed to innocence stemming from narrow-
mindedness and remaining enclosed within a definite microcosm, is what gives an advantage 
to the charismatic leader. Winter proffers a curious example of the fear of the “march of 
intellect” and advancing scientific knowledge, popularised in many cartoons during the 
Victorian era (17-18); whilst Ivan Turgenev in Russia personified those fears in the figure of 
the nihilistic Bazarov in Fathers and Sons (1862), who yet again creates a furore in a sleepy 
provincial town with his philosophical arguments and scientific experimentation.223 This 
reveals the exceptionalist society’s innermost fear  – the exaggerated individual liberty 
running loose, and threatening the established order. It is noteworthy that the respondents to 
the exceptionalist leader do not ever require proof of this experience, being seemingly content 
with a show of supposedly true characteristics, or, as in case of Stavrogin, a deliberate display 
of seeming intellectual prowess (in comparison to those surrounding him): 
It also turned out that he was extremely well educated, even considerably 
knowledgeable. Of course, it didn’t take much knowledge to impress us; but he could 
form opinions about current and extremely interesting topics, and, what is even more 
valuable, he had a great deal of good sense. (Devils 44-43) 
            Therefore, a major trait emerges that defines the specific way in which a successful 
exceptional individuality, incarnated as a charismatic leader, differs from a case of repressed 
individual rebellion manifested in characters of Pierre and Raskolnikov. Whilst being 
perfectly conscious of his own exceptional self, the charismatic leader possesses the 
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necessary savoir-faire to navigate the rigid Plinlimmonian framework holding society 
together – as well as the covert cynicism requisite not to take it in earnest.224  
              The idea of theatricality or pretence is therefore relevant – the above passage shows 
Stavrogin as knowing precisely what “sensible” opinions may be well received in a 
microcosm composed mainly of figures who believe that they are motivated by logic and 
reason (whilst in reality, their motivation is determined by the conventions of a typological 
framework of which they are not likely to be aware). There is, I argue, no marked instance 
where the stereotypical psychological characteristics of a leader are commented on (such as 
willpower or fervent faith in one’s ideals). Instead, the successful exceptional leader’s 
charisma comes from the fact that he understands how to manipulate the “horologicals” that 
society sets to protect itself against its potentially dangerous elements. In particular, Alison 
Winter (referring to the Carlylean school of thought) seems to share the opinion that if an 
“exceptional” individual (in her particular investigation – one endowed with mesmeric talent) 
is permitted to attain a leadership position thanks to particularly robust psychological 
capacities, eventually society has no choice but to accept them as such: “[A]s for the 
charismatic leaders … vulnerability to them was a fact of life, no matter how destructive this 
propensity might be. In 1841 Carlyle deplored hero worship but thought the only answer was 
to choose one’s heroes well” (332). 
                The textual matter in both novels attests to the notion that the reader should view 
Captain Ahab as well as Dostoyevsky’s “prince” as masters of manipulative illusion. The 
image of a mask explicitly appears in Moby-Dick as well as in Devils. The famous “little 
lower layer” passage explores this – and the reader sees Ahab himself hint at the mask-like, 
appearance-based nature of his leadership: 
                                                 
224 In The Human Condition (1958), Hannah Arendt comments on the concept of juristic frameworks for 
society’s efficient functioning. See also Walsh in Arendt Contra Sociology: Theory, Society and its science: 
“Arendt asks what must be the case about the deep structures of the social world that are presupposed by our 
activities – which are varied, patterned, but irreducible to each other” (17). 
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Hark ye yet again, - the little lower layer. All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard 
masks. But in each event – in the living act, the undoubted deed – there, some unknown 
but still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the 
unreasoning mask. If man will strike, strike through the mask! (MD 145) 
           It is somewhat shocking to hear Ahab speak so openly, as if disclosing the 
technicalities of a magical trick. However, it appears that the crew, preoccupied with thoughts 
of the tangible “Nantucket market” possess neither the awareness nor cynicism sufficient to 
comprehend what Ahab is saying. His comment, “But come closer, Starbuck; thou requires a 
little lower layer” (MD 145) is a sharp affirmation of the fact that no other soul on the 
“Pequod” can possibly compete with Ahab for the position of a charismatic leader.  
          The chief difference between the “exceptional” individual who succeeds as a leader 
and an ordinary individual, is the ability of the former to maintain an external and adaptable 
mask to present to others. The gimmick explaining this phenomenon is that the mask is 
usually deceptively simplistic, for all the vested mysteriousness, so that the onlookers 
immediately recognise and relate to it. The public does not need extreme character 
complexity, and Ahab is quite aware of it: “Ahab’s larger, darker, deeper part remains 
unhinted” (MD 166). The underestimated “little lower layer” is the driving manipulative 
force underneath the malleable façade which the leader can adapt accordingly to varied 
responses from the led. Bearing in mind what was explored in previous chapter, I state that 
“the little lower layer” is the awareness of the individual as an exceptional being – which has 
moreover passed the potentially dangerous rebellion phase which neither Raskolnikov nor 
Pierre Glendinning have managed.  
            Furthermore, Ahab’s speech brings one to the point raised by Carlyle in On Heroes, 
regarding whether a supposed charismatic leader acts out of his own volition, or is merely a 
carrier for a non-physical spiritual force using his physical body (described by Melville as 
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“an unreasoning mask”) as a smokescreen of sorts.225 Looking at the text, it appears that 
Melville himself hints at the possibility that Ahab is not a self-governing buffoon, but merely 
transmits and voices an incorporeal theoretical idea, quite in harmony with Carlyle’s 
argument. “[T]hat before living agent, now became living instrument” (MD 165), is an 
especially explicit statement, implying that Ahab, robbed to a large extent of self-will, 
becomes a machine-like medium for disembodied Carlylean “spirit” to thrive in the physical 
world. “Striking through the mask” could liberate this spirit or at least force it to manifest 
itself as it is (it is a common Realist and proto-Realist genre trope that the societal framework 
is essentially “insincere” and must be overturned in order for the “truth” to surface, sparing 
no shocking or “low” detail – precisely as the mid-nineteenth century writer-observer is 
expected to do).226 Yet Ahab can confidently voice it in the presence of the crew (much like a 
mythological immortal hero prophesying where his death is hidden), because he knows that 
the ordinary, non-exceptional personalities would not attempt it.   
           Thus we encounter yet another characteristic of a charismatic leader: he is seemingly 
invincible, and not because of enchantment of great personal power, but rather because of the 
ineptitude of those surrounding him (the society who, according to Carlyle, needs a hero in 
order to function). Logically, his blasphemous or chilling actions then become explainable 
not just as psychological tricks to gain attention, but as manifestations of his unpunishable 
power, which the leader may attribute to his divine status. This is why Ahab can say: “Talk 
not to me of blasphemy, man; I’d strike the sun if it insulted me” (MD 145). 
            
 NATURE AND ARTIFICE. 
                                                 
225 See Carlyle, Sartor Resartus and On Heroes. 
226 Also a trope favoured by Marxist school of thought, in particular - Georg Lukasc (1885-1971).  
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             The symbolism of a mask becomes more obvious upon observing the character of 
Stavrogin. Unlike the maimed and marked Ahab, of whose physicality it is said that one 
“would find a birth-mark on him from crown to sole” (MD 109), Stavrogin’s initial 
appearance is that of extreme, impossible physical perfection bordering on artifice.  
 Our dandies regarded him with envy and were eclipsed by him. His face also impressed 
me: his hair was just a bit too black, his bright eyes a bit too clear and serene, his 
complexion a bit too fair and delicate, his colour a bit too fresh and pure, his teeth like 
pearls, his lips like coral – he seemed to be a paragon of beauty, yet at the same time 
there was something repulsive about him. His face was said to resemble a mask…. 
(Devils 44) 
 
                    Echoing the first chapter, Ahab upholds the tendency for an exceptional 
individual to emerge maimed or disabled in some manner, after having confronted society. 
Yet with Stavrogin, one sees a beautifully crafted mask, where sophisticated workmanship 
has been painstaking, but the effect is nevertheless highly disturbing. The initial interpretation 
could be that in his desire to seem exceptional to others, Stavrogin only succeeds in alienating 
himself further from the rest of society. Yet this might be precisely his aim. The 
“exceptional” individual’s perfection should be exaggerated to the point of theatrical extreme, 
so as to immediately mark the character as such. In a uniform, unified exceptionalist society, 
any physical divergence would mark one as an outcast to be destroyed as endangering the 
communal existence – or alternatively, set them apart as a potential leader. Leslie Fiedler 
asserts that being a physical “freak” distinguishable from others may result in either 
destruction of the said freak, or, if that fails, awe and worship, for it is the unusualness that 
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makes such a character more akin to the unknown divine: “Freaks are simultaneously 
understood as symbols of the absolute Other and the essential Self” (Fiedler, 40-42).227 
            The charismatic leader in both texts is set apart from the rest of essentially mediocre 
personalities: in Dostoyevsky’s case, by extreme beauty, in Melville’s case, by apparent 
disability. If we reconcile Carlyle’s theory with how humanity commonly imagined gods or 
heroes (distinguished either by physical perfection or by a notable physical trait, such as one-
eyed Odin in the Norse tradition), we come to the conclusion that the leader has to be 
different – whether fair or foul, they should appear distinctive from anyone else.  
            This distinctiveness can either be physical, or even cultural. An interesting parallel 
between Ahab and Stavrogin is that although both are nominally products of their culture, 
one a Nantucketer, another hailing from a respected genteel clan, they can be viewed as 
essentially foreign, and ill at ease in their supposed home environment. With Ahab, this is 
manifested in wild rumours surrounding his life at sea. With Stavrogin, there appears an 
uncomfortable dimension to this notion, quite typical of the Russophile tendencies in 
Dostoyevsky’s day, that he is a dangerous “foreigner.” Described as “this Russian gentleman 
who, in spite of his European education, still hadn’t mastered the Russian grammar” (Devils 
752), Stavrogin is an element which is wholly alien to the body of the microcosm where he 
would be supposed to feel at home, and in his final confessional note, admits: “I’m not 
attached to anything in Russia – everything is as alien to me here as elsewhere” (Devils 753). 
This harmonises well with what we have seen with Ahab, remaining sequestered in his cabin 
apart from the crew. The “charismatic leader” is definitely not one of the people, even though 
he may eventually become the bringer of the mob rule; he has to stay separated, as a sole 
freestanding element. He also remains a foreign and potentially life-threatening presence for 
the social body, and cannot be reconciled with it naturally. And this is where the theme of 
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physical artifice, often taken to the extreme so as to function within this social body and even 
subject it to one’s will, becomes relevant. 
           Indeed, the charismatic leader’s physical difference from others has more than a hint 
of artifice or unrealness about it (which could possibly hint at a higher status, rising above 
ordinary organic nature) – Stavrogin’s mask is mirrored by Ahab’s ivory leg, which, fused 
with his body, implies that in the personality of a leader, artifice becomes fused with 
physicality, and grows to be his second nature, grotesque as it may seem at first. This 
argument, however, challenges the one put forth by Michael Rogin, who suggests that rather 
than becoming an integrated part of a charismatic leader’s self, the artificial element only 
contributes to sow further discord within his psyche, and subsequently, the disorder in the 
outside world ensues.228 Rogin states: “Ahab imposes a forced unity on the world. Ahab’s 
wound has awakened his anxiety over separation, and therefore has intensified his inner 
division as well” (117). 
             Furthermore, Rogin offers an interesting explanation to the significance of the artifice 
as a concept in regards to Ahab in particular. Artifice, according to him, is a venerated part of 
societal functioning and structure: and it is Ahab’s task, as a charismatic leader, to divest the 
artificial or material of the awe associated with it: 
The Protestant ethic, glorifying visible signs of grace, located saving power in material 
objects rather than God. This fetishism of commodities replaced pagan idol-worship 
with a modern form of animism. It endowed material objects with magical, redemptive 
power … Ahab … strikes through the visible signs of grace to destroy the governing, 
inscrutable power. (126) 
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               Rogin indirectly evokes the Jeffersonian rhetoric of cheerfully materialistic “pursuit 
of happiness” where tangible gain replaces loftier ideals. The spiritual (in specifically 
Protestant, American discourse) is overridden by the material, and in such a world, the 
artificially-constructed “false prophet” takes the centremost position.  Ahab is a material 
presence rather than a spiritual one, positioning himself as an automaton of sorts but turning 
away from anything that can be possibly seen as “organic” and thus liable to fail: “No such 
green weather stains on Ahab’s head!” (MD 500). However, Ahab’s efforts to do away with 
the organic, the weak, the ordinary, are not destined to work out. Such a stance leads him to 
perceive other individuals as artificial units fulfilling a particular purpose in his plan, the 
replaceable human “material” in his mad game. Fredericks summarises this attitude:  [T]he 
crew … he considers merely the means to his own ends, the “tools” he will use to accomplish 
his one object… (66). 
           Such a notion comes into conflict with a different image of leadership that Melville 
provides in his depiction of Steelkilt’s rebellion.  There is a notable difference with Ahab in 
that Steelkilt is frequently referred to in terms of being very much part of the natural rather 
than man-made world, “wild ocean-born and wild ocean-nurtured” (MD 220); a leader who 
emerges organically, exactly as per Carlyle’s argument.229 I maintain that the conflict 
between nature and artifice is crucial for understanding the central argument put forth in this 
chapter. Ahab, as it has been stated above, is associated with artifice first and foremost: 
artifice which duly becomes part of his essential being, yet artifice nevertheless. However, 
Steelkilt’s chief difference that sets him apart from Ahab is that Steelkilt is seen as naturally 
endowed with “exceptional” attributes marking him as a genuinely “exceptional” individual 
and a potential leader. Described as a “tall and noble animal” and “charger” (MD 221), 
Steelkilt represents a personality who is naturally or evolutionally selected to lead, 
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overturning the established norms (especially ones as rigid as on board a whaling ship) to 
establish his own. Certainly, there is a strong echo of Carlyle’s argument regarding the innate 
human search for a hero figure, and Melville stresses that indeed it is the case: “[A] brain, 
and a heart, and a soul in him, gentlemen, that made Steelkilt Charlemagne, had he been born 
son to Charlemagne’s father” (MD 221). 
             Steelkilt, in narrator’s eyes, is a leader in the manner that is pre-determined and 
favoured by the natural order - rather unexpectedly foreshadowing the theory of the survival 
of the fittest (it is not surprising that this observation should come from Ishmael, whose 
interest in the natural world’s dynamics is a recurrent motif throughout the novel). From the 
above citation, it can be implied that the established codes holding society together (such as 
genealogy) initially may not be kind to the emerging exceptional individual: however, once 
those are overturned, there emerges a more instinctive, primeval mode of existence 
reminiscent of the older times (represented by the image of Steelkilt and his men “seizing a 
large double war-canoe of the savages” (MD 234)) where the most “exceptional” individual 
took the position of a leader as a logical right. Such a situation challenges man-made laws, 
but does not go against the natural order: and therefore, Steelkilt (by the end of Ishmael’s 
narrative, at least) survives. Meanwhile Ahab, whose power is associated with artifice and 
imitation (however brilliantly executed), rather than strictly natural capacities, does not.  
           As Ahab’s personality is essentially “constructed,” it is interesting to note that as the 
ship hurtles towards its eventual doom, it seems to fall apart. The character of “hair-turbaned 
Fedallah” (MD 207) is especially interesting in that respect. Interpreting Fedallah as a 
demonic tempter of sorts, I maintain, would not be wholly correct. He is a macabre and 
mysterious figure, but through the course of the novel, can hardly be seen indulging in any 
particularly malicious activity. His origins or purpose of being onboard are shadowy: 
“Whence he came in a mannerly world like this, by what sort of accountable tie he soon 
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evinced himself to be linked with Ahab’s peculiar fortunes; nay, so far as to have some sort 
of a half-hinted influence; Heaven knows…” (MD 208). This sets him wholly apart from the 
other shadowy double, Peter Verkhovensky, who, for his seeming ordinariness, in the text is 
suggested to be the true “demon” who both tempts the Faustian Stavrogin and orchestrates 
the chaos, and who “had organized the first attempt at such systematic disorder, the 
programme for our future action” (Devils 749). Fedallah may be more unusual in appearance, 
yet he lacks Verkhovensky’s initiative for sowing the seeds of chaos.  
           My understanding of the character is that Fedallah, typically mute, is seen as the 
subconscious, shadow innate aspect of Ahab. Verkhovensky, however, is a fiendish external 
presence who comes deliberately to tempt and wreck disorder, his hellish nature stressed by 
adjectives such as “pointed” (Devils 189-190) and vivid descriptions: “One began to imagine 
that the tongue in his mouth had a special shape, unusually long and thin, very red, and with 
extremely pointed tip, flickering constantly and involuntarily” (190).  
          Fedallah could be a product of the psychological projections incarnated and set loose, 
and of Ahab’s desire to establish himself as a charismatic leader that led him to break out of 
the safe pre-determined framework of what can or cannot be done. This would have liberated 
a grotesque presence that is recognisable by its arcane appearance, connected with Ahab in 
some mysterious manner, and yet not a wholly independent agent. “He was such a creature as 
civilized, domestic people in the temperate zone only see in their dreams, and that but dimly,” 
Melville says (MD 208). This comment is full of rather racist overtones, yet again 
juxtaposing the acceptable “exceptionalist” America of Melville’s imagination with 
fantastical imaginary realms of “otherness” supposedly populated by chimeras and freaks in 
an exceptionalist mind. However, what Melville may actually mean here is that breaking out 
of the typological constraints would liberate chimeras like Fedallah, who just as well may be 
a product of Ahab’s mind. For all their frightening appearance, these creations merely attest 
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to the state of mind of the one who produced them. This harmonises with the subject of 
projected, imaginary notions interconnected with the exceptionalist discourse that I brought 
up in the introductory chapter; the only difference being that in a standard exceptionalist 
state, the projected visions are quite definite and typical, whilst in a chaotic situation where 
the charismatic leader comes to power, they can be wildly diverse, as the products of just one 
individual’s imagination rather than of the “collective conscious” of a nation-state in its 
entirety.  
          Fedallah’s prophecies, such as “Hemp can only kill thee” (MD 442) can just as well be 
vestiges of the monologue that Ahab holds within his head, as a manifestation of his 
monomaniac traits. Fedallah thus is no “pet monkey” (Devils 598) of Stavrogin’s who serves 
him in a Mephistophelean fashion, but a separate aspect of Ahab’s psyche projected into 
reality, who does not tempt, but echoes what is going on in Ahab’s soul. Thus a significant 
discrepancy between the two writers, I argue, is that for the Russian writer, the toxic 
“exceptional” leader endowed with inexplicable charisma is viewed as being assisted by 
supernatural devilish forces; in the American writer’s eyes, meanwhile, it is the “exceptional” 
leader’s inner projections, brought to the surface and incarnated, which contribute to how the 
events turn out.  
          The individual imaginary projections by the leader have the sufficient power to 
influence others. In “The Hat” chapter, as Ahab’s monomania grows, this quite inhuman, 
non-corporeal “shadow” aspect of Fedallah becomes more noticeable to the crew, even if 
they cannot quite define it:  
…Ahab’s eyes so awed the crew’s, the inscrutable Parsee’s glance awed his; or 
somehow, at least, in some wild way, at times affected it. Such an added, gliding 
strangeness began to invest the thin Fedallah now; such ceaseless shudderings shook 
him; that the men looked dubious at him; half uncertain, as it seemed, whether indeed 
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he was a mortal substance, or else a tremulous shadow cast upon the deck by some 
unseen being’s body. (MD 473) 
             The comparison of Fedallah to a separate part of Ahab’s psyche, when “in the Parsee 
Ahab saw his forethrown shadow, in Ahab the Parsee his abandoned substance” (MD 474) is 
clearly enough stressed by Melville. Both cannot function without each other, as they are one, 
to a large extent, and it was Ahab’s desire to establish himself as a leader that birthed 
Fedallah in the first place. Bringing up what also was previously said about Ahab being a 
transmitting agent for incorporeal Carlylean “spirit,” the notion is cemented by the textual 
evidence: “Still again both seemed yoked together, and an unseen tyrant driving them; the 
lean shade siding the solid rib” (MD 474). It is notable, furthermore, that in the scene where 
the final chase takes place, Fedallah perishes prior to Ahab’s demise, yet, in a fittingly 
theatrical fashion, his link with Ahab is preserved: “his sable raiment torn to shreds, his 
distended eyes turned full upon Ahab” (MD 503). One could almost say that the projected 
part of Ahab’s inner world returns back to him and is reabsorbed into his psyche. Fedallah’s 
body is reminiscent of a discarded puppet, or else the abandoned “pasteboard mask” already 
discussed. I interpret this that in the full view of his demise, Ahab loses the various separated 
aspects of his person that he developed as a “charismatic leader” to attain the bare life status, 
essentially whole and neutral, before eventual death. Saying “Thou goest before” (MD 503), 
Ahab acknowledges Fedallah’s death, and I interpret this as Ahab’s awareness of the gradual 
shedding of the aspects that made him the leader, in the stark face of reality and mortality. He 
loses his “exceptional” traits to become a neutral unit, on the par with other human units 
making up society (or metaphorically, the “Pequod’s crew), and just as susceptible to danger 





THE LEADER AND THE LED. 
           The charismatic leader essentially is an almost wholly superficial presence, whose 
existence is founded upon relationships and interactions with others. His personality is 
fascinating precisely because in reality he has little, or none. For himself, unless consumed 
with a monomaniac goal (which is often the result of a virulently transmitted vagabond idea), 
he does not truly desire or seek anything, exercising his influence on the masses solely for the 
ever-increasing influence’s sake. His appearance may be arresting, but inside there is actually 
little substance. This differs such a figure from either Melville’s ordinary, but solidly 
personable three ship-mates concerned with their mundane problems (MD 167) or zealotic 
souls like Shatov, who are described as “[O]ne of those idealistic Russian personalities who 
are suddenly struck by some compelling idea and seem overwhelmed by it immediately, 
sometimes even for ever” and remain faithfully believing this idea until, in an image 
reminiscent of imagery encountered in the previous chapter, “the stone [that’s] fallen on them 
and already half-crushed them to death” (Devils 29). The human units making up an 
exceptionalist society and that a charismatic leader can use as his “material,” to use their 
hidden innate potential in the pursuit of a monomaniacal idea, can thus be either ordinary 
souls unconcerned with higher subjects, or earnest idealistic believers - yet the charismatic 
leader himself is neither. He professes to believe, but nevertheless lacks substance at the core. 
             Ahab’s pursuit of the White Whale is essentially meaningless from the logical 
viewpoint. Stavrogin does not genuinely wish for a revolution to make life in Russia fairer, or 
at least different to what it was before: as he says, “I’m not attached to anything in Russia – 
everything is as alien to me here as elsewhere” (Devils 753). The “exceptionalist” leader is 
essentially hollow, lacking personal goals or genuine purpose, apart from wilfully exercising 
influence. For this, he would certainly require an audience, since on his own, he would be 
reduced to the individualistic rebel seen in the first chapter, vulnerable to suppression or 
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social rejection. Therefore, the presence of a retinue is an obvious and distinguishing trait of a 
successful charismatic leader.  
            “The Quarter-Deck” chapter is pivotal in allowing one to understand how the 
leadership of Captain Ahab is received by the rest of individuals inhabiting the “Pequod”’s 
microcosm. I maintain that the fact that Melville chose to precede the chapter with what looks 
like a stage-direction (Enter Ahab: Then, all) (MD 141), had a very specific reasoning behind 
it, beyond stylistic or literary purposes. It is notable that the rest of the chapter is not laid out 
as a theatrical scene (unlike quite a few others), and indeed, it is not Melville’s purpose to 
present it as such. Rather, the crucial importance of “The Quarter-Deck” lies with that it sets 
out, once and for all, the relationship that is to be between Ahab and his crew. Being the 
nominally formal leader (in his capacity as the ship’s captain) at the beginning of the 
“Pequod”’s journey, Ahab uses his position at this precise point to openly declare himself as 
a charismatic leader, thus subverting the previous status quo within the microcosm in order to 
create a radically new order drawn towards a radically different idea – the revenge upon the 
White Whale. Certainly, this echoes an all-too-familiar historical image where the 
“exceptionalist” society held together by its national discourse and laws is suddenly headed 
by a totalitarian leader spouting controversial ideas in a charismatic manner. 
             The charismatic leader depends on the response from others and cherishes artifice 
and theatricality as helpful attributes in attaining and maintaining his status. Thus it is not 
surprising that Ahab envisages this moment as a theatricalised, carefully constructed 
performance, which he can use to traverse established boundaries and mark out his own, in 
his capacity as a leader.230 This scene is his declaration of a claim to be a charismatic leader. 
                                                 
230 See Olson in Call me Ishmael (68), for an analysis of theatrical tricks employed by Ahab (e.g. nailing the 
doubloon coin to the mast to create a centre-stage, or using a specifically theatrically effective language). Olson 
hints, although he does not offer a thorough analysis, that Ahab’s theatrical manipulative techniques direct the 
course of the novel’s action. 
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Psychologically speaking, he uses the time and the mysteriousness of the situation to his 
advantage, to set the scene: 
        It drew near the close of day. Suddenly he came to a halt by the bulwarks, and 
inserting his bone leg into the auger-hole there, and with one hand grasping a shroud, 
he ordered Starbuck to send everybody aft. 
“Sir!” said the mate, astonished at an order seldom or never given on ship-board except 
in some extraordinary case. 
“Send everybody aft,” repeated Ahab. “Mast-heads, there! Come down!” (MD 142) 
                  Ahab exhibits an astute awareness of traits and tricks that subtly contribute 
towards positioning himself as an unusual, extraordinary (and thus – exceptional) leader. The 
usage of his customary authority as the captain of the “Pequod” is also employed by him as a 
resource working towards establishing himself as an exceptional leader (quite in the same 
vein as Stavrogin puts to use his noble birth and aristocratic ways). The well-calculated pose, 
“one hand grasping a shroud” is quite likely intentional (amusingly, it is rather reminiscent of 
how leaders such as Napoleon or even Stalin used to be portrayed).231 Ahab immediately 
asserts his claim to that role by feigned disregard for the “commoners” (the rest of the crew) 
and taking his time, “unmindful of the wondering whispering among the men.” (MD 142) As 
he is “darting his eyes among the crew” (142) one may say that Ahab is acting 
simultaneously in two aspects of a charismatic leader: an actor and a puppeteer keenly 
observing the reactions of his intended audience. He perfectly manipulates his timing – the 
posing “did not last long” (142). In this theatricalised mise-en-scene, the supposedly 
democratic spirit of equality associated with America, and the American navy specifically, is 
not present – the new hierarchical order is plainly outlined without words.  
                                                 
231 J. Mark Powell offers a summary of the origins and significance of this specific pose, made popular by artists 




           Further on, Ahab yet again uses a strategy associated with theatrical manipulation, 
which also hints at his charismatic qualities – the element of surprise. He has sufficiently 
prepared the assembled crowd, and deftly plays the calculated reaction of “wild approval in 
his tones; observing the hearty animation into which his unexpected question had so 
magnetically thrown them” (MD 142-143). Much as I like the Melvillean term “magnetic,” I 
would like to disagree here with Sam Halliday who argues that the nature of Ahab’s 
leadership is magnetically attractive in some preternatural way.232 If anything, Ahab comes 
across in this scene as a genius of mass manipulation, employing such tactics as undoubtedly 
would only be too familiar to a scholar of political or sociological authoritarian tendencies.233 
Keeping in perfect harmony with the expected image of a charismatic leader, Ahab is not as 
much as a mystic, as a gifted psychologist. The figure of an exceptional leader is therefore 
less mysteriously “magnetic” than might be initially imagined.  
           Thus “The Quarter-Deck” is a scene which deals with the key transitional point in the 
development of the individualistic leader – namely, the precise moment at which the 
individual, rebellious personality of the previous chapter lays claim to the next evolutionary 
step – the position of a leader who is able to influence groups by the sheer yet calculated 
force of the exceptional character. It is notable that Ahab has not yet attained the full power 
as a charismatic leader as such (still remaining within the hierarchical bounds as a captain), 
but makes himself known as one nevertheless. Stubb, acting as a commentator, summarises it 
perfectly: ““D’ye mark him, Flask?” whispered Stubb; “the chick that’s in him pecks the 
shell. ‘Twill soon be out”” (MD 142). 
           As well as the more direct reference to the emerging positioning of Ahab as an 
exceptional leader, Stubb’s words send one back to the more profound notion briefly touched 
                                                 
232 See Sam Halliday. 
233 See broadly Arendt, and Foucault.  
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upon before. The “chick” that Stubb speaks of, may accidentally imply the wandering “germ” 
of an idea (as per Wald’s hypothesis explored previously) taking over and determining the 
motives of Ahab. At the beginning of this chapter, the question was – what really moves the 
charismatic leader, particularly if we know quite plainly that this role is largely superficial 
and externally-viewed. The question then arises, who or what is really behind the “pasteboard 
mask.”  
           Indeed, as Ahab says later (as a private remark), “Something shot from my dilated 
nostrils, he has inhaled it in his lungs. Starbuck now is mine; cannot oppose me now, without 
rebellion” (MD 146). This reminiscence is central to my argument regarding the disembodied 
idea spreading as a contagion through a human “agent,” for it reveals two crucial points about 
the charismatic leader’s influence over his followers. Firstly, Melville succinctly summarises 
the idea touched upon in the previous paragraph and asserted in detail in the first chapter, 
concerning the diffusion of the dangerous idea from one individual to others.234  
            Secondly, Ahab’s own utterance shows him as a manipulator who is quite aware of 
the mechanism behind the diffusion of a dangerous idea that is not necessarily produced 
enitrely by his own volition - and of how it can be used in order to influence an audience. It is 
the idea (which Ahab voices), rather than the human being, that genuinely holds power over 
the “Pequod”’s crew. The calculated performance, timing, and posing only serve to assist in 
putting this idea across in an arresting fashion, but Melville makes it clear: as a leader, Ahab 
is not a powerful personality who can influence others by the magnificent display of personal 
strengths (or even malice). His figure is that of an agent or transmitter of a particular idea – 
and what is required of an agent-transmitter is primarily an ability to continue with the 
specific theatrical performance which helps to convey an idea in a comprehensible and 
arresting manner.  
                                                 
234 As per Wald, Foucault and McGill. 
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           Indeed, earlier on, Melville manages to reconcile the diverse aspects of this hypothesis 
by proposing in the text that what he views as mental “illness” can evolve into a manipulative 
force of a much more effective and sinister nature: “Human madness is oftentimes a cunning 
and most feline thing. When you think it fled, it may have but become transfigured into some 
still subtler form” (MD 165). As well as attributing the non-physical force driving Ahab with 
organic and animalistic traits, Melville underlines its evolving, deftly dissembling essence.  
            One should not be led astray by the words, “Starbuck is now mine,” thinking that 
Ahab is just a conscious manipulator. On the contrary, this sentence reinforces my argument. 
It is true that Ahab is used by the non-corporeal “virus” of a particular idea as a carrier and 
transmitter in the actual physical world. He himself is quite convinced that he is a leader in 
his own right; whilst the reality is quite different. From here, it would follow that the pursuit 
of the White Whale is not even necessarily something that Ahab himself truly wants, as a feat 
of revenge or of masculine prowess. It is the ideological virus that determines that the next 
step would be the hunt for Moby-Dick, for reasons known only to itself, and it finds a fertile 
breeding-ground in the minds of the ship’s crew, already conditioned by the American 
exceptionalist discourse to readily accept passionate ideological imaginary projections – 
however ludicrous. 
           Therefore Ahab is an instrument, rather than a manipulator drunk on boundless 
individual liberty that his hierarchical position affords him over his subordinates. By arguing 
that Ahab is a medium for the transmission of the ideological contagion, I separate my 
argument from the view that places Ahab as a hypnotic figure using the magnetic properties 
of his “self” for his own mystical purposes. Quite on a par with Stavrogin, who, although 
“capable of acting with great cunning, [he] was not actually in his right mind or control of his 
actions” (Devils 53), Ahab is essentially all about pretence, and is much less grand and 
mystical than others may deem him to be. He also is quite respectful, in word, of established 
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hierarchy and rules, referring to concepts such as “fair play,” and which can be interpreted as 
exquisite mockery on the par with Stavrogin’s antics: “Avast!” cried Ahab; let’s have fair 
play here, though we be the weaker side” (MD 447). 
            However, this does not divest Ahab of possessing selfish or explicable motives (albeit 
these would be on a far lesser scale than the dangerousness of the idea he transmits). As a 
human being, Ahab certainly enjoys the psychological sensation of exercising what he sees as 
mystical power over the crew, and indeed, he may think that this power is “his” and he is a 
bona fide magnetic leader. However, it is the non-corporeal idea who truly determines the run 
of the events, and not the Captain. He may say that Starbuck is “his,” and superficially 
readers might think of parallels with Satan taking over human souls in general Protestant 
(and, specifically, New England) tradition.235 However, what the exceptionalist discourse 
would make of his words is that Starbuck has fallen under the influence of the particular 
vision founded upon the principle of opposing an imaginary projection of the evil “other” 
(even though the highly theatricalised performance displaying Ahab’s supposedly charismatic 
self was what largely attracted Starbuck’s attention in the first place). It is the non-corporeal 
idea that really matters, not the interchangeable physical individual.  
            While Starbuck is an upholder of pan-human, essentially faceless and abstract virtue, 
in Ahab it is precisely the masculine, biological, animalistic traits, or rather, the perfect 
imitation of those, that exercise influence on the non-reasoning, instinctive and emotional 
psychological aspects of the rest of the crew. This renders him akin to Stavrogin yet again. 
Recalling Dostoyevsky’s general plot, Stavrogin’s masculinity forms a significant part of the 
narrative, such as the seductions of Liza and Marya Lebyadkina, or the slavish admiration by 
Verkhovensky. The reasonable, theoretical virtue has no place or hope of survival in the 
                                                 
235 See, for instance, Nathaniel Hawthorne’s story, “Young Goodman Brown” (1835), or Washington Irving’s 
story, “The Devil and Tom Walker (1824), for the role that the Devil plays as a “soul-taker.” 
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realm ruled by emotional, subconscious responses. Ahab’s superiority to Starbuck as an 
instinctive, Dionysian presence who “feels” sensually instead over over-analyzing, in this 
particular situation is highlighted by Melville: “Here’s food for thought, had Ahab time to 
think; but Ahab never thinks; he only feels, feels, feels; that’s tingling enough for mortal 
man!” (MD 498). 
                   Thus, this chapter pinpoints and explains the exact mistakes made by both Pierre 
and Raskolnikov as described in the preceding case studies. The failed exceptional 
individuality attempts to influence or affect the turn of events by what they deems to be the 
exceptional strength or remarkableness of their own self. Society does not readily accept this, 
and the result is failure (and quite likely, death). The charismatic leader, however, is someone 
who (normally subconsciously, as is the case with Ahab) has learnt to adjust the movements 
of the self in order to latch on to a particular ideology or discourse and let it speak through 
himself, bolstering this with occasional showcases of animalistic, masculine prowess which 
crosses the boundaries of what is deemed “acceptable.” Masses are won over by a well-
presented idea appealing to their instincts, not solely by the magnitude of an individual 
personality alone without at least a semblance of a definable ideological position (what this 
personality truly believes in, is a rather different question).236 This tendency was closely 
adhered to in literature, especially plays, during the Enlightenment, only to be gradually done 
away with as Romanticism advanced, and then slowly re-emerging with the advent of the 
Realist genre, right at the time when both Melville and Dostoyevsky produced their texts.  
           Nevertheless, just as the whalebone leg of Ahab is seen as if fused with his flesh, the 
wider society cannot generally distinguish in a charismatic leader where personality ends and 
an ideological attack begins. This in turn leads to the creation of a myth of a charismatic 
                                                 
236 The exchange of ideas in a “public sphere” space designated for them, and associated problems like 
demagoguery are also discussed by Jurgen Habermas in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 
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leader’s commanding personality and animal magnetism. However, in reality Ahab is just as 
much of a manipulated marionette as the crew that he seeks to influence. The fact that 
Starbuck “cannot oppose me now, without rebellion” would suggest that the real force 
constraining a would-be rebel is the notion of ideological treachery and unwillingness to take 
part in open dissent. Furthermore, once the exceptional leader becomes part and parcel of the 
accepted discourse, it becomes quite as problematic to transgress once-revolutionary new 
rules laid out by him.  
          The reactions of the crew to Ahab’s assertion of himself as a charismatic leader are 
interesting. As the performance progresses, Melville openly stresses the transition of human 
to animal (rather than from the living to non-living that is explored in Pierre): “But those 
wild eyes met his, as the bloodshot eyes of the prairie wolves meet the eye of their leader, ere 
he rushes on at their head in the trail of bison; but, alas! Only to fall into the hidden snare of 
the Indian” (MD 147). 
              It is of course a well-known metaphoric tendency to compare a group headed by a 
powerful leader to the “pack” or “herd” animalistic mentality (which is also echoed in Devils 
by the epigraph concerning the Biblical story of the Gadarene swine possessed by demons 
and drowned in the sea). “The Candles” chapter offers an alternative view of such mentality 
as equated either to animalistic state of being, or death: 
 …[A] number of seamen, arrested by the glare, now cohered together, and hung 
pendulous, like a knot of numbered wasps from a drooping orchard twig. In various 
enchanted attitudes, like the standing, or stepping, or running skeletons in Herculaneum, 
others remained rooted to the deck…. (MD 449) 
            In “The Town-Ho’s Story” we also see an animalistic image of following the leader, 
as the crew, “in obedience to Steelkilt, they preceded him down into their dark den, 
growlingly disappearing, like bears into a cave” (MD 227).  Such mentality (as 
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Dostoyevsky’s use of the Biblical tale also implies) commonly leads to perdition, because of 
the “animal” mentality being presumably unable to reason. Indeed, Dostoyevsky, for his part, 
does stress the notion of complete and utter loss of judgement in the scene of Liza’s murder 
by a mob: “I declared that everything had occurred entirely by accident, through the actions 
of people, who, while they might have been incited, were not really aware of what they were 
doing. They were drunk and not in control of themselves” (Devils 609). Although 
Dostoyevsky does not expand as much on the “animal” theme at this precise moment, he 
evokes the complete loss of consciousness and humans acting as if hypnotized, or 
automatons. 
            The initial suppression of Steelkilt’s rebellion is also rife with unpleasant animalistic 
imagery of the punished crew likened to “dead cattle” or “three quarters of meat” (MD 229). 
Yet the case is not as simple as the shepherd-like leader directing an animalistically-turned 
group. The “snare of the Indian” mentioned earlier is of a particular meaning. If the crew, and 
even Ahab, are wolves, may the disembodied idea transmitted by Ahab and hidden 
underneath external “layers” of his persona, as Carlyle suggests in his treatises, not be 
metaphorically represented by the human being who sets the trap?  
           The epigraph to Devils is of particular importance here. If one analyses it alongside the 
wolf-pack metaphor of Melville’s, apart from the obvious association of group mentality with 
animalistic characteristics some distinct differences can be observed. In case of 
Dostoyevsky’s epigraph, it is the demons (who one can interpret as a metaphor for potentially 
destructive ideas) who leave the man’s body in order to go into the animals. However, with 
Melville we see the idea or Carlylean “spirit” penetrate human psyche in order to render it 
beast-like. Recalling Kovalev’s critique of the novel, this difference can be interpreted easily 
enough: Moby-Dick is a narrative of perdition. Dostoyevsky, however, implies that in spite of 
destruction described, salvation is theoretically attainable (as personified in the figure of 
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Dasha, the “nursemaid” who meekly bears her tribulations in a markedly Christian manner 
and survives, unlike many other characters) – many scholarly analyses propose that it is 
possible through the embrace of Christianity.237 More broadly, in a discussion of the 
intellectual climate at the beginning of nineteenth century, Charles McCann, referring to 
figures as diverse as Locke or Jean-Jacques Rousseau, hints that societal cohesion stemmed 
not from imposed rules, but as a natural, instinctive act to gravitate towards what is seen as 
“good” (McCann 2). 238 Assembling under Ahab or Stavrogin’s eyes is, meanwhile, a Satanic 
parody of such a vision.  
           Curiously enough, both writers subtly hint at the existence of an immaterial, unseen, 
yet potentially dangerous entity dominating the scene. The Biblical demons of Devils are 
somewhat more understandable than the unobserved hunter in the second case – however, 
this latter parallel can be read more deeply, a disembodied theoretical idea being likened to 
the “snare” placed by the unknown hand rather than an active agent. This then can be 
explained by the fact that the ideas, however influential, can exist, virus-like, yet do not occur 
of themselves. They have to be produced or formed by something or someone, quite likely 
with a specific aim in mind. Reverting to the discussion of Plinlimmon’s pamphlet in the 
previous chapter, we have already seen that ideas (essentially disembodied and immaterial) 
are formed by people of flesh and blood, who do not even necessarily have to exhibit 
exceptional characteristics (Plotinus Plinlimmon is remarkably unremarkable for an 
influential philosopher). They can be produced for prosaic purposes: self-promotion, personal 
interest or even arbitrary malicious playfulness. Yet, whilst the ideas are birthed by living 
people and cannot engender themselves of their own accord, once formed, they gain a 
viability similar to that of a non-material demon (or, far more prosaically in Melville’s case, a 
                                                 
237 See Frank, Schur, Berdyaev. 
238 See McCann, Individualism and the Social Order. 
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solidly material instrumental trap waiting to be sprung). The idea is an entity – albeit one 
divested of moral sense or compassion. To summarise and deepen the previous analogy with 
the virus, I argue that an idea has its own life cycle precisely like a virus – and its purpose is 
(whether the idea is beneficial or noxious) to reproduce as much as possible, taking over 
more and more territory – not space, but rather individual human minds, forming a radical 
new discourse based on imaginary constructs, and assumptions on what may be right or 
wrong. As they take over more and more, quite like the amaranth in Pierre, they become 
more and more axiomatic, as readily-recalled instantaneous memes which are immediately 
recognised yet seldom questioned. 
 
THE POWER OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS: IMAGINARY PROJECTIONS. 
           It is not enough to simply comment upon the descent of the crew into animalistic 
behaviour without exploring deeper the motives that might be affecting their response to the 
idea transmitted by Ahab, who is essentially a hollow receptor through whose agency the idea 
spreads. After all, much has already been said about the influential power of the non-material 
idea, but we have not yet seen why exactly it is influential.  
          To understand this better, it would be helpful to recollect the theoretical framework put 
forward by the Myth and Symbol postwar school of thought and also echoed later by scholars 
like Bruce Kucklick and Mary Poovey, as it affords the best vantage-point to contextualise 
historic and psychological factors together.239 The instinctive substrata of the psyche (perhaps 
reminiscent of the “little lower layer”) extends further and broader than the logical, conscious 
mind, and operates by recognising given symbols or stimuli, which could be viewed as 
essentially defining reality rather than logically and sequentially attempting to explain it. 
                                                 
239 C.G. Jung’s theory of archetypes shares some similarities with the idea above, although it is generally a 
radically different vision, and will not be asserted in this particular investigation. 
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They are associable with ready concepts like “right” or “wrong” and the subconscious 
recognises them before the actual logical mind does. Viewed from this perspective, Ahab’s 
White Whale can be interpreted as a manifestation of reality in its essence; not easily 
explainable or fully understandable, often surrounded by all sorts of imaginary aspects, but 
immediately recognisable, if inspiring a particular emotion, such as fear: 
…[T]he outblown rumours of the White Whale did in the end incorporate with 
themselves all manner of morbid hints, and half-formed foetal suggestions of 
supernatural agencies, which eventually invested Moby Dick with new terrors 
unborrowed from anything that visibly appears. So that in many cases such a panic 
did he finally strike, that few who by those rumors, at least, had heard of the White 
Whale, few of those hunters were willing to encounter the perils of his jaw. (MD 160-
161) 
                   As a concept, embodying reality in its most actual yet intangible aspect, the 
White Whale is seen as being continuously present and not limited by the constraints of 
space, or time, or physical limitations. “[M]oby Dick was ubiquitous; [that] he had actually 
been encountered in opposite latitudes at one and the same instant of time” (MD 162). The 
Whale represents timeless and undefinable reality who “revealed his identity, at a long 
distance, to those who knew him” (MD 161) by certain symbolic traits; and in this respect, it 
proves to be the perfect foil for the “exceptional” leader who despises all earthly constraints 
or limitations. Inhuman greatness must be overcome with inhuman means.  
           As he pursues Moby-Dick, Ahab can be described as trying to make logical sense of 
reality, conquer it, and adapt it to suit a particular mythologised purpose. He either invented 
this purpose himself (precisely as Donald Pease argues exceptionalist ideals are formed), or 
else became “infected” with an abstract idea, only to be dumbfounded when the actual reality 
confronts him. In “The Town-Ho’s Story” chapter, Melville, under the guise of a traditional 
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Christian image, deftly proposes the notion that the White Whale is representative of reality 
which rearranges even the best-laid plans by the strongest and most capable individuals, 
proving that there is an unfathomable force to which even the most audacious leader must 
submit: “[T]he Town-Ho’s story, which seemed obscurely to involve with the whale a certain 
wondrous, inverted visitation of one of so called judgements of God which at times are said 
to overtake some men” (MD 218). 
            However, the true meaning of Moby-Dick as a concept of reality incarnated is not 
limited solely to Ahab. Ishmael says about Radney’s death in the jaws of Moby-Dick, that “a 
strange fatality pervades the whole career of those events, as if verily mapped before the 
world was charted” (MD 233). I maintain that this is not simple fatalism, but the fact that 
reality (in its unfathomable real form) overturns the social codes (whether established by 
Plinlimmonian hierarchy or by an emerging leader’s audacity) to rearrange the scene 
according to its own irresistible logic. Social codes may baulk upon encountering a 
particularly forceful personality, but even the strongest personality is overcome by reality 
which has no regard for individual strength or cunning. Moreover, reality (personified by 
Moby-Dick), can be described as the only truly democratic phenomenon in that it levels and 
conquers one and all (since even the ship’s microcosm, in spite of arguments by figures like 
C.L.R. James or Kovalev, is not entirely divested of hierarchical tendencies).240  
             Reality is powerful precisely because it touches or affects everyone and anyone 
involved, and not just a few selected individuals. The term “collective unconscious,” pointing 
towards a shared field of subconscious instinctive understanding in all mankind, is relevant, if 
we are speaking about how a particular microcosm (be it a ship or a provincial town) 
functions. Henry Smith reconciles this notion with the specifically national, exceptionalist 
                                                 
240 Jennifer Greiman in an essay “Democracy and Melville’s aesthetics” comments on the fluidity of democracy 
as a definition in Melville’s works. 
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discourse, discussing immediately recognisable symbols that are nevertheless elusive and 
hard to pinpoint, in his discussion of “varying national consciousness” (3). 241 In short, the 
idea, once it is formed, viable, and enters the mind of any given individual, puts forth a 
particular symbol or notion that corresponds or evokes with a particular notion fixed in the 
subconscious of the human being. Perhaps this can be the closest definition of the concept of 
“reality” as it stands, and it has to be laconic yet recognisable and familiar to all – just like the 
White Whale: 
All this while Tashtego, Daggoo and Queequeg had looked on with even more intense 
interest and surprise than the rest, and at the mention of the wrinkled brow and 
crooked jaw they had started as if each was separately touched by some specific 
recollection. (MD 143-144) 
               The White Whale can be defined as a condensed notion of reality, perfectly 
summarised and easily recognised by its attributes, setting in motion the particular individual 
psychological triggers that each of the three harpooners may possess. These triggers can be 
diverse, but each acts “separately” on an instinctual level. Although here he exhibits the 
stereotypical racial bias of his time, that the three harpooners are “savages” and thus could be 
viewed as more instinctive beings, than, say, Starbuck, Melville hints that as more instinctive 
and less formalised characters who can logically be deemed to be less affected by the 
typological rigid codes dictating an individual’s reactions and actions, the three harpooners 
are more readily prepared to react at the idea that addresses the instinctive subconscious 
rather than the overtly logical conscious: “The Pagan leopards – the unrecking and 
unworshipping things, that live, and seek, and give no reasons for the torrid life they feel!” 
(MD 146). 
                                                 
241 See Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as symbol and myth.  
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                The fact that all three come from extremely diverse cultural backgrounds 
(Polynesian, Native American and African) reinforces what was said earlier: the shared 
collective unconscious is extremely broad, yet streamlined and effective so as to speak as if 
individually to any given human being, regardless of the specific background. Yet it is the 
same stimulus (that is, the Whale) that speaks to it, in all the three harpooners. One may 
therefore assume that such is (personified in the figure of the White Whale) reality at its 
truest: it exists independently of interpretations or perceptions. The language in which the 
idea is transmitted is therefore highly transnational, individual and adaptable – which 
precisely is what is required for effective spreading. As the individual differences become 
unimportant, the personal psychological boundaries are blurred, the group becoming and 
moving as one.  As Melville comments: “The crew, man, the crew! Are they not one and all 
with Ahab, in this matter of the whale?” (MD 146). 
                After the charismatic leader’s mind becomes engrossed with a particular idea, the 
said idea is diffused by him to the rest of those who interact with such a leader, uniting them 
together to form a single “social body,” in an essentially artificial (recalling the earlier 
discussion of Ahab and Stavrogin’s physicalities), image of perverted unity and wholeness. 
The seemingly random and separate individuals are susceptible to uniting into a single “social 
body” under the influence of a particular idea transmitted by a charismatic leader precisely 
due to inert state of their intellectual and physical being suddenly reacting to a given 
stimulus.  
              From here, there follows a neat mechanism defining just how the idea transmitted by 
a charismatic leader is caught on and regurgitated by the rest of those affected, and made 
seem as their own conscious decision. “The Quarter-Deck” in particular offers the algorithm 
of how it is calculated so as to influence the audience (the crew): 
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 …And this is what ye have shipped for, men! To chase that white whale on both sides 
of land, and over all sides of earth, till he spouts black blood and rolls fin out. What say 
ye, men, will ye splice hands on it, now? I think ye do look brave. (MD 144) 
                 Apart from the obvious provocative manipulation where such a mechanism is used 
for pushing the crew to prove their worth and bravery, an important trait emerges that throws 
more light on how exactly the charismatic leader engages his audience. The leader perversely 
implies that it was originally the intention of the audience rather than an imposed vision – 
“this is what ye have shipped for.” Moreover, it offers a contrast with the extreme 
unusualness of the mission that the crew seemingly have chosen to embark upon – this is no 
mere whaling expedition. If to agree with Kovalev’s argument that in Moby-Dick every 
image is a symbol, then Ahab’s rousing call parodies rhetorics surrounding Manifest Destiny 
–  promising a unique path that also requires one to exhibit worthiness of pursuing it. Of 
course, what this pursuit actually comes to, is glaringly obvious in the final chapters, which 
can be interpreted as a bitter Melvillean mockery of the expansionist speeches: “The ship! 
The hearse! The second hearse!” cried Ahab from the boat; “its wood could only be 
American!” (MD 506). In Dostoyevsky’s narrative, the demise of the “Pequod” is loosely 
comparable to the disillusioned aesthete Stepan Trofimovich, departing against the backdrop 
of burning town and running mobs “in search of Russia” (Devils 607) – and in reality, to his 
death in a peasant’s hut, as a parody of Slavophile beliefs. 
          Notably, the objective of the hunt in Melville’s novel, seemingly concrete, remains 
elusive. I maintain that this is a point in the narrative where reality (personified by the White 
Whale) and imaginary constructs spawned by the exceptionalist environment (personified by 
Ahab) clash. The hunt for the White Whale is at the core just as futile as Stepan 
Trofimovich’s search for some imaginary Russia amid violence and disorder, or the vague 
promises of Stavrogin’s followers: “Russia would welcome any way of escape – just show it 
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to her” (Devils 392).  It is movement for movement’s sake, first and foremost. From Ahab’s 
words, one may glean that there exists a “white whale” that ought to be killed in satisfaction 
of vengeance, which is of little actual relevance or profit to the Captain’s intended audience. 
However, in the defence of his stance, Ahab offers an argument that transcends common 
logic: 
 If money’s to be the measurer, man, and the accountants have computed their great 
counting-house, the globe, by girdling it with guineas, one to every three parts an 
inch; then, let me tell thee, that my vengeance will fetch a great premium here! (MD 
145) 
 
             This rhetoric, with its focus on promise of non-tangible and universalist abstract 
glory, rather than of immediate and definable practical benefits, is uncomfortably evocative 
of the one employed by the Communist ideologues throughout the life-cycle of the Soviet 
Union. On the surface of things, the charismatic leader’s audience is invited to put aside any 
concerns with pragmatic matters, in order to become part of a vast global mythological 
scenario – evoking De Tocqueville’s visions of affecting the destinies of the entire world. 
Dostoyevsky echoes this notion, but he suggests that what attracts the followers is not so 
much the promise of a hypothetical reward, but the “right to dishonour” (Devils 393) – that is, 
to question the unshakeable rules of yore, and thus subsequently join a select group of “clever 
people” representing a different, more glorious future, despite the fact that the details about 
what this future exactly entails, are not divulged: 
Only we will be left, we who have prepared ourselves to assume power; we’ll attract 
the clever people to our side, and ride roughshod over the fools. You mustn’t back off 




                   Howard Bruce Franklin argues that as a leader, Ahab invites the crew to become 
part of an epic myth played out as a mystic ritual upholding the universe’s existence.242 This 
is perfectly on the par with the exceptionalist rhetoric in general. Dostoyevsky is less epic in 
proportions, although the mythologised role offered by the charismatic leader is outlined – on 
the contrary, in the scenes during a ruined fete, the morbidly comical debate on the value of 
laurels in the kitchen rather than on the poet’s head reinforces the “mundane” actual 
preoccupations of the nihilistic rebels, opposed to the higher societal ideals (Devils 546). 
                  With Melville’s novel, the potential followers are promised an exceptional role in 
a globally significant narrative (which brings one back to Raskolnikov’s obsession with the 
Napoleonic myth explored in the previous chapter). Yet it is notable that the actual reward or 
benefit they would supposedly reap again is not described in any detail, even though it is an 
axiom that they should receive it. Ahab hints at “a great premium,” but what that premium 
might be, even in terms of feelings (satisfaction, personal greatness, excitement) is never 
said. As possibly the most pragmatic of characters, Stubb summarises it excellently: 
“[M]ethinks it rings most vast, but hollow” (MD 145).  
             The vast scale of Ahab’s promise is impressive, but there is just as little substance to 
it, as there is to Ahab’s persona as a charismatic leader.243 This is easily explained by the fact 
that, as it has already been shown, the idea (which speaks through Ahab) exists and spreads 
simply for the sake of existing and spreading. As a non-corporeal being divested of material 
concerns, and not even necessarily benevolent (that is, intending to bring about positive 
tangible change in the material world to do with the material well-being of others) the idea 
does not seek to give any physical reward to those it chooses as its “host.” The “great 
premium” would therefore be the completion and fulfilment of the idea, purely for the 
                                                 
242 See Bruce Franklin, The Wake of the Gods: Melville’s Mythology.  
243 For Ahab as a hollow soulless presence, see Stephen Ausband’s article, “The Whale and the Machine.” 
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fulfilment’s sake. From a human viewpoint, it may strike one as nonsensical; but from the 
biological perspective of a virus’s existence, it is logical, since the virus does not need 
incentives or justification in order to spread.  
             Melville hints that the actual concept of Manifest Destiny with its central image of 
“spreading” or “taking over” although it is not explicitly presented, but allegorical and 
symbolic. Possibly this could be attributed to the fact that Moby-Dick straddled the advent of 
the Realist genre and the more allegorical literary era preceding it, and this subtlety is 
homage to the earlier era. The chief difference between this text and Devils,  therefore is that 
Dostoyevsky, as an established representative of the Realist genre, chooses to discuss the 
same subject in much less ambiguous terms, presenting it as the direct conversation between 
the charismatic leader Stavrogin and the doubting Shatov (who, if to use Frank’s 
terminology, could be perceived as the binary or double to Starbuck, playing the part of the 
only doubting element in the charismatic leader’s retinue).  
            It should be mentioned that the characters of Devils are essentially members of the 
Russian intelligentsia, typically seen as a class formed around the sense of the importance of 
the idea, the intellectual, the non-material (and therefore different from the simultaneously 
emergent bourgeoisie, distinguished primarily by their economic “middle-ground” status). 
Therefore, unlike the almost wholly pragmatic Starbuck preoccupied with barrels of whale 
oil, or the three harpooners, they unsurprisingly exhibit a stronger awareness and capability 
of putting into words the counter-arguments for a potentially dangerous idea transmitted by 
the charismatic leader. In his conversation with Stavrogin, Shatov shows that he is conscious 
of the fact that behind the national idea, there is no actual pragmatic or even logical 
explanation (that Melville’s Starbuck seeks so eagerly): 
…[N]ot one single nation has ever been established on principles of science and 
reason … Reason and science have always … played only a secondary and 
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subordinate role in the life of the nations ... Nations are formed and moved by some 
other force that commands and dominates them, whose origin is unknown and 
inexplicable. This force is the force of an insatiable desire to go on until the end, 
while at the same time denying that there is an end. It is the force of a continual and 
indefatigable affirmation of its own being and the denial of death … I refer to it more 
simply as “The Search for God.” The goal of every national movement, in every 
nation at every period of its existence, is solely the search for God … and belief in 
him as the only true God. (Devils 264)  
                If the heroes of Melville’s novel may intuitively suspect the true driving force 
behind the hunt for the White Whale (the Whale standing for the essence of reality that they 
fail to grasp, being led astray by ideological demagoguery), in Devils Dostoyevsky attempts 
to summarise what it is. However, quite harmoniously with Dostoyevsky’s central belief that 
salvation can only be attained through a return to one’s Christian faith, Shatov equates the 
immaterial idea not to a biologically-explainable movement for movement’s sake, but to a 
conscious “search for God” and Truth. While this corresponds with the typical understanding 
of the American exceptionalist discourse, which holds at its core the search for the nation’s 
unique path, it also presumes greater consciousness and ability to distinguish between “good” 
and “evil.” Therefore, Shatov’s argument diverges from the virus analogy because it is not 
wholly neutral or aimless, although his observation that the spreading of the idea is 
distinguishable by both its illogical nature and its fierce desire to “go on until the end” comes 
close to it.  
           Further on, Shatov’s speech reveals what can be described as a close parallel with the 
collective unconscious as well as the exceptionalist framework introduced at the beginning of 
this chapter, which both affect the crew members during “The Quarter-Deck” scene: 
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The more powerful a nation, the more individual its God. There’s never been a nation 
without religion, that is, without conception of good and evil. Every nation has its own 
conception, and its own particular good and evil. When these conceptions become 
common to many nations, the nations begin to die and the very distinction between 
good and evil begins to fade away and disappear. (Devils 264) 
            If to substitute the word “nation” for “individual” at first, the concept of the collective 
subconscious or “groupthink” emerges more clearly. Shatov’s speech suggests that collective 
subconscious poses a danger – precisely because the loss of clear individual or group 
boundaries in attempting to mimic or emulate a pre-set example is followed by the gradual 
loss of being able to distinguish between right and wrong in a perfect example of “herd” 
mentality. Of course, this argument also brings to mind the “chronometricals” of Plotinus 
Plinlimmon – however, the chief difference between the philosophies of Plinlimmon and 
Shatov is that the first advocates an individual’s extreme adaptability to the accepted mores 
within a given segment of society (at least – superficially), whilst the latter exhibits notable 
rigidity of mind, in that each individual or an accepted group should exist firmly within the 
boundaries set by themselves as a separate unit.  
 
AGAINST NATURE: THE OUTCOME OF CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP. 
          At the end of each text, we have an image of explicit destruction: one is a town aflame 
and a police investigation going on, another is a ship sinking. At a first glance, the stance of 
Melville and Dostoyevsky is univocal. “Charismatic leadership” by an “exceptional” 
personality is a toxic concept, which is bound to result in destruction, and therefore, should 
not be emulated or sought after. The difference in the national context is of no consequence – 
in Russia or in America, the outcome is similar.  
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          My argument concluding this chapter is that both cases essentially present the struggle 
between the artificially engendered idea or projected image that the leader attempts to put 
forth, and the natural order of things which is impossible to overcome or argue with. If the 
epistemic rules engendered by society can be scorned, ignored or deliberately broken by the 
leader and his followers, and they can even escape the expected punishment for such a 
transgression, opposing or battling the natural order, which is personified by elusive White 
Whale (or, to Dostoyevsky, the teaching of Christ), and is far less definable than man-made 
customs, would be quite as useless as attempting to flout the laws of physics.  
          The final chapter of Melville’s novel presents a perfect tableau to illustrate this notion. 
We see a frantic, tragicomical scene with Tashtego nailing the flag to the mast of the sinking 
vessel whilst being bothered by a sea-hawk. I interpret the scene as the aftermath of the 
charismatic leader’s demise, where the followers, despite the overall chaos and confusion, are 
still desperately trying to proclaim the ideological message (represented by the flag) that the 
leader first attracted them with, whilst the natural order, personified by the hawk, impedes 
their activity: 
But as the last whelmings intermixingly poured themselves over the sunken head of the 
Indian at the main-mast, leaving a few inches of the erect spar yet visible, together with 
the long streaming yards of the flag, which calmly undulated, with ironical coincidings, 
over the destroying billows … at that instant, a red arm and a hammer hovered 
backwardly uplifted in the open air, in the act of nailing the flag faster and yet faster to 
the subsiding spar. A sky-hawk that tauntingly had followed the main-truck downwards 
from its natural home among the stars, pecking at the flag … [T]his bird now chanced 
to intercept its broad fluttering wing between the hammer and the wood; and 
simultaneously feeling that eternal thrill, the submerged savage beneath, in his death-
grasp, kept his hammer frozen there; and so the bird of heaven, with archangelic shrieks, 
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and his imperial beak thrust upwards, and his whole captive form folded in the flag of 
Ahab, went down with his ship, which, like Satan, would not sink to hell till she had 
dragged a living part of heaven along with her, and helmeted herself with it. (MD 508) 
                 The conflict is laid out as follows: despite the sinking “Pequod,” which can 
alternatively be interpreted as the entire microcosm’s destruction (according to Kovalev), or 
the failure of a particular enterprise by a group of individuals following a leader, the “nailing 
the flag faster and faster” can be likened to the individuals desperately trying to hold on to the 
idea the leader propagated, the flag “calmly undulated” as it is about to disappear. The hawk, 
clearly a product of a natural order who comes “from its home among the stars,” is “pecking 
at the flag” – which may suggest that in the view of the laws of nature, ideological legacy left 
behind by the leader is useless and ridiculous – just like the flag swirling over “destroying 
billows.” And yet, as Tashtego nails the bird to the mast, it can be seen as the toxic impact of 
the “exceptionalist” leadership’s effects upon the natural world; a small part of it would 
nevertheless be impacted. Reverting to my previous argument about the virulence and the 
spreading of the noxious idea, one may assume that since the microcosm of the ship is 
infected, the charismatic leader being the initial virus carrier, and charisma being essentially a 
harmful ideological virus, and is beyond any healing, in its demise it would attempt to 
destroy, in perfect harmony with my earlier hypothesis about “spreading,” as much of the 
natural world as can be grasped. The closing image of the Satan sinking to hell clutching his 
prey is thus appropriate.  
             However, the afflicted microcosm has to be cleansed or destroyed. Since it is the 
laws of nature that prevail over the smartest idea, the dramatic sinking of the “Pequod” 
eventually is replaced by the restored natural equilibrium, despite all deaths, destruction and 
debris. If humans cannot attain the balance between equality and liberty, nature would 
nevertheless take its course. The final image that Melville provides is the great natural order 
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returning to how it was originally intended: “Now small fowls flew screaming over the yet 
yawning gulf; a sullen white surf beat against its steep sides; then all collapsed, and the great 
shroud of the sea rolled on as it rolled five thousand years ago” (MD 508). 
            The battle between the “exceptional” individual, who evolves to be the leader, and the 
rules established by human society, is fraught with dramatic juxtaposition and violence, as 
essentially neither is the stronger. However, as the charismatic leader attains status as such, 
he graduates from flouting various social conventions to attacking or challenging the 
unfathomable reality of the unseen and unknown laws governing the world. These are 
reflected at times in the laws of physics as much as in religious teachings, and cannot be 
perfectly summarised, being the product of the subconscious “little lower layer.” Yet they 
exist, and govern reality, so once the individual attempts to challenge them, they efficiently 
dispatch him and what he stands for. Going even deeper, I could assert that as biological 
“viruses,” the potentially dangerous ideas affecting the “exceptional” individual serve as 
viruses or foils in the natural order; yet the natural order is endowed with the capacity to self-
regulate and efficiently destroy those viruses to preserve the old equilibrium of “five 
thousand years.” 
           With Dostoyevsky’s novel, the suggestion is not as much of wild natural order, as it is 
of the rule of law triumphing over destruction. The above meaning, nevertheless, is 
preserved. The leader and his followers attempted to create chaos; this was punished and 
stopped, but the motives are outlined, and they are similar to what we see in Melville: 
In reply to the question, “Why were there so many murders, scandals, and outrages 
committed?” he replied in ardent haste that it was to “promote the systematic 
undermining of every foundation, the systematic destruction of society and all its 
principles; to demoralize everyone and make hodge-podge of everything, and then, 
when society was on the point of collapse – sick, depressed, cynical, and sceptical, but 
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still with a perpetual desire for some kind of guiding principle and for self – preservation 
– suddenly to gain control of it, raising the banner of rebellion…. (Devils 749) 
            At first, Stavrogin’s followers may be seen as trying to destroy mainly human-created 
Plinlimmonian boundaries to create a new order. And yet, their weakness can be seen from 
the adjectives “sick, depressed, cynical and sceptical.” The rebels would have liked society 
and the world to be “sick” so that their virus of an idea could make itself at home, but 
essentially, in the view of the natural order of affairs, society is not “sick” – and what results 
is as much of an attempt to fight the natural equilibrium – which of course results in failure. 
Thus we revert to the self-regulating natural order; tragically, it can be assumed that the final 
scene of the fire and violence is part of this healing process, where those infected by coming 
into contact with Stavrogin or rendered by him unviable (Kirillov, Lembke, Shatov) perish. In 
a wry analogy with the virus image, one could imagine that the fire (Devils 584-585) is 
evocative of the Great Fire of London burning up the infection; although it is essentially the 
“charismatic leader” and his followers who start it, in the self-regulating manner of 
reestablishing the natural equilibrium, it serves as the final closing scene of the anarchic 
bacchanalia on the par with “Pequod”’s sinking before the order is restored.  
            Therefore, instead of relying on the existing readings of Melville’s novel as a 
Calvinist parable, or viewing Dostoyevsky as a sermonizing preacher, I propose that the true 
meaning behind the individualistic leadership, as it is viewed in the two texts is that neither is 
actually about punishment, or fatal pride, or anything of the sort. The “charismatic 
leadership” as it is presented, appears to oppose the natural laws (which actually revert to a 
neutral balance even without human interception), and therefore suffers an expected defeat. 
Whether in Russia or in America, the laws of physics work in the same way. The ideas or 
goals pursued by the leaders in their monomania or subconscious need for more influence, 
are not “bad” or “noble” – they simply create an imbalance in a pre-ordained natural 
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equilibrium, and this imbalance would be expulsed quite as harmful bacteria is expulsed by 
the work of lymphocytes. There is no element of punishment, or wrongness to this 
phenomenon.  It is the human perception, stemming from the breach of made-up frameworks 
set by humanity that judges an “exceptional” outstanding individual or “charismatic” 
leadership as undesirable, and seeks to develop mechanisms or attitudes to rectify the 
imbalance created by them, since it lacks the self-regulating efficiency of natural equilibrium. 





















CHAPTER THREE. FLOGGING NOT LAWFUL: CONTROLLING AN EXCEPTIONAL 
INDIVIDUAL IN THE EXCEPTIONALIST SOCIETY. 
 
           The previous chapters discussed how a rebellious individualistic spirit proves a 
genuine threat to the presumed balance of liberty-equality running through the core of the 
exceptionalist society composed of human “units” all working simultaneously to uphold it. 
This aspect of the problem suggested that Melville, as well as Dostoyevsky, believed that if 
an exceptional personality emerges prematurely and is not given a chance to develop the 
characteristics of a charismatic leader (mainly to do with the ability to manipulate), it will be 
instantaneously destroyed or neutralised, its potential sapped by the sheer rigidity of societal 
structure. This happens to avoid the apocalyptic outcomes discussed in the second chapter. In 
this chapter, in the meantime, I focus on the rules, or mechanisms, that prevent chaos from 
happening - looking at the relationship between an “exceptional” individual, and the law 
representing and on the behalf of the wider exceptionalist society.  
           As we have seen with Ahab and Stavrogin’s examples, uncontrolled anarchy leads to 
tragic consequences. However, would this then mean that the fear of potential “Ahabs” may  
result in complete suppression of liberty as a notion? In Federalist Paper 9, Alexander 
Hamilton states: “Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly 
expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, 
because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is 
essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.”244 In other words, 
balance is called for. Unbridled liberty causes a fractured society vulnerable to the wiles of a 
manipulative tyrant like Ahab; the lack of liberty results in the death of central democratic 
                                                 
244 See Federalist Paper 9. 
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principle. An efficient judicial system, however, would help preserve the natural balance 
between fire and air; or liberty and equality. 
         If an exceptional personality is given an opportunity to develop into a “charismatic 
leader,” who, supported by followers, actively pursues the fulfilment of a particular idea 
destructive to wider society, it becomes clear that the societal structure, however rigid, has 
not proven to be sufficient in containing it. Therefore, specific mechanisms would have to be 
devised by society especially to deal with such individuals. The general collective name for 
these mechanisms is the rule of law. And, as the actual historical context proves, many 
thinkers at the time were preoccupied with making these mechanisms as efficient as possible. 
In what concerns the situation in America, Gordon S. Wood discusses the prevalent post-
Revolutionary desire “to create certainty out of uncertainty” (Wood 403) in the newly-formed 
nation state; whilst Russia of Dostoyevsky’s age was just as strongly preoccupied with 
balancing out the traditional hierarchical vision and the new liberal tendencies - the writer 
himself, as biographers (Schur, Ruttenburg, Frank) show, was strongly interested in the 
notions of law and justice.  
            Both Devils and Moby-Dick addressed a highly specific kind of leadership at the core 
of their respective plots, which proves fatal to those caught up in it. Both the American and 
the Russian authors appear to reach an unanimous verdict at the end of addressing their 
hypothetical case studies: as enticing as personal charisma and following the new 
“extraordinary” hero may seem, such philosophy brings only peril. If the very first duo of 
case studies I analysed imply a certain degree of sympathy for Pierre Glendinning and 
Raskolnikov (as their motives are made more or less clear), and in the second chapter the 
selected novels showed quite explicitly why charismatic leadership by a self-proclaimed 
“exceptional” individual poses a genuine danger to the rest of the microcosm, this final set of 
texts will address the necessity for society to curtail such individuals’ influence. I describe 
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this way of looking at my thesis subject as working “outwards from the core” – having first 
addressed the motives or causes that make an “exceptional” individual emerge, and then the 
effect that such an individual may exercise on the rest of his microcosm, finally one arrives at 
the external perception of the “exceptional” individual by society and the reception he or she 
may encounter. It also is the reason why I have chosen to work in reverse chronological order 
(especially with Melville), putting an earlier text, White-Jacket, after the writer’s latter and 
more renowned works in my sequence of case studies. At the beginning of his writing 
journey, Melville would have noticed the effects of society’s conflict with individuals 
standing at odds with it (manifested in scenes such as the corporal punishments on board of a 
man o’war for the breach of the established naval code), before he proceeded onto 
questioning the motives that prompted such individuals to find themselves at odds with 
society in the first place. Metaphorically speaking, with both writers I have sought first to 
address the causes of the virulence before going on to describe the symptoms and prescribed 
cures.  
 
CHECKS AND BALANCES: THE NECESSITY OF CONTROL. 
          In current scholarship, there rests one marked major distinction between Melville and 
Dostoyevsky, which I seek to challenge in this thesis. The general verdict regarding 
Dostoyevsky’s life and works (voiced by Frank, for example), implies that writer was not in 
support of revolution, radical societal change or extreme liberalism, his vision being more 
aligned with a quasi-Christian version of “enlightened monarchy” where the monarchical 
ruler is held responsible for the well-being of his subjects (who should remain quite content 
with their status as such), according to the Christian principles. Dostoyevsky preached 
compassion – but not the complete overhaul of societal structures to remake society into a 
more liberal one. As Zenkovsky argued, “Dostoyevsky… emphasizes with great acuteness 
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that to bring harmony into the historical process one must inevitably suppress human 
freedom” (Wellek 144), whilst Alex De Jonge notes that the writer’s “…mode of resistance 
to individual self-seeking and the consequent cultural collapse is a reaffirmation of traditional 
cultural values” (De Jonge 209). From this, it follows that the author sided with the 
exceptionalist society, rather than the rebellious “exceptional” individual.  
           In contrast to this, Melville has been viewed by a number of thinkers (notably -
Delbanco, Rogin, or C.L.R. James) as championing the plight of individual human beings 
contrasted with the stifling hierarchical codes holding society together. A good case to 
illustrate this is the analysis by Yuri Kovalev, which sought (speaking from the platform of 
Soviet, Socialist context) to portray Melville as a writer striving for fairer and more humane 
socialist ideals in the world ruled by ruthless pragmaticism symbolised by the duo of 
avaricious ship-owners, Peleg and Bildad, in Moby-Dick. 
           However, the work I have carried out so far in the previous chapters suggests a 
somewhat different picture, rendering Melville more akin to the Russian vision, than to an 
image of the champion of unconstrained freedom. Ahab, who flouts the codes of the naval 
world, goes to his doom. Pierre forgoes his status and installs himself in the chaotic realm of 
the “Apostles” only to meet his end. The dissection of the two previous case studies shows 
that although Melville had been concerned with individualism as a major theme in his works, 
he was too aware of its negative effects to genuinely extol it.  
         Therefore, Melville has it in common with Dostoyevsky that society should be held 
together with a framework of codes or rules (moral or legal) to protect itself from the anarchy 
wreaked by Ahabs and Raskolnikovs.245 This solution may appear less exciting than the 
glorious images evoked by the notion of the Titanic struggle of an exceptional individual 
                                                 




against the mundane exceptionalist world represented by the far less grandiose characters of 
Razumikhin or Starbuck, yet it is the only one that does not result in excessive violence. Both 
writers non-explicitly advocate for the Hamiltonian idea of “checks and balances” to keep 
society safe from its particularly active scions.  
          Let us recall what is meant by “checks and balances.” In The Federalist Papers, 
Hamilton outlines a theory that contradicts the classic Jeffersonian ideal of individualistic 
pursuit of happiness. As all individuals are interconnected within the societal framework, 
pursuing one’s individual vision regardless of others is quite as unfeasible as it is dangerous. 
This is particularly true concerning those at the very top of the social hierarchy and holding 
real power – considering, for instance, Ahab’s actual status as the captain of the vessel, 
compared against Raskolnikov’s sudden awareness of himself as “exceptional” in spite of his 
humble background. In a world characterized by individualistic pursuit of personal goals, 
there must needs arise a system of accountability to society in general, to ensure that this 
pursuit does not bring about tragic consequences that we have already seen in the previous 
chapters.  
          In a general summary of how this might be implemented, Hamilton compares his 
theory favourably against the disastrous outcomes of the abuse of individual power seen 
throughout history, which he dubs “disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics.” His 
vision, meanwhile, is perfectly, mathematically efficient: 
 … The efficacy of various principles is now well understood ... The regular distribution 
of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; 
the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; 
the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election … 
They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican 
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government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. (Hamilton, 
Federalist Paper No.9) 
           The Hamiltonian vision is about as far removed from the image associated with the 
“exceptional” individual as it gets. Hamilton’s ideal of society is a carefully measured and 
rationalised one, the words like “efficacy” bringing to mind both machine-like efficiency and 
the maxims about maintaining societal balance spouted by Plotinus Plinlimmon or Luzhin. 
Even from a purely stylistic viewpoint, the choice of language with terms such as “balances 
and checks,” “regular distribution” “distinct departments” or “good behaviour” upholds this 
image. Indeed, this is a kind of an environment that supposedly completely opposes 
everything that the “exceptional” individual stands for, such as grandeur, irrationality or 
transgressing set boundaries. However, the rhetoric of the “exceptionalist” society, where the 
national community is viewed as an example to all other societies or nations, is very much 
present in Hamilton’s vision: “…[A]merica will be the broad and solid foundation of other 
edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their errors” 
(Hamilton, Federalist Paper No.9). 
             The second chapter of this thesis presented one with exactly the same hypothetical 
vision that Hamilton warns about, of the consequences of excessive libertarianism given free 
rein, and uncontrolled “exceptional” individuals free to do as they please. Whether on board 
of the “Pequod” or on the streets of Skvoreshniki, the pendulum oscillates between the 
tyrannical “charismatic leader” acting as Pied Piper to hypnotised masses, and the anarchical 
chaos, if all think of themselves as “exceptional” individuals, and act accordingly (as 
Raskolnikov’s final dream presented). Hamilton notes a similar picture in political history 
since the days of the antiquity: 
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A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a 
barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of 
the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust 
at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid 
succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration 
between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. (Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 9)  
 
            Hamilton’s idea of the “firm union” protecting the citizens from the “perpetual 
vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy” sounds uncannily like the 
Plinlimmonian framework of rules previously described. As we saw in the two preceding 
chapters, it is essentially mediocrity, in the sense of perfect ordinariness, combined with the 
clearly defined set of social norms or values, that protects society from exceptional 
individuals harbouring potentially dangerous designs. In the meantime, focusing on the 
terminology used by Hamilton, and specifically, “tyranny and anarchy,” I maintain that the 
emergence of an exceptional individual, as both authors seem to suggest, if uncontrolled, may 
spiral into either.  
          The analysis of Raskolnikov’s final dream alongside Pierre Glendinning’s visions of 
Enceladus addressed the notion of anarchy, which comes as a consequence of each and every 
individual realising their “exceptional” aspirations, whilst the leadership of both captain Ahab 
and Nicholas Stavrogin can be described as a perfect example of tyranny. This is of course 
bolstered up by the actual historical context: as mid-nineteenth century was marked by a 
series of revolutionary uprisings worldwide, with different degrees of success (Innes and 
Philp, 8-9). This third and final set of case studies, however, addresses the possibility of 




           As Hamilton argues, a society like that of the “ancients” of Classical Greece and 
Rome, did not yet achieve the absolute clarity of principles to ensure that it remained stable 
and just. The modern, post-Enlightenment world, however, was sufficiently developed as to 
at least attempt to define such principles, laying them out clearly for each member of society. 
The balance between liberty and equality could then be achieved by that the laws were the 
same for all; and they clearly set out the limits beyond which personal liberty could not go.  
              From the theoretical vantage-point, Hamilton’s proposed model works perfectly. The 
centremost necessity for the smooth and safe running of society are essentially the 
“legislative balances and checks.” In the light of my prior argument regarding the emergence 
of the “exceptional” personality, the image employed by Hamilton is that of quasi-Hellenistic 
harmony, where a rigid system of rules and concepts serves to ensure that nothing excessive 
or grotesque threatens the established harmonious order. It is notable that he chooses to use 
the term “perfection,” associated with ideal and absolute balance. This contrasts with my 
analysis of depersonalizing “mob mentality” in the second chapter, as well as with the images 
of constraint discussed in the first chapter.  
          According to Hamilton, it is the law (rather than religion, or some form of higher 
conscience, or any psychological trait), that acts as the harmonising and regulating force 
protecting society from extremes associated with the “exceptional” individuals wreaking 
havoc or tyrannical “charismatic leaders.” Therefore, I propose that the mysterious yet 
prosaic “Plinlimmonian rules” that “exceptional” protagonists flout or oppose are actually 
Hamilton’s “balances and checks.” Essentially, the “Plinlimmonian” rules are the law, or how 
it is perceived by society. The conflict between Raskolnikov and Luzhin, or Ahab and 
Starbuck is one between an outlaw and a law-abiding citizen. To consider oneself 
“exceptional” and thus able to ignore the staid Plinlimmonian framework of maxims upon 
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which the exceptionalist society with its constructs of the right and wrong is founded, is to 
place oneself “outside” the law.  
           Whilst for the purposes of this investigation I do not seek to define all law (it being an 
extremely broad concept) as a “mechanism” created so as to suppress all active individuality 
and leadership, I regard the law in this specific chapter as the most efficient control method 
that preserves society from the effects of potentially toxic leadership just as much as from 
anarchy wreaked by “King Numbers.” Moreover, it serves as an effective “Apollonian” 
antidote against the “Dionysiac” charisma of a leader that tempts people to follow the leader 
regardless of how things actually stand, as well as against the dangerous sway of mass 
thinking feared by John Stewart Mill, De Tocqueville and John Randolph, and that Hannah 
Arendt also warns about, in the modern context.246   
            Considering Arendt’s argument in particular, concerning the “prepolitical state” based 
upon “the State of Nature” and the fact that “whatever political organization men may have 
achieved has its origins in crime” (Arendt 20), the law can also be regarded as the cultivating, 
civilising force that curtails the expansive influence of the “natural” leader based upon brute 
strength that leads to violence and chaos, as well as the danger contained in uncontrolled 
mass thinking. Even if the laws are deemed “unjust,” they may be theoretically amended or 
abolished in a subsequent juristic operation after their flaws are openly brought to light (if 
one recalls the influence of White-Jacket on the naval laws concerning corporal punishment). 
In short, law is preferable to lawlessness. Bearing in mind both the events of 1917, which, as 
Lyudmila Saraskina argues, Dostoyevsky foresaw, and the Arendtian perception of “America 
as a mass society” susceptible to mob rule, asserted by Richard King (117), this problem rang 
                                                 
246 See Arendt, On Revolution.  Also: Richard King, Arendt and America.  
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just as true for America as it did for Russia, and “checks and balances” were needed to 
contain it. 247  
          A straightforward stance could be to regard the juxtaposition of an individual and the 
rule of law as the suppression and even destruction of the individual creative “genius.” Yet, 
given the findings that have surfaced in the previous chapters, this advocates for a more 
balanced vision first explored by Brook Thomas in his landmark analysis of the relationship 
between law and literature.248 Thomas’ approach to the notion of law is preferable, as rather 
than siding with either the Apollonian principles of law or the individual Dionysian spirit, he 
considers both impartially in equal measures – precisely as a writer-observer figure that I 
described in the introductory chapter was expected to do.  
           It is assumed in this chapter that since the state is represented by its law, the legal 
system acts as a mouthpiece of sorts that expresses the state’s will and implements it. 
However, there is an important distinction that needs to be commented on. Whilst both texts I 
selected as case studies address problematic situations where an individual comes into direct 
opposition with the forces of the state and the law, Brothers Karamazov chooses to look at 
conflict between the individual (Mitya Karamazov) and the Russian state, represented by the 
Russian penal system. Meanwhile, in The White-Jacket the forces opposing the individual 
(whom Melville deliberately dresses in a conspicuous manner so as to make him 
“exceptional” in the eyes of the readers) represent the American state – but on a much 
smaller, microcosmic scale represented by the naval setting and the adherence of that space 
specifically and metaphorically to the naval laws.  
 
                                                 
247 Saraskina, Besy: Roman-preduprezhdenie..  
248 Thomas, Cross Examinations of Law and Literature. 
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THE VIOLATION OF THE RULES: WHAT EXACTLY HAPPENS BETWEEN 
INDIVIDUAL AND STATE? 
            It is a well-known story that The White-Jacket contributed to the abolition of 
corporeal punishments in the American navy (a fact amply commented upon by Yuri 
Kovalev, as supposed evidence of Melville’s socialist views).249 This, as well as the passages 
within the novel such as the one below, has led to the establishment of a general perception 
that The White-Jacket should be regarded first and foremost as a call for social reform which 
addressed the fact that the actual naval law was essentially flawed and unjust: 
It is singular that while the Lieutenants of the watch in American men-of-war so long 
usurped the power of inflicting corporal punishment with the colt, few or no similar 
abuses were known in the English Navy. … The chivalric Virginian, John Randolph of 
Roanoke, declared … that on board of the American man-of-war that carried him out 
Ambassador to Russia he had witnessed more flogging than had taken place on his own 
plantation of five hundred African slaves in ten years. Certain it is … the English 
officers, as a general thing, seem to be less disliked by their crews than the American 
officers by theirs … A coarse, vulgar man, who happens to rise to high naval rank by 
the exhibition of talents not incompatible with vulgarity, invariably proves a tyrant to 
his crew. (WJ) 250  
            From the above passage it initially seems that Melville offers a stinging factual 
critique of the state of affairs within the American navy specifically, claiming that it is 
overrun by “coarse” and “vulgar” individuals abusing their given power. However, there can 
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injustices occurring in the American navy. For more on the matter, see Myra C Glenn’s article, “The Naval 





be a deeper interpretation of the central theme of the novel, particularly if to bear in mind its 
original full title: The White-Jacket, or the World in a Man O’War. It is quite likely 
(revisiting the argument developed by Reeve in The White Monk) that Melville regards the 
enclosed microcosm of one single naval vessel as a small contained copy of the entire world. 
The world is reflected in a man o’war, and therefore, the injustices and the cruelty which 
occur upon it are reflective of the injustices that occur in the world – omnipresent and 
constant. Existing scholarly evidence may be relied on to support this hypothesis: for 
example, Brook Thomas combines the metaphor for the ship as a small model of a nation 
state with the argument that Melville was aware of America’s exceptional role, stating: “[A]t 
the end of White-Jacket Melville pleads against strife within the American ship of state, 
because to him America serves a divine purpose” (152). 
            A logical question subsequently emerges: why would then Melville incorporate 
comparisons of the violence within the American Navy to that in the English one? My answer 
to this is that Melville concerns himself with the imaginarily perfect “American” world 
governed according to the quasi-exceptionalist mores, as opposed to the projective images of 
other, “flawed” nation-states. Thomas’s central argument harps upon the fact that White-
Jacket is indeed a work strongly tinged with exceptionalist overtones, since America’s unique 
and supposedly more benevolent role is being constantly referred to: “Actual practices within 
America do not always live up to the ideal America. Precisely because America represents so 
much, institutions and laws that are tolerated in other countries should not be tolerated in the 
United States” (152). 
            Turning to the text of the novel, Melville provides a summary of what could be 
effectively seen as his interpretation of why America should be regarded as an “exceptional” 
nation, whose role is “to make precedents, and not to obey them,” and therefore is bound by 
obligation to provide an example to all others: 
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Escaped from the house of bondage, Israel of old did not follow after the ways of the 
Egyptians … And we Americans are the peculiar, chosen people—the Israel of our 
time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world. … [G]od has given to us, for a future 
inheritance, the broad domains of the political pagans, that shall yet come and lie down 
under the shade of our ark ... The rest of the nations must soon be in our rear. We are 
the pioneers of the world; the advance-guard, sent on through the wilderness of untried 
things, to break a new path in the New World that is ours … Long enough, have we … 
doubted whether, indeed, the political Messiah had come. But he has come in us, if we 
would but give utterance to his promptings (WJ).  
 
            From the purely stylistic viewpoint, in this excerpt Melville comes across as a writer 
yet to develop his distinct style, and therefore, evidently influenced by the evangelical, 
preaching style widespread at the time – which is apparent from the usage of hackneyed 
terms like “house of bondage” or “shade of our ark,” alongside the quintessentially American 
imagery of “the advance-guard, sent on through the wilderness of untried things.” Of course, 
to an extent that the plot requires, Melville parodies this exalted rhetoric style, contrasting it 
with the harrowing realities White-Jacket observes. Yet I believe that Melville’s main aim at 
this point is not irony for irony’s sake, but the need to expiate or exorcise the ghosts of the 
exceptionalist rhetoric pervading the political and cultural realms of his time, quite as Rogin 
suggests in Subversive Genealogy, discussing this stage in Melville’s writing career at length 
(15-77).251 
           It is quite obvious that Melville regurgitates the exceptionalist rhetoric, which, as I 
already showed in the previous two chapters, was prevalent at that exact time; phrases such as 
                                                 
251 See Rogin, Subversive Genealogy (in particular, pp 15-77). Rogin offers an in-depth view of various familial 
and socio-political influences that Melville came in contact with during his formative years as a writer, and 
generally implies that the impact of those on Melville’s world view should not be overlooked.  
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“God has predestinated, mankind expects, great things from our race” sound far more like a 
mediocre political pamphlet than the Melville we encounter in Moby-Dick or Pierre. The 
exact ideas that the writer puts forward are also quite unoriginal and faithful to the 
exceptionalist discourse as it manifested itself. The past is rejected, and somewhat brashly so, 
whilst the future is embraced: 
Let us leave the Past, then, to dictate laws to immovable China; let us abandon it to the 
Chinese Legitimists of Europe. But for us, we will have another captain to rule over us 
– that captain who ever marches at the head of his troop and beckons them forward, not 
lingering us in the rear, and impeding their march with lumbering baggage-wagons of 
old precedents. This is the Past. (WJ) 
            Although the above passage is strongly reminiscent of pamphlets and sermons 
widespread at the time Melville was writing (as well as Plinlimmon’s treatise), it is pivotal 
for explaining the difference between the “exceptional” individual who is suppressed by the 
Plinlimmonian code of rules, and the “exceptionalist” society.252 The previous textual case 
studies have shown how an “exceptional” individual is suppressed and why to position 
oneself as such in society is deemed unacceptable; however, recollecting the “Body Politic” 
notion concerning society functioning as one single organism, from Melville’s text it 
becomes apparent that if society in this capacity acts as an “exceptional” individual would, it 
is not only permissible and acceptable; in fact, it is laudable. At a first glance, this seems to 
contradict everything that has been previously said in this thesis, as the Plinlimmonian rules 
that fall upon a rebellious individual so harshly, seem to uphold and support it if a society 
made up of many individuals behaves in a similar manner. What is forbidden to one, is 
encouraged for many.  
                                                 
252 For pamphletic language and the role of a preacher delivering sermons crucial to American culture of the 
time, see Bruce Kucklick and Alison Winter. 
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           It is easy to fall into a trap of assuming that the young Melville, swept away by the 
relevant discourses of the time such as “Young America” (which is particularly how Rogin or  
Kovalev view this part of his life), differs from the older and jaded writer describing the 
earth-encased Enceladus by virtue of life experience yet to be gained. However, I would like 
to state that there is more to say about Melville’s particular views. Returning to Richard 
King’s assessment of the Arendtian vision (King 118-119), I envisage the possibility where 
the masses or society in general in the “exceptionalist” American discourse are invested with 
the virtue of better comprehension and moral rectitude, than just one (possibly mistaken) 
individual. This could be the uncomfortable truth that Melville eventually comes to realise.    
              According to King’s argument, America had developed the mass thinking to a fine 
degree unconceivable for anywhere else in the world, and certainly not in Europe. King 
comments upon the inevitable rift or conflict between the individual and society, however, 
due to the fact that mass thinking and action in America remained on an advanced level 
unseen elsewhere (due to democratic element in the developed political system), the society 
was likely to be perceived to be in the right. Therefore, although a particularly vocal 
emergent individuality might be deemed dangerous and consequently suppressed, an identical 
action coming from a group is approved, because the virtue of mass thinking renders its 
decisions more correct and fitting. That is even more true, if it is purely verbal expression of 
opinion and theoretically proposed change that are concerned, rather than actual enterprise of 
some drastic action by a single agent. Recalling the image of society acting as one single 
organism, King’s argument is logical in that group-based opposition (or Hamiltonian 
“faction”) is deemable to come from society itself, and thus not as dangerous to its goals and 
well-being. 
           The imagery used by Melville in the previous passage curiously attests to the vision of 
society moving as one single individual, as many units unite together to realise their innate 
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potential jointly. Furthermore, the “captain who ever marches at the head of his troop” or “a 
teacher to posterity” evokes not just an individual as a unit, but an individual invested with 
rights to act as a leader and determine the course of the events – an exceptionalist image if 
ever there was one. The previous texts stressed that for an individual personality, or for a 
group of people acting to overturn the established societal framework, to assume such a 
position was not permissible. It was then easy to imagine that challenging the status quo of 
the exceptionalist state is quite as unacceptable in America as in Russia. However, in the 
world governed by the idea of “checks and balances” one exception remains: that is, when 
society acts as one body in accordance to the framework set out by those “checks and 
balances,” in order to bring about only such events or changes that the “checks and balances” 
allow.  
          A consequent question arises at to who exactly determines those said “checks and 
balances,” if they seem to direct the actions of society? One possible answer is to be found in 
the concept of the “state of exception” coined by Agamben, and which means the extent to 
which society, or “state” is prepared to change or contradict the legal framework holding it 
together, in “exceptional” circumstances.253 Agamben describes it as “the legal form of what 
cannot have legal form” and further, speaks about the “state of exception as the original 
structure in which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension.” To him, 
the state acts as a self-regulating physical organism which intuitively makes a correct choice 
or “suspension” in a specific situation - so the relationship of state and laws is nowhere as 
rigid as one might fancy. Agamben touches upon the conflict between the theoretical legal 
limits and unexpected or exceptional circumstances caused by actual life itself. I maintain 
that whilst the “checks and balances” are set out by human beings and for human beings, they 
possess a certain degree of malleability that can be of use when life and the hypothetical 
                                                 
253 See Agamben, States of Exception. 
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structure of rules collide. Although on the surface the societal rules appear to be the example 
of rigid Apollonian logic counteracting the Dionysian chaos, in reality they are quite 
adaptable: 
 America is a “new nation” and therefore should provide a wholly new and progressive 
stance concerning any major issues, particularly as it is supposed to be perceived as a 
bastion of democracy, unmarred by hierarchical or aristocratic discourses preventing 
everyman’s voice from being heard. Yet “the world in a man o’war” where floggings 
and brutality occur on a frequent basis, seems to contradict this rather cheerful and 
hackneyed philosophy. It is next to idle, at the present day, merely to denounce an 
iniquity. Be ours, then, a different task. If there are any three things opposed to the 
genius of the American Constitution, they are these: irresponsibility in a judge, 
unlimited discretionary authority in an executive, and the union of an irresponsible 
judge and an unlimited executive in one person. Yet by virtue of an enactment of 
Congress, all the Commodores in the American navy are obnoxious to these three 
charges, so far as concerns the punishment of the sailor for alleged misdemeanors not 
particularly set forth in the Articles of War. (WJ) 
            To ever-observant Melville who stresses the word “irresponsibility” several times, the 
discrepancy between the constitutional ideal and the actual practice is evident, and the main 
problem remains that the new ways of implementing “checks and balances” that would be 
harmonious with the popularised exceptionalist vision, “the genius of the American 
Constitution,” cannot be found or developed rapidly enough to keep pace with the theoretical 
exceptionalist discourse. The old methods of preserving the legal framework of codes to hold 
society together remain and are implemented, although their highly unsatisfactory nature and 




           Envisaging an “exceptional” state, one could imagine that there exist two versions of 
America: a fictitious ideal cemented in manifestations such as the Constitution or the imagery 
surrounding concepts like the Manifest Destiny, and the real-life geographical location that 
nominally bears the “exceptional” status, but never can fully fulfil it. The thread uniting the 
two, meanwhile, is the Hamiltonian framework of the rules supporting it, the very 
Plinlimmonian “Horologicals” personified by the legal system. The law, setting out the 
general outline of the rules according to which the state and society function, constantly 
evolves and adapts in order to make the way of the nation’s existence more and more like the 
aforementioned fictitious ideal. Therefore, White-Jacket as a plea for reform of the naval law 
can be seen as the most “exceptionalist” of Melville’s texts. 
           It is curious to note in particular that in expressing his dismay upon America using the 
same repressive mechanisms as other, “barbarous” states, Melville should choose Russia of 
all places, resorting to the projective imagination typical of the exceptionalist cosmos, and yet 
portraying the utter injustice occurring on Russian soil as a perfectly normal phenomenon 
characteristic of an imaginary, flawed realm: 
Such objections cannot be urged against the laws of the Russian navy (not essentially 
different from our own), because the laws of that navy, creating the absolute one-man 
power in the Captain, and vesting in him the authority to scourge, conform in spirit to 
the territorial laws of Russia, which is ruled by an autocrat, and whose courts inflict the 
knout upon the subjects of the land. (WJ) 
              Brook Thomas comments on this: “For Melville, it is an outrage that the United 
States Navy uses essentially the same code of discipline found in the Russian navy” (149). 
His view is supportive of the hypothesis that I propose, that specifically in White-Jacket, 
Melville is incongruously supportive of the exceptionalist discourse, instead of being critical 
(as in Moby-Dick), or plainly analytical (as with Pierre). America is juxtaposed to the rest of 
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the world as “exceptional” society which should use different, supposedly fairer and 
somehow nobler mechanisms to bind it together, than other, “barbaric” states. In the light of 
the actual historical context, however, there is a chronological twist to Melville’s perception 
of exceptionalism that suggests a rather different picture. White-Jacket is the earliest dated 
text assessed in my thesis, and I argue that it represents a younger Melville not as yet 
disillusioned with the notion of exceptionalism, and not yet fully independent from the major 
political and public debates prevalent in his day, just as Rogin portrays him at this particular 
biographical point.254 The subsequent two texts, as the thesis works chronologically 
backwards, represent a mature Melville who managed to see and reflect on the concept of 
exceptionalism and what it means for society enough to amend his views and dive deeper to 
explore the hidden origins of the conflict between the “exceptional” individual and 
“exceptionalist” society.  
           Yet White-Jacket’s relevance for me lies with the fact that as a young writer not yet 
disillusioned with exceptionalism albeit keenly aware of injustices taking place before his 
own eyes, Melville addresses the part of the “exceptionalist” and “exceptional” conflict 
which is most obvious to the observer, despite being the last stage after the “exceptionalist” 
individual emerges, and after the said individual becomes a leader and virulently influences 
others. This stage is when the existing established framework of codes holding society 
together suppresses or punishes the individual who “stands out” and puts the existing order in 
peril; using a variety of techniques and arguments to do so. As a romantically-inclined new 
writer at that particular point in his literary career, Melville presents a view that suggests that 
as an “exceptionalist,” unique society, America holds a duty to develop better practices that 
                                                 
254 Rogin in Subversive Genealogy (especially Chapters 2-6) explores in particular the influence of Melville’s 
older and politically active brother, Gansevoort, on early Melville’s writing and views. Rogin argues that before 
Melville became a writer revealing his talent in full, he first had to leave behind Gansevoort’s influence that 
inspired him to contemplate participating in various social debates such as the struggle for reform to benefit the 
poor, seen in Redburn. 
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do not crudely destroy the “exceptional” individual, which would otherwise only contradict 
the maxims upon which the “exceptionalist” society is founded, rendering it just like the 
tyrannies of yore that Hamilton so deplored.  
            However, why would Melville mention specifically Russia, and not Brazil, or China, 
or any other state that at the time was equally impacted by the concept of slavery? I already 
implied in the introduction that America and Russia at the time presented a particularly 
interesting duality; essentially similar in their developmental history (according to De 
Tocqueville in particular) and yet made distinct from one another by one difference in 
particular – the temporality of national destiny. America was expected to be at the forefront 
of social progress, setting an example as a “new” nation founded in the progressive, post-
Enlightenment times upon the principles of liberty and democracy. In this highly distinct 
social climate, the role of collective or mass thinking was allocated an important role, and 
this set the United States apart from Europe (Russia included), which, according to King’s 
reading of Arendtian vision, was “…less prepared than American society for the emergence 
of a mass society” (King 118). 
           Russia was at a first glance a different case, being immersed deeply into what could be 
described as theocratic and monarchical tenets of centuries-old tradition closely weaving 
religious obedience and submissiveness of subjects to a sovereign (the rigidity of that 
particular era being exemplified by the Table of Ranks system determining society’s 
composition and structure –  and most societal advancement was regulated by this system). 
Yet it was also founded upon the principle of setting an example to the world, and being 
somewhat apart from the “European” fount of culture. As Dostoyevsky claims in a preface to 




If there is one country in the entire world that could have been to other, neighbouring 
or remote nations, more unfamiliar, more unexplored, more misunderstood and 
baffling than any other – this country is Russia for its Western neighbours, without 
any doubt. Neither China nor Japan are veiled with as much mystery against the 
European curiosity as Russia used to be, is now, and, perhaps would be for a long 
time. (A Number of Articles on Russian Literature) 
            In short, Russia and America had it in common that they both were essentially 
marginal communities on the fringes of mainstream European cultural heartland, and 
henceforth not too comfortable with it. Contradictorily enough, both were supposed to act 
exemplarily to that same cultural heartland they found themselves at odds with, and yet, both 
harboured in their midst brutality and injustice that diverged poignantly from their self-
imposed expected status as an example to other nations. In this way, I would like to 
somewhat disagree with Arendt on the fact that since the times of the American Revolution, 
America was exemplary in that it avoided the trappings of violence that Arendt argues were 
distinctive of the Old World: whilst on the level of ideas it may have been so, the factual 
reality that White-Jacket grapples with, was quite different.  
          Melville might not have been closely familiar with Russian culture or problems 
marring everyday life in Russia, however, the fact that he commented upon Russia and not 
any other state implies that subconsciously, the young writer might have been edging close to 
the fact that Russia and America were, using David Foglesong’s terminology, each other’s 
“dark double.” On the surface, they might have deemed each other barbarous; the truth is that 




CARLYLEAN ECHOES: BUT, WHO ARE THE JUDGES?255 
            It appears that in an exceptionalist society, a certain degree of repression is 
permissible for the preservation of the delicate liberty-equality balance. To exercise the 
ability to punish or suppress an “exceptional” individual threatening the said balance, 
however, another individual clearly should have received leave from society in some manner 
to do so.  
           Recalling my previous argument about the clearly outlined characteristics of the 
Plinlimmonian rules of society as compared to the organically chaotic nature of “exceptional” 
individual and its influence, I hold that societal hierarchy is a crucial mechanism that is used 
against an emerging personality that threatens the established order. The setting in the 
Melvillean text symbolizes hierarchy condensed to the point of grotesque, that makes for the 
even more immediate understanding of how this suppression works. 
          In a hierarchical setting, such as within the microcosm of a man o’war vessel regulated 
by the naval code, the way that the said hierarchy is determined is comprehensible enough – 
according to the military ranks. The question is, who exactly occupies the highest position 
within the ranks that gives the right to dispense judgement on the offending “exceptional” 
individual, using forceful methods if necessary.  
         In the immediately preceding set of case studies, I drew out the important distinction 
between the assumed leadership that the individual considering themselves “exceptional” 
wilfully seizes, and the leadership pre-determined by the natural order, that reflects the 
Carlylean argument of human society “looking for a hero” since time immemorial. A 
unifying characteristic for both these concepts is the fact that initially, the position of a leader 
is seized in spite of societal rules – rightfully or not. What I will focus upon right now, 
                                                 
255 This is a well-known quotation from a play by Alexander Griboedov, Woe from Wit. (1831). It has become a 
byword in Russian for whether one has a right to judge others. 
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though, is the way in which the established Plinlimmonian structure appoints one to head it 
and judge or punish others.256  
          The hierarchy on board of the “Neversink” is organised to set the officers firmly apart 
from the rest of the crew - an image that we have already seen in the tale of the White Whale, 
and which is commented upon in that context specifically by C.L.R. James.257 He notes the 
extreme rigidity and mechanics-like inner workings of the ship’s little world: 
In his next book, White Jacket (1850), he [Melville] crosses the bridge from his own 
time into ours. His greatest discovery is to push individual characteristics aside and see 
men in terms of the work that they do. A warship is an organization where men perform 
special functions. This man may be a drunkard, that one a thief, the other one writes 
poetry, another is a splendid, fine sailor, a born leader of men and charming. But a ship 
is in reality nothing more than various groups of men who do certain types of work, 
without which there would be complete chaos. It is this specific type of work which 
determines their social characteristics. And the ship is only a miniature of the world in 
which we live. (James 86) 
           Bringing to mind Shakespearian words that all the world’s a stage, James evokes a 
microcosm populated by individual human units who each have a specific, pre-ordained role 
to play – a good example of typology at work. One can imagine that each of those is actually 
quite “exceptional” in that they have a unique set of responsibilities to fulfil. What interests 
me, however, is the binding ties of mutual obligations and responsibilities between those 
individuals that make the man o’war run smoothly as a society (albeit on a smaller scale), and 
the existing hierarchical structure that organises those in a meaningful manner.  
                                                 
256 The conflict between the heroic expectations imposed by such a position and the ordinary human nature is 
also explored by Melville in the character of Captain Vere in a later work, Billy Budd, Sailor (1924?). 
257 See C.L.R. James, Mariners, Renegades and Castaways. 
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             The said structure needs to be headed by a leader of some kind. In the previous 
chapter, it has been shown what occurs if a leader is an “exceptional” individual acting as 
such, and the tragic consequences that this causes. The role of the leader, therefore, is crucial. 
However, in White-Jacket, it is made more explicit that in Moby-Dick. The text attests, in no 
uncertain terms, to the power over life and death on board that the captain holds as the head 
of the hierarchical structure: 
By this article the Captain is made a legislator, as well as a judge and an executive. So 
far as it goes, it absolutely leaves to his discretion to decide what things shall be 
considered crimes, and what shall be the penalty; whether an accused person has been 
guilty of actions by him declared to be crimes; and how, when, and where the penalty 
shall be inflicted. (WJ) 
            What can be seen is that the societal framework, exemplified by the “article” of naval 
legislation, invests the captain as the head of hierarchical order with clear and uncontested 
power to pass judgement, destroying or neutralising any element that he can hold to be 
threatening. This harmonises with the Carlylean argument about the priest-hero, who is 
willingly appointed by the human masses so as to pass supposedly wise judgement, and the 
rights that the priest-hero may enjoy subsequently. What is true, is that, according to the 
hierarchical mechanism, such a figure should stand firmly apart from the rest, and hold 
knowledge and skills that are out of a common person’s reach (a picture quite different from 
Dostoyevsky’s effete intellectual-liberals intent on talking “without any definite aim,” as per 
Irving Howe (Wellek 68-69)). Nancy Fredericks also attests to this: 
 Anyone who wishes to paint a portrait of Melville as a radical egalitarian democrat has 
got to come to terms with his ambivalent feelings toward the masses. In White Jacket, 
for example, he indulges in an image of the “public” as monstrous in a dialogue between 
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Lemsford and Jack Chase. Lemsford is complaining about the “addle-pated mob and 
rabble” who failed to appreciate a volume of poems he had published…. (9)258 
            I disagree with Fredericks in that Melville necessarily wishes to view the masses, or 
the “unexceptional” people as grotesque or boorish, and the term “indulges” may be 
somewhat misdirected. Melville not so much shares the sentiment in earnest, as he wishes to 
show how hierarchy works, and how its inner cogs and wheels function. In that respect, he is 
more neutral than biased. Yet what Fredericks is right about is two things. First, she is correct 
in also underlining that the top figure in the hierarchy essentially stands apart from others 
filling up the hierarchical steps. Secondly, she comes upon an important notion: that the 
leader favoured by the hierarchical structure of the established societal rules is distinguished 
by more refined spiritual life incomprehensible to the general public: the arcane, Druidic 
knowledge that, in perfect unison with Carlyle’s argument, is the domain of the Priest-Hero 
chosen to lead. At a first glance, Lemsford lecturing the sailors about his poetic achievements 
is a ludicrous figure; in terms of how societal hierarchy works according to Carlyle’s 
argument, this scene makes sense. The hierarchical leader approved by Plinlimmonian rules 
is not a wilful impostor after Ahab or Stavrogin’s fashion, nor is he a naturally distinctive 
“alpha” that Steelkilt represents. What he is, however, is someone possessed with knowledge 
or skill that ordinary everyperson does not possess, and that may be, for its apparent 
impracticality (of what use may be poems on board a navy vessel?), a trait reconciling the 
lower strata of society with the higher ones, in a code-like language. As a poet who can 
appreciate the rhymed word, which as a concept is supposedly treasured by the higher classes 
in the established order, even if the ordinary sailors do not understand its purpose, the 
accepted hierarchical leader can be an effective mediator and communicator with the higher 
                                                 
258 Fredericks, Melville’s Art of Democracy. 
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social strata. In this way, Fredericks’ argument, “Melville did not hate people or popular 
culture. He just decided to write for what seemed at the time to be an intellectual minority, an 
“aristocracy of the brain”” (10) rings true. Reconciling her point with my argument about the 
head of hierarchical order being invested with knowledge untypical for common person, I 
propose that Melville was painting a faithful image of the distinctly American 
“exceptionalist” social order, setting out what exactly determined it. In an environment 
divested of hereditary aristocracy or implements like The Table of Ranks of nineteenth-
century Russia, the factor determining who should head the societal order approved by the 
Plinlimmonian rules (which have already been shown to oppose the controversial “natural 
order” philosophy), would be intellectual superiority. Fredericks illustrates this possibility 
quite well: 
 This “aristocracy of the brain” (Letters, 126) is based on talent and merit, not the 
accident of birth into a particular economic class. It is guaranteed by the “great 
democratic God” (Moby-Dick, 117) who has lifted up persons of such lowly economic 
status as Bunyon, Cervantes, and Andrew Jackson…. (10) 
           The protagonist of the novel meanwhile offers an interesting foil to the hierarchical 
mechanism described above. As I briefly stated previously, White-Jacket, for his distinctive 
manner of dressing and sharp observational aptitude, can be described essentially as an 
“exceptional” individual; the chief difference in his particular case being that he is not as 
much an agent of active change as an observer. Nevertheless, Melville ensures that he stands 
apart from the rest of the crew sufficiently as to be viewed by the reader as “exceptional.” 
The description that Melville gives is evocative at the same time of the image of the “white 
raven” (i.e. a misfit in a particular group) and the clear, or “white” conscience, at which the 
specific word choice hints: “It was not a very white jacket, but white enough, in all 
conscience, as the sequel will show” (WJ). 
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            Further on, the epithets such as “frock” or “Quakerish,” concerning the title 
character’s unusual choice of costume, present priestly connotations, uniting essential 
neutrality and superiority and suggesting a different way of understanding the situation. Just 
as a priest or a judge is distinguished from the rest by the virtue of a wig or a cassock (a 
theme of monastic dress is brought up as a plot detail in Brothers Karamazov as well, where 
the pious monk Alyosha is distinguished from the rest of the characters by his garb, and 
frequently acts as a listener to various characters’ monologue confessions, from Dmitry to 
Liza Khokhlakova and Grushenka), so is White-Jacket instantaneously set apart by his 
clothing. Given what already has been said about the self-imposed “exceptional” status of an 
individual, it is interesting that White-Jacket is not given the garment by anyone else, but 
makes it himself (the process of making being laboriously described). In this way, it can be 
argued that the White-Jacket, from the very first page, is established as an “exceptional” 
individual; however, this is more due to a twist of fate than an active and conscious choice 
(Alyosha in this respect is essentially different, being given the monk’s robes upon entering 
the monastery, rather than fashioning them himself, so he accepts being given a typological 
observer-role rather than wilfully seizing it). Yet the lot has been cast. White-Jacket has been 
set apart from the rest, and now he has to act accordingly.  
          Therefore, looking at White-Jacket from such a perspective, I disagree with the 
argument proposed by Michael Rogin that the white jacket of the title character makes him 
more vulnerable or denies him any definite role in the meticulously ordered naval hierarchy.  
Rogin’s interpretation suggests primary discomfort: 
 The costumes of Redburn and White-Jacket are instruments of anxious self-
dramatization. They announce that their wearers are not at home in the world. Their 
families have made Redburn and White-Jacket unlike ordinary people, and they hang 
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on to that painful difference as their identity. Redburn and White-Jacket refuse the 
normal dress of their stations, for they will not be defined by their roles. (Rogin 89) 
           Rogin’s description brings to mind the same “exceptional” individual acting in an 
explicitly rebellious manner so as to highlight his supposedly “exceptional” nature that puts 
White-Jacket on the par with Ahab, Raskolnikov and Pierre. Yet I maintain that whilst Rogin 
is correct in stating that White-Jacket is not like the rest of the people, his response to this is 
one of calm acceptance of his lot, and not the “painful difference” of rebellion. Nor can one 
say for certain that White-Jacket actively “refuses” any other clothing – instead, he seems to 
accept his unusual garb and position. Unlike other sailors, White-Jacket does not indulge in 
reckless or violent deeds, and this suggests greater maturity and holistic understanding of the 
situation, than a typical “exceptional” rebel would express.  
       Formally, White-Jacket makes up a part of a hierarchy within the man o’war’s 
microcosm, yet he clearly surpasses the limits conventionally permitted to a person of his 
hierarchical status, notably doing so without creating conflict or antagonising. This leads me 
to disagree with the vision of the protagonist described by James H. Justus as simply a 
“responsible mariner whose common sense reliably ratifies his expose of the inequities and 
vices of the US Navy” (Lee et al., 43)259 Such an interpretation over-simplifies the 
significance of the White-Jacket as an “exceptional” individual within an “exceptionalist” 
society, overlooking one major and interesting aspect of the problem. An “exceptional” 
individual may not be permitted to commit controversial actions in an “exceptionalist” 
society moving as one organism. In fact, any such activity would be severely curtailed.  
          However, what such an individual may very well do, is to act as an observer, noting 
any injustices or imbalances that occur – especially as his education and background invest 
him with the necessary understanding to do this. It is then left up to the society at large to 
                                                 
259 See James H. Justus, “Redburn and White-Jacket: Society and Sexuality in the Narrators of 1849.” 
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physically right those wrongs or make amends. White-Jacket does not commit the mistake 
made by Rodion Raskolnikov or Pierre Glendinning, since he does not actively take it on 
himself to bring about positive change. However, it is his keen observational powers that 
make society in general aware of what is happening, leading effectively to real-life changes 
in the American naval law, as commented on by Kovalev, or Myra C. Glenn. Those powers, 
in turn, could only be acquired if the character took it on himself to consider himself as an 
“exceptional” individual, and thus psychologically overcome the rigid hierarchical structure 
so as to see the situation for what it was. This is a deeper image than the one proposed by 
Justus, of an ordinary sailor who simply comments occasionally on what is before his eyes. 
Justus notes that White-Jacket as a character is at the same time both keen upon hierarchical 
structures and yet looking beyond those, however, he does not fully and explicitly state what 
may be hidden behind this. He stands apart, as Fredericks shows: 
 The dread of ostracism that dogs every crewman of the microscopic world affects 
White-Jacket as well, but his fear of exclusion from the group … is balanced by 
exclusivity that is almost obsessive. His sense of his proper place among other men and 
his sensitized feelings for classes of men are transformed into a hard-edged 
discrimination of innate values and human and social worth beyond the maritime 
functions for which classes on a frigate necessarily exist. (56) 
           From this, it follows that at least to Melville, the “exceptional” individual and the 
“exceptionalist” society were not always conflicting with each other. The true and accepted 
place of the “exceptional” individual, whose exceptional nature may be attributed to 
advanced intellectual powers, dubbed by Melville “the aristocracy of the brain,” is to act as 
an observer, drawing attention to any wrongs occurring, though not attempting to rectify 
them. This is not quite the same as the service of a spy, or a whistleblower, but rather the 
concept associated somewhat later with the Russian intelligentsia, which was frequently 
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dubbed sovest’ natsii (the nation’s consciousness), and harmonises with Melville’s notion of 
intellectual aristocracy or elite. Bogdan Kistyakovsky comments on the sceptical perception 
of the law and legal established frameworks as a characteristic trait of this group: “The 
Russian intelligentsia consists of people who are neither individually nor socially disciplined. 
This is related to the fact that the Russian intelligentsia never respected law and never saw 
any value in it” (Landmarks, 112-113). Although Kistyakovsky talks in the negative sense, 
being able to approach the edifice of law without awe or trepidation is essential for an astute 
societal observer seeking to pinpoint the existing flaws. In pre-1917 Russia, this role was 
often expected to be assumed by a writer – Dostoyevsky certainly saw himself as belonging 
to that strata – and it is quite tempting to consider Melville possibly sharing the same 
sentiment.  
         Justus is right to note White-Jacket’s “unordinary intelligence” (Lee et al. 43), but he 
does not mention the actual significance of this character’s unusual status. I, however, 
maintain that White-Jacket as a character presents a meritocratic vision of the “exceptional” 
individual at the service of the “checks and balances” governing the exceptionalist society. 
After all, the hypothetical framework of rules possesses no human sense so as to 
independently note and determine what works and what does not in a given particular 
environment or situation. The “exceptionalist” society functioning according to pre-set 
“checks and balances” may appear idyllic on paper, but the divergence between this and 
actual reality, as I stated previously, is vast, if one relies on the “checks and balances” alone. 
This is then the role of the “exceptional” individual invested with high intelligence and 
requisite education, to note wherever changes are needed to be made. White-Jacket may not 
be a dazzling intellectual, but he receives his white garment, and therefore he needs to act as 
expected, according to this “vocation” of sorts. He is distinctive, but he is also not occupying 
any definite hierarchical position; he is with others and yet apart from them.  
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         Such a perception is different from the vision of Melville as a radical, revolutionary 
thinker actively campaigning for immediate change. However, it goes well with my prior 
argument that quite like Dostoyevsky, Melville essentially is a somewhat conservative spirit, 
in that he prefers to effect change gradually, through observational and commentary means, 
and only where it is needed, rather than insisting on doing away with the old order so as to 
create a radical new one (unlike Captain Ahab overturning the life on board of the vessel 
upside down). White-Jacket may not have been acclaimed by the critics on the par with 
Melville’s most renowned novels, but it is notable that this text has effectively managed to 
contribute towards the changing of the naval law to abolish the corporal punishment through 
doing precisely what an “exceptional” individual acting as an observer would be expected to 
be doing, and this implies that the theory about the “exceptional” individuals being well 
positioned (thanks to their superior intellectual abilities) to act as observers rather than 
change-makers is highly workable. Also, bearing in mind the disastrous consequences seen in 
the previous novels, it is the only and correct way to bring about societal change in an 
effective, non-violent manner.  
           What, meanwhile, can be said of the Russian side of the argument? At a first glance, 
Dostoyevsky’s novel differs cardinally from White-Jacket, both in terms of subject-matter 
and stylistic structure. One may wonder – how does the description of a murder trial taking 
place in a provincial town relate to the treaty on the punishment and legal codes governing 
the American navy? Yet Brothers Karamazov is rather akin to Melville’s narrative, in that 
both effectively provide an example of how a system of rules, or namely, the law, operates in 
relation to both the “exceptional” individual, acting as a mechanism of suppression as well as 
a field for observation and improvement, and to the “exceptionalist” society. Even though 
there rests a major distinction in that Dostoyevsky discusses an example of criminal justice 
and Melville specifically chooses as his subject the naval code, both are quintessentially the 
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same in that they are the “checks and balances” implemented to hold the fabric of society 
together, and to castigate any individual who attempts to transgress them. 
            In his text, Dostoyevsky highlights the anxiety about the suitability of those chosen to 
carry out judicial duties, and whether they may be rightfully placed for this purpose 
hierarchically. The writer refers to concerns regarding the choice of the jurors: 
 [T]he twelve jurymen—four were petty officials of the town, two were merchants, and 
six peasants and artisans of the town. I remember, long before the trial, questions were 
continually asked …  “Can such a delicate, complex and psychological case be 
submitted for decision to petty officials and even peasants?” and “What can an official, 
still more a peasant, understand in such an affair?” All the four officials in the jury were, 
in fact, men of no consequence and of low rank. Except one who was rather younger, 
they were gray-headed men, little known in society, who had vegetated on a pitiful 
salary, and who … of course, had never read a single book. … [T]here is no need to 
speak of the artisans and the peasants … So that one might well wonder, as I did as soon 
as I had looked at them, “what men like that could possibly make of such a case?” Yet 
their faces made a strangely imposing, almost menacing, impression; they were stern 
and frowning. (BK 748) 
             A course of events that occurs at this point in Dostoyevsky’s novel is rather similar to 
what we saw in White-Jacket. A technically innocent character must face punishment, the 
extent of which would be determined by the jury made up of ordinary human beings. The 
men invited to do the jury service may not be intellectual aristocrats by any means, yet they 
are solid representatives of their particular social class and place in society, whether “petty 
officials” or “peasants” they all strive to play their typological part well, with dignity. This 
group is definitely not a depersonalized “mass” of the totalitarian nightmare described in the 
previous chapter, even though the jurors represent their social sub-group rather than exhibit 
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overt individuality. Some anxiety may be felt from the worries that the jurors probably “had 
never read a single book” – thus possibly undermining the meritocratic element requisite for 
the fulfilment of their task, which is described as “complex” and “delicate.” 
           One could almost fancy that the entire Table of Ranks is represented by the author on 
those pages, with a representative from each societal rank making an appearance. This is a 
good example of the societal liberty-equality balance at work: the opinions about to be 
expressed by the jurors are of equal weight, but the jurors themselves are not uniform – not at 
least in terms of social position.260 Their opinions are expected to matter, which again sends 
us back to the notion that in a “balanced” society, all individuals are seen, to an extent, as 
“exceptional,” even if humbly dressed and “uninviting-looking.” Yet rebellious youthful 
Enceladuses they are not, as the detailed description asserts. Moreover, just like White-Jacket 
after clothing himself in his distinctive outfit, those very ordinary-looking people suddenly 
attain a different spiritual dimension, “stern and frowning” in reaction to their new position 
and duty. The post of an “aware observer” may not be permanent, and the individuals called 
to fulfil it would eventually return to their “unpresentable wives and crowds of children” (BK 
748) but it is important and therefore causes a certain kind of a personal transformation.  
             Reverting to the issue of who acts as dispensers of justice and the representatives of 
the “checks and balances,” in the chapters describing Mitya’s trial, Dostoyevsky provides an 
interesting portrait of the President of the Court: 
 As for the President of our Court, I can only say that he was a humane and cultured 
man, who had a practical knowledge of his work and progressive views. He was rather 
ambitious, but did not concern himself greatly about his future career. The great aim of 
his life was to be a man of advanced ideas. He was, too, a man of connections and 
                                                 
260 One may note that nevertheless, the jury is exclusively male: a fact of which Margaret Fuller despairs in 
Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions (1848): “He has withheld from her rights which are given to the most 
ignorant and degraded men—both natives and foreigners.” 
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property. He felt, as we learnt afterwards, rather strongly about the Karamazov case, 
but from a social, not from a personal standpoint. He was interested in it as a social 
phenomenon, in its classification and its character as a product of our social conditions, 
as typical of the national character, and so on, and so on. His attitude to the personal 
aspect of the case, to its tragic significance and the persons involved in it, including the 
prisoner, was rather indifferent and abstract, as was perhaps fitting, indeed. (BK 746) 
           This snapshot presents the reader with the example of a typical dispenser of justice, 
one of “advanced ideas” and “progressive views” just as may arise in the system ruled by 
“checks and balances.” From an emotional perspective, he seems a shallow and cold 
personality, yet let us read deeper into this character. Following what was stated earlier about 
Melville’s stance on societal hierarchy being headed by the most culturally progressive 
individuals, it can be seen that Dostoyevsky’s President fits the similar pattern: he is 
sufficiently “humane and cultured,” as is expected of him, and, what is far more important, he 
echoes the quasi-Carlylean ideal of being at the intellectual forefront; as “the great aim of his 
life was to be a man of advanced ideas.” This statement has more than a touch of somewhat 
fanatical dedication to the theoretical concept of justice and intellectual understanding, which 
is strongly reminiscent of Carlyle’s notion of a priest-hero previously discussed. In this 
instance, the aspect of the priest comes forward to overshadow that of a hero: unlike the 
“exceptional” leader, the representative of the judicial and moral framework holding society 
together exhibits more priestly qualities such as dedication to the point of self-denial. Being 
“indifferent and abstract” as a neutral presence unaffected by emotion is precisely what is 
required of him in this situation. The President is preoccupied with the case “from a social, 
not a personal standpoint” suggests a certain degree of impartiality, necessary for successful 
observation as seen with Melville’s protagonist. As well as this, it suggests the fact that the 
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President, precisely like White-Jacket, stands somewhat apart from the “masses” swayed by 
the emotional, affective responses to the case: 
 In brief, there was a great deal of talk. … There were numbers of severe, frowning, 
even vindictive faces. Mitya, indeed, had managed to offend many people during his 
stay in the town. Some of the visitors were, of course, in excellent spirits and quite 
unconcerned as to the fate of Mitya personally. But all were interested in the trial, and 
the majority of the men were certainly hoping for the conviction of the criminal, except 
perhaps the lawyers, who were more interested in the legal than in the moral aspect of 
the case. (BK 745) 
           This passage, as well as illustrating a range of varied, personal emotional reactions to 
the case, highlights one specific aspect that I believe to be crucial for my argument. It is 
notable that whilst the ordinary spectators exhibit their feelings about the trial in a rather 
straightforward and animated manner, the lawyers are described by Dostoyevsky as 
impassive presences, “more interested in the legal than in the moral aspect of the case.” At a 
first glance, this suggests extreme dispassion, a human being likened to an artificial, 
faultlessly running mechanism unaffected by emotional sways.  
          Curiously enough, the artificial automaton is an image that is also encountered in the 
previous analyses of Captain Ahab and Stavrogin. Yet the mechanistic image of 
“horologicals” also emerges in the discussion of Plotinus Plinlimmon’s philosophy, acting as 
another name for the Plinlimmonian rules supposedly vital for the peaceful social existence. I 
argue that at this point, reconciliation occurs between the two concepts that previously stood 
juxtaposed to one another: namely, the “exceptional” individual and the “exceptionalist” 
society run according to the “horological” framework that Plinlimmon describes. The lawyers 
fulfil the part necessary for this framework to function properly, yet to do so effectively, they 
must detach themselves from the emotional, irrational responses characterising the rest of the 
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people – and thus, effectively, setting themselves up as “exceptional.” One is then left with 
the image of the “exceptional” individual at the service of the “exceptionalist” society – a 
notion unimaginable at the point that one looked at Pierre or Raskolnikov’s tales.  
 
EMOTIONS AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS? DISPASSIONATE AND EXCEPTIONALIST.      
               At this point, there arises an inevitable conflict of possibilities. Is an “exceptional” 
individual acting within the limits permitted to him by the “exceptionalist” society an 
emotional being, or not? The evidence unearthed above implies that such an individual is 
likely to be a highly dispassionate presence, which of course recalls the notion of the distant 
priest-hero, as Carlyle sees it. However, the evidence procured in the preceding two sets of 
textual case studies addresses a whole range of possibilities. Pierre and Raskolnikov are to an 
extent highly emotional beings, the latter perhaps less so, given the meticulousness with 
which he plans the pawnbroker’s murder or explains his philosophical views. Ahab and 
Stavrogin, in the meantime, are not as much passionate as feigning heightened emotional 
states in order to attract those to whom such conditions come naturally.  
            Yet Pierre and Raskolnikov are presented as essential failures – particularly from a 
viewpoint of the “exceptional” individual / “exceptionalist” society dichotomy. 
Dostoyevsky’s “Prince Hal” and Ahab, although eventually destined to perish, nevertheless 
succeed to a significant extent as leaders. Now, as the final set of texts gives us a figure of an 
“exceptional” individual acting in a manner approved by society as a disengaged observer 
interested primarily in the greater good, a logical conclusion is that although an “exceptional” 
individual may or may not be an emotional being as a personality, to survive the punishing 
effects of the societal regulations and to thrive, they must need distance themselves from the 
personal, affective reactions. To do so would be a genuine “exceptional” feat, a quasi-act of 
complete renouncement of the self and devotion to the “exceptionalist” society – an image 
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that sends one back to Carlyle’s argument. Delving even deeper into Carlyle’s vision, the 
meaning becomes quite obvious: to act as a priest-hero at the service of the “exceptionalist” 
society is to express the divine will vicariously through one’s actions, the only difference 
being that the role of a god is taken by the “exceptionalist” society. In doing so, the priest-
heroes become something of a god in themselves; essentially detached and removed from the 
ordinary human experience. The vision of this perfect detachment for the sake of the societal 
harmony is at the same time Buddhist and Socialist in spirit.  
          The horrific scene of the sailors’ punishment, that is probably the most well-known 
episode in Melville’s novel, subtly references the possibility that as a representative and 
executive of the judiciary powers on board the man o’war, the captain acts precisely as a 
priest acting in the capacity of a god, or enacting the divine will: 
         The fourth and last was Peter, the mizzen-top lad. He had often boasted that he 
had never been degraded at the gangway. The day before his cheek had worn its usual 
red but now no ghost was whiter. As he was being secured to the gratings, and the 
shudderings and creepings of his dazzlingly white back were revealed, he turned round 
his head imploringly; but his weeping entreaties and vows of contrition were of no avail. 
"I would not forgive God Almighty!" cried the Captain. The fourth boatswain's-mate 
advanced, and at the first blow, the boy, shouting "My God! Oh! my God!" writhed and 
leaped so as to displace the gratings, and scatter the nine tails of the scourge all over his 
person. At the next blow he howled, leaped, and raged in unendurable torture. 
"What are you stopping for, boatswain's-mate?" cried the Captain. "Lay on!" and the 
whole dozen was applied. 
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"I don't care what happens to me now!" wept Peter, going among the crew, with blood-
shot eyes, as he put on his shirt. "I have been flogged once, and they may do it again, if 
they will. Let them look for me now!" 
"Pipe down!" cried the Captain, and the crew slowly dispersed. 
Let us have the charity to believe them—as we do—when some Captains in the Navy 
say, that the thing of all others most repulsive to them, in the routine of what they 
consider their duty, is the administration of corporal punishment upon the crew; for, 
surely, not to feel scarified to the quick at these scenes would argue a man but a beast. 
(WJ) 
               The abundance of shocking details and emotive language (using expressions such as 
“shudderings,” “imploringly” or “unendurable torture”) undoubtedly affects the reader; 
however, the captain remains clearly intent on carrying the punishment through, with 
mechanistic detachment characteristic of the hypothesis I set out above. Yet what is 
especially poignant are the words, “I would not forgive God Almighty!” as the sailor pleads, 
“My God! Oh! My God!” At this instance, the captain is carrying out the duties bestowed on 
him by the justice (in place of a deity), and the pleadings of Peter may be directed at him, but 
in his status as a priest fulfilling the role of a god, the captain remains unable to offer the 
young sailor the forgiveness an ordinary human being might have done.261 Justice on board of 
the “Neversink” equals the fulfilment of a precisely defined religious ritual, to overturn which 
with an inappropriate show of emotion would be unthinkable. 
          Interestingly, Melville does mention that in ordinary discussion the captains who had 
the experience of carrying through such acts of punishment deem it barbaric, “for, surely, not 
                                                 
261 Melville explored a similar dilemma more fully in a posthumous work, Billy Budd (1924?). 
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to feel scarified to the quick at these scenes would argue a man but a beast.” Such is 
undoubtedly the ordinary, everyday response of the captains in their capacity as human 
beings. However, when acting in their role as dispensers of justice on board of their vessels, 
they are effectively required to stay in the detached, “exceptional,” dispassionate state – for 
the sake of  preserving judicial order, or metaphorically, the “checks and balances” holding 
together the microcosm, remaining intact. They may notice the disproportionate cruelty, but 
cannot stop it, for the fear of annihilating the entire system of codes on which society rests, 
which would result in the anarchic horrors described by Hamilton. The only hope, then, lies 
with the “exceptional” individual observers (who can be alternatively dubbed intelligentsia, 
or elite) such as White-Jacket, who can see and comment on what is wrong, and then hope 
that their comments have an effect and that the “exceptionalist” society actually agrees to 
view a particularly harrowing law as “arbitrary.” White-Jacket, in his observer role capable of 
deeper intellectual reflection than most, may comment or think that the laws are arbitrary, yet 
he is divested of the power to actively interfere. “You see a human being, stripped like a 
slave; scourged worse than a hound. And for what? For things not essentially criminal, but 
only made so by arbitrary laws” (WJ). In short, the judges in an exceptionalist society should 
be emotionless; and the observers are expected to be emotional.  
 
THE LEVIATHAN OF AN ANSWER: A JURISTIC FRAMEWORK? 
          At this point I come to the issue that reconciles Melville and Dostoyevsky’s visions 
from the platform of broader judicial context. To this day, scholarship on both Melvillean and 
Dostoyevskian literary universes often envisioned the two writers as primarily humanistic, 
highly liberal spirits opposing the rigid societal structure founded upon authoritarianism.262 
This view, to some extent, is affected by portrayals of characters such as Ishmael, 
                                                 
262 See Kovalev, C.L.R. James, Delbanco, and Samuel Otter. 
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Raskolnikov or Pierre Glendinning – highly individualised and standing aside from the world 
as such.263  
          Leaning on my previous findings, I maintain that one unifying trait that Melville and 
Dostoyevsky have in common, opposes the above argument. Both writers can be seen as 
effectively championing the established hierarchical societal order. It may be initially 
shocking to think of Melville as siding with Plotinus Plinlimmon rather than Pierre, or to 
envisage Dostoyevsky believing that Mitya Karamazov’s sentencing can actually be justified. 
Yet both of them appear to come to the same conclusion in the course of their philosophical 
searching. Whether Russian or American context, the conclusion is the same for both writers, 
since they ponder rather universal questions. Although in the previous two sets of case 
studies it already has been shown that Melville and Dostoyevsky are uncomfortable with the 
concept of rigid societal structures and punishments they produce upon individuals who dare 
to strike out as “exceptional,” eventually both writers arrive to the same common 
denominator – namely, that maintaining a sound social order and curtailing the boundless 
potential of the “exceptional” individuals intent upon attaining leadership is the only practical 
way to preserve social harmony and peace.  
          It is notable that some scholars (especially Frank, and also Rowan Williams, who of 
course speaks from a distinct Christian viewpoint) have commented upon the fact that 
Dostoyevsky opposed radical revolution, and, for all his humanistic compassionate impulses, 
believed that the preservation of the theocratic order with a tsar at the helm, where principles 
of justice are founded upon the traditional Orthodox views of good and evil, would be the 
only way for Russia to remain stable. Such a vision is staggeringly conservative for a man of 
supposedly humanistic views, however, it is particularly curious as Dostoyevsky’s response 
to the notion of “Russian exceptionalism.” It may not be most revolutionary or radical, yet it 
                                                 
263 See, in particular, C.L.R. James, Kovalev, Delbanco and Frank. 
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is strongly “exceptionalist” in that it chooses to uphold a “Russian” way of preserving 
societal order rather than rely on any models offered by the contemporaneous European 
schools of thought. Melville, in the main bulk of existing scholarship, has been frequently 
portrayed as exhibiting non-explicit radical tendencies, experimentially puting himself at the 
opposite axis to the established social order (particularly, by thinkers such C.L.R. James, and 
also, notably, by the Soviet critical school, which held a specific objective to draw out 
Melville’s supposed sympathies for revolutionary change and dissatisfaction with the 
“capitalist” America). Therefore, one would have deemed Melville as opposing 
Dostoyevsky’s vision, rather than sharing it. However, upon carrying out a textual analysis of 
the two writers’ milestone works, it becomes clear that despite their numerous critiques of 
specific individual aspects of the established social order, both finally arrive at the same hard-
won conclusion that the “exceptional” individual unconstrained by any means remains a 
tangible threat to the world at large, and therefore, preserving the established juristic norms 
holding society together, imperfect as they are, is the proper thing to expect or do. The 
“exceptionalist” society should be preserved for the greater good of all forming it, even if it 
comes at the expense of specific individual lives, and any changes that must be effected for 
the benefit of society as a whole, should be wrought, as White-Jacket reveals and 
Dostoyevsky’s entire philosophical vision stands, in a gradual, reformist manner. This is a 
markedly democratic vision, perhaps even more so than the revolutionary or radical ones, as 
it appears to stress the well-being of all the members of society rather than just individuals 
deemed “exceptional.” The society is “exceptionalist” precisely because all of its members 
are “exceptional” and liable to be treated, or protected, in a similar way, by the virtue of the 
law.  
           There rests one strain of philosophy, which arose much earlier than either Melville or 
Dostoyevsky’s era, yet nevertheless appears to reflect and summarise this vision: namely, 
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Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651).264 There have been previous studies of Hobbesian 
influence on Melville’s works, such as the study by Aloysius Martinich, who notes that 
Melville referred to Hobbes in his works, albeit fleetingly.265 In addition, I maintain that an 
important factor uniting the seemingly diverse philosophies of Melville and Dostoyevsky is 
the fact that both of them, in their reflections upon the conflict between the “exceptional” 
individual and the “exceptionalist” society, as well as in their thoughts regarding how the said 
society should be run, are intensely Hobbesian. 
           Hobbes’ philosophy centres around the concept of the “Law of Nature.” This is not a 
reference to the natural order opposing human aspirations (which I described in the previous 
chapter), but a concept which can be defined as an individual’s natural thirst for freedom.  In 
the liberty-equality equation, it can be associated primarily with the concept of individual 
liberty. As a notion, it harmonises well with the already-familiar Jeffersonian ideal of “the 
pursuit of happiness” as well as with the specific tendencies of the “exceptional” individual 
personified by White-Jacket, Ishmael or Raskolnikov, such as the desire to preserve one’s 
own “life” or identity – or, thinking of Agamben’s theory, one’s individuality or essence, 
even if it may come into conflict with society in general or its particular aspects. Leviathan 
defines this concept as follows: 
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each 
man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own 
Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in 
                                                 
264 As a side note on the influence of Hobbes’ work on specifically Russian society and culture, we may mention 
the recently-produced Russian film Leviafan (2014). Directed by Alexander Zvyagintsev, the film, presented as 
a reflection on modern-day problems in Russia, deals with several major Hobbesian themes, such as “natural 
order” and the necessity for legal positivism.  
265 See Aloysius Martinich, “Two Uses of Thomas Hobbes's Philosophy in Melville's The Confidence-Man.” 
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his own Judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. 
(Leviathan) 266 
           At a first glance, Hobbes could be described as putting forth an individualistic 
manifesto, as if Pierre’s dream of Enceladus, or White-Jacket’s garment, or Raskolnikov’s 
axe, suddenly were transformed from symbols into words. Of course, the immediate 
interpretation of what Hobbes may mean as “Nature” or “Life” could be life in the biological 
sense, the “bare life” remaining after all the social or cultural meanings have been removed, 
as per Agamben. In my interpretation of Hobbes, I move away from this, connecting 
“Nature” in Hobbes’ manifesto with preserving the exceptional individuality together with its 
societal significance, which becomes intrinsically linked with biological “life” as such, and 
its inseparable part.  
        As White-Jacket puts his distinctive garb on, this is comparable to making a statement 
about one’s social duty that almost becomes part and parcel of one’s being; a “skin” of sorts. 
In “preservation of his own Nature” as per Hobbes, White-Jacket goes to laborious ends to 
earmark his separate, individual position on board the vessel. Corresponding with Enceladus’ 
wild struggle for freedom that this thesis began with, Hobbes’ statement regarding the 
individual’s passionate fight for preserving their “life” or essence meets a solid reflection in 
the images we have encountered in all the three sets of case studies. Yet what happens when a 
distinctive yet morally neutral white garment of Melville’s hero suddenly becomes 
Raskolnikov’s bloodied axe? 
          At this point, Hobbes introduces another concept, “the Law of Nature,” which could be 
viewed as the prototype of Hamilton’s polished theory of “balances and checks” regulating 
the political and social spheres. It is defined as follows: 
                                                 




 A Law of Nature, (Lex Naturalis,) is a … generall (sic) Rule, found out by Reason, by 
which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the 
means of preserving the same ... For though they that speak of this subject, use to 
confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because 
RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and 
bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and 
Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent. (Leviathan) 
           The conflict between “Obligation and Liberty” certainly echoes the juxtaposition of 
liberty and equality which I raised at the very beginning. From the above passage, Hobbes’ 
philosophy also foresees the Hamiltonian vision in that unbridled human “exceptional” 
potential needs to be tempered by man-made, logically determined rules “found out by 
Reason.” The point and purpose for those rules are explicitly set out as offering protection to 
individuals from the potentially dangerous or “destructive” effects of their own or others’ 
actions. This, of course, correlates both to the analytical findings from all three sets of case 
studies within this thesis, and to Hamilton’s theory, as it speaks of the necessity to determine 
the fine balance between the “Right and Law” or the extent to which an “exceptional” 
individuality may be allowed to act in an “exceptionalist” society.  
            If we examine the themes from both White-Jacket and Brothers Karamazov from this 
vantage-point, an important aspect uniting Melville and Dostoyevsky’s visions is revealed. 
From a purely humanistic perspective, the sentencing of Mitya, or the rigid naval discipline 
seem essentially harsh. In terms of Hobbesian and Hamiltonian philosophies, both are a 
necessary evil, which, for all its hideousness, ensures that the “law of nature” is honoured and 
further, greater ills are prevented. The societal fabric or order has been preserved, in that 
justice has been dispensed, and an individual’s freedom or life has been sacrificed for the 
greater good of the communitarian, “exceptionalist” society.   Thinking of the historical 
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context, this idea was adapted, in a perverse manner, within the Jeffersonian arguments about 
the preservation of slavery as an institution as crucial to the state’s existence -  whilst the 
abolitionist thinkers used the same argument lines to condemn slaveholding as well (echoing 
the debates for or against the naval reforms assessed in Melville’s novel).267 The main 
theoretical factor remained overturning the status quo – whatever this entailed. The 
“exceptional” individual, who upsets the existing order, to Hobbes is seen as a “stubborn” 
presence, a stone that “takes more room from others, than it selfe fills” or an outlaw, whom 
he explicitly positions against society: 
 [C]OMPLEASANCE; that is to say, "That every man strive to accommodate himselfe 
to the rest." … [T]here is in mens aptnesse to Society; a diversity of Nature, rising from 
their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for 
building of an Aedifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of 
Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills … and thereby hindereth the 
building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man 
that … for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast 
out of Society, as combersome (sic) thereunto. (Leviathan) 
            Hobbes’ stance is clear in that he stands with society and not with the individual. His 
imagery of a stone in the building, “cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome” does recall 
Herder’s imagery of an anthill, and Melville’s stone-giant, as well as the broader vision of 
society made up of near-similar human “units” banded together to realise joint potential in 
fulfilment of a unifying, exceptionalist goal. The statement, “He that shall oppose himselfe 
against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow,” is exactly 
the rational explanation to what happened to various “exceptional” individuals encountered in 
                                                 
267 See Gordon S. Wood broadly on Jefferson’s era. 
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the previous chapters, whose opposition to society brings about “warre, “ as Hobbes would 
say.  
               Hobbes’ theory also becomes relevant in the light of the following argument 
regarding the role of the “exceptional” individual primarily as an observer and social 
commentator clamouring for necessary change. Yet, reverting to the democratisation of the 
concept of an “exceptional individual,” where any given individual may deem oneself 
“exceptional” (which also rings quite true particularly taking to view the nationalistic aspect 
of the exceptionalist discourse both in Russia and America, where being a member of a given 
national community presumably set one apart as “exceptional”), a question arises: what 
happens if each and every member of society believes themselves to be “exceptional” and 
therefore beyond any control? White-Jacket seems content with observation, whilst Mitya is 
essentially an “everyman” preoccupied with wishful thinking or his personal problems. 
However, looking back at the previous sets of case studies, an uncomfortable picture 
emerges, that can be summarised both by Raskolnikov’s wild theory about the “exceptional” 
and “unexceptional” people, or by Stubb’s words, “All of us are Ahabs.” Hamilton in 
Federalist Paper 9 depicts “…a number of citizens … who are united and actuated by some 
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”268 Hobbes, meanwhile, maintains that 
this is actually the main danger of allowing the “Right of Nature” to run unbridled, primarily 
because a high concentration of “exceptional” individuals enacting their free will in any 
given microcosm would create an intertangled, volatile web of conflicts descending into 
chaos: 
And because the condition of Man … is a condition of Warre of every one against 
every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is 
                                                 
268 See Federalist Paper 9.  
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nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life 
against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to 
every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of 
every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong 
or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to 
live. (Leviathan) 
           The previous two sets of textual case studies have provided sufficient evidence 
supporting Hobbes’ imagined version of what this “condition of Man” could possibly look 
like, if given free rein. What could be done to control it, has already been mentioned in the 
above discussion of Hamilton’s theory about the necessity of instilling a comprehensible 
juristic framework. Hence it suffices to say that the main purpose of the “balances and 
checks,” or Plinlimmonian rules, is the search for “security to any man” that Hobbes speaks 
about. This brings me to the next part of my argument. 
          It is clear that the individuals, who, like Mitya Karamazov, or the sailors punished by 
the captain, are repressed by the established judicial system, are also essentially unstable 
elements who cause “warre” in their immediate environment. This implies emotional 
instability as well as actual unstable behaviour. Let us compare the two examples from both 
texts, illustrating this notion. White-Jacket presents us with the following picture: 
Among the many… none laughed more heartily than John, Peter, Mark, and Antone—
four sailors of the starboard-watch. The same evening these four found themselves 
prisoners in the "brig," with a sentry standing over them. They were charged with 
violating a well-known law of the ship—having been engaged in one of those tangled, 
general fights sometimes occurring among sailors. They had nothing to anticipate but a 
flogging, at the captain's pleasure. (WJ) 
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            At a first glance, the reader may consider this image to depict the outrageous 
unfairness of a situation where genuine, living, emotional people are being subjected to brutal 
punishment for daring to reveal their emotions. Yet, looking more closely the notion of 
“checks and balances” is evoked again, as well as the previously discussed notion of excess. 
The four sailors can be described as creatures governed by free emotion that they express 
liberally and uninhibitedly – a trait which is connectable with the figure of a free-ranging 
“exceptional” individual flouting customary conventions. They may have been expressing 
emotions, however, these emotions are essentially of a private nature, ill-consistent with the 
established societal framework. 
          In referring to the “tangled, general fights sometimes occurring among sailors,” 
Melville evokes the entropic, chaotic way of existence that brings to mind both the wildly 
naturalistic imagery encountered in Pierre, and the subconsciously-determined, sporadic 
movements of a hypnotised crowd seen in the second chapter. However, this way of being is 
completely unacceptable in the light of the Hamiltonian, or Hobbesian ideal of a measured 
and controlled society, where lawfulness equates to logical, comprehensible unity and order. 
As mundane and pedestrian as this view may appear if compared to the theatrical excesses 
wrought by an “exceptional individual,” it is nevertheless logically explicable. The four  
sailors present a potential danger to the overall harmonious existence within the microcosm – 
and the real reason is not the fact that they act “exceedingly diverted” at the expense of the 
higher-status hierarchical figures, but the fact that they behave in an “exceeding” manner. 
Therefore, what Melville offers at this point is a real-life version of the Enceladus sequence, 
the four “Enceladuses” finding themselves as “prisoners in a brig with a sentry standing over 
them” rather than contained by masses of rock. Another noteworthy moment is that the 
punishment incurred by the sailors is shown to be a logical and expected outcome, which 
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even the perpetrators themselves are aware of: “They had nothing to anticipate but a 
flogging.”  
           The flogging scene in White-Jacket thus appears to be a perfect illustration of the 
ancient juristic principle, or dura lex, sed lex. What can one, meanwhile, make of Mitya 
Karamazov’s plight? 
           Considering the overall plot of Brothers Karamazov, it can be said that at the point of 
being captured by the representatives of the law, Mitya remains in a highly strung, disturbed 
emotional state, albeit caused by the reasons that have nothing to do with the actual crime 
that occurs. Moreover, right from his initial appearance in the text, he gives an impression of 
an unstable character, mercurial to the point of volatility, emphasised by terms such as 
“irascible,” “restless” or “violent”: 
Even when he was excited and talking irritably, his eyes somehow did not follow his 
mood, but betrayed something else, sometimes quite incongruous with what was 
passing. “It's hard to tell what he's thinking,” those who talked to him sometimes 
declared. … A certain strained look in his face was easy to understand at this moment. 
Every one knew, or had heard of, the extremely restless and dissipated life which he 
had been leading of late, as well as of the violent anger to which he had been roused in 
his quarrels with his father. There were several stories current in the town about it. It is 
true that he was irascible by nature, “of an unstable and unbalanced mind,” as our justice 
of the peace, Katchalnikov, happily described him. (BK 69) 
           Interestingly enough, it is the representative of the law within the microcosm who 
passes a comment on Mitya, declaring him an unstable character and a threat, and of all 
words he uses the term “unbalanced”.269 Unlike White-Jacket, who is distinctive but not 
                                                 
269 The original Russian here says something a bit literally like “incorrect” (nepravil’nyi). However, in the light 
of this thesis’ theme, the choice of the term “unbalanced” appears better suited.  
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intent on assaulting the established order as it stands, Mitya is a perfect example of a 
subversive element, marked by specific personal traits to stand out as such, and also seen to 
contradict the accepted hierarchical familiar order (family being an even smaller version of a 
social microcosm) by quarrelling with his father.  
          Yet there is an even more interesting facet to his situation. As he is about to be brought 
to trial, Dostoyevsky presents a picture of extreme general instability: 
 I know for a fact that there were several serious family quarrels on Mitya's account in 
our town. Many ladies quarreled violently with their husbands over differences of 
opinion about the dreadful case, and it was only natural that the husbands of these ladies, 
far from being favorably disposed to the prisoner, should enter the court bitterly 
prejudiced against him. In fact, one may say pretty certainly that the masculine, as 
distinguished from the feminine, part of the audience were biased against the prisoner. 
(BK 745) 
            Mitya may not have done anything at all that can be described as a “crime,” and is 
even off the stage at this precise moment, however, he serves as a subject of debates and 
arguments among the general public. Notably, given what was said previously about the 
dangerous individualist being specifically male and reputedly possessed of ability to exercise 
psychological influence, one may argue that here, discussing what at first seems an amusing 
picture of marital strife, Dostoevsky reveals typical anxieties of the time about the town’s 
citizens being afraid of the influence Mitya can wield over the repressed group – the “ladies,” 
threatening the familial and domestic foundations of the microcosm by exposing 
uncomfortable truth (and echoing the argument made by Mary Wollstonecraft (1792): 
“[T]ruth must be common to all, or it will be inefficacious with respect to its influence on 
general practice” (A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 3)).270 Moreover, referring to the 
                                                 
270 See also Rogin, broadly. 
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character’s progress in the novel as a whole, Dostoyevsky states that Mitya did “offend many 
people during his stay in town.” In regards to how society treats its Enceladuses, the 
conclusion is horrifyingly harsh, but corresponds with Dostoyevsky’s overall philosophy. 
Even if Mitya did not commit a crime, in the author’s eyes he nevertheless presents a 
disturbance to the microcosm as it stands, by harbouring thoughts of parricide that oppose the 
Christian mindset that the microcosm is founded upon - and thus has to be contained or 
removed.  
           From a humanistic viewpoint, the plight of Mitya (or of the four sailors of the 
“Neversink”) is possibly one of the most distressing imaginable. From a juristic one, 
however, it is not quite as simply defined. As it has already been shown, the Hobbesian 
notion of the “right of nature,” where any given element deems itself “exceptional” and acts 
completely unconstrained, puts the survival of society as it stands at danger, and therefore 
gets curtailed. For society, justice has been dealt in removing an individual that may cause a 
potential threat, even purely hypothetically (such as Mitya’s morbid plans to murder his 
father). Mitya’s emotional state, as he faces his father for the last time  (presented as an 
entirely individual, personal experience) is condemning enough by itself even if he does not 
technically carry the crime out, as Dostoyevsky shows: 
It was a rush of that sudden, furious, revengeful anger of which he had spoken, as 
though foreseeing it … when, in answer to Alyosha's question, “How can you say you'll 
kill our father?” “I don't know, I don't know,” he had said then. “Perhaps I shall not kill 
him, perhaps I shall. I'm afraid he'll suddenly be so loathsome to me at that moment. I 
hate his double chin, his nose, his eyes, his shameless grin. I feel a personal repulsion. 
That's what I'm afraid of, that's what may be too much for me.” (BK 439) 
            However, Dostoyevsky further on offers a curious perspective on what an individual 
can do in this instance, that yet again evokes the “right of nature” concept in that it may mean 
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the individual’s struggle to preserve their individuality or essence. Mitya is sentenced to 
prison, but effectively, this unjust suffering can be perceived as an individual’s chance to 
reawaken spiritually and even develop any “exceptional” characteristics that would 
eventually place him as a genuinely spiritually superior character. Of course, this is a very 
typical Dostoyevskian vision, bringing to mind Raskolnikov’s cathartic reawakening as well. 
Yet there is also another hugely important point that divides the rebel who must be restrained 
from an enlightened exceptional observer proposed in White-Jacket, approved and supported 
by society. Namely, this is psychological awareness, or the triumph of the logic and reason, 
directed at the improvement and preservation of society, over the subconscious, chaotic 
movements of the “exceptional” individual, produced by the over-active sense of one’s ego. 
Previously in this chapter, it has been shown how such an enlightened, aware state of mind 
can be attributed to superior education or knowledge.  
          As well as this, Dostoyevsky offers another possibility in that this enlightenment can 
also be attained through a Golgotha-like experience of intense suffering or undergoing 
punishment that can be quite faithfully described as “ritually just.” Strong “criminal” 
emotions must be purged by equally strong remorse.  
           In this manner, the theory of “checks and balances” restraining the wild chaos 
engendered by the “right of nature” serves not just to preserve the general social order intact 
and protect society from particularly dangerous individuals. It also acts as an evolutionary 
step for the “exceptional” individual, assisting the transition from the wildly flailing Titan to 
an intellectually advanced mind; effectively, it is a refinement of sorts.  
         The following passage from Dostoyevsky’s novel suggests that Mitya just begins to 
understand this principle, although he cannot accept his lot according to this philosophy: 
         His character was displayed, and it spoke for itself … [T]he opening statement 
was read. It was rather short, but circumstantial. It only stated the chief reasons why he 
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had been arrested, why he must be tried, and so on … The clerk read it loudly and 
distinctly. The whole tragedy was suddenly unfolded before us, concentrated, in bold 
relief, in a fatal and pitiless light … [T]he President asked Mitya in a loud impressive 
voice: “Prisoner, do you plead guilty?” 
   Mitya suddenly rose from his seat. 
“I plead guilty to drunkenness and dissipation,” he exclaimed, again in a startling, 
almost frenzied, voice, “to idleness and debauchery. I meant to become an honest man 
for good, just at the moment when I was struck down by fate. But I am not guilty of the 
death of that old man, my enemy and my father. No, no, I am not guilty of robbing him! 
I could not be. Dmitri Karamazov is a scoundrel, but not a thief.” (BK 749) 
           The main characteristic of the “checks and balances” theory emerges in the description 
of the opening statement, “short, but circumstantial” and founded strictly upon facts. The 
language of the legal system is unemotional but clear, quite like the clerk’s voice reading 
“distinctly.” Intuitive or emotional undercurrents have no place in this framework – else 
Mitya would have in all likelihood been acquitted. However, bearing in mind what was said 
about the “exceptional” individual’s punishment as a crucial step of this individual’s 
evolution, Mitya’s passionate admittance that he is “guilty of drunkenness and dissipation” 
and that he “meant to become an honest man for good, just at the moment when I was struck 
down by fate,” is quite timely, and by no means a tragic failure. In fact, it might be assumed 
that Dostoyevsky offers his hero a chance to transition from a “scoundrel” or an embittered 
youth beset with potentially harmful thoughts and reminiscent of Pierre Glendinning, 
Raskolnikov and Steelkilt, to an aware and understanding “watcher” who understands the 
role of inner cogs and workings of society. Nevertheless, to do so, he must first pass through 
the purgatory of punishment. From other characters’ point of view, Mitya’s sentencing is his 
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downfall, as that means descending into the lower strata of the societal hierarchy: his brother 
Alyosha worries about “how hard it would be for a man like Mitya to pass at once so 
suddenly into the society of robbers and murderers, and that he must get used to it by 
degrees” (BK 861). Yet even the monk Alyosha cannot fully define what Dostoyevsky hints 
at – that in the world governed by “checks and balances,” what looks like Mitya’s death-knell 
is effectively a lead-up to resurrection. His words of comfort are based on the Orthodox 
Christian doctrine of understanding spiritual advancement through suffering. However, they 
resonate well with the general, Hobbesian, Hamiltonian theory I outlined in this chapter, as 
well as with the notion that suffering refines the “exceptional” individual’s potential to make 
it fully developed: 
 Alyosha smiled gently. “Listen, brother, once for all,” he said. “This is what I think 
about it. … If you had murdered our father, it would grieve me that you should reject 
your punishment. But you are innocent, and such a cross is too much for you. You 
wanted to make yourself another man by suffering … Your refusal of that great cross 
will only serve to make you feel all your life an even greater duty, and that constant 
feeling will do more to make you a new man, perhaps, than if you went there. For 
there you would not endure it and would repine, and perhaps at last would say: ‘I am 
quits.’ The lawyer was right about that. Such heavy burdens are not for all men. For 
some they are impossible.” (BK 863) 
             Alyosha’s statement, “Such heavy burdens are not for all men,” in the light of all that 
has been previously said, means more than mere concern for his brother. Mitya’s lot is 
horrific, but it also makes him elect, and following a path of destiny reserved only for the 
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most stalwart or extraordinary.271 In the mainstream exceptionalist discourse, he attains the 
status of a martyr, transcending the physical constraints to attain true transformational glory. 
The constant reference to imprisonment as a “cross” makes the parallel explicitly clear: in 
partaking of the suffering inflicted upon one by the operating judicial system, the individual 
is imitating Christ – who can be described as the absolute ideal of an enlightened 
“exceptional” observer drawing people’s attention to how life should be lived not by radical 
violence, but by setting an example and teaching through parable. If we consider this 
possibility alongside the actual Biblical text, there are many passages in the New Testament 
specifically to uphold this theory, such as the following passage.272 It describes Jesus’ 
specific way of teaching, which corresponds with the notion of the “enlightened observer” in 
the vein of what we encounter in White-Jacket: 
Here is my servant, whom I have chosen, the one I love, and with whom I am pleased. 
I will send my Spirit upon him, and he will announce my judgement to the nations. He 
will not argue or shout, or make loud speeches in the streets. He will not break off a 
bent reed, or put out a flickering lamp. He will persist until he causes justice to 
triumph, and in him all peoples will put their hope. (NT Matt.12.18-21) 
           The similarities previously discussed are all present: the leadership exemplified by 
Jesus Christ shows the key aspects of persistence and non-violence that may at first glance be 
confused with inaction. Both we have already seen in the figure of the “exceptional observer” 
that Melville brings out. As a curious side-note, the Captain’s exclamation, “I would not 
forgive God Almighty!” gains an unusual dimension if seen from this perspective. Christ is 
the only societally acceptable example of an “exceptional” individual that can be emulated – 
                                                 
271 This is also a trope found in American literature at the time; note the fate of the protagonist in Billy Budd, 
Hester Prynne in Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter (1850), or, less tragically, Tom Sawyer’s lies to receive 
punishment instead of Becky Thatcher in Twain’s Tom Sawyer (1876). 
272 See New Testament (Good News Bible).  
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in the opposition to the rebellious, Satanic Enceladus.273 Yet, given what has already been 
said, to become on the par with Christ means first to partake in suffering, as a necessary 
transitionary step. The Captain’s words, for all their barbaric cruelty, may subconsciously 
point towards this notion, that Peter is undergoing an evolutionary step changing him from an 
unaware rebel to an individual of higher awareness. This is a somewhat Dostoyevskian notion 
(especially if we recollect the writer’s own biographical experiences following his 
imprisonment for the involvement with the anti-monarchic Petrashevsky movement and 
encounters with other prisoners) – all the more so because it suggests that there is a higher 
philosophy involved here, and the Captain is acting like a heartless but efficient unthinking 
mechanism enabling it to occur.  
         To summarise this idea, it can be said that the vision of smoothly-run society can be 
divided into distinct aspects. The representatives of authority (such as the Captain, or the 
court officials at Mitya’s trial) are expected to carry out their tasks, preferably in as logical 
and emotionally detached manner as possible. The enlightened observers after the example of 
White-Jacket should closely monitor those processes, noting instantaneously any 
disproportionate cruelty or individual recklessness upsetting the legal balance, and draw 
society’s attention to this through their writing and commenting, so as to bring about 
necessary amendments.274 Finally, the unhappy individuals like Peter or Mitya Karamazov, 
who find themselves facing punishment from this system for asserting their “exceptional” 
nature, may find salvation in the notion of understanding punishment as a painful but 
necessary stage in the journey towards a higher consciousness. 
                                                 
273 Imitating Christ was a common idea to Protestant, American mindset at the time. In particular, Benjamin 
Franklin frequently evoked this notion.  
274 In On Heroes, Carlyle dubs the press “The Fourth Estate,” playing a similar part as observer: “[T]here were 
Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far 
than they all (392).” 
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           Of course, imitating Christ was not a novel concept by any means in the day of either 
Melville or Dostoyevsky, or either in Russian or American culture. In fact, it would have 
been odd to expect a character like Alyosha Karamazov to suggest anything else, whilst 
White-Jacket can also be described as a solid scion of specifically Protestant cultural 
tradition. However, this assumption is not quite as simplistically explained. The system of 
“checks and balances” of judicial control is essentially man-made. There is no notion as such 
of any openly religious connotations that it originated from, or an intention to implement it so 
as to please any particular deity. Whether one adores or despises them, the “Plinlimmonian 
rules” exist primarily so as to enable non-violent and safe human coexistence within any 
given microcosm. This, of course, resonates closely with Hobbes’ main argument about the 
true purpose of the law in society, which is to bring justice and attain balance: 
Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth. ... 
[T]herefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some 
coercive Power, to compell (sic) men equally to the performance of their Covenants, 
by the terrour (sic) of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the 
breach of their Covenant … [S]o that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of 
valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of 
a Civill (sic) Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them: And then it is also that 
Propriety begins. (Leviathan) 
            The state of “Propriety” that Hobbes so fondly refers to, means humans living as a 
society, with a particular goal in mind - namely, peaceful coexistence that assists productivity 
rather than hinders it. The devising and implementing of man-made legal frameworks, or the 
“checks and balances” of Hamilton, is an essential aspect for the community’s survival, but it 
is man-made – “the Constitution of a Civill Power,” rather than divinely inspired or 
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instinctively carried out. There is nothing particularly mystical or covert about it. The 
religious cornerstone of the Biblical teaching, however, resonates with Hobbes, despite its 
objective being somewhat different than just a practical notion of devising a set of rules for 
humans to exist together. The similarity to what is said in this chapter about both Hamilton’s 
vision and Hobbes’ theorising can be seen in the New Testament: 
 And so I tell all of you: what you prohibit on earth will be prohibited in heaven, and 
what you permit on earth will be permitted in heaven. And I tell you more: whenever 
two of you on earth agree about anything you pray for, it will be done for you by my 
Father in heaven. For where two or three come together in my name, I am there with 
them. (NT Matt.18 18-19) 275 
          Of course, Melville and Dostoyevsky (as well as Hamilton or Hobbes) would have 
been familiar with the Biblical teaching. Moreover, society that they have been the product 
of, was founded upon Biblical teaching to a large extent, with Christian values (here I mean 
the universal teachings from the Bible rather than specifically Orthodox or Protestant visions) 
shaping it. The above Scriptural passage, at any rate, seems to uphold the theory of 
“Plinlimmonian rules.” Human law is not detachable from the divine law, but absolutely 
mirrors it. There is no marked discrepancy between the imagined divine justice and man-
made legal rules, but one is effectively the other. This goes even further than Hobbes’ view of 
the “Covenants” as agreements assumed solely between humans for mutual benefit. Rather, 
the law produced by human beings is the manner of managing society approved by the 
divine. The superiority of the “Common-wealth” to an individual is also evoked in the 
passage. The rules agreed upon by more than one individuals are the ones to be acted upon. 
As a conclusion, one may say that the theory of “checks and balances” is an intensely 
                                                 
275 See New Testament (Good News Bible). 
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Christian one as well. Looking at Hobbes’ argument, some religious overtones come across 
distinctly: “As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall [sic] felicity of Heaven, 
by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable; and that is not breaking, but 
keeping of Covenant” (Hobbes, Leviathan). 
         Referring to the “perpetuall felicity of Heaven,” Hobbes, I argue, is not being simply 
ironic. More likely is the possibility that he envisages heavenly bliss attainable by living 
individuals: but this is made possible strictly by adhering to the rules laid down by humans 
rather than an abstract and vaguely defined divinity. “Propriety” within a microcosm is an 
ideal, and moreover, is an achievable ideal, if the balance depicted by Hamilton is carefully 
preserved. In this manner, we are left with the well-exploited argument pervading the existing 
scholarship both on Dostoyevsky and on Melville, that the various “exceptional” individuals 
they depict act as Lucifer-like rebels threatening the “exceptionalist” (in that it can be likened 
to a heavenly ideal) united society.  
          In this manner, I propose that Melville and Dostoyevsky are absolutely not to be 
viewed as radical thinkers lamenting the demise of “exceptional” individuality at the hands of 
a staid societal structure. In the course of their philosophical searching, both come to a 
similar conclusion that the said societal structure may not be overturned by heroic outbursts 
of an “exceptional” individual, but must needs be protected as the only way for all the 
individuals to survive. Change can and should be brought about by acute observation and 
gradual growing awareness, which often may be the evolutionary by-product of suffering. An 
“exceptional” individual does have a place in society as the “aristocracy of the brain” – but 




          In regards to Dostoyevsky in particular, one argument is frequently cited to debate that 
he in his views opposed and criticised the established system rather than strove to uphold it. 
Rowan Williams in Dostoyevsky: Language, Faith and Fiction brings up a citation from the 
writer’s personal correspondence: “…[I]f someone were to prove to me that Christ was 
outside the truth, and it was really the case the truth lay outside Christ, then I should choose 
to stay with Christ rather than with the truth (Williams 15). 
        This appears at first to be a typical outburst from an “exceptional” individual: that the 
system of societal rules, dubbed “truth” by Dostoyevsky, is forsaken for the teaching of 
mercy and compassion exemplified by Christ. Yet, if we recall the words from the New 
Testament discussed above, it becomes obvious that Dostoyevsky is fighting a non-existent 
enemy here. Christ is not outside the truth, because his teaching supposedly runs 
harmoniously along the same lines as the man-made maxims designed to hold the “Common-
wealth” together. Indeed, Williams is quick to note that this statement is made by the writer at 
his early stage, as he is still to refine his main philosophical vision.  
          In comparison to the early Dostoyevsky, in White-Jacket Melville comes across as 
much more tempered and suited for the role of the enlightened but neutral observer. The real-
life impact of this particular novel on the naval laws in America at the time, passionately 
discussed by Kovalev, speaks for itself. Meanwhile, Rogin implies that White-Jacket is 
neither a piece of political propaganda with a definite aim in mind, nor a narrative wholly 
detached from the controversy surrounding the proportionality of punishment in the 
American navy. What makes it such an effective treatise is the fact that Melville, just as the 
cultural context of his era expected of the writer, manages to achieve the perfect balance 
between personal reaction to what he observes, and the need to draw attention to this through 
using conventional arts of persuasion. In her essay, “White-Jacket: Telling who is – and ain’t 
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– a Slave” Jeannine Delombard tentatively asserts this notion by equating the abolitionist 
debates of the time with how Melville depicts the treatment of sailors (Levine 53).276 The 
writer expands his observational powers so far as to draw attention to other, even more 
problematic questions, such as slavery, taking a seemingly unrelated, yet actually relevant 
stance in the environment pervaded by heated abolitionist debates, as Rogin claims: 
Melville was capitalizing, in part, on a well-advanced political campaign to abolish 
naval flogging. White-Jacket’s attack on flogging did not offend respectable opinion. 
Flogging matters in the story less as naval reform than as politically significant personal 
obsession. It was politically provocative, in the middle of a debate over slavery, to 
identify shipboard with slave masters, and condemn the use of the whip. (Rogin 90) 277 
            From Rogin’s words, it becomes clear that Melville manages to achieve the fine 
balance between the dispassionate addressing of facts and the expressing of a distinct 
emotional response to those – precisely as an enlightened observer should. If Dostoyevsky 
still acts quite like a wilful spirit putting himself at odds with the established order, Melville, 
in White-Jacket, is anything but rebellious. It is much more evident that whilst Melville draws 
a distinct line between the necessity to honour the law as  a general concept, he is not blind to 
the proportion of the punishments dealt out on the “Neversink,” and draws society’s attention 
to those as well as he possibly can. We may say that Melville almost immediately manages to 
seize what is to be expected of him, whilst Dostoyevsky has yet a long way to go to arrive at 
the same stage.278 Melville’s argument, contrasted with the early Dostoyevsky’s emotional 
style, is concise and based on the virtues of perfect logic and juristic balance. The sailors’ 
                                                 
276 See Jeannine Delombard in The New Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville. 
277 Melville generally is seen as standing aside from key abolitionist polemics rather than taking an active part, 
although he was sympathetic to the plight of the slaves. See Delbanco, Abolitionist Imagination, viii. 
278 Nevertheless, Melville was also son-in-law to Lemuel Shaw (1781-1861), who occupied a judicial post at the 
time the reform of corporal punishment in the navy took place – so the notion of personal influence is not 
wholly irrelevant here. See Brook Thomas, “American Literature and the Law” (Levander and Levine, 407).  
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plight should be seriously considered precisely because it is illogical in the light of the 
harmonious societal structures and institutions such as the American Constitution, which 
define the maxims upon which society stands - juxtaposed to imaginary projections of 
“flaws” pervading all other nations, exemplified by “the territorial laws of Russia” ruled by a 
despot. Ignoring the sailors’ suffering would therefore make those very maxims a “lie,” and 
the whole exceptionalist narrative based on “broad principles of political liberty and equality” 
meaningless: 
Certainly the necessities of navies warrant a code for their government more stringent 
than the law that governs the land; but that code should conform to the spirit of the 
political institutions of the country that ordains it. It should not convert into slaves some 
of the citizens of a nation of free-men. Such objections cannot be urged against the laws 
of the Russian navy … because the laws of that navy, creating the absolute one-man 
power in the Captain, and vesting in him the authority to scourge, conform in spirit to 
the territorial laws of Russia, which is ruled by an autocrat, and whose courts inflict the 
knout upon the subjects of the land. But with us it is different. Our institutions claim to 
be based upon broad principles of political liberty and equality. Whereas, it would 
hardly affect … the condition on shipboard of an American man-of-war's-man, were he 
transferred to the Russian navy and made a subject of the Czar. As a sailor, he shares 
none of our civil immunities ... For him our Revolution was in vain; to him our 
Declaration of Independence is a lie. (WJ) 
            At this particular point the conflict between the “exceptional” individual and the 
“exceptionalist” society is highlighted. Hobbes proposes an interesting notion in that “where 
there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust.” Applying his proposition to this 
specific investigation, I would like to suggest that the “exceptional” individual, at the 
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beginning of his or her emergence, is actually a neutral entity, in that they cannot be 
described as definitely “good” or “evil.” This assumption brings me to the vision of 
Enceladus yet again: the Titan is assuredly “exceptional” in his sheer physical grandeur, but 
just as any other part of nature, he cannot be pigeonholed as “evil” (or good, for that matter). 
His size may be alarming to the onlooker, but his motives are not known. It is only in its co-
operation with the wider exceptionalist society and adherence to “checks and balances,” or in 
the refusal to do so, that such a grand entity sheds its neutrality.  
          To conclude, Pierre Glendinning or Raskolnikov meet with punishment. So do 
Nicholas Stavrogin, Captain Ahab or even Mitya Karamazov. Of course, these characters 
may not be described as neutral “observers” in any way. They oppose human society, which 
is bound by specific laid-out rules for smooth co-existence, by their actions, way of living or 
even thinking (as in the instance of Mitya Karamazov harbouring parricidal thoughts). 
Following along the lines set by Hobbes, one may imagine that they oppose the concept of 
commonality, and from this perspective, can be defined with a certain degree of confidence 
as law-breakers receiving their just deserts. There is, of course, the opportunity to acquire an 
aware and enlightened state of mind through suffering, but only Mitya consciously takes it, 
and even that unwillingly.  
            Finally, if we regard Melville and Dostoyevsky’s texts from a Hobbesian vantage-
point, the manner in which they assert the theory of “checks and balances” does not 
contradict any religious notions, but harmoniously interweaves with them. Much already has 
been said in this thesis as well as throughout the extent of scholarly works available, about 
the Luciferian rebellions attempted by “exceptional” individuals in the novels by both 
writers, and their complete failure. In this light, White-Jacket and Mitya present a particularly 
interesting case study, since, as it already has been shown, they come across different ways to 
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come to terms with the legal framework holding society together, rather than get completely 
and utterly destroyed by it. And the reconciliation of the individual and the communal 
through the means of the law therefore presents the most important theme uniting the 
























CONCLUSION: MELVILLE, DOSTOYEVSKY, AND A UNIFIED COMMUNITY.  
 
            As this thesis draws to a close, what can we say we have gleaned from this analysis? 
To start with, it is obvious that Dostoyevsky and Melville’s worldviews are akin. They 
champion a gradual, measured reformist approach within their respective national 
communities. Both are concerned with attaining a balance between individual freedom and 
societal obligations, leaning slightly towards the latter. In that regard, their works reflect the 
general intellectual tendencies of their era, treading the line between the affirmation of the 
individual’s significance and the necessity to preserve the social order.  
             Let us very briefly review the main points that I made throughout the three chapters. 
            The core texts by these authors share thematic traits, exhibiting an uncanny similarity 
in the use and arrangement of textual and plot tropes generally typical of the literature of the 
time (such as the usage of dream-sequences to carry across the metaphoric points).279 This 
phenomenon is illustrated in my analysis of Pierre alongside Crime and Punishment in the 
first chapter.  
            The same chapter proposed a specific interpretation of the individualised self, which 
diverged from the stereotypical Romantic vision. For Melville just as much as for 
Dostoyevsky, the “everyperson” who fits well within society is preferable to the 
individualistic, larger-than-life hero. Although both authors recognise the essential spiritual 
poverty of such a figure (Razumikhin, Plotinus Plinlimmon), they nevertheless perceive it as 
congruent with society founded upon the exceptionalist ideal of coexistence within the 
national community. Excessive individualism, however, is opposed by the world. As Melville 
puts it in Pierre, “He shall now learn, and very bitterly learn, that though the world worship 
                                                 
279 Dreams as a general concept occupied an important place in mid-nineteenth century literary world, 
coinciding with the nascent interest in psychoanalysis. See, for instance, Frank Seafield, The Literature and 
Curiosities of Dreams.  
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Mediocrity and Common Place, yet it hath fire and sword for all contemporary Grandeur” 
(Pierre 226).  
          The second chapter discussing Moby-Dick and Devils considered the “charismatic 
leader” who “will not strike his spars to any gale” (MD 455), as a potentially highly 
dangerous phenomenon associated with the unlimited sway of personal freedom and abuse of 
hierarchical power. The selected texts reflected my original argument concerning the 
ambiguous Jeffersonian ideal of “the pursuit of happiness” and the dilemmas associated with 
it, such as the possible descent into a lawless nightmare. I also revealed that the chief danger 
in such a situation is the depersonalizing draw of the charismatic leader’s personality that 
binds together the conscious individual members of a given community to form a 
homogenous, anarchic mass. 
         In the third and final chapter, I have arrived at the conclusion that the Hamiltonian 
vision of attaining societal harmony through curtailing individual freedoms and introducing 
juristic “checks and balances,” rings true for both Melville and Dostoyevsky. The general 
impression, gleaned from close reading of the core texts as well as the critical sources, 
suggests that both authors seem supportive of the cohesive commune-oriented vision, 
previously described by Herder. Dostoyevsky is being rather more explicit in expressing his 
sympathies, whilst Melville is playing on the contrast, by showing the essential futility of 
refusing to accept this ideal.  
          Also in the third chapter, I determined that whilst both Melville and Dostoyevsky are 
interested in the achievement of balance between the individual liberties and the social 
obligations, the proposed potential methods of achieving this balance are rather different. If 
Melville holds on to the idea that I noted in the introductory chapter, regarding the figure of 
the writer as a physically uninvolved commentator who invites readers to make their own 
decisions regarding what may be done, for Dostoyevsky, balance is achieved via juristically-
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established punishment imposed upon an individualistic transgressor according to the 
accepted legal code – and the said individual subsequently undergoing this tribulation to 
grow spiritually and come into a more harmonious state of existence within the wider 
exceptionalist society, to which he was a foreign element previously, “as if he and they 
belonged to different nations” (C&P, 517). 
        In what concerns achieving of the balance between liberty and equality, Melville focuses 
on the close observation of the adherence to the rule of law by figures of authority such as 
captain Jack Chase of the “Neversink,” and comments on the flaws regarding the law’s 
implementation, referring to “checks and balances” explicitly (WJ). This is illustrated by the 
image stressing the impersonal, mechanistic nature of this vision: “The whole body of this 
discipline is emphatically a system of cruel cogs and wheels, systematically grinding up in 
one common hopper all that might minister to the moral well-being of the crew” (WJ ). 
         Meanwhile, Dostoyevsky sees the attainment of the perfect social harmony as an 
individual, private quest that “everyperson” can and should take part in. Following the 
Russian vision of osobyj put’ and adhering to it by honouring the rule of law is a spiritual and 
moral duty (or even a divinely-inspired vocation) of every individual, whilst transgressing it 
is primarily associated with moral shame. This comes across in the judge’s words to the jury 
members in the trial scene, which is ironic (given the plot of the narrative) and yet at the 
same time, highlights the unifying exceptionalist spirit pervading society: 
 Remember that you are the champions of our justice, the champions of our holy Russia, 
of her principles, her family, everything that she holds sacred! Yes, you represent 
Russia here at this moment, and your verdict will be heard not in this hall only but will 
re-echo throughout the whole of Russia, and all Russia will hear you, as her champions 
and her judges, and she will be encouraged or disheartened by your verdict. Do not 




         In this respect, one may argue that the Melvillean, American vision, stressing the 
necessity of honouring the law, notwithstanding the personal suffering of the individuals 
involved, in order to preserve societal order (and avoid greater evils, such as a mutiny on 
board of the “Neversink”) is rather more realistic: “Checks and balances, blood against blood, 
that is the cry and the argument” (WJ).  It is also much more reconcilable with the 
mainstream exceptionalist discourse, as the writer does not openly oppose the American 
national vision, but offers suggestions for improvement whilst America proceeds on its 
spiritual course. Dostoyevsky, though, is quite fatalistic in accepting that there would always 
remain discontents or innocent victims of the exceptionalist society – but they should be 
offered the path of individual spiritual development as a possible way of reconciling with it. 
This reminds one of the somewhat latter non-violent philosophy stressing usefulness to 
society over individual brilliance, which was frequently discussed at the time in Russian 
literature, and brought forth most notably by Tolstoy and his followers.280   
 
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES: DETAILED OVERVIEW.  
            In the introductory chapter, the question was posed regarding Melville and 
Dostoevsky’s similarities, and what they exactly entail. Both the novels analysed and the 
evidence offered in the critical works  to prove the Melville-Dostoyevsky dichotomy 
tentatively proposed by Delbanco, Chances and Olson, showed a marked and powerful 
similarity. The first chapter, comparing the tribulations of Pierre Glendinning with those of 
Rodion Raskolnikov, immediately and explicitly placed the two protagonists as being, in a 
sense, “mirror” reflections of each other. Harping on Delbanco’s aforementioned statement 
                                                 
280 See, for example, a humorous fairy-tale Ivan the Fool and His Two Brothers (1886). Tolstoy presents a 




that Melville is an American version of Dostoyevsky, I maintain that if it is so, then Pierre is 
an American Raskolnikov. Both protagonists exhibit a remarkable similarity in their 
background and motivation: semi-genteel origins contrasted with the surrounding squalor; the 
obsessive desire to “rescue” subtly boosted by a sense of their unique predestined purpose; 
and an underlying capability for violence, which Dostoyevsky’s hero exhibits at the 
beginning of the novel, and Pierre’s earthly existence concludes with. What is even more 
interesting, though, is the stylistic similarities found within both texts  (like the usage of 
dream sequences precisely at the same chronological point in both narratives in order to 
metaphorically present a startlingly similar message (symbolised by the visions of a stone 
titan or the unnamed “disease”). These passages I interpreted as exceptionalist parables, 
describing the unviability of the individualistic attitude within an exceptionalist society. 
          Further on, throughout the remaining core texts, the two authors still echoed each other. 
My analysis of the volatile “charismatic leader” taking over a given microcosm in Moby Dick 
and Devils revealed that the dangers presented by a powerful individualistic personality 
permitted to run riot, emerge through the texts as a constant, unifying theme. As the sinister 
Verkhovensky hints, such personalities commonly exhibit malicious traits: “Those with 
higher abilities can’t help being despots and have always done more harm than good” 
(Devils, 442). Comparing those two texts has also shown the hypothetical outcome of the 
situation when a supposed hero or “leader” comes to power by divesting the rest of the 
microcosm of their own individual or spiritual traits, resulting in complete depersonalization 
and reducing a given segment of society to “one thick cluster” (MD 448), or homogenous 
“mob” laden with potential for destruction.  
         The metaphorically similar images of the sinking “Pequod” and the fire destroying the 
town put forward a subliminal image of the likely fate of a nation-state surrendered into the 
hands of a nihilistic individualist – presented in a strikingly melodramatic and effectively 
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terrifying vision.281 If my first chapter revealed the fact that Dostoyevsky and Melville are 
similar in terms of the subjects they choose to depict and the techniques they employ to do so, 
my second chapter seizes onto the fact that they were quite alike in terms of their beliefs as 
well, fearing the same potential outcome. Recollecting the initial argument outlined in the 
introductory chapter, I concluded that both Melville and Dostoyevsky dreaded the unfettered 
individualism of the “charismatic leader” as a driving force behind uniform group movement 
- seeing it as a prime threat to the very fabric of human existence. 
          The third chapter attempted to compare Melville’s chronicle of naval day-to-day 
existence contrasted with what is frequently described as one of Dostoyevsky’s most complex 
novels. From both the stylistic and the narrative viewpoints, the texts appeared extremely 
different. My focus remained on the description and analysis of the administration of legal 
punishment and the juristic rationale surrounding this topic – relying on the previously 
discussed principle of “checks and balances” envisaged by Alexander Hamilton as a perfect 
antidote to the unrestricted Jeffersonian “pursuit of happiness.” This yet again supported the 
original hypothesis that neither Melville nor Dostoyevsky can be regarded as opponents of 
the establishment, rebels or Promethean figures intent on deliberately subverting the existing 
order.  
       Thus I came to a conclusion that both writers should be regarded as subtly advocating for 
the upholding of the existing judicial system holding society together, and evidently 
unwilling to sacrifice the fragile balance of group coexistence in favour of individual goals. 
The depiction of what can be typically seen as examples of extreme cruelty (scenes of 
corporal punishment described by Melville, or the imprisonment of the technically innocent 
Mitya Karamazov) both authors view as a hard but necessary aspect of preservation of the 
liberty-equality balance, as the interests of one are not predominant over the interests of 
                                                 
281 See Kovalev, Herman Melville and American Romanticism. 
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many. Neither writer have I found to be ardently clamouring for the instantaneous abolition 
of the admittedly flawed judicial system produced by the “exceptionalist state.” 
          Certainly, the solutions proposed to justify or amend the horrific cruelty of the judicial 
controls differ markedly for both. Melville, in the figure of his anonymous and eccentrically-
dressed protagonist acts as a critic highlighting the shortcomings of the existing judicial 
system, so that they can be looked at and, theoretically, corrected. Dostoyevsky, meanwhile, 
focuses mainly on spiritual transformation as the main consequence of being subjected to 
punishment: even though factually he is innocent, Mitya nevertheless harboured and 
considered in earnest thoughts of parricide, and the writer views his punishment as a cathartic 
spiritual journey necessary in order to expiate the potentially noxious elements of the hero’s 
psyche and eventually return him to society as its healed and more harmonious member. 
Essentially Dostoyevsky is a somewhat unorthodox “spiritual healer” in terms of solutions he 
proposes; Melville, meanwhile, is more of a dispassionate “observer” that is more 
reminiscent of the authorial role I discussed in the introductory chapter. Nevertheless, for 
both, society as a whole matters decidedly more than the single given individual – which is a 
solid argument in favour of the Herderian ideal of the unified existence discussed in the 
introduction.  
            In this manner as seemingly relevant as it may have initially appeared, the vision of a 
larger-than-life, Carlylean or Emersonian hero who is a law unto himself, is not favoured by 
either writer, but is held by both as potentially highly dangerous. In terms of genre, I hold 
both writers to be sceptical of Romanticist or Transcendentalist flights of fancy. 
Dostoyevsky, if viewed from a primarily religious, Orthodox platform, can be described as a 
champion of humility and reconciliation with one’s perhaps unsatisfactory lot – which is 
quite likely to turn out to be a perfect starting point for a psychological transformation into a 
more adaptable member of society. In the meantime, Melville can be described as openly 
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championing ordinariness, making it clear that bouts of extreme individual “cosmic” struggle 
are unviable – and even comical. In his correspondence with Nathaniel Hawthorne, he 
explicitly assumes a sceptical stance, saying, “It is but nature to be shy of a mortal who 
boldly declares that a thief in jail is as honourable a personage as Gen. George Washington. 
This is ludicrous. But truth is the silliest thing under the sun.” In reality Melville recognised 
his own subconscious attraction to the individualistic hero – but he was also able to mock it 
as being unviable and inappropriate in actual life.282 
          Therefore, I conclude that Melville’s true heroes are not Pierre Glendinning or Captain 
Ahab for all their enormous aspirations: rather, it is Plotinus Plinlimmon (as disagreeable as 
the character is, his philosophy nevertheless is far more practical and sensible that Pierre’s 
romanticized misfortunes), the observant but not-too-active Ishmael, Starbuck with his 
preoccupation for barrels of whale oil and profits in the Nantucket market, or the unassuming 
narrator in White-Jacket. The true hero for Melville is essentially the one who strives to 
uphold the legal “checks and balances”; as pedestrian as their presence may seem. And this 
subsequently renders Melville’s universe relatable to Dostoyevsky’s ideals of humility and 
ordinariness.  
 
SOCIETY OR INDIVIDUAL? FINAL THOUGHTS. 
          At this point, I revert to the general juxtaposition between the two theoretic models: the 
ruthless pursuit of individual goals, or a somewhat depersonalized state of being as an 
“equal” unit making society up.  
          The image proposed by Johann-Gottfried Herder is that of an “ant colony” where 
individuals are seen as human units making it up, more or less equal and all working 
collaboratively towards the achievement of goals for the good of the community as a whole. 
                                                 
282 Herman Melville to Nathaniel Hawthorne, 1? June ? 1851, in OUP edition of Moby-Dick. 
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My original hypothetical argument implied that Dostoyevsky and Melville both can be 
described as echoing this image in their works, although each gives a distinct interpretation. 
Dostoyevsky sees the individual’s participation in communal collaborative existence as a 
conscious individual decision to leave behind one’s egotistical motives, rather than a 
subconscious choice determined by some unfathomable “natural order.” Meanwhile, Melville 
may not be enthusiastically supporting the vision of such unified commonality, yet comes to 
the conclusion that it is the only possibly viable mode of existence, since his individualistic 
protagonists, such as the “proud man” (Pierre 223) Pierre Glendinning or Captain Ahab, 
eventually perish. In order to survive, an individual should become a perfectly mediocre 
presence – like Plotinus Plinlimmon, or, going even further, totally forsake individualism so 
as to become nearly faceless and fluid in one’s identity – like the elusive Ishmael or the 
anonymous, blank-faced narrator of White-Jacket. Pierre and Ahab’s demise are certainly a 
tragedy to Melville, but rather cynically, he has to admit that such characters are not fated to 
survive. 
             I contrasted Herder’s vision with the theory of “hero-worship” outlined by Thomas 
Carlyle and similar thinkers such as Emerson, centred around a suggestion that humankind 
naturally gravitates towards exceptional individuals who magnetically attract others with the 
sheer force of their personality. My initial assumption was that to Dostoyevsky, the figure of 
a conceited hero such as Nicholas Stavrogin would have been an abhorrent presence (and 
which he also denounces in Raskolnikov’s case), whilst to Melville (as a representative of a 
supposedly more individualistic culture founded, among other things, upon Jeffersonian 
maxims regarding the individual “pursuit of happiness”) a protagonist like Pierre 
Glendinning would at least be offered a chance of redemption in the reader’s eyes. However, 
the subsequent literary analysis has shown that the situation is nowhere as simplistically 
explicable. It is true that Dostoyevsky regarded with trepidation the rampantly individualistic 
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characters such as the protagonist of Crime and Punishment, openly stating that this 
worldview is essentially arrogant at the core and repugnant to the traditionally Russian, 
Orthodox ideal (which is evident, for example, in the scenes where Raskolnikov is shunned 
by his fellow-prisoners as a “gentleman”). However, reading the texts in their entirety 
(particularly in regards to the third chapter) has shown that to Dostoyevsky, hero-worship is 
not a wholly alien topic altogether. The chief difference lies in what exactly constitutes the 
necessary requisites for achieving heroic status. A “hero” becomes as such not through 
application of physical force, committing shocking actions or deliberately putting themselves 
above others. Rather, Dostoyevsky offers a curious twist on the traditionally Christian ideal 
of humility, that becoming a hero in the true sense of the word means conscious individual 
spiritual development in order to become a better-integrated member of the human society. 
The typically Carlylean notion of the hero as a great manipulator or fighter the writer 
envisions as a spiritual trap on the way to enlightenment that forms part of the soul’s journey. 
The finale of Crime and Punishment summarises this in no uncertain terms: 
…He did not even know that a new life would not be given him for nothing, that it still 
had to be dearly bought, to be paid for with a great future deed… But here begins a new 
account, the account of man’s gradual renewal, the account of his gradual regeneration, 
his gradual transition from one world to another, his acquaintance with a new, hitherto 
unknown reality. (C&P 522) 
           Regarded from this angle, Dostoyevsky’s novel appears quite akin to the homiletic 
novels of the Protestant tradition, quite popular in the United States at the time that Melville 
was writing – in that the writer presents a quasi-pilgrimage towards a “new life” and 
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“transition” into a supposedly better, more soulful world.283 However, I feel there is a 
possible twist in the tale that Dostoyevsky preserves, whether knowingly or unwittingly, and 
which gives the whole novel a somewhat satirical, almost Melvillean spin. By suggesting that 
attaining the status of a spiritual hero will have to be “paid for with a great future deed,” the 
writer proffers a worrying suggestion that on his journey, the protagonist may repeat the same 
mistakes that have brought him to punishment before – in a crazy vision of never-ending déjà 
vu. The “regeneration” or “renewal” will be possible only if the hero strives towards spiritual 
improvement consciously, with the full understanding of things – and not instinctively, as 
Herder would have imagined. In this manner, oddly enough, I arrived at the conclusion that 
although he can be described on the surface as upholding societal cohesion, Dostoyevsky can 
be seen as recognising the significance of individualism – and offering a way to reconcile it 
with societal expectations.  
         What can one, in the meantime, make of Melville’s perception of “hero-worship?” I 
maintain that to Melville, excessive heroism is first and foremost ludicrous, perhaps best 
symbolised by a stone Titan’s vulnerability “to the defilements of the birds, which for untold 
ages had cast their foulness on his vanquished crest” (Pierre 295), or by the final scene of 
Moby-Dick, where the sinking of the “Pequod” is accompanied by Flask’s anxieties about his 
unreceived pay ( MD 506) and the “tauntingly” flying sky-hawk (MD 508) being nailed to the 
mast by “submerged savage” Tashtego. The latter is essentially tragicomic in spirit, as this 
pathetic act of defiance is defeated by the natural forces and “the great shroud of the sea 
rolled on as it rolled five thousand years ago” ( MD 508).284 To Melville, excessive heroism, 
particularly if set against the much more powerful adversary such as nature (as in Moby-Dick) 
                                                 
283 The homiletic novel promoting the distinctly Protestant religious ideals formed a significant part of the 
cultural landscape in Melville’s day. For further information on that era marked by “evangelical surge” 
(Tharaud 55), see Jerome Tharaud’s article. 
284 See broadly Kovalev, and Herschel Parker. 
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or human society in general (as in Pierre) is laughable – precisely because it is doomed to fail 
from the start. True heroism, as the writer sees it, is quite pedestrian in spirit: the most 
sympathetic among his characters probably being Starbuck: “[B]rave as he might be, it was 
that sort of bravery chiefly, visible in some intrepid men, which, while generally abiding firm 
in the conflict with seas, or winds, or whales, or any of the ordinary irrational horrors of the 
world, yet cannot withstand those more terrific… more spiritual terrors” ( MD 102), or 
Queequeg, whose gallantry is tempered with ignorance of Western manners and exhibited in 
appropriate actions at appropriate times (such as the rescue of a drowning man in 
“Wheelbarrow” chapter (MD 54)). John Bryant, in Melville and Repose (1993), dubs this 
aspect “tragicomic.” Melville’s idea of true heroism consists of being able to peacefully exist 
in the united society, not harming one’s fellow-beings. Throwing oneself into the teeth of 
unnamed “spiritual terrors” in the full imitation of a hero, however, would result in parodic 
demise.  
         If being a “hero” is unviable in an exceptionalist state, what do the both writer-observers 
suggest is the correct way to live out one’s life and purpose in a manner harmonious with the 
exceptionalist discourse of one’s nation? As the individual’s role in society was metaphorically 
comparable to a sailor’s work required to keep the nation-vessel afloat, as long as the individual 
kept within the boundaries of the legislative codes, respecting their extent and putting forth 
solutions to be implemented communally, rather than attempting individual radical actions, 
their individuality was not in danger of suppression.  
         Looking at Melville’s vision in more depth, an even more interesting picture appears. The 
writer metaphorises the image of a weaver at work, as the individual harmoniously introduces 
his own path or destiny, “interblending” his own journey into the intermingled general fabric 
of life whilst still remaining conscious of his “own shuttle”: 
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There lay the fixed threads of the warp subject to but one single, ever returning, 
unchanging vibration, and that vibration merely enough to admit of the crosswise 
interblending of other threads with its own. This warp seemed necessity: and here, 
thought I, with my own hand I ply my own shuttle and weave my own destiny into these 
inalterable threads. (MD, 192) 
            Melville views the role of the individual in society as a weaver, merging his own life-
path with that of all others. Later in the text, he is even more explicit, evoking what could be 
described as absolute, Herderian societal cohesiveness, where the human community is 
united into one biological body: 
Oh! My dear fellow beings, why should we longer cherish any social acerbities, or know 
the slightest ill-humor or envy! Come; let us squeeze hands all round; nay, let us 
squeeze ourselves into each other; let us squeeze ourselves universally into the very 
milk and sperm of kindness. (MD 373) 
          In that aspect, I maintain that Melville is extremely akin to Dostoyevsky and his 
notions of forsaking the egotistical self. Just like Dostoyevsky, he is wary of extreme 
individualism and recognises the lure of complete social cohesion – although Melville is 
definitely more wistful and even ironic, imagining achieving unison with others coming 
naturally through trance-like pleasure (as a somewhat far-fetched idea) rather than a 
conscious effort to put behind one’s ego. 
          If we compare this situation with what we see with the works by Dostoyevsky such as 
Crime and Punishment, one encounters uneasiness about overt liberty, individualisation and its 
noxious effects on human beings, and the marked isolation of individual self - laid bare (as 
most notably presented in the character of Rodion Raskolnikov). Just like with Melville, 
Dostoyevsky’s world appears to uphold the concept of the individual interblending with the 
rest of society: moreover, in Dostoyevsky’s Russia, religious awareness, and the conflict of the 
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individual and society produces a somewhat more turbulent effect. The vague unwritten law of 
Melville, where individuals “have been their own legislators and lawyers” (MD 354) is more 
expressly replaced by the Orthodox, traditional sobornost’-oriented mentality in order to bring 
about the cohesive harmony, denying concepts such as privacy or individuality in the process. 
This could practically ensure the survival of human community where the concern for 
individual is replaced by the community’s interests, and Dostoyevsky is seen as a supporter of 
this view. This exact difference forms a major distinction between the foundations of American 
and Russian exceptionalist discourses. To connect the last point with existing scholarly 
analyses, Andrei Zorin in Osobyj Put’ suggests that Russian exceptionalist identity is 
inseparable from “the specific Orthodox path” and the fusion of “private and common”: 
 [T]he relatively recent formation of the theory of Russian nationalism (including 
Dostoyevsky’s novels and journalistic articles, and his idea of “universal sin”), proves 
to be intrinsically connected with the formation of individual consciousness during the 
early New era. The specific Orthodox path of salvation serves as a base for further 
ideological construction of national identity, and the logic behind the electedness of 
the Russian people is nurtured by the categoric lack of distinction between private and 
common, which stem from the religious practices of the other era, when the 
boundaries of the concept “Russianness” were set differently from the nineteenth 
century. (Osobyj Put’ ?) 
             According to Zorin, the specific composites of the Russian culture going back in time 
before the middle of the nineteenth  century, have set out a specific outlook where it was the 
community (not even the nation per se) who was to be deemed “exceptionalist.” In this 
environment, everyone is inherently “sinful” and therefore, destined to work collaboratively 
as well as individually as means of atonement for the hypothetical sins (a stance shared by 
Dostoyevsky). Russian “exceptionalism” was essentially religious and Orthodox at the core, 
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and submission to authority personified by government or nobility was likely viewed as part 
of this quasi-penance. “True” equality at the level of almost bodily cohesion, where 
individuals take it naturally that everything should be communal, is remarkably resented by 
Dostoyevsky’s characters on a subconscious level. This can be seen, for example, in Shatov’s 
recollections of his stay in America: “Once when we were travelling, a man put his hand into 
my pocket, took out my hairbrush, and started brushing his own hair; Kirillov and I 
exchanged glances and decided it was all right…” (Devils, 146). This state of unison is 
unnatural, yet presents a something to aspire to, by overcoming personal resentment possibly 
stemming from rigid societal hierarchy – an ascetic feat of sorts. If to Melville the dissolution 
of the individual within the communal is a subconscious psychological process, which 
moreover is ironically parodied as not being feasibly achievable in reality, to Dostoyevsky it 
is not natural – but takes a conscious effort to attain, and the author appears to believe that it 
is a correct thing to do so, in order for the exceptionalist society to continue existing.285 
          Therefore, I reiterated the original hypothesis that both Melville and Dostoyevsky held 
on more or less faithfully onto the older, Herderian ideal of societal coexistence and the 
necessity to preserve it for harmonious social functioning. The juristic institutions of legal 
codes and practices (represented respectively by the naval code in White-Jacket and in the 
description of the courtroom realities in Brothers Karamazov) are viewed by both writers as a 
necessary evil, without which human society, as we know it, would simply disintegrate. 
Dostoyevsky deliberately describes the sentencing and jailing of an innocent character, 
constructing the evidence in the overall narrative plot so deftly as to render proving Mitya’s 
innocence nigh impossible. Melville’s unnamed narrator is powerfully shocked by the 
explicit physical brutality of corporal punishment in the navy. Yet both writers are similar in 
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that they do not choose to openly campaign against the abolition of all punishment altogether, 
just so that potentially, a few blameless souls can be saved. To abolish judicially imposed 
punishment would be, to both writers, to unfasten the bindings holding together the societal 
fabric, unleashing chaos as a result, and destroying the fragile balance between the individual 
and the communal. 
          Nevertheless, the grandiose vision of a hero who “insists upon treating with all the 
Powers upon an equal basis” (Melville to Hawthorne, MD 510) is not wholly and univocally 
condemned by the authors. Dostoyevsky offers a more personal, spiritual alternative for an 
individual to achieve heroic status in a way which would be more harmonious towards all 
others. Melville clearly sets it that heroism in its over-exaggerated form is unrealistic and 
doomed to fail – but also exhibits sympathy and pity for a failed hero (such as Pierre). 
Isabel’s scream upon Pierre’s death, “All’s o’er and ye know him not!” (Pierre, 310) is 
prophetic in this instance, hinting that the human in Pierre has been overshadowed by the 
grandiose heroic aspirations that of course had to be curbed. Societal order has been 
preserved, but the individual, who has posed a threat by “stumbling” and his “too moody 
ways” (Pierre, 310), was killed in the process. Melville does not expiate the individualistic 
rebel; but he pities the human underneath. Both writers do not support the individualistic 
hero, but they view him with compassion.  
       In the end, though, one thing is clear: for both, frail and imperfect humanity is infinitely 
preferable to stalwart heroism of epic proportions: albeit this attitude is reworked by both 
authors to become more conscious and personal, rather than mechanistic and resembling the 
instinctive movements of an ant-colony as original Herderian theory goes. I maintain that this 
aspect, common to both writers, places them in a similar position, hanging somewhere in the 
middle between the Romanticist and Realist worldview just as I initially proposed. Neither 
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have yet acquired the Realist cynicism, yet both actively favour a genuine human soul over a 
spiritually dead grandiose hero.  
        Having previously discussed the sheer artifice of the charismatic hero’s anatomy in my 
analysis of Stavrogin and Captain Ahab – at this point, I reiterate that just as Herder, Emerson 
and Thoreau originally favoured nature over artifice and regularity over excess, so did both 
Dostoyevsky and Melville, amid the fevered discussions at that exact time regarding the 
reconciliation of equality and liberty and conflicting obligations to one’s fellow-humans with 
the ever-hungry ego. The ordinary was the new heroic for the post-Romantic, pragmatic mid-
nineteenth century world. Summing up this view, favouring the ordinary, the simple, the 
common, I close with a quotation from Pierre: “Ah! Easy for a man to think like a hero; but 
hard for man to act like one” (147). 
          What, then, can we say of the wider implications of this thesis’ proved argument? 
Melville and Dostoevsky represent a crucial point on the timeline of literary history, which is 
also significant in regard to the broader comparative developmental patterns of nineteenth-
century Russia and America. Russia and America both were “young” nations, yet to catch up 
with Europe and realise their full political and cultural potential. They therefore could be seen 
as the representatives of the world to come – which would be based on the more democratic 
than hierarchical ideals, and avant-garde ideas. This would surface fully during the twentieth 
century, coming to the head at the time of the Cold War crisis, De Tocqueville’s words about 
the two nations becoming unique players on the world stage due to their marked and distinct 
stance concerning the need to preserve societal balance, yet constantly teetering on the brink 
of totalitarian abyss, ringing prophetically true.  Meanwhile, this thesis addressed the deep 
origins of that juxtaposition, looking to the previous era when both America and Russia just 
commenced to cement their specific stance, and the landmark literary works by their great 
writers reflected it.  
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         The subject of this thesis signposts the exact transitional phase in literary history, 
wedged between the “Age of Revolutions” with its Romanticist idealistic visions, and the 
more pragmatic era characterised by societal concerns, reform, and emergent Realism. Whilst 
both Melville and Dostoevsky have been dubbed radical and ground-breaking on occasion, 
they both arrived independently at the conclusion that attempting to wreak revolutionary 
change would result in tragic consequences. Both dreaded rampant individualism and 
totalitarian facelessness equally, and both were aware of the fact that their home nation could 
fall victim to either. Therefore, both used the platform of their works to articulately warn 
their fellow-humans, yet employing logical paradoxes and well-constructed sophistry rather 
than overt Sentimentalist techniques to argue their case. 
        Instead, the writers offered a solution consisting of cooperation of all the members of 
society, coupled with accessible education and awareness of one’s fellow human beings in 
the Christian, as well as democratic sense of the word – which would not threaten the 
established hierarchical patterns. This exact moment marked the dawning of the new era, 
where social consciousness and obligation to one’s fellow beings took the central stage, as 
the straightforward legal obligations replace the arcane aristocratic codes of honour. It was 
early yet, as both writers had still been shaped by the prevailing opinions of the day 
(particularly, regarding the role of women, serfs or the enslaved), yet it was a genuine start. In 
the future, this would be discussed further by the Marxist and Socialist critical schools of 
thought, and by the feminist, racial and queer theory scholars. Literature would be seen not as 
an elitist pleasure-pursuit, but as an instrument to promote fairness and equality.  
         Finally, acting essentially as prophets for their own era, both Melville and Dostoyevsky 
did foresee the rise of totalitarianism and the dangers that it will bring (whether we think of 
the Russian Revolution or the Cold War), arguing instead the necessity of a carefully 
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constructed societal framework regulated by smoothly-functioning legal rules.286 Yet rather 
than mystics or visionaries, these writers were both first and foremost gifted social observers, 
whose opinions are as valuable for the fields of law or sociology as they are for literature. In 
the present-day scholarly cosmos, this puts my research alongside the recent contributions 
reconsidering nineteenth-century authors’ place in a wider philosophical, cultural, or 
historical context, such as the notable Melville’s Philosophies (2017), edited by Branka Arsic 
and focusing on Melville being reinterpreted through various philosophical lens. It is hoped 
that the lessons offered by the whaler and by the intelligent, the American and the Russian, 
would be a source of wisdom not just to literature scholars looking to establish new points of 
dialogue between the two great but distinct literary traditions, but also to state-workers, 
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